Sanaram Tirky Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Sanaram Tirky S/o Buddhuram Tirky Aged About 55 Years R/o Village Kadamdhodhi, Goheshilar, Police Station Kapu, Tahsil Dharamjaigarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

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Appellant(s)

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Versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Kapu, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

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Respondent(s)

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellant(s) : Mr. G.V. Kutumba Rao, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Dy. AG

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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Per Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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09/12/2025

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This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19/02/2018, passed by the

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learned Sessions Judge, Raigarh, (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 73/2016,

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whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:

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Conviction under Section	Sentence
U/s 302 of the Indian Penal	Life Imprisonment and fine of Rs.
Code	1,000/-, with default stipulation.

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Case of the prosecution in brief is that the daughter of Meri Ekka (PW9), namely Anita Tirki (PW2), was married to Chaitram @ Rahatu, son of the accused Sanaram Tirwa. The deceased, Vimal Kujur, was the nephew of Meri Ekka (PW9), while the accused Sanaram was related to her as a samdhi . At the time of the incident, Meri Ekka (PW9) had gone with her son Anil Ekka and her nephew Vimal Kujur to visit Anita at her matrimonial home, where her husband Chaitram and father-in-law Sanaram resided. They had lunch at the house of the accused. At about 5:00 p.m., the accused demanded ₹100 from Vimal, which Vimal gave. Later in the evening, when Vimal, Meri Ekka and Anil went to the courtyard of Chaitram for dinner, a quarrel ensued between Anil Ekka and Chaitram, during which Anil slapped Chaitram twice. Vimal intervened to pacify the situation. At that moment, the accused Sanaram, saying that his son was being assaulted, initially arrived with a tangi and returned home, but shortly thereafter came running back uttering threats to kill, and stabbed Vimal Kujur in the abdomen with a knife, causing him to fall to the ground. The incident was witnessed by Meri Ekka (PW9), Anita Tirwa (PW2) and Anil Ekka. The injured Vimal was first taken to Dharamjaigarh Hospital for primary treatment and thereafter referred to the District Hospital, Raigarh.

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On receiving information, SI R.N. Rathiya (PW5) recorded the injured’s

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statement and prepared the dehati nalisi (Ex. P-11), followed by registration of a zero FIR at City Kotwali, Raigarh (Ex. P-13), which was subsequently transferred to Police Station Kapu where Crime No. 15/2016 was registered (Ex. P-15). On 07.02.2016, Vimal Kujur succumbed to his injuries during treatment. Based on the hospital intimation (Ex. P-17), merg intimation (Ex. P- 18) was registered, inquest was conducted, the body was sent for postmortem, the spot map was prepared, and plain and blood-stained soil were seized. The Tehsildar was directed to have the site map prepared through the Patwari. The statement of Anita Tirwa under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded. On 08.02.2016, the memorandum of the accused (Ex. P-07) was recorded, leading to the recovery of the knife used in the offence (Ex. P-08), which was also sent for medical examination. The medical papers relating to Vimal’s treatment were seized, and all seized articles were forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination. Upon completion of investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the accused. The appellant abjured the guilt and entered into defense stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 34 documents.

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The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 19/02/2018 convicted the accused/appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been filed.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgment of

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conviction and sentence dated 19.02.2018 is unsustainable in law, as the learned Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record. It is argued that the prosecution story is fraught with material contradictions and omissions, and the testimonies of the principal witnesses do not inspire confidence. The incident, as projected, arose out of a sudden quarrel between Anil Ekka and Chaitram, and the appellant is said to have intervened only upon seeing his son being assaulted. There was no prior motive, enmity, or premeditation, and the occurrence took place in the heat of passion over a trivial family dispute. Even if the prosecution version is taken at face value, the act attributed to the appellant does not establish any intention to kill; at best, it may amount to knowledge of the likelihood of causing such injury. Thus, the present case squarely falls within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC , and the offence, if any, would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC. It is further submitted that the appellant has remained in custody for about 5 years, 7 months and 23 days , and has already undergone substantial incarceration. Hence, considering the totality of facts and circumstances and the period already undergone, it is prayed that the conviction under Section 302 IPC be altered to Section 304 IPC and the sentence be confined to the period already undergone. Accordingly, the present appeal deserves to be allowed at least to the extent of modification of conviction and sentence.

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Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, submitting that the prosecution has duly proved the charge against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt through

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cogent, consistent and reliable evidence. It is argued that the eye-witnesses have clearly attributed the fatal act to the appellant, and the medical and forensic evidence fully corroborates the prosecution version. The appellant, without any justification, armed himself with a knife and inflicted a deliberate and forceful blow on the abdomen of the deceased, which is a vital part of the body, thereby demonstrating clear intention or, at the very least, full knowledge that such an act was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is further submitted that the incident cannot be treated as a case of sudden fight attracting Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, as the appellant had ample time to cool down, yet returned armed with a deadly weapon and delivered a fatal blow. The offence committed is a heinous offence of murder, and the learned Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC. Hence, it is contended that no case is made out for alteration of conviction to Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC, and the present appeal deserves to be dismissed in toto.

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We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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The question for consideration would arise before this Court whether the appellant has committed such offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The prosecution for proving its case beyond reasonable doubt examined the witnesses whose statements have been recorded before the trial Court observed hereinbelow:-

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Merry Ekka (PW-9) deposed that she knows the accused Sanaram Tirki, who is her samdhi , and she also knows the deceased Vimal Kujur, who was her

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nephew. She stated that about 8–9 months prior to the incident, she, her son Anil Ekka, and Vimal Kujur had gone to the house of the accused to visit her daughter Anita. At the house, the accused, his son, and his daughter-in-law were quarreling, and when they decided to leave, the accused allegedly returned with a shawl draped around him and suddenly stabbed Vimal in the abdomen with a knife, causing his intestines to protrude. She stated that Vimal was taken first to Dharamjaigarh Hospital and thereafter to the District Hospital, where he died during treatment. She affirmed that she had given a statement to the police and also before the Magistrate. In cross-examination, she stated that she was present at the spot and saw the accused stab Vimal and denied the suggestion that she was not at the scene or that she had been tutored by the police. She admitted that all persons present had consumed alcohol, that her vision was weak, and that there were only a few persons at the scene. She denied the suggestion that her son-in-law Chaitram had assaulted Vimal or that the accused was not present. She also denied harbouring any animosity against the accused and maintained that her present testimony was consistent with what she had stated before the Magistrate. Her statement was read over to her in Court, and she admitted it to be correctly recorded.

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Anita Tirki (PW2) stated that she is a resident of Village Kadamdohdi and knows the accused Sanaram Tirki as her father-in-law, but she does not know the deceased Vimal Kujur. She deposed that she has no knowledge about the incident as she was at her parental home at the relevant time. She denied that the police recorded her statement and also denied having given any statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate. As she did not

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support the prosecution case, she was declared hostile.

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In cross-examination, she denied knowledge of any marriage discussions relating to her sister-in-law, or that on 03.02.2016 her mother, her brother Anil, and the deceased had come to her matrimonial home. She denied knowledge of any quarrel, or that the accused had first come with a tangi and later returned with a knife and stabbed Vimal. She denied knowing that Vimal was taken to hospital and later died. She also denied having made incriminating statements to the police (Ex. P-3) or before the Magistrate (Ex. P-4), and denied that she was resiling due to her relationship with the accused.

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Chaitram (PW-3) stated that he knows the accused Sanaram Tirki as his father but does not know the deceased Vimal Kujur, and he has no knowledge regarding the manner of Vimal’s death. He denied that the police had ever recorded his statement. As he did not support the prosecution version, he was declared hostile.

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Dr. D. Behara (PW-12) stated that he conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased Vimal Kujur on 08.02.2016. On examination, he observed multiple surgical wounds on the abdomen with drainage tubes and sutures, swelling of the abdominal cavity containing about 2.5 litres of yellowish fluid, and congestion of internal organs including the brain, lungs, heart, liver, spleen, kidneys, and intestines. He opined that the cause of death appeared to be septicemia resulting from the abdominal injuries after surgical treatment, and that the nature of death was homicidal. He clarified that the precise nature of the original injuries could only be determined by the treating surgeon and did not comment on whether the injuries were sufficient to cause

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death in the ordinary course of nature, though such injuries could cause immediate unconsciousness.

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In cross-examination, he denied that his findings were based on statements of others, or that the injuries could have occurred accidentally or due to a fall on a sharp object. His statement was read over and he confirmed it to be correct.

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From the material on record, it is evident that the learned trial Court rightly concluded that it was the appellant/accused who inflicted the fatal injury on the deceased Vimal Kujur. The testimony of Meri Ekka (PW9), an eyewitness, clearly establishes that the accused stabbed the deceased in the abdomen with a knife, leading to injuries from which he subsequently died. The appellant, in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., failed to provide any plausible or satisfactory explanation regarding the occurrence or the death of the deceased. His defence that he has been falsely implicated finds no support from the evidence. In view of the above, we affirm the trial Court’s finding that the appellant caused the death of the deceased.

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The aforesaid finding raises the next question for consideration, namely, whether the case of the appellant falls within the ambit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, thereby amounting to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and whether his conviction under Section 302 IPC can be modified to an offence under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. In this context, the nature of the incident, the conduct of the appellant, and the circumstances under which the fatal act was committed must be carefully scrutinized.

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It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh¹ . The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu² has made the following observations :

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“Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.”

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It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would

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1 (2012) 8 SCC 289

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2 AIR 1956 SC 488

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be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 of the IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 of the IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana³ has observed as under:-

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“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of

3 (2002) 3 SCC 327

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Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana⁴ has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :-

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“23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under :

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(a) Motive or previous enmity;

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(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment;

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(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury;

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(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days;

4 (2009) 15 SCC 635

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(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;

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(f) The age and general health condition of the accused;

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(g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight;

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(h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted;

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(i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused;

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(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock;

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(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused;

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(l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations;

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(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident.

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Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ?

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These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused.

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24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives

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appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.”

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Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda⁵ , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death.

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Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh⁶ has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :-

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“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 220, para 7)

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“7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who

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5 (2012) 8 SCC 450

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6 (2017) 3 SCC 247

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offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.”

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Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9)

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“9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate

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any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”.

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In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.

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Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)⁷ has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under:

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“ 16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required:

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(i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in 7 (2019) 6 SCC 122

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Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023 disposed off on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under:

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“60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:

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(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and

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render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.

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(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.

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(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would

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apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.

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(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.

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(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.

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To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of

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the IPC.

(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.

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(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.

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(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury

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inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.

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(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.

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(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.

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(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.

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(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.”

¶150

Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments discussed above, it is evident from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that on the date of the incident, the accused/appellant, Sanaram Tirky, stabbed the deceased Vimal Kujur during a sudden quarrel arising out of a family dispute. There was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause the death of the deceased. The appellant did not have any intention to cause death, but by inflicting such injuries, he must have had the knowledge that such injuries were likely to cause death. Accordingly, his case falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, as the act of the appellant satisfies the four necessary ingredients of this exception: (i) there was a sudden fight; (ii) no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in the heat of passion; and (iv) the appellant did not take any undue advantage nor acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

¶151

Considering the above facts, the nature and gravity of the injuries sustained by the deceased, the evidence of eyewitnesses, and the fact that the appellant has remained in custody for about 5 years 7 months and 23 days and

¶152

22

¶153

CRA No. 1079 of 2018

¶154

he was aged about 55 years on the date of incident; his conviction under Section 302 IPC is liable to be altered/converted to a conviction under Section 304 Part-II IPC.

¶155

Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is set aside. However, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-II IPC and sentenced to undergo to the period of imprisonment already served by him. The fine amount imposed by the trial shall remain as it is and one month time is granted to the appellant to deposit the same, failing which, he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month.

¶156

In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed in part, to the extent indicated hereinabove. The appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail bonds shall remain operative for a period of six months in view the provisions of Section 481 BNSS, 2023.

¶157

The Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.

¶158

Sd/Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

¶159

Rahul/Amardeep

Sanaram Tirky v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Sanaram Tirky v. State of Chhattisgarh

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