Sunil Kumar Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Challenge in this appeal is to the legality and validity of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.1.2008 passed by II Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar in ST No.232/2006 whereby accused/appellant stands convicted & sentenced as under:

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Conviction Sentence Under Section 304B of Indian RI for seven years Penal Code.

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Under Section 306 of Indian Penal	RI for seven years, pay a fine of
Code.	Rs.1000/- and in default thereof to suffer additional RI for one year.
Under Section 498A of Indian	RI for three years, pay a fine of
Penal Code.	Rs.5000/- and in default thereof to suffer additional RI for six months.

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All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

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Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that marriage of Pramodnibai was solemnized with the accused/appellant on 18.5.2005. On 18.8.2005 at around 4 am she consumed some anti-lice medicine. At that time she was sleeping with the accused/appellant. When she started shivering, her husband/accused called out his parents. When she was asked as to what she consumed, she disclosed nothing. She was taken to the doctor at Pendravan who advised them to take her to Mission Hospital, Sarsiwa. However, she was taken to Primary Health Center, Sarangarh in unconscious condition and admitted there at 7.30 am but during the course of treatment she died at 7.55 am. Information regarding her death was conveyed to her parents and then they reached hospital at Sarangarh at 2 pm. The police was informed about her death. During investigation, inquest over her dead body was performed in presence of witnesses; postmortem of the dead body was conducted which revealed that she was carrying 10-12 weeks pregnancy and statements of the witnesses were recorded. After

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completing usual investigation charge sheet under Sections 304B/34 and 498A of IPC was filed against the accused persons.

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Learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 304B, 306 and 498A of IPC against the accused persons, which were denied by them and they prayed for trial. In order to bring home the charges the prosecution examined 10 witnesses in all. Statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of CrPC wherein they denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication.

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After hearing counsel for the respective parties and appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court while acquitting co-accused Kaushilya, Pukram and Pannalal of all the charges by giving them benefit of doubt, convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as mentioned above. Hence this appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the material available on record. The FIR was lodged after 8 days of the incident without any explanation therefor. Further, the statement of PW-1 Gajanand is full of exaggeration and omission and likewise, the statement of PW-2 Phoolbai is also not reliable as she stated against the appellant merely on the basis of suspicion. Learned trial Court ought to have appreciated the fact that marriage of the deceased was

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performed against her will by her parents; there was no ill-treatment or cruelty by the appellant against her; the allegation of dowry is not specific and only general and omnibus allegations have been made. Learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that PW-8 Tahsildar himself admitted in cross-examination that the deceased before attempt to commit suicide had written with Mehandi on her left hand “My Dear Soni I Love You”, which makes it clear that no cruel treatment was meted out to her by the appellant before her death. This witness also admitted that parents and brother of the deceased did not express anything against the appellant at the time of preparation of inquest memo. It is also not appreciated that the appellant along with other coaccused immediately took the deceased for treatment to hospital. As per medical evidence she died of poison and there was no injury on her body. It has also come in the evidence that the deceased never made any complaint to her parents or relatives regarding demand of dowry by the appellant or subjecting her to cruelty in connection therewith. Thus, looking to the overall evidence and conduct of the appellant, his conviction awarded by learned trial Court is not at all sustainable and the appeal deserves to be allowed.

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Reliance has been placed on the judgment dated 31^st January, 2025 of Hon’ble Supreme Court in CRA No.1076/2014 in the case of Karan Singh Vs. State of Haryana ; judgment of the Uttarakhand High Court in State of UP (Now State of Uttarakhand) Vs. Arun Kumar Shrivastava and others, 2010 0 Supreme (UK) 418 ; and judgment

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dated 14.2.2025 of this Court in CRA No.416/2019 in the matter of Krishna Kumar and others Vs. State of CG and other connected criminal appeal.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposing the contention of the appellant would submit that in view of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant by the impugned judgment which calls for no interference by this Court. The present appeal being without any substance is liable to be dismissed. Reliance has been placed on the judgment dated 8.7.2025 of this Court in CRA No.317/2005 in the matter of Balak Ram and others Vs. State of CG .

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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Learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 304B, 306 and 498A of IPC against the appellant and other co-accused persons and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, acquitted the co-accused of all the charges and convicted the appellant under Sections 304B, 306 & 498A of IPC and sentenced as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment.

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It is not in dispute in this case that appellant Sunil Kumar was married with the deceased Pramodnibai on 18.5.2005 and she died

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within seven years of her marriage on 19.8.2005 by consuming some poisonous substance (anti-lice medicine).

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PW-1 Gajanand Vyovahar, father of the deceased, states that at the time of engagement the appellant and his mother and father demanded Rs.60,000-70,000/- and that appellant used to harass his daughter after consuming liquor. In cross-examination he admits that co-accused Pannalal used to visit his house even prior to marriage. He also admits that they took initiative for marriage of the deceased with the appellant. He denied the suggestion that his daughter used to remain sick. However, he admitted the suggestion that at the time of preparing inquest memo he gave statement to the Tehsildar that his daughter/deceased did not make any complaint against the accused persons. He also admits that whatever articles were given to his daughter, its receipts are there in the house and not given to the police.

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PW-2 Phoolbai, mother of the deceased, states that the accused persons harassed the deceased for dowry. In cross-examination she admits that at the time of marriage no discussion regarding dowry took place and whatever articles were given, the same were given voluntarily.

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PW-3 Ajay Kumar, uncle of the deceased, states that he does not know as to why his niece/deceased consumed poison. He is declared hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined where he admits the

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suggestion that at the time of marriage maternal uncle of the appellant namely Pannalal (co-accused) demanded dowry. In cross-examination by the defence he admits the suggestion that after marriage of the deceased he did not meet her. PW-6 Gayatri and PW-7 Koushal Joshi also not supported the prosecution case and were declared hostile. In cross-examination by the prosecution they denied all the suggestions.

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Close scrutiny of the evidence makes it clear that at the time of death of the deceased, allegations regarding demand of dowry and consequent ill treatment were made by mother, father and other relatives of the deceased against the appellant. However, there is no specific allegation regarding demand of dowry against the appellant. It is also clear that there is material omission with regard to allegation of demand of dowry in the police statements of the witnesses. Learned trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 306 and 304B of IPC both. Sections 306, 107 and 304B of IPC read as under:

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“306. Abetment of suicide. – If any person commits suicide, whoever, abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

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“107. Abetment of a thing. - A person abets the doing of a thing, who—

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First .—Instigates any person to do that thing; or

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Secondly .—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal

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omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or

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Thirdly .—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

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Explanation 1 .—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.

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Illustration - A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z, B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C.

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Explanation 2 .—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”

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“304B. Dowry death. - (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

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Explanation- For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning. as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

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(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.]”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Karan Singh (supra) held in paras 6 & 7 of its judgment as under:

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“6. The following are the essential ingredients of Section 304-B:

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a) The death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;

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b) The death must have been caused within seven years of her marriage;

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c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of her husband; and

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d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.

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If the aforesaid four ingredients are established, the death can be called a dowry death, and the husband and/or husband's relative, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have caused the dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides that dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to the other party to the marriage or to any other person. The dowry must be given or agreed to be given at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties.

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The term valuable security used in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has the same meaning as in Section 30 of IPC.”

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In the matter of Kashibai and others Vs. State of Karnataka , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with offence under Sections 498A and 306/34 of IPC held in para 9 of its judgment dated 28.2.2023 in SLP (Cri) No.8584/2022 as under:

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“9. In M. Mohan Vs. State Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police (2011) 3 SCC 626 , this Court has elaborately dealt with the provisions contained in Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC, and after discussing various earlier decisions has observed as under: -

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"41. This Court in SCC para 20 of Ramesh Kumar [(2001) 9 SCC 618: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] has examined different shades of the meaning of "instigation". Para 20 reads as under: (SCC p. 629)

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"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation."

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In the said case this Court came to the conclusion that there is no evidence and material available on record wherefrom an inference of the appellant-accused having abetted commission of suicide by Seema (the appellant's wife therein) may necessarily be drawn.

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In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal [(1994) 1 SCC 73: 1994 SCC (Cri) 107] this Court has cautioned that (SCC p. 90, para 17) the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it appears to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and difference in domestic life, quite common to the society, to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and difference were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.

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This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(2009) 16 SCC 605: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the word "instigation" and "goading". The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the others. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.

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Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction carinot be sustained.

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The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide."

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In the said matter, after appreciation of the overall evidence on record in light of its earlier decisions on the issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court acquitted the appellants of the charge u/s 306 of IPC by giving them benefit of doubt and maintained their conviction u/s 498A of IPC.

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In the present case, the prosecution has only proved that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage by consuming poison at her matrimonial home but there is no piece of evidence to show that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty by the appellant or any of his relatives in connection demand of dowry or the appellant in any manner abetted his wife to commit suicide. Thus, the prosecution has utterly failed to prove essential ingredients constituting the offence under Sections 304B and 306 of IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The father and the mother of the deceased (PWs-1 & 2) only

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stated that the appellant used to consume liquor excessively, quarrel with her and also beat her.

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In order to convict a person under Section 498A of the IPC, it must be proven that a married woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. Cruelty includes willful conduct that drives her to suicide, causes grave injury or danger to her life, limb, or health, or involves harassment with a view to coercing her to meet an unlawful demand for property. Evidence can include medical reports, witness testimony, and other documents that establish the link between the cruelty and the actions of the accused. Section 498A of IPC reads as under:

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“ 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty

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Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

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Explanation- For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means-

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(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

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(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her

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to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.]”

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In view of the above, looking to the statements of the parents of the deceased and other witnesses, it is clear that the appellant treated the deceased with cruelty, therefore, his conviction under Section 498A of IPC recorded by learned trial Court being based on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, cannot be faulted with. As regards sentence thereunder, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the fact that the incident took place in the year 2005, the appeal is pending since 2008; at the time of incident the appellant was 21 years of age and now more than 40 years; he was on bail during trial as also during pendency of the appeal and did not misuse the liberty; he remained in jail for about four months, this Court is of the opinion that no fruitful purpose would be served in sending him back to jail at this stage and the ends of justice would meet if he is sentenced to the period already undergone while keeping the fine imposed on him with default sentence by learned trial court intact. He has already deposited the entire fine amount.

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On the basis of aforesaid discussions, the appeal is allowed in part. While acquitting the appellant of the charges under Sections 304B and 306 of IPC, his conviction under Section 498A of IPC is hereby maintained and the substantive jail sentence thereunder is reduced to

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the period already undergone by him. The impugned judgment stands modified to the above extent only.

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The accused/appellant is reported to be on bail, therefore, keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of BNSS, 2023 he is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

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The record of the trial Court along with copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. A copy of this judgment be also forwarded to the concerned Jail Superintendent for information and necessary action.

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Sd/ (Rajani Dubey) Judge

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The date	The date	The date when the judgment is uploaded on
when the	when the	the website
judgment is	judgment is
reserved	pronounced
		Operative Full
7.8.2025	14-11-2025	- 14-11-2025

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Digitally signed MOHD by MOHDAKHTAR KHAN AKHTAR Date: KHAN 2025.11.1416:32:03 +0530

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Khan

Sunil Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Sunil Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh

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