Remanded

M.K. Rai v. the Union of India and Others

Chhattisgarh HC9 Jun 2024WPS/6771/2008

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court condoned the delay in filing a revision petition by a railway inspector. It set aside a revisional order that dismissed the matter on technical grounds of limitation without affording an opportunity to file an application for condonation of delay.

What did the court decide?

The order of the Revisional Authority dated 09.04.2008 is set aside, the petition is dismissed for lack of prosecution is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Revisional Authority to be decided

M.K. Rai Vs the Union of India and Others — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Chhattisgarh HC (2024)

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

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WPS No. 6771 of 2008

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M.K. Rai S/o Shri Ramagya Rai aged about 44 years, presently working and posted as Inspector/R.P.F. (Intelligence) Zonal Headquarter, South East, Central Railway, Bilaspur Division at Bilaspur (C.G.)

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---- Petitioner

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Versus

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1. The Union Of India, Through, the Secretary, Ministry of Railways Rail Bhawan,New Delhi

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2. The South Eastern Central Railway Through : its General Manager, Bilaspur (C.G.)

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3. The Divisional Security Commissioner/ R.P.F. SECR Bilaspur (C.G.)

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4. The Chief Security Commissioner, R.P.F. SECR Bilaspur (C.G.)

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5. The Deputy Chief Security Commissioner, RPF SECR Bilaspur (C.G.)

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6. The Inquiry Officer (A.S.C./R.P.F.), Bilaspur (C.G.)

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---- Respondents

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(cause title is taken from case information system)

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For Petitioner : Mr. Achyut Tiwari, Advocate For Union of India : Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Deputy Solicitor General

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board

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10.06.2024

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1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief (s) :

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“ 10.1 The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records from the office of respondents with regard to the case of the petitioner.

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10.2 The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the orders impugned dated 18.10.2006 (Annexure P/5), 20.01.2007 (Annexure P/6) and 09.04.2008 (Annexure P/7) passed by the respondents authorities respectively.

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10.3 The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief, which deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.

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10.4 Cost of the petition.”

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Mr. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that at the relevant time, the petitioner was holding the post of Inspector, R.P.F. Manendragarh and he registered an FIR on 04.04.2005 against the unknown persons. On 27.06.2006, the articles of charge were issued against the petitioner making the allegation that the petitioner could not complete the investigation within the prescribed period and failed to arrest the culprits. An Inquiry Officer was appointed, he submitted the inquiry report and subsequently, a punishment was imposed by the disciplinary authority on 18.10.2006, whereby the punishment of reduction of pay by two stages lower for one year in the existing pay scale with cumulative effect was imposed against the petitioner. He would further submit that an appeal was preferred which was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 20.01.2007. Mr. Tiwari would also submit that thereafter, a revision was preferred after 10 months of getting the appellate order before respondent No. 4 along with an application for condonation of delay but the same was dismissed by the authority on the ground of limitation alone. He would also submit that the authority ought to have taken a lenient view while entertaining the revision preferred by the petitioner. He would lastly submit that by a non-speaking order, the revisional authority dismissed the revision preferred by the petitioner.

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1. On the other hand, Mr. Mishra, Deputy Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Tiwari. He would

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submit that sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner. He would further submit that there was an inordinate delay in preferring the revision before the Revisional Authority and the delay caused in filing the revision was not properly explained, therefore the authority concerned rightly dismissed the revision so preferred by the petitioner.

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1. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record.

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1. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Ranjeet Singh Kumpawat vs. The Madhya Pradesh Gramin Bank (erstwhile Central Madhya Pradesh Gramin Bank) & another passed in WP No.7223 of 2019 while dealing with the issue of limitation in para 8 has held as under :

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“8. From the record, it is apparent that the petition has been filed on 31.03.2109 after more than two years from the date of passing of the impugned order by the respondents on 08.12.2016 and to explain the delay the petitioner has also placed on record the various medical certificates issued in this behalf to demonstrate that he was suffering from various ailments hence, in view of the same, even though the petitioner had also attended the Bank during the said period, it cannot be said that this would be a sufficient ground not to allow the petitioner to contest the matter on merits especially when a major penalty has been imposed against him. It is also found that the respondents have clearly stated in their reply that had the petitioner submitted an application for condonation of delay, it would have been placed before the appellate authority and thus the appeal of the petitioner, which was barred by limitation of only two days was not even placed before the appellate authority. It is trite law that a judicial or quasi judicial authority must always make endeavour to decide the matters on merits rather then dismiss the same on technical grounds. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94 , in para 11 to 14 has held as under:-

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“11. Power to condone the delay in approaching the court has been conferred upon the courts to enable them to do

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substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. This Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji held that the expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice— that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It was further observed that a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: (SCC p. 108, para 3)

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“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

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2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

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3. ‘Every day’s delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

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4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.

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5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

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6. It must be grasped that judiciary is

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respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”

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12. After referring to the various judgments reported in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi, Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe, Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath, O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakh- mir Singh, Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra, G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India, Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India, Ram Kishan v. U.P. SRTC and Warlu v. Gangotribai this Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani held: (SCC p. 138, para 11)

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“11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court — be it by private party or the State — are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an evenhanded manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the in-herited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the notemaking, file-pushing, and passing-onthe-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of

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pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.”To the same effect is the

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judgment of this Court in Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma.

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13. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab this Court under the peculiar circumstances of the case condoned the delay in approaching this Court of about 31 years. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy this Court held that the purpose of the Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a lifespan for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching then court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack of mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context it was observed: (SCC p. 127, para 9)

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“9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior

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court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court.”

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14. Looking into the facts and circumstances of the case, as noticed earlier and with the object of doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned, we are of the opinion that sufficient cause has been made out by the petitioners which has persuaded us to condone the delay in filing the petitions. Dismissing the appeals on technical grounds of limitation would not, in any way, advance the interests of justice but admittedly, result in failure of justice as the impugned judgments are likely to affect not only the parties before us, but hundreds of other persons who are stated to be senior than the respondents. The technicalities of law cannot prevent us from doing substantial justice and undoing the illegalities perpetuated on the basis of the impugned judgments. However, while deciding the petitions, the reliefs in the case can appropriately be moulded which may not amount to unsettle the settled rights of the parties on the basis of judicial pronouncements made by the courts regarding which the State is shown to have been careless and negligent. It is the paramount consideration of this Court to safeguard the interests of all the litigants and persons serving the Police Department of the State of Bihar by ensuring the security of their tenure and non-disturbance of accrual of rights upon them under the prevalent law and the rules made in that behalf. Accordingly delay in filing the petitions is condoned.”

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In view of the aforesaid dictum, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner deserves for a right of hearing, as a major penalty has been imposed against him and the appeal preferred by him has also been dismissed on the ground that the same was barred by two days only and the petitioner had also not filed the application for condonation of delay, which led to dismissal of his appeal. This Court is of the considered opinion that instead of dismissing the petitioner’s appeal on the ground that no application for condonation of delay has been filed, the respondents ought to have afforded an opportunity to the petitioner to file the application for condonation of delay but it appears that the respondents were more

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interested in seeing to it that the petitioner does not file the appeal.”

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1. Taking into consideration the law laid down by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Ranjeet Singh Kumpawat (supra) and the manner in which the revision preferred by the petitioner has been dealt with by the Revisional Authority, in the opinion of this Court, the order passed by the Revisional Authority dated 09.04.2008 is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Consequently, the order passed by the Revisional Authority is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Revisional Authority to decide the revision on merits.

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1. As the revision was preferred on 20.12.2007, the authority concerned is directed to decide the same within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

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1. With the aforesaid observation(s) and direction(s), the present petition is disposed of .

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Sd/-

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(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge

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rekha

M.K. Rai v. the Union of India and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

M.K. Rai v. the Union of India and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

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