Partly allowed¶159

Safed Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC11 Sept 2025CRA/1344/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Alteration of conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC; single fatal blow with spade (rapa) on head during sudden quarrel between son and father over sale of household rice; Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC; culpable homicide not amounting to murder; intention versus knowledge; seven years rigorous imprisonment; eyewitness testimony of wife and daughter of accused; FSL blood group 'A' on spade; reliance on Anbazhagan (2023 INSC 632) and Velthepu Srinivas (2024 SCC OnLine SC 107); appeal under Section 415(2) BNSS 2023; sentence suspension application disposed of.

What did the court decide?

Conviction altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC; sentence modified to rigorous imprisonment for seven years, to be served out; I.A. No. 1 of 2025 (suspension of sentence/bail) stands disposed of. ¶159

Safed Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Chhattisgarh HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

¶159

Issue for consideration

Whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. +2 more

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Court's answer

The death of the deceased was homicidal in nature; the trial court's finding is fully borne out by the medical evidence and is affirmed.

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Ratio / Principle

The appellant is the perpetrator: the eyewitnesses Radhika Sahu and Ku. Lakeshwari Sahu, who resided with the deceased, credibly deposed that the appellant assaulted the deceased on the head with a rapa/spade; the spot map, seizure of the spade and the FSL findings lend assurance to the prosecution version.

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Key takeaways

Recovery of the spade on the appellant's disclosure and the medical opinion fortify authorship, but such factors by themselves cannot automatically elevate the offence to murder under Section 302 IPC, particularly when the incident occurred during a sudden quarrel.ratio¶151
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is attracted — sudden quarrel, no premeditation, heat of passion, single blow with a weapon available in the house and no undue advantage or cruelty — hence the offence cannot be murder.ratio¶150
Intention to cause death is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; knowledge that striking the head with a rapa (spade) was likely to cause death is clearly attributable; the case falls under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Chhattisgarh High Court, Bilaspur (Division Bench: Ramesh Sinha, CJ and Bibhu Datta Guru, J), CRA No. 1344 of 2025, decided 12.09.2025 — Appeal under Section 415(2) BNSS against judgment dated 28.05.2025 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Sarangarh (Sessions Trial No. 32 of 2021) convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC for causing the death of his father, Ramlal Sahu, by a single blow of a spade (rapa) on the head during a sudden quarrel over the sale of household rice. Homicidal nature of death affirmed on medical evidence; authorship established on the testimony of the appellant's wife (Radhika) and daughter (Lakeshwari), corroborated by seizure of the bloodstained spade and the FSL report (blood group 'A' on the spade). Holding that there was no premeditation, the occurrence took place in the heat of passion following a sudden quarrel, and only one blow was inflicted, the Court found Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC attracted; intention to cause death was not proved, only knowledge, and relying on Anbazhagan v. State (2023 INSC 632) and Velthepu Srinivas v. State of A.P. (2024 SCC OnLine SC 107), altered the conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for seven years (he had been in custody since 23.05.2021, having undergone over four years, three months and twenty days). Appeal partly allowed; I.A. No. 1 of 2025 disposed of.

2025:CGHC:46773-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 1344 of 2025

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Safed Sahu S/o Late Ramlal Sahu, Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Kapisda, Police Station Kosir, District Raigarh Now Sarangarh Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant(s)

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versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Kosir, District Sarangarh Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh

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...Respondent(s)

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For Appellant : Mr. Bhuvneshwar Singh Rajput, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Deputy Advocate General.

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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12.09.2025

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1. Heard Mr. Bhuvneshwar Singh Rajput, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the respondent/State.

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Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN BRIJMOHAN MORLE MORLE Date: 2025.09.15 18:59:33 +0530

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2. Today, the matter is listed for hearing on I.A. No. 1 of 2025, an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail. However, with the consent of the parties, we proceed to hear the matter finally.

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3. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNSS’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 28.05.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 32 of 2021, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:

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Conviction under Section	Sentence
Section 302 of the Indian	Rigorous imprisonment (for short,
Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’)	‘R.I.’) for life and fine of Rs. 1,000/-,
	in default of payment of fine, 01
	month R.I. more.

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4. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant, Puniram Jatwar (PW-1), Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Kapisda, received a telephonic call at about 08:15 a.m. on 22.05.2021 from Padumlal Sahu, husband of the Deputy Sarpanch. He informed that Radhika (PW-5), wife of the appellant/accused Safed Sahu of village Kapisda “A”, had come to his house and disclosed that her husband had assaulted his father, Ramlal Sahu, with a spade, thereby causing injuries.

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5. On receipt of this information, PW-1, along with Shyamlal Sahu

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(PW-15), Kotwarin Budhwara Chauhan, Mathura Lahare (PW-2) and others, proceeded to the house of the appellant. There they found Ramlal Sahu lying in the courtyard with bleeding head injuries and already dead. Radhika (PW-5) narrated that the appellant, having sold the household rice, was reprimanded by the deceased, whereupon, in a fit of rage, he struck his father with a spade on the head, causing his death. This narration was made in the presence of Kotwarin Budhwara, Shyamlal Sahu, Padumlal Sahu and Motilal.

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6. Based on the oral information of PW-1, Merg No. 13 of 2021 (Ex. P/2) was registered and thereafter, Crime No. 98 of 2021 under Section 302 of the IPC was recorded at Police Station Kosir. The matter was taken up for investigation. The SDM was informed, a countercopy of the FIR (Ex.P/1) was forwarded to the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sarangarh, and inquest proceedings were conducted. A spot map was prepared; notices under Section 175 of the Cr.P.C. were issued; an inquest report was drawn; and the dead body was sent for postmortem. Bloodstained and plain soil were seized from the spot.

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7. Pursuant to the memorandum statement (Ex.P/11) of the appellant, a spade was seized from him, measuring 35.5 inches in handle length, 4.2 inches in top thickness, 4.6 inches in bottom thickness, 7.5 inches in blade length and 7.5 inches in blade width. A Patwari map of the spot and spot inquest report were prepared. The seized spade was examined and a query report was obtained from the Doctor. From the sealed packet received, the undergarment/shorts and

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one lungi of the deceased were seized. The seized articles were sent to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Bilaspur, acknowledgment of receipt was obtained, and the FSL report was later received. The statements of Radhika Sahu and Lakeshwari Sahu (PW-6) were also recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sarangarh. The appellant was arrested vide Ex.P/14 and his arrest was duly attested by witnesses.

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8. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant before the jurisdictional criminal Court, and the case was committed to the Court of Session, from where it was transferred to the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) for trial.

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9. The learned trial Court framed charge against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The appellant abjured the charge and pleaded false implication.

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10. In support of its case, the prosecution examined sixteen witnesses and exhibited thirty-one documents. The appellant did not examine any witness in defence.

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11. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court, by judgment dated 28.05.2025, convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him as mentioned hereinabove. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the instant criminal appeal.

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12. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned trial Court has fallen in error in convicting the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. It is urged that the conviction rests solely on circumstantial evidence, yet the prosecution has not been able to establish a complete chain of circumstances pointing unerringly to the guilt of the appellant. Alternatively, it is submitted that even if the prosecution case is accepted in its entirety, the incident occurred on the spur of the moment, without premeditation, in the heat of passion and anger, following a sudden quarrel between the appellant and the deceased. Thus, there was no intention or motive on the part of the appellant to cause the death of his father. The act, at best, would fall within the ambit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, amounting to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Consequently, the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC may be altered to one under Section 304 Part I or Part II of the IPC. It is further submitted that the appellant has been in custody since 23.05.2021 and has undergone almost four years and three months of incarceration; therefore, in the event of alteration of conviction, the sentence may be restricted to the period already undergone. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal be allowed either in full or in part.

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13. Per contra , learned State counsel has supported the impugned judgment and order of sentence. He submits that the prosecution has proved the charge under Section 302 of the IPC beyond reasonable

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doubt, primarily on the basis of the testimonies of Radhika (PW-5) and Ku. Laxmiwari Sahu (PW-6), both of whom have categorically deposed that the appellant assaulted the deceased with a spade, leading to his death. Their evidence, corroborated by the other material brought on record, fully establishes the culpability of the appellant. It is, therefore, contended that the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offence of murder, and there is no occasion to convert the conviction from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part I or Part II of the IPC. In the circumstances, the appeal, being devoid of substance, deserves to be dismissed.

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14. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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15. The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased was homicidal in nature ?

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16. In this regard, Dr. Sunil Kumar Patel (PW-13), who conducted the postmortem examination on the body of the deceased at Community Health Centre, Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.), deposed that he found an incised/stab wound measuring 3 cm x 2 cm, extending up to the fractured bone with separation of fragments. Surrounding the wound was a reddish contusion measuring 7 cm x 5 cm. The injury was linear in appearance, oriented parallel to the sagittal suture, and located over the upper part of the left ear near the hairline region. He further noticed a lacerated wound over the left parietal region, measuring 7 cm

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x 5 cm, penetrating through the skull bone into the cranial cavity, with active bleeding present at the site. The Doctor opined that the cause of death was head injury involving internal damage to the brain, accompanied by excessive hemorrhage from the head region. He further stated that the nature of death was homicidal in character and that the time since death was estimated to be between 2 to 16 hours prior to the postmortem examination. He also noted that the bloodstained lungi produced by the police was examined, sealed, and handed back to the same constable for further proceedings. His postmortem report is Ex.P/9.

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17. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and upon due consideration of the evidence, we are of the considered opinion that the finding of the learned trial Court that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature is fully borne out from the medical evidence on record. Such finding is neither perverse nor contrary to record, and we accordingly affirm it.

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18. Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the accused/appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question ?

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19. Radhika Sahu (PW-6), wife of the appellant and daughter-in-law of the deceased, is an eyewitness to the occurrence. She deposed that on 23.05.2021, a quarrel took place between the appellant/accused, Safed Sahu, and his father, deceased Ramlal Sahu, over the sale of household rice. During the altercation, the appellant/accused threatened

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to kill the deceased and immediately thereafter assaulted him on the head with a rapa (spade). As a result of the blow, Ramlal Sahu sustained grievous injuries and succumbed to them. The appellant/accused thereafter fled from the spot. She further stated that following the incident, she informed the village Panch and Sarpanch, after which the police was apprised of the matter. Her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, which is exhibited as Ex.P/25 and bears her signature. She categorically affirmed these facts during her examination-in-chief and remained firm and consistent in cross-examination.

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20. Ku. Lakeshwari Sahu (PW-6), daughter of the appellant/accused and granddaughter of the deceased, who is also an eyewitness to the incident, deposed that she knows the accused, Safed Sahu, who is her father, and also knew the deceased, Ramlal Sahu, who was her grandfather. She stated that the incident took place about one year prior, at around 7:00–7:30 p.m. She saw her father, the appellant/accused, Safed Sahu, assaulting her grandfather, Ramlal Sahu, with a rapa (spade). The deceased sustained a head injury and, after receiving the blow, fell down in the courtyard of the house. Blood was oozing from his head, and he died as a result of the assault committed by the appellant/accused. She further deposed that after the incident, her father, Safed Sahu, went to the Police Station, Kosir. The quarrel between her father and her grandfather had arisen because her father had sold the rice stored in the house. She also stated that her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded before the

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Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sarangarh, which is exhibited as Ex.P/26, bearing her signatures.

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21. In the present case, the Investigating Officer, Rupendra Narayan Sai (PW-16), prepared the spot map (Ex.P/4), which has been corroborated in the testimony of Puniram Jatwar (PW-1). Puniram Jatwar (PW-1) had also visited the place of occurrence and deposed that he had seen the deceased lying in the courtyard. Similarly, the site map (Ex.P/24) prepared by the Halka Patwari was also supported by Puniram Jatwar (PW-1), and its correctness was further confirmed by the Halka Patwari, Robins Bhardwaj (PW-11). Although in paragraph 5 of his cross-examination, Halka Patwari Robins Bhardwaj (PW-11) admitted that the map merely shows the place where the complainant was residing and that the length and breadth of Ramlal’s house are not mentioned therein, nevertheless, the spot map pertains to the residence of deceased Ramlal. The evidence further shows that the deceased Ramlal was residing along with his son, the appellant/accused, Safed Sahu. The Patwari has recorded in the spot map (Ex.P/24), the inquest report (Ex.P/23), as well as in Ex.P/16, that the place of occurrence was indeed the residence of deceased Ramlal.

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22. In the present case, Constable Amit Divya (PW-14) deposed that the seized articles, namely soil, spade, and the lungi and underwear of the deceased, were deposited in the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Bilaspur, through application Ex.P/20, and he confirmed receipt of the FSL report (Ex.P/22). The report of the Regional Forensic

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Science Laboratory, Bilaspur (Ex.P/22), confirms the presence of human blood on the spade, soil, underwear, and lungi , and further establishes that blood of group “A” was found on the spade. Although the investigation is silent on whether the blood group of the deceased or the accused was “A,” the evidence regarding the appellant/accused Safed Sahu assaulting the deceased Ramlal Sahu with the rapa (spade) remains unimpeached.

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23. On the seizure memo (Ex.P/12), Puniram Jatwar (PW-1) and Mathura Lahre (PW-2) admitted their signatures. Both these witnesses stated that the spade was seized by the police from the place of occurrence. The evidence further establishes that it was with this very spade that the deceased, Ramlal Sahu, was assaulted. Since the parties belong to a rural background, the interchangeable use of the words rapa and spade in their testimonies is natural.

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24. In the present case, the evidence of the witnesses, who were naturally present at the place of occurrence, supports the prosecution version that a son assaulted his father on the head with a spade. Radhika Sahu (PW-5) is the wife of the appellant/accused, Safed Sahu, and Ku. Lakeshwari Sahu (PW-6) is the daughter of the appellant/accused. The deceased, Ramlal Sahu, was the father of the appellant/accused, Safed Sahu. The record establishes that all of them were residing together. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of Radhika Sahu (PW-5) and Ku. Lakeshwari Sahu (PW-6) that it was the accused who assaulted his father, deceased Ramlal Sahu, on the head

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with a rapa/spade.

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25. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ?

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26. The distinction between intention and knowledge in the context of Section 299 and Section 300 IPC is crucial in determining the culpability of the appellant. Intention denotes a conscious desire to bring about a particular result, whereas knowledge implies awareness that a particular consequence is likely to ensue. In the present case, while the appellant's actions were undoubtedly culpable, the circumstances suggest that he did not intend to cause the death of his father. However, it is evident that he knew that his actions were likely to cause harm.

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27. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the following facts are salient:

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No premeditation or prior motive has been proved by the prosecution.

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The incident occurred inside the home following a sudden quarrel late at night.

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There was one fatal blow with a household tangi; there is no evidence of repeated assault or pursuit.

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28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Anbazhagan v. The

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State Rep. By The Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 INSC 632 , readily held when a case would fall under Section 304 Part II of the IPC rather than Section 302 of the IPC, emphasizing that Part II applies where “murder is never established” and only knowledge (not intention) is attributable; it also surveys classic “single blow” cases altering Section 302 to Section 304 Part II (e.g., Jawahar Lal, Camilo Vaz, Jai Prakash, Kulwant Rai, Hem Raj, Pulicherla Nagaraju) and ultimately converts the conviction to Section 304 Part II. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-

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“20. The word "intent" is derived from the word archery or aim. The "act" attempted to must be with "intention" of killing a man.

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21. Intention, which is a state of mind, can never be precisely proved by direct evidence as a fact; it can only be deduced or inferred from other facts which are proved. The intention may be proved by res gestae, by acts or events previous or subsequent to the incident or occurrence, on admission. Intention of a person cannot be proved by direct evidence but is to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of a case. There are various relevant circumstances from which the intention can be gathered. Some relevant considerations are the following:-

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1. The nature of the weapon used.

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2. The place where the injuries were inflicted.

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3. The nature of the injuries caused.

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4. The opportunity available which the accused gets.

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22. In the case of Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab, AIR

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1964 SC 986, at page 990, Das Gupta J. has explained the concept of the word 'intent. The relevant observations are made by referring to the observations made by Batty J. in the decision Bhagwant v. Kedari, I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202. They are as under:-

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"The word “intent” by its etymology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies “aim” and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result-foreseen perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired-but rather connotes the one object for which the effort is made-and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant motive, without which, the action would not have been taken.”

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23. In the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488, at page 490, the following observations have been made by Chadrasekhara Aiyar J.:-

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"6. Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the

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three ideas are used interchangeably and this had led to a certain amount of confusion.”

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24. In para 9 of the judgment, at page 490, the observations made by Coleridge J. in Reg. v. Monkhouse, (1849) 4 COX CC 55(C), have been referred to. They can be referred to, with advantage at this stage, as they are very illuminating:-

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"The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to whether an act has been committed, because you cannot look into a man's mind to see what was passing there at any given time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law, and one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a man to do what is the natural consequence of his act. The consequence is sometimes so apparent as to leave no doubt of the intention. A man could not put a pistol which he knew to be loaded to another's head, and fire it off. without intending to kill him; but even there the state of mind of the party is most material to be considered. For instance, if such an act were done by a born idiot, the intent to kill could not be inferred from the act. So if the defendant is proved to have been intoxicated, the question becomes a more subtle one; but it is of the same kind, namely; was he rendered by intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent charged?"

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25. Bearing in mind the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and also bearing in mind that our legislature has used two different terminologies 'intent' and 'knowledge' and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be proper to hold that 'intent' and 'knowledge' cannot be equated with each other. They connote different things. Sometimes, if the consequence is so apparent, it may happen that from the knowledge, intent may be presumed. But it will not mean that 'intent' and 'knowledge' are the same. 'Knowledge' will be only one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent.

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26. In the case In re Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi, AIR 1960 AP 141, also the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'intention' is aptly explained. It is as under:-

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"Knowledge and intention must not be confused.

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17. …… Every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act until the contrary is proved. It is therefore necessary in order to arrive at a decision, as to an offender's intention to inquire what the - natural and probable consequences of his acts would be. Once there is evidence that a deceased person, sustained injuries which

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were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the person who inflicted them could be presumed to have intended those natural and probable consequences. His offence would fall under the third head of sec. 300, I.P.C.

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18. …..A man's intention has to be inferred from what he does. But there are cases in which death is caused and the intention which can safely be imputed to the offender is less grave. The degree of quilt depends upon intention and the intention to be inferred must be gathered from the facts proved. Sometimes an act is committed which would not in an ordinary case inflict injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, but which the offender knows is likely to cause the death. Proof of such knowledge throws light upon his intention.

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19. ...Under sec. 299 there need be no proof of knowledge, that the bodily injury intended was likely to cause death. Before deciding that a case of culpable homicide amounts to murder, there must be proof of intention sufficient to bring it under Sec.300. Where the injury deliberately inflicted is more than merely likely to cause death' but sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the higher degree of quilt is presumed."

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It has been further observed therein as under:-

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"26. ... Where the evidence does not disclose that there was any intention, to cause death of

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the deceased but it was clear that the accused had the knowledge that their acts were likely to cause death the accused can be held guilty under the second part of sec. 304, I.P.C. The contention that in order to bring the case under the second part of sec. 304. I.P.C. it must be brought within one of the exceptions to sec 300, I.P.C. is not acceptable."

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27. Thus, while defining the offence of culpable homicide and murder, the framers of the IPC laid down that the requisite intention or knowledge must be imputed to the accused when he committed the act which caused the death in order to hold him guilty for the offence of culpable homicide or murder as the case may be. The framers of the IPC designedly used the two words 'intention' and 'knowledge', and it must be taken that the framers intended to draw a distinction between these two expressions. The knowledge of the consequences which may result in the doing of an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Except in cases where mens rea is not required in order to prove that a person had certain knowledge, he "must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow." (Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, Volume 1 at page 40).

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28. This awareness is termed as knowledge. But the knowledge that specified consequences would result or could result by doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. If an act is done by a man with the knowledge

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that certain consequences may follow or will follow, it does not necessarily mean that he intended such consequences and acted with such intention. Intention requires something more than a mere foresight of the consequences. It requires a purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end. This we may make it clear by referring to two passages from leading text-books on the subject. Kenny in his Outlines of Criminal Law, Seventeenth Edition at page 31 has observed:-

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"To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective; the noun 'intention' in the present connexion is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible consequences of his conduct........ It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction, and accordingly must foresee, that to which his express purpose is directed......... Again, a man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it."

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29. Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, 1st Volume at page 41 has observed:-

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"In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word "intention" is used to denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to achieve a particular end at which he aims............ Differing from intention, yet closely resembling it, there are two other attitudes of

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mind, either of which is sufficient to attract legal sanctions for harm resulting from action taken in obedience to its stimulus, but both of which can be denoted by the word "recklessness". In each of these the man adopts a line of conduct with the intention of thereby attaining an end which he does desire, but at the same time realises that this conduct may also produce another result which he does not desire. In this case he acts with full knowledge that he is taking the chance that this secondary result will follow. Here, again, if this secondary result is one forbidden by law, then he will be criminally responsible for it if it occurs. His precise mental attitude will be one of two kinds-(a) he would prefer that the harmful result should not occur, or (b) he is indifferent as to whether it does or does not occur."

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30. The phraseology of Sections 299 and 300 respectively of the IPC leaves no manner of doubt that under these Sections when it is said that a particular act in order to be punishable be done with such intention, the requisite intention must be proved by the prosecution. It must be proved that the accused aimed or desired that his act should lead to such and such consequences. For example, when under Section 299 it is said "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death" it must be proved that the accused by doing the act, intended to bring about the particular consequence, that is, causing of death. Similarly, when it is said that "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to

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cause death" it must be proved that the accused had the aim of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death.

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31. Thus, in order that the requirements of law with regard to intention may be satisfied for holding an offence of culpable homicide proved, it is necessary that any of the two specific intentions must be proved. But, even when such intention is not proved, the offence will be culpable homicide if the doer of the act causes the death with the knowledge that he is likely by his such act to cause death, that is, with the knowledge that the result of his doing his act may be such as may result in death.

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32. The important question which has engaged our careful attention in this case is, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case we should maintain the conviction of the appellant herein for the offence under Section 304 Part I or we should further alter it to Section 304 Part II of the IPC?

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SECTIONS 299 AND 300 OF THE IPC:-

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33. Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC deal with the definition of 'culpable homicide' and 'murder', respectively. In terms of Section 299, 'culpable homicide' is described as an act of causing death (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (iii) with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause death. As is clear from a reading of this provision, the former part of it emphasises on the expression 'intention' while the latter upon 'knowledge'. Both these are positive mental attitudes, however, of different degrees. The mental element in

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'culpable homicide', that is, the mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. Once an offence is caused in any of the three stated manners noted-above, it would be 'culpable homicide'. Section 300 of the IPC, however, deals with 'murder', although there is no clear definition of 'murder' in Section 300 of the IPC. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, 'culpable homicide' is the genus and 'murder' is its species and all 'murders' are 'culpable homicides' but all 'culpable homicides' are not 'murders'. (see Rampal Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 289)

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34. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382, this Court, while clarifying the distinction between these two terms and their consequences, held as under:-

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"12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' is species. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not viceversa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment. proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is what may be called 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of

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culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304."

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35. Section 300 of the IPC proceeds with reference to Section 299 of the IPC. 'Culpable homicide' may or may not amount to 'murder', in terms of Section 300 of the IPC. When a 'culpable homicide is murder', the punitive consequences shall follow in terms of Section 302 of the IPC, while in other cases, that is, where an offence is 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishment would be dealt with under Section 304 of the IPC. Various judgments of this Court have dealt with the cases which fall in various classes of firstly, secondly, thirdly and fourthly, respectively, stated under Section 300 of the IPC. It would not be necessary for us to deal with that aspect of the case in any further detail.

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36. The principles stated in the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, are the broad guidelines for the courts to exercise their judicial discretion while considering the cases to determine as to which particular clause of Section 300 of the IPC they fall in. This Court has time and again deliberated upon the crucial question of distinction between Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC, i.e. 'culpable homicide' and 'murder' respectively. In Phulia Tudu v. State of Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 588, this Court noticed that confusion may arise if the courts would lose sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these

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sections. This Court observed that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of these sections.

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37. This Court in Phulia Tudu (supra) has observed that the academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences:-

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Section 299

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Section 300

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A person commits Subject to certain culpable culpable homicide if the homicide is murder if the act by which the death is exceptions act by which the caused is donedeath is caused is done-

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INTENTION

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(a) with the intention of (1) with the intention of causing causing death; or death; or (b) with the intention of (2) with the intention of causing such causing bodily such bodily injury as the injury as is likely to offender knows to be likely to cause death; or cause the death of the person

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to whom the harm is caused; or
(3) with the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person and
the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to
cause death; or

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KNOWLEDGE

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(c) with	the	knowledge (4) with the	knowledge that the
that the	act	is likely to act is so im	minently dangerous
cause de	ath	that it must	in all probability
		cause deat	h or such bodily
		injury as is	likely to cause
		death, and	commits such act
		without any e	xcuse for incurring
		the risk of	causing death or
		such injury	as is mentioned
		above.

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29. Recently, in Velthepu Srinivas v. State of A.P., reported in 2024

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SCC OnLine SC 107 , the Supreme Court converted a Section 302 of the IPC conviction to Section 304 Part II for one accused, sentencing him to 10 years, where the role and circumstances evidenced lack of intention but knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-

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“28. Even though, A-3 might not have had the common intention to commit the murder, nevertheless, his participation in the assault and the wielding of the stone certainly makes him culpable for the offence that he has committed. While we acquit A-3 of the offence under

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Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, he is liable for the offence under 304 Part II IPC. The law on Section 304 Part II has been succinctly laid down in Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa, (2000) 9 SCC 1, where it was held that:

¶139

14. This section is in two parts. If analysed, the section provides for two kinds of punishment to two different situations: (1) if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is the “intention”; (2) if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When a person hits another with a danda on a vital part of the body with such force that the person hit meets his death, knowledge has to be imputed to the accused….

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29. In the past, this Court has considered factors such as lack of medical evidence to prove whether the act/injury was individually sufficient to cause death 1, a single blow on head with a hammer2 and lack of cogent evidence of the eye-witnesses that the accused shared a common intention to commit murder 3 as some factors to commute a sentence from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC.

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30. Returning back to the facts of the case, there is certainly no escape from coming to the conclusion that A-3 should have had the knowledge that the use of a stone to hit the head of the deceased is likely to cause death. However, as demonstrated 1 Bawa Singh v.

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State of Punjab, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 754. 2 Sarup Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 16 SCC 479. 3 Ghana Pradhan & Ors. v. State of Orissa, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 451. before, the evidence is insufficient to deduce a conclusion that he shared a common intention with the other accused to commit the murder of the deceased. Considering the role that A-3 has played, we hold him guilty of the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC.

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31. The perusal of the evidence would reveal that it is not the case of the prosecution that A-3 was along with the other accused while the deceased was dragged to the house. The deposition would reveal that after the other accused assaulted the deceased with sword, A-3 came thereafter and assaulted the deceased with stone lying there. We, therefore, find that the prosecution has not been in a position to establish that A-3 shared the common intention with the other accused to cause the murder of the deceased.

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32. For the reasons stated above, we uphold the conviction and sentence of A-1, A-2 and A-4 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and dismiss their Criminal Appeal No. 2852 of 2023 against the judgment of the High Court of Telangana in Criminal Appeal No. 308 of 2005 dated 26.04.2022. We acquit A-3 of the conviction and sentence under Section 302 read with Section 34 and convict him under Section 304 Part II and sentence him to undergo imprisonment for 10 years. To this extent, the appeal of A-3 is allowed by altering the conviction under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC. ”

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30. A grievous injury on a vital part i.e. head is undoubtedly sufficient

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in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. But the question is not capacity of the injury; it is whether, in these circumstances, we can safely infer intention to cause death or that very particular injury. Given the heat-of-passion domestic quarrel, lack of pre-planning, intoxication, and single blow, we are not persuaded the prosecution has crossed the threshold to prove intention beyond reasonable doubt.

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31. At the very least, the appellant knew that striking the head with a rapa (spade) was likely to cause death. That maps squarely attracting Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

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32. The record satisfies the Chronological four-part test: (i) sudden quarrel; (ii) no premeditation; (iii) heat of passion; (iv) no evidence of undue advantage or cruelty (there is no repetition of blows; the weapon appears to be available in the house ; the assault was momentary). Thus, Exception 4 is attracted; the offence cannot be murder.

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33. So far as recovery and medical consistency are concerned, the recovery of the rapa (spade) on the appellant’s disclosure and the medical opinion (Ex.P/9) that the said weapon could have caused the injuries sustained by the deceased, undoubtedly, fortify authorship and connect the accused with the assault. These circumstances lend assurance to the prosecution version. However, such factors, by themselves, cannot automatically elevate the offence to murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, particularly when the surrounding circumstances demonstrate that the incident occurred during a sudden quarrel.

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34. On careful consideration of the ocular and medical evidence, it is evident that the incident was not a premeditated or pre-planned act. From the evidence of both eyewitnesses, it stands established that the appellant/accused assaulted the deceased with a rapa (spade) during a sudden quarrel arising out of a domestic dispute concerning the sale of household rice. The prosecution evidence does not reveal any prior enmity or pre-arrangement. The occurrence took place in the heat of passion when tempers flared between father and son. Although the blow was directed at a vital part of the body, namely the head, it was only a single blow. Therefore, while intention to cause death is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, knowledge that such an act was likely to cause death is clearly attributable. The case thus falls squarely within the ambit of Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

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35. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that the appellant is guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. His culpability is manifest from the fact that he inflicted the fatal blow with a rapa (spade) upon his father, Ramlal Sahu, which resulted in his death. Nonetheless, the surrounding circumstances—absence of premeditation, the incident having occurred in the course of a sudden quarrel, and the appellant’s inebriated state— justify alteration of conviction from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

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36. As regards the sentence, this Court is mindful of the principle that punishment must balance deterrence with proportionality. While the act

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of the appellant warrants censure and cannot be condoned, the mitigating circumstances, particularly that the incident was not a coldblooded or calculated murder but a spontaneous act, must also weigh in sentencing. In the considered opinion of this Court, rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Section 304 Part II of the IPC would meet the ends of justice. Such a sentence would adequately punish the appellant, serve as a deterrent against violence in domestic disputes, and yet not be unduly harsh in the peculiar facts of this case.

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37. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant has been in custody since 23.05.2021 and has already undergone more than four years, three months, and twenty days of incarceration. He is, therefore, convicted under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. The appellant shall serve out the sentence as modified hereinabove.

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38. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. Consequently, I.A. No. 1 of 2025 also stands disposed off .

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39. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail, where the appellant is lodged, with a direction to serve the same upon the appellant and inform him that he is at liberty to assail this judgment by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, with the assistance of the High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.

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40. Let a copy of this judgment along with the original record be

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transmitted forthwith to the concerned trial Court for information and

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necessary compliance.

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Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

¶166

Brijmohan

Safed Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Safed Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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