Janiya Bai Vs State Of Chhattisgarh And Ors.

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2025:CGHC:18917 NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

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ACQA No. 20 of 2015

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Janiya Bai W/o Bhagwan Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Dhodhapur Khapri, Police Station-Patharia, Distt. Mungeli, Civil District Bilaspur C.G. , Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh And Ors. S/o Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Patharia, Distt. Mungeli, Civil District Bilaspur C.G. , Chhattisgarh

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2 - Parasar @ Prasar S/o Mukutram Aged About 22 Years Caste - Lodhi, R/o Village - Dhodhapur Khapri, Police Station-Patharia, District Mungeli, Civil District - Bilaspur C.G.

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3 - Roshan Kumar S/o Krishna Kumar Rajput Aged About 21 Years Caste - Lodhi, R/o Village - Dhodhapur Khapri, Police Station-Patharia, District Mungeli, Civil District - Bilaspur C.G.

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4 - Lomash Kumar S/o Taran Singh Aged About 19 Years Caste - Lodhi, R/o Village - Dhodhapur Khapri, Police Station-Patharia, District Mungeli, Civil District - Bilaspur C.G.

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5 - Ajay Kumar S/o Mukutram Aged About 19 Years Caste - Lodhi, R/o Village - Dhodhapur Khapri, Police Station-Patharia, District Mungeli, Civil District - Bilaspur C.G.

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6 - Krishna Kumar S/o Sadriram Lodhi Aged About 40 Years Caste - Lodhi, R/o Village - Dhodhapur Khapri, Police Station-Patharia, District Mungeli, Civil District - Bilaspur C.G.

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7 - Taran Singh S/o Laxman Singh Lodhi Aged About 39 Years Caste - Lodhi, R/o Village - Dhodhapur Khapri, Police Station-Patharia, District Mungeli, Civil District - Bilaspur C.G.

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... Respondents

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For Appellant : Ms. Sameeksha Gupta, Advocate For State : Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, Govt. Advocate ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge

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Order on Board

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25.04.2025

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Today when the matter is called out for hearing, no one appeared on behalf of the appellant, therefore, requested for assistance from a counsel of the High Court Legal Aid Services Committee, Ms. Sameeksha Gupta, Advocate has been nominated to assist the Court.

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I have gone through the judgment under appeal and the depositions of witnesses and exhibits assisted both by Advocate, Ms. Sameeksha Gupta through the High Court Legal Services Committee and Learned State Counsel. In view of (2014) 14 SCC 222 (Surya Baksh Singh V. State of Uttar Pradesh) , I do not consider it necessary to adjourn this case and issue fresh notice to the appellant as his interest has been duly taken care of by nominating

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another counsel from the High Court Legal Services Committee.

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With the consent of learned counsel for the respective parties the matter is heard finally.

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This Appeal filed under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been preferred by the appellant against the impugned judgment of acquittal passed in Special Sessions Case No. 29/2012 by the Court of learned Special Judge (Atrocities), Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh (Annexure A/1) dated 24.12.2014 from the charges punishable under Sections 294, 506 of Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(10) and 3(1)(11) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

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The case in nutshell is that complainant/appellant lodged an FIR against the present respondents on 15^th June, 2011 stating that at around 2:00PM that she along with her elder sister was going for answering the nature’s call, at that time the respondents with the intent to outrage their modesty held her elder sister’s hand upon which she started shouting. The respondents started hitting her with fists and hand, thereafter they grabbed the chest of her sister. They both shouted and ran towards their home. Upon hearing their voice, their mother and elder sister came to rescue them. The respondents started abusing them using filthy language based on castes. They even hit their mother and elder sister with stick due to which they received grievous injuries on

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forehead and head. Thereafter threatened them to kill.

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After due investigation, the respondent accused were tried for the offence punishable under Section as mentioned above.

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In order to prove the case, prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses in its favour. And thereafter the accused statements were recorded by the trial court under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.

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After perusal of the record learned trial court as upon consideration of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submission of the accused respondents and the prosecution in this case found that there is sufficient ground for considering the charges against the accused, therefore,learned Trial Court held the respondents guilty of the offences punishable under the aforementioned sections. However, accused Krishna Kumar and Taran were acquitted from all the charges leveled against them.

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Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned judgment dated 24.12.2014 is perverse, erroneous, contrary to law, facts and circumstances of the case. The learned trial court has failed to appreciate the deposition of appellant PW-02 and her daughters who categorically deposed that the respondents no. 2 to 7 were taken near Jaystambh by abusing with derogative and filthy languages in the name of caste. Learned trial court has failed to appreciate that the allegation of appellant is supported by the independent witnesses, therefore acquittal of

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respondents no. 2 to 7 is bad in the eye of law. Hence she prays to set aside the impugned judgment dated 24.12.2014 passed by the learned trial court and convict and sentence the respondent no. 2 to 7 for the offences punishable under Section 294, 506 of Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(10), and 3(1) (11) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, in the interest of justice.

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On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents opposed the prayer made by the learned counsel for the State by stating that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond any doubt. Moreover there seems to be no cognizable ground upon which this appeal deserves to be allowed. Hence, prays for dismissal of the present appeal.

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I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length and perused the record with utmost circumspection.

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The victim in her statement has stated that she along with her sister was going to answer the nature’s call, at the same time accused persons tried to grab their chest and started abusing them. On shouting, one person name Jagdhar came and accused on seeing him ran away. As soon as Jaghar went from that place the accused again came and thereafter when they both again shouted upon seeing the accused persons, mother of the both came. Thereby the accused assaulted them by way of hand and fist. The statement of the victim was supported by her

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sister.

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To prove the offence under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code any obscene abuses or words must be uttered in a public place. Any obscene song, ballad or word is uttered or recited envisaged in Clause A. The obscene act in a public place envisaged in A can also be said to be committed. Therefore, it clearly appears that Clause B of Section 294 is redundant. But, it is not so. Clause B is attracted when an obscene act is committed in a public place, while Clause B is attracted when the specified therein is not only committed in a public place but also when it is committed near a public place. Section 506 of the IPC deals with the punishment for criminal intimidation. It is committed when someone intentionally causes fear or alarm in another person by threatening to injure their person, reputation, or property. However, in the present case at hand, the same has not been proved by the prosecution.

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To constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(10) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 there must be wilful insult or intimidation by a member of non-Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe in a place in public view, with an intent to insult a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribes. Merely calling a person by his caste name, though may amount to insult, does not appear to fall under all the four elements mentioned in Section 3(1)(10) of the said Act.

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Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, criminalizes the assault on or use of force against a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe with the intent to dishonour or outrage her modesty . The offence requires a connection to the victim's caste or tribe, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court in cases where conviction for this section necessitates that the act of outraging modesty was committed on the grounds of caste.

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Close scrutiny of the evidence placed on record reveals that prosecution has failed to prove that the accused must be held for the offence punishable under Section 294 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 3(1)(10), 3(1)(11) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, beyond reasonable doubt . Hence, there seems to be no illegality or infirmity in the judgment passed by the Trial Court.

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Taking into consideration the findings recorded by the learned trial Court, acquitting the respondent from aforesaid offences, I do not find any reason to allow this appeal for grant of leave. Moreover age of the appellants at the time of commission of the offence and particularly the appellants are facing lis from last 10 years, they are on bail and in this case, this court is of the considered view that justice would not be met if, upholding the conviction under Section 294, 506 of IPC and Section 3(1)(10), and 3(1)(11) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Act for which appellants have already been acquitted. Also accused

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Taran and Krishna Kumare were acquitted from all the charges leveled against them, which in the considered opinion of this Court is correct and needs no interference.

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Recently, applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram” reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 984, has held as follows:-

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“8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interfere would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all.”

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Accordingly, the present Appeal is dismissed and is consequently disposed of . sd/-

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(Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge

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alfiza

Janiya Bai v. State Of Chhattisgarh And Ors.

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Janiya Bai v. State Of Chhattisgarh And Ors.

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