State of Chhattisgarh Vs Salik Ram

Salikram, S/o.-Rohidas, Aged about 35 years, R/o.-Junwani, P.S. Kanker, At present – Bafna Crusher Machine, Kotela, P.S. - Charama, District – Kanker (CG)

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... Respondent

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For Appellant : Mr. Hariom Rai, Panel Lawyer For Respondent : Mr.Amit Kumar, Advocate appears as amicus curiae

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ

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29/10/2025

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1. Though the accused / respondent is represented by Mr. C.P.Sahu,

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Mr. S.P.Sahu and Mr. Aditya Kumar, Advocates, but on repeated calls, they were not present to contest the matter.

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2. In view of the same, this Court proceeds to appoint Mr.Amit Kumar, who is present in the Court, as amicus curiae on behalf of

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the respondent as today the acquittal appeal is listed for final hearing and is of the year 2010.

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3. By this acquittal appeal under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as “CrPC”), the appellant/State calls in question legality and propriety of the judgment of acquittal dated 27.04.2010 passed by learned Sessions Judge, North Bastar, Kanker in Sessions Trial No.88/2009, whereby the respondent was acquitted of the charge under Sections 4 & 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (hereinafter called as “Act of 1908”)

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4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 24.11.2008, SubInspector K.M. Mishra of Police Station Charama, along with Assistant Sub-Inspector Thanuram Nayak, Constable No. 436 Sadanand Churendra and Ishwar Mandavi, went towards village Kotela for the purpose of crime investigation. He received information from an informer that Salikram Sahu, Manager of Bafna Crusher in village Kotela, was illegally keeping explosive materials in the mine for carrying out blasts. Believing the information to be true, he, along with witnesses Sudesh Markam, resident of Makdi and Suresh Kumar Komra, resident of Bhiraud, conducted a raid at Bafna Crusher. During the raid, accused / respondent Salikram, son of Rohidas, resident of Junwani, was found at Bafna Crusher. From his possession, explosive materials were recovered from the crusher machine room including 6.25

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meters of safety fuse wire, 6.500 grams of explosive powder kept in a sack of urea, and 05 detonators. These materials were seized from his possession. When asked to produce authorization documents regarding the possession of explosive materials, the accused / respondent stated that he had no such licence. Consequently, an offence was registered against him under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1908. 6.25 meters of safety fuse wire, 6.500 grams of explosive powder kept in a sack of urea, and 05 detonators were seized from the possession of the accused / respondent vide Ex.P-1. The investigating officer prepared the spot map vide Ex.P-3. The accused / respondent was arrested on 24.11.2008 vide arrest memo Ex.P-4. Patwari also prepared the spot map vide Ex.P-5. Sanction for prosecution was obtained from the District Magistrate, North Bastar Kanker vide Ex.P-7. FIR was registered vide Ex.P-10.

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5. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanker, who in turn, committed the case to the Court of Sessions, North Bastar Kanker.

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6. In order to bring home of the offence, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses and exhibited 12 documents as Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/12

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7. The statement of the accused / respondent was examined under Section 313 CrPC, wherein he denied all the incriminating circumstances put to him as appearing in the evidence led by the

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prosecution. He asserted that he has been falsely implicated in the present case and claimed complete innocence.

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8. After affording due opportunity of hearing to both the parties and upon appreciation of the evidence available on record, learned Sessions Judge, North Bastar Kanker, vide the impugned judgment dated 27.10.2010, acquitted the accused/respondent of all the charges framed against him.

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9. Aggrieved by the said judgment of acquittal, the State has preferred the present appeal.

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10. Mr. Hariom Rai, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the appellant/State submits that the trial Court has erred in acquitting the respondent from the offences charged. He further submits that the trial Court is not justified by discarding the prosecution case as the independent seizure witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. He also submits that learned trial Court is not justified by suspecting the case of the prosecution to the extent that the explosive substances were recovered from the exclusive possession of the respondent. As such, the acquittal appeal deserves to be allowed, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and the respondent deserves to be convicted of the charge under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1908.

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11. On the other hand, Mr.Amit Kumar, learned amicus curiae supports the impugned judgment and submits that learned trial Court after considering the material available on record has rightly

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acquitted the accused / respondent. As such, the acquittal appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment and records of the trial Court.

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13. This appeal challenges the acquittal by learned Sessions Judge under Section 378(1) CrPC. While exercising appellate jurisdiction, the Court must act with caution, recognizing that the trial Court has the advantage of observing witness demeanour and assessing credibility firsthand. The accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt, but only if it is real and substantial, such as a doubt a reasonable person would honestly entertain. Mere theoretical doubts or minor discrepancies not affecting the core prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. The appellate Court must ensure the trial Court properly appreciated all evidence and extended the benefit of doubt in line with settled principles.

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14. The Supreme Court in the matter of C. Antony v. Raghavan Nair¹ , and Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha² has observed that an appellate Court should not substitute its own view unless the trial Court’s findings are perverse or relevant, convincing evidence has been unjustifiably ignored, providing compelling reason for interference.

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15. The principles in Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab³ ,

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1 AIR 2003 SC 182

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2 AIR 2004 SC 1053

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3 AIR 1987 SC 1083

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clarify that while an appellate Court can examine an acquittal, it must do so cautiously. The trial Court has the advantage of observing witnesses and assessing credibility. Interference is warranted only if the trial Court committed a manifest error, ignored material evidence, or reached a conclusion based on conjecture or misappreciation. Minor discrepancies cannot outweigh the core, consistent, and credible testimony unless they go to the root of the case. Interference is justified only in exceptional circumstances where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice and held in para 6 as under:-

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“……….the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a re-appreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.”

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16. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram⁴ , the Supreme Court held that an appellate Court must exercise extreme caution before interfering with an acquittal. The trial Court’s advantage in observing witness demeanour and trial conduct cannot be lightly disregarded. Interference is warranted only in exceptional cases where the trial Court committed a manifest error, overlooked material evidence, relied on conjecture, or reached a palpably perverse conclusion. Minor contradictions or inconsistencies not affecting the core prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. Thus, while an appellate Court may review an acquittal, it must do so circumspectly, extending the benefit of doubt only when a reasonable and substantial doubt exists and has held as follows:-

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"8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all."

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17. Further, in the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of

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Kerala⁵ , the Supreme Court held as under:-

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"25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate Court has to consider whether the trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason

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4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984

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5 (2022) 8 SCC 440

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is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters."

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18. While exercising appellate jurisdiction against an acquittal, the Court may re-appreciate all evidence such as, oral and documentary, to determine whether the trial Court correctly weighed the materials and assigned valid reasons. If the trial Court’s conclusions are unsustainable, erroneous, or perverse, the appellate Court may arrive at its own conclusion.

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19. The trial Court while acquitting the accused / respondent has observed that from reading Ex.P-7, it is clear that the District Magistrate did not personally examine the explosive articles. Clerk Omnarayan Tiwari (PW-4) himself has admitted in his crossexamination that the seized property was not sent by the police. The then District Magistrate merely signed the approval in a routine manner on the sanction letter. Therefore, the acknowledgment given in Ex.P-7 in light of the above legal precedent and the admissions made by Omnarayan Tiwari in cross-examination, cannot be considered valid. As held in AIR 1920 Lahore 367 , an approval must contain a brief description of the facts leading to the alleged offence and must indicate the authority granting permission to prosecute. This ensures that it is

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clear that the District Magistrate, Kanker actually authorized prosecution as claimed in Ex.P-7.

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20. The trial Court in para 24 of its judgment has further observed that Avkash Ram Nareti (PW-7) stated that the seized property was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur for chemical examination and that the receipt (Ex.P-9) was obtained. Perusal of Ex.P-9 reveals that it is dated 19.12.2008. This report was not proven by the prosecution during the trial. It is thus evident that the District Magistrate under Section 7 of the Act of 1908 formally signed the approval letter without personally examining the explosive materials and did not appear in court to prove the issuance of the order. Therefore, this permission cannot be considered legally valid.

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21. The trial Court in para 25 of its judgment has held that on the basis of the above discussion, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on 24.11.2008, the accused, in a room near Bafna Crusher machine in village Kotela, kept explosive materials specifically, 6.25 meters of safety fuse wire, 6.500 grams of explosive powder in a urea sack, and 5 detonators under his sole control, with the intention of endangering the lives of Indian citizens or putting them at risk. The prosecution has also failed to prove that the District Magistrate, Kanker had legally granted permission to prosecute accused Salikram under Section 7 of the Act of 1908. Therefore, the trial Court has acquitted the

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accused / respondent of the charges under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1908.

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22. The State has filed the present appeal challenging the acquittal of respondent Salikram by learned Sessions Judge, North Bastar Kanker under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1908. The trial Court, after full consideration of evidence including the statements of witnesses and documents Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-12, concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, the trial Court observed that Ex.P-7, the sanction letter by the District Magistrate, Kanker, did not indicate personal examination of the explosive materials. The clerk, Omnarayan Tiwari (PW-4), admitted that the seized property was not sent to the District Magistrate. The approval was merely signed in routine, and therefore cannot be considered legally valid. Ex.P-9, the receipt for sending the materials for chemical examination, was dated 19.12.2008 and was not proven by the prosecution. Hence, the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the District Magistrate had legally authorized prosecution under Section 7 of the Act of 1908. There was no evidence to establish that the accused / respondent intended to endanger the lives of Indian citizens or put them at risk with the explosive materials. The prosecution has also failed to produce corroborating evidence from seizure witnesses that would link the accused / respondent exclusively to the possession or intention to use the explosives illegally.

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23. The State’s appeal rests on challenging the trial Court’s appreciation of evidence and alleging misjudgment. However, it is settled law that an appellate Court cannot interfere with an acquittal unless the trial Court’s conclusions are perverse, based on manifest illegality, or ignoring material evidence. The trial Court is best positioned to assess witness credibility and demeanor. Minor inconsistencies or theoretical doubts do not justify setting aside an acquittal. Where two plausible views exist, the appellate Court must respect the view taken by the trial Court unless it is impossible or perverse. No material evidence has been overlooked by the trial Court in reaching its decision and as such, the accused / respondent is entitled to the benefit of doubt, which has been correctly applied by the trial Court.

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24. Considering all these factors, the acquittal is a plausible and wellreasoned conclusion. The State’s appeal under Section 378(1) Cr.P.C. lacks merit and is dismissed . The judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court is hereby affirmed.

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Sd/- Sd/-

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(Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Bablu

State of Chhattisgarh v. Salik Ram

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State of Chhattisgarh v. Salik Ram

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