A retired Deputy Director challenged his non-promotion to Joint Director (Geology) in 2009, alleging the DPC downgraded his 2007 ACR and malafide by a colleague. The court held Rule 7(9) permitted comparative grading by the DPC, found no malafide, and dismissed the petition for unexplained five-year delay and laches.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
-1-
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
WPS No. 2078 of 2014
Dr. Datta Mainkar S/o Late J.V. Mainkar Aged About 60 Years,Retired Deputy Director Geology, In The Directorate Of Geology And Mining Chhattisgarh, Department Of Mineral Resources, R/o C -52, Gayatri Nagar, P. And Ps Shankar Nagar, Raipur District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ---- Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Secretary, Department Of Mineral Resources, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Distt. Raipur C.G. , Chhattisgarh.
2. The Director Geology, Directorate Of Geology And Mining, Sonakhan Bhawan, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3. Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission Through Its Secretary, Shankar Anagar, Raipur Distt. Raipur C.G. , District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
4. J.K. Pashine Directorate Of Geology And Mining, Sonakhan Bhawan, Raipur C.G., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
5. Ramesh Rao Bisen Retired Joint Director Geology, Directorate Of Geology And Mining, C 27, Gayatri Nagar, P.O. Shankar Nagar, Raipur C.G. , District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
6. S.K. Trivedi Presently Posted As Officer On Special Duty, Department Of Mineral Resources, State Of Chhattisgarh, Raipur Chhattisgarh, Retired Additional Director, Raipur Directorate Of Geology And Mining Chhattisgarh R/o E-7 Officers Colony Shankar Nagar, Near Bottle House Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ---- Respondents
(Cause Title is taken from Case Information System)
| For Petitioner |
: Mr. Abhyuday Tripathi, Advocate, holding the brief of Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, Advocate |
|---|---|
| For State |
: Ms. Neelima Singh Thakur, Panel Lawyer |
| For Respondent No.3 |
: Mr. Anuroop Panda, Advocate, holding the brief of Mr. B. D. Guru, Advocate |
| For Respondents No. 4 & 5 | : Mr. Keshav Dewangan, Advocate |
Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
12.07.2024
-2-
“10.1 That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue notices to the respondents, returnable on some early date of hearing;
10.2. That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned promotion order dated 01.09.2009 (Annexure P/1);
10.3. That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent State to grant promotion to the petitioner on the post of Joint Director (Geology) w.e.f. 01.09.2009, thereby granting all the earlier promotional benefits w.e.f. 01.09.2009; &
10.4. That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent State to initiate departmental enquiry against the respondent S.K. Trivedi and to take necessary action against respondent S.K. Trivedi, if so requires; &
10.5. That, any other relief(s), which the Hon’ble Court deems fit & proper may kindly be pleased to granted in favour of petitioner.”
-3-
the post of Deputy Director (Geology).
-4-
-5-
Rules, 2003 , (for short, Promotion Rules of 2003), the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) or Screening Committee shall make a comparative assessment of the merit of candidates who are within the zone of consideration and grade them based on their service records. These rules are made under Article 309 read with Articles 16 and 335 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has not challenged the promotion rules on grounds of competency or violation of fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution. He also submitted that the DPC evaluated all candidates within the zone of consideration, categorized them, and recommended the names of respondents No. 4 & 5 for promotion. The petitioner has also not challenged the DPC’s recommendations on grounds of competency or malafide. He contended that the petitioner submitted documents to demonstrate his excellent service record and publications. However, respondents No. 4 & 5 also have an excellent service record with published papers and awards. Thus, the entire petition lacks merit and is hopelessly time-barred, which deserves to be dismissed.
-6-
under:-
“7.(9) The Departmental Promotion/Screening Committee shall make a relative/comparative assessment of the merits of public servants who are within the zone of consideration and make an overall grading of the public servants' merit on the basis of their service records and place them in the categories as "Outstanding", "Very-Good", "Good", "Average" and "Poor" as the case may be. However, only those public servants who are graded as "Very Good" and above will be included in the select list, by placing the public servants graded as "Outstanding" on top followed by those graded as "Very-Good", subject to availability of vacancies, with the public servants with the same grading maintaining their inter-se seniority in the feeder cadre/part of the service/pay scales of post .”
“19.(1) Any person who, does not receive a decision within the time specified in sub-section (1) or clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 7, or is aggrieved by a decision of the Central Public
-7-
Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, may within thirty days from the expiry of such period or from the receipt of such a decision prefer an appeal to such officer who is senior in rank to the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer as the case may be, in each public authority:
Provided that such officer may admit the appeal after the expiry of the period of thirty days if he or she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. ”
-8-
upgraded by the higher authorities; therefore, such direction cannot be issued.
‘17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remain unauthorizedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons -who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle”. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.
Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 64 held as under:-
‘9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. state of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on
-9-
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of England , Vol. 68 (2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression.(see Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510).Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N. Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998)7 SCC 123. Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mils Ltd Vs. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company and Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C.221 in the following words:
“ Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine, Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by this conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case,if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
of Orissa and others reported in 2023 Livelaw (SC) 883, under relevant para
-10-
21 held as under:-
“21 . Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passagesfrom certain decisions of this Court:
(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied)
(B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:
"Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.
Laches
-11-
21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.
23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence.
Acquiescence
24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other.
25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis.” (emphasis supplied)
-12-
(C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301:
"36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case.
X x x
38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court observed that if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action.The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part. However, this general principle would not apply when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v.Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following
-13-
elucidation in Halsbury's Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 1213)
“12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911,p. 395 as follows:
‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part;and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress,but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’
13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?”
39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his
-14-
assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34] Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See “Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures — Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence.
40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.”
-15-
circumstances leading to the report, the relevant para-17 reads as under:-
“17. The principle is well-settled that in accordance with the rules of natural justice, an adverse report in a confidential roll cannot be acted upon to deny promotional opportunities unless it is communicated to the person concerned so that he has an opportunity to improve his work and conduct or to explain the circumstances leading to the report. Such an opportunity is not an empty formality, its object, partially, being to enable the superior authorities to decide on a consideration of the explanation offered by the person concerned, whether the adverse report is justified. Unfortunately, for one reason or another, not arising out of any fault on the part of the appellant, though the adverse report was communicated to him, the Government has not been able to consider his explanation and decide whether the report was justified. In these circumstances, it is difficult to support the nonissuance of the integrity certificate to the appellant. The chain of reaction began with the adverse report and the infirmity in the link of causation is that no one has yet decided whether that report was justified. We cannot speculate, in the absence of a proper pleading, whether the appellant was not found suitable otherwise, that is to say, for reasons other than those connected with the non-issuance of an integrity certificate to him.”
“2. The first respondent was down graded at a certain point of time to which the Service Tribunal gave a correction. Before the High Court, the petitioners' plea was that down grading entries in confidential reports cannot be termed as adverse entries so as to obligate the Nigam to communicate the same to the employee and attract a representation. This argument was turned down by the High Court, as in its view confidential reports, were assets of the employee, since they weigh to his advantage at the promotional and extensional stages of service. The High Court to justify its
-16-
view has given an illustration that if an employee legitimately had earned an 'outstanding' report in a particular year which, in a succeeding one, and without his knowledge, is reduced to the level of 'satisfactory' without any communication to him, it would certainly be adverse and affect him at one or the other stage of his career.
3. We need to explain these observations of the High Court. The Nigam has rules, whereunder an adverse entry is required to be communicated to the employee concerned, but not down grading of an entry. It has been urged on behalf of the Nigam that when the nature of the entry does not reflect any adverseness that is not required to be communicated. As we view it the extreme illustration given by the High Court may reflect an adverse element compulsorily communicable, but if the graded entry is of going a step down, like falling from 'very good' to 'good' that may not ordinarily be an adverse entry since both are a positive grading. All what is required by the Authority recording confidentials in the situation is to record reasons for such down grading on the personal file of the officer concerned, and inform him of the change in the form of an advice. If the variation warranted be not permissible, then the very purpose of writing annual confidential reports would be frustrated. Having achieved an optimum level the employee on his part may slacken in his work, relaxing secure by his one time achievement. This would be an undesirable situation. All the same the sting of adverseness must, in all events, be not reflected in such variations, as otherwise they shall be communicated as such. It may be emphasized that even a positive confidential entry in a given case can previously be adverse and to say that an adverse entry should always be qualitatively damaging may not be true. In the instant case we have seen the service record of the first respondent. No reason for the change is mentioned. The down grading is reflected by comparison. This cannot sustain. Having explained in this manner the case of the first respondent and the system that should prevail in the Jal Nigam, we do not find any difficulty in accepting the ultimate result arrived at by the High Court. ”
08. We have perused the said order of the Principal Secretary
-17-
which is annexed as Annexure P4 to the counter affidavit (Paper Book-Volume-II). We have also perused the Government Order No.36/1976 Karmik-2 dated 30th October, 1986 and G.O. No.36/1/1976 Karmik 2 of even date, G.O.No. 35/1/78-Karmik2/93 dated 5th March, 1993 and certain other executive instructions issued by the State Government in the matter. The contentions raised by Shri Dwivedi that the Reporting Officer while giving the gradings outstanding or excellent had not stated any reason or justification in support of it cannot be rejected as without substance. The factual position cannot be ignored that the entries were made in 1980s and long time has lapsed since then. In all probability the Reporting Officers, the Reviewing Officers and the Accepting Officers concerned might not be available in the posts and might also have retired from Government service and therefore, no useful purpose will be served in requiring the officers concerned to re-consider the matter.
09. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case we are of the view that the Principal Secretary of the Public Works Department of Government of Uttar Pradesh should consider the matter afresh applying his mind to the grievances raised by the petitioner in the representations submitted by him in the light of the provisions of the rules and executive instructions relating to making entries in the administrative character roll and promotion from the post of Superintendent Engineer to Chief Engineer Level II and pass a reasoned order. The Principal Secretary should give a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the respondent so that he may place before the authority the materials available on record in the department which may be relevant for consideration of the matter.
10. In the result, we allow the appeal set aside the judgment of the High Court under challenge and also the order dated 2nd May, 2000 passed by the Principal Secretary, Public Works Department of the State of Uttar Pradesh and direct him to consider the matter afresh in the light of the discussions in this judgment and pass a reasoned order expeditiously if possible within four months of receipt of intimation of this judgment. The respondent shall produce a copy of this judgment before the Principal Secretary to enable the latter to take further steps in the matter. There will be no order for costs. ”
-18-
a direction to the State authorities to decide the matter of the petitioner afresh, but in the present case, the petitioner has been well aware of his grades and remarks recorded in his ACRs, but he kept mum until issuance of promotion order. Therefore, the reliance placed in this case is also of no help to the petitioner.
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge
Nadim
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the DPC could grade the petitioner 'Very Good' for ACR 2007 despite the Accepting Authority's 'Excellent' rating under Rule 7(9) of the Promotion Rules of 2003?
Whether a promotion order of 2009 could be challenged in 2014 given delay and laches?
Whether departmental action should be directed against respondent No.6 for alleged malafide downgrading of ACRs?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of PunjabDistinguished¶21
(1979) 2 SCC 368 · Who else cites this
U.P. Jal Nigam and others v. Prabhat Chandra Jain and othersDistinguished¶23
(1996) 2 SCC 363 · Who else cites this
State of U.P. v. Narendra Nath SinhaDistinguished¶25
(2001) 9 SCC 118 · Who else cites this
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. T.T. Murali BabuApplied¶27
(2014) 4 SCC 108 · Who else cites this
Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal CorporationApplied¶27
2022 SCC Online SC 64 · Who else cites this
Bichitrananda Behera Vs. State of OrissaApplied¶27
2023 Livelaw (SC) 883
3 provisions across 2 enactments
Dr. Datta Mainkar
State Of Chhattisgarh
The Director Geology
Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission
J.K. Pashine
Ramesh Rao Bisen
Rakesh Mohan Pandey
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
