Appeal against conviction for infanticide. Conviction upheld based on medical evidence and extra-judicial confession. Sentence reduced to time already undergone in custody. Bail extended for six months.
Appeal partly allowed; conviction affirmed; sentence reduced to period already undergone in custody; bail continued for six months.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1149 OF 2002
• Kumari Indu Verma, aged about 19 years, D/o Ram Ratan Verma, R/o Village Pundardih, Police Station Suhela, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner
versus
• State of Chhattisgarh, through: District Magistrate, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent
For Appellant : Mr. Aman Kesharwani, Adv. For Respondent : Mr. Ajay Kumrani, P.L.
Hon’ble Shri Justice P. Sam Koshy Judgment on Board [14/02/2023]
1. The present is an Appeal filed by the Appellant assailing the Judgment dated 30.10.2002 passed in Sessions Trial No.49/2022 by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar, District Raipur (as it then was).
2. Vide the impugned Judgment, the Appellant stands convicted for the offence punishable under Section 315 of IPC and has been sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 3 years.
3. Facts of the case in brief are that the Appellant at the time of incident is said to have aged around 18-19 years. She was an unmarried girl. It is a case of the Prosecution that on account of the physical relationship that she had with one Lekhram, she got conceived. It is said that she had suppressed her pregnancy from the world and after the child was born she threw the child into the village pond i.e. Bartalab pond in Village Pundardih under Police Station Suhela, District Raipur (as it then was and presently under District
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Balodabazar-Bhatapara). The dead body of the infant child was recovered on 4.11.2001 by some villagers who had gone to the said pond for taking bath.
4. The matter was thereafter reported to the Police Station Suhela. Merg was registered on 4.11.2001. Subsequently, in the course of investigation it was revealed that one of the villagers had seen the Appellant at the village pond while he was taking bath and her appearance looked as if she was in the advance stage of pregnancy. Suspecting that it was the Appellant's child, the villagers gathered in the house of the Appellant and where it is said that the Appellant made a confession of her having delivered a child on 2.11.2001 in the evening at her residence and subsequently she threw the child into the village pond. She also confessed of the child having born from the relationship that she had with one Lekhram from the same village.
5. After conclusion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed and the matter was put to trial before the First Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar where the case was registered as Sessions Trial No.49/2002. The Prosecution in all examined 11 witnesses in support of their case. In turn, the Appellant in defence has examined 3 witnesses.
6. After conclusion of the evidence and recording of the statement under Section 313 of CrPC, the learned Trial Court vide the impugned Judgement found the Appellant guilty of committing an offence under Section 315 of IPC and accordingly convicted her for the said offence
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and imposed a sentence upon the Appellant to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 3 years. It is this Judgment of conviction and sentence which is under challenge in the present Appeal.
7. Learned Counsel for Appellant submits that there is no evidence that has been collected or produced by the Prosecution to establish that the dead body that was recovered from the village pond was in fact the child of the Appellant. He further submits that no medical examination to establish the mother-child relationship between the Appellant and the dead body recovered was adduced before the Trial Court and therefore the entire finding is a perverse finding and the same deserves to be quashed.
8. Learned Counsel for Appellant further submits that from the evidence adduced before the Trial Court it cannot be conclusively held that it was the Appellant who had delivered the child which was recovered from the pond. There is no proof of the Appellant having undergone delivery and there is also no proof of the Appellant throwing/disposing of the body in the pond. In the absence of which, the conviction of the Appellant under Section 315 of IPC is unsustainable and the Appeal therefore deserves to be set aside/ quashed.
9. Learned State Counsel on the other hand submits that it is a case where there are sufficient material collected and produced before the Trial Court by the Prosecution so far as establishing the offence under Section 315 of IPC is concerned. Contention of learned
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State Counsel is that the Doctor (PW-7, Dr. R.N. Joshi) who had conducted the post-mortem of the dead body has clearly opined that the child was born alive and had subsequently died.
10. It was also the contention of learned Counsel for Appellant that PW-5 Dr. Jagriti Agrawal and PW-10 Dr. Jaya Phuljhele both have given a categorical finding that upon medical examination, the Appellant was found to have recently undergone delivery and that the Appellant had all the symptoms of a recently undergone delivery.
11. In addition, learned State Counsel has strongly harped upon the extra judicial confession that the Appellant is said to have made before the villagers who had all gathered in her house immediately after the recovery of the dead child from the pond. Thus, according to learned State Counsel, there was ample material that was placed before the Trial Court for reaching to the conclusion that the offence under Section 315 of IPC charged against the Appellant stood proved beyond all reasonable doubts and hence the Appeal should be rejected.
12. Learned Counsel for Appellant at this juncture submits that it is a case where the Appellant has already undergone custody of more than a month i.e. roughly around 34 days. If, for any reason, this Court finds that the conviction of the Appellant is justified then at-least the sentence period may be reduced to the period already undergone by the Appellant in custody, considering the fact that the Appellant at the relevant point of time was an unmarried girl of around 18-19 years
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of age. It is more than 22 years now and at this juncture no fruitful purpose would be served in sending the Appellant back to jail for any period so determined by this Court or for the period as has been imposed by the Trial Court itself.
13. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of record, what is necessary to be taken into account at this juncture is the deposition of PW-1 Kejnath and PW-4 Mohanlal both of whom were the villagers who had assembled at the place from where the dead body of the child was recovered first, i.e., the village pond Bartalab. They had subsequently also assembled at the house of the Appellant under suspicion of her having disposed of the new born child. The said two witnesses have supported the case of the Prosecution to the extent of admitting the fact that before them the Appellant had made a categorical extra judicial confession of her having delivered a child on 2.11.2001 and subsequently she had wrapped the child in salwar and thrown into the pond.
14. PW-5 Dr. Jagriti Agrawal and PW-10 Dr. Jaya Phuljhele, both are the lady Doctors who had medically examined the Appellant. They have given a categorical finding that on examination there were ample materials available to establish that the Appellant had recently undergone delivery and that all the symptoms reflected in her of a mother given birth recently.
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15. PW-7 Dr. R.N. Joshi, is the Doctor who had conducted the postmortem of the dead child recovered from the pond. He gave a categorical finding that from the post-mortem it is evidently clear that the child was born alive and had died subsequently and it was not a case where the child was born dead.
16. Perusal of the records, particularly the evidence which have come on record on behalf of the defence and also taking note of the statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC that of the Appellant, would clearly reflect that the defence as also the Appellant has failed to give cogent, plausible explanation of the symptoms that were visualized by PW-5 and PW-10 and also that by the villager of the Appellant being pregnant and having recently undergone delivery.
17. There was no explanation and justification provided by the Appellant as regards the whereabouts of the child that was born to the Appellant whether it was stillborn child or the child was born alive. If it was a stillborn child what she had done to the stillborn child and if the child was born alive the whereabouts of the child. In the absence of any proper explanation so provided by the Appellant, it has to be accepted that she had undergone delivery and that it was she alone who had thrown the child in the village pond, as is the case of the Prosecution which stands further substantiated from the extra judicial confession made by the Appellant before the villagers and which stands also corroborated by the evidence of PW-1 and PW-4.
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18. Given the said facts, this Court is of the opinion that the finding of the learned Trial Court to the extent of holding the charges levelled against the Appellant stands proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the same does not warrant any interference.
19. However, at this juncture, this Court would like to appreciate on the quantum of sentence that has been awarded by the Trial Court. It may not be forgotten that the present Appeal is of the year 2002 and at present it is more than 21 years old. The Appellant was on bail all along during the trial and subsequently she had remained in custody after conclusion of the trial for a period of around one month. In all, the Appellant has remained in custody for a period of 34 days. The Appellant in the course of pendency of appeal during these 21 years of period must have definitely undergone much mental agony and trauma of a convict, a person whose appeal is pending before the Court. Another fact which also cannot be lost sight of is that at the time of the incident, the Appellant was an unmarried girl. She was in pretty young age of around 18-19 years. Now, by efflux of these 21 years of time gap, the Appellant in between must have well passed the middle age of her life. Moreover, by efflux of time, the Appellant must have also got married and must have settled around somewhere in life. Sending the Appellant back to jail at this juncture would have far more serious repercussions to her and to her family if she is already married.
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20. Taking these factual aspects into consideration, this Court is of the opinion that no fruitful purpose would be served in now sending the Appellant to jail to undergo the further sentence that has been awarded by the Trial Court. Thus, it would be in the larger interest of justice if the sentence part is reduced to the period already undergone by the Appellant, affirming her conviction under Section 315 of IPC.
21. Accordingly, the conviction of the Appellant under Section 315 of IPC is sustained. However, the sentence awarded to the Appellant stands reduced to the period already undergone by her in custody.
22. The Appellant is said to be on bail. Her bail-bonds shall remain in operation for a period of six months from today in view of the provisions contained in Section 437-A of CrPC.
23. With the aforesaid modification in sentence, the Appeal stands partly allowed.
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(P. Sam Koshy) JUDGE
sharad
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the conviction of the appellant for infanticide under Section 315 of IPC is sustainable in view of the medical and extra-judicial confession evidence.
Whether the sentence awarded by the trial court warrants reduction considering the long pendency of the appeal and the appellant's age.
Whether the bail conditions under Section 437-A of CrPC need to be extended.
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Kumari Indu Verma
State of Chhattisgarh
P. Sam Koshy
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
