Shankar Lal Agrawal Vs Umesh Sinha

¶1

1

¶2

2025:CGHC:20261

¶3

Digitally signed byAVINASH AVINASH SHARMA SHARMA Date: 2025.05.05 10:52:15 +0530

¶4

NAFR

¶5

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

¶6

ACQA No. 143 of 2025

¶7

1 - Shankar Lal Agrawal S/o Late Kirodimal Agrawal Aged About 65 Years R/o Prop Shankar Sales Corporation, Address Pt. Deendayal Upadhyay Market, Plant Road, Khursipar Gate, Shop No. 12/1, P.S. Khursipar, Tehsil And Dist. Durg (C.G.).

¶8

... Appellant/Complainant.

¶9

versus

¶10

1 - Umesh Sinha S/o Shankar Lal Sinha Aged About 47 Years R/o Of Patel Para, Ward No. 43, Station Maroda, P.S. Nevai, Tehsil And Dist - Durg (C.G.).

¶11

...Respondent/Accused. For Appellant : Shri Raza Ali along with Pushp Kumar Gupta, Advocates. For Respondent : Shri Virendra Kashyap, Advocate.

¶12

Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari

¶13

Judgment on Board

¶14

02/05/2025

¶15

This Acquittal Appeal has been preferred against the judgment of acquittal dated 25.10.2024 passed in criminal complaint case No.9551/2017 by JMFC, Durg (Chhattisgarh), whereby the respondent/accused was acquitted of the charges under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments

¶16

2

¶17

Act, 1881 (henceforth “the Act, 1881”).

¶18

As per the averments made in the complaint, the complainant and the respondent/accused were having business relations. Respondent/accused purchased some electronic goods and for payment of the outstanding amount, he gave three different cheques vide Ex.P/1 of Rs.1,15,000/dated 03.08.2017, Ex.P/3 dated 10.08.2017 amounting to Rs.1,29,900/and Ex.P/5 dated 14.07.2017 amounting to Rs.1,40,900/-. When the said cheques were presented for encashment, the same got dishonoured on account of insufÏciency of funds which was communicated by the appellant’s Bank. Thereafter, a legal notice was sent vide Ex.P/16 and despite receiving the same, payment of the cheque was not made. Thereafter, a complaint was filed.

¶19

The complainant in order to prove its case examined himself and Abhijeet Alok(CW-2), Branch Manager of appellant’s Bank i.e. Bank of Maharashtra.

¶20

Respondent/accused abjured his guilt and stated that he being a guarantor had given a blank cheque against loan for the purpose of finance of an vehicle Activa to one Rohit Auto, Utai and the said cheques were misused.

¶21

Learned trial Court, after evaluating the evidence, acquitted the respondent/accused. Hence this appeal.

¶22

Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the trial Court has wrongly acquitted the respondent/accused in compliance of Section 146 of the Act, 1881 as in the return memo, there is no seal or signature, though as per the circular of Reserve Bank of India, both seal and signature are mandatory. Learned counsel further submits that appellant has examined one of the ofÏcers of the Bank, who categorically deposed that the said

¶23

3

¶24

clause has been complied with and the cheque was dishonoured on account of insufÏciency of funds. He would further submit that finding arrived at by the trial Court is perverse and prays to allow this appeal.

¶25

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would support the impugned judgment.

¶26

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection.

¶27

In the matter of Budh Singh vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 9 SCC 731] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in a matter of Appeal against acquittal, the High Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, although the view of the Appellate Court is a more probable one. However, while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, it is free to consider the entire evidences on record so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. It is also entitled to consider as to whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court has failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and has taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law.

¶28

10.Further, in the matter of V.N. Ratheesh vs. State of Kerala, (2006) 10 SCC 617, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is no embargo on the Appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court said that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,

¶29

4

¶30

one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. It is further held that the paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. It was also observed that the principle to be followed by appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference.

¶31

In the matter of Rajesh Jain vs. Ajay Singh¹ it has been observed that

¶32

presumption under Section 118 & 139 of the Act, 1881 are rebuttable in nature and following was materially observed at paras 33 to 44, which read as under:-

¶33

“33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that “unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability”. It will be seen that the “ presumed fact” directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138. The rules discussed hereinbelow are common to both the presumptions under Section 139

¶34

1 (2023) 10 SCC 148

¶35

5

¶36

and Section 118 and are hence, not repeatedreference to one can be taken as reference to another”

¶37

“ 34. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a “shall presume” clause is illustrative of a presumption of law. Because Section 139 requires that the Court “shall presume” the fact stated therein, it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. But this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary as is clear from the use of the phrase “ unless the contrary is proved” .”

¶38

“ 35. The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had been issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer of the cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque and secondly , in the event where the complainant proves that cheque was issued/executed in his favour by the drawer. The circumstances set out above form the fact(s) which bring about the activation of the presumptive clause. [ Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. v. Amin Chand Payrelal] [(1999) 3 SCC 35]”

¶39

“ 36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that presumption takes effect even in a situation where the accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 197]. Therefore, mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of the entire contents in the cheque, is now sufÏcient to trigger the presumption.”

¶40

“37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden

¶41

6

¶42

is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further.”

¶43

“38. John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law on Evidence states as follows:

¶44

“The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufÏcient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule.”

¶45

“39. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-existence of the presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of “ preponderance of probabilities” , similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan (AIR 2010 SC 1898)]”

¶46

“40. In order to rebut the presumption and prove to the contrary, it is open to the accused to raise a probable defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. The words “ until the contrary is proved” occurring in Section 139 do not mean that accused must necessarily prove the negative that the instrument is not issued in discharge of any debt/liability but the accused has the option to ask the Court to consider the non-existence of debt/liability so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition that debt/liability did not exist. [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa (AIR 2019 SC 1983) ; see also Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513 ]”

¶47

“41. In other words, the accused is left with two options. The first option-of proving that the debt/liability does not exist-is to lead defence

¶48

7

¶49

evidence and conclusively establish with certainty that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The second option is to prove the nonexistence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances of the case. The preponderance of probability in favour of the accused’s case may be even fifty-one to forty-nine and arising out of the entire circumstances of the case, which includes: the complainant's version in the original complaint, the case in the legal/demand notice, complainant's case at the trial, as also the plea of the accused in the reply notice, his 313 CrPC statement or at the trial as to the circumstances under which the promissory note/cheque was executed. All of them can raise a preponderance of probabilities justifying a finding that there was “ no debt/liability”. [Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513]”

¶50

“42. The nature of evidence required to shift the evidential burden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e., oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by the opposite party; it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumption of law or fact.”

¶51

“43. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the instrument was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability and, if he adduces acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts to the complainant. At the same time, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift to the complainant. It is open for him to also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance those mentioned in Section 114 and other sections of the Evidence Act. The burden of proof may shift by presumptions of law or fact. In Kundan Lal case v. Custodian (Evacuee Property), AIR 1961 SC 1316 when the creditor had failed to produce his account books, this Court raised a presumption of fact under Section 114, that the evidence, if produced would have shown the non-existence of consideration. Though, in that case, this Court was dealing with the presumptive clause in Section 118 NI Act, since the nature of the presumptive clauses in Sections 118 and 139 is the same, the analogy can be extended and applied in the context of Section 139 as well.”

¶52

8

¶53

“44. Therefore, in fine, it can be said that once the accused adduces evidence to the satisfaction of the Court that on a preponderance of probabilities there exists no debt/liability in the manner pleaded in the complaint or the demand notice or the afÏdavitevidence, the burden shifts to the complainant and the presumption “ disappears” and does not haunt the accused any longer. The onus having now shifted to the complainant, he will be obliged to prove the existence of a debt/liability as a matter of fact and his failure to prove would result in dismissal of his complaint case. Thereafter, the presumption under Section 139 does not again come to the complainant's rescue. Once both parties have adduced evidence, the Court has to consider the same and the burden of proof loses all its importance. [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, AIR 2019 SC 1983; see also, Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441]”

¶54

12.If I examine the facts and circumstances of the case in light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the abovementioned cases, it is vivid that the respondent/accused has taken a plea by examining himself that his friend namely Sahid Khan @ Kaju has purchased an Activa vehicle on finance from Rohit Auto, Utai and he, being a guarantor, gave the cheque. Respondent/accused further stated that he was only a driver and has never purchased any goods from the shop of the complainant. In the cross-examination, the complainant has not given a suggestion that the respondent was not working as Driver. Further, considering the various purchase bills, which have been produced vide Ex.P/6 to Ex.P/15, it appears that unless a person is doing a business, normally there would be no requirement of so many refrigerators, televisions, diwans etc. Moreover, when the respondent/accused himself has come before the Court and narrated his occupation as Driver, then, it

¶55

9

¶56

was the complainant, who was under the obligation, to put certain question about such supply. Looking to the manner in which, without any payment, the goods were regularly supplied on credit only after obtaining the cheques which was not acknowledged in the bill book, though the ledger has not been produced, all the transactions appear to be dubious.

¶57

For the foregoing, this Court is of opinion that the view taken by the trial Court is a possible one and the finding recorded by it, acquitting the respondent/accused is just and proper and there is no reason to take a different view in this case.

¶58

14.In the result, this Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

¶59

Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge

¶60

Avinash

Shankar Lal Agrawal v. Umesh Sinha

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Shankar Lal Agrawal v. Umesh Sinha

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Premsukh Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Mrs. Anita Xess Vs E-Trading Academy

Lalit Jain Vs Ritesh Nathani

Chhagan Lal Ganjeer Vs Kaushilaya Bai

Maulana Waliullah Vs Kyamuddin Hasan Urf Panne Kabadi

Arvind Patel Vs Rajkumar Pando