Partly allowed

Budhram v. Jan Sai (Dead) Through Legal Heirs

Chhattisgarh HC17 Sept 2020SA/107/2008

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this second appeal, the High Court of Chhattisgarh set aside the first appellate Court's decree granting defendants a share in suit land. The Court held that joint revenue entries do not confer title, children of illicit relationships have no inheritance rights, and the lower court erred in granting undeclared reliefs. The trial Court's decree was restored.

What did the court decide?

The judgment and decree of the first appellate Court setting aside the trial Court's decree are set aside; the trial Court's decree is restored in toto.

Budhram Vs Jan Sai (Dead) Through Legal Heirs — Partition | Chhattisgarh HC (2020)

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

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 Second Appeal No. 107 of 2008
Judgment reserved on 02.09.2020

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Judgment delivered on 17.09.2020

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 1. Budhram, S/o. Late Jaljeet Gond, Occupation
Agriculutre R/o Village Pasla, Tahsil
Baikunthpur, District Koriya (C.G.)

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2. Jaggu Singh (Dead) Through : Legal heirs

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2.a Shanti Bai, D/o. Late Jaggu Singh, W/o.
Devnarayan Singh, aged about 35 years, R/o.
Salka,Tah.Baikunthpur, District Koria (C.G.)

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2.b Kamta (wrongly mentioned as Kanta D/o. Late
Jaggu Singh), S/o. Late Jaggu Singh, aged
about 32 years,R/o. Salka, Tah. Baikunthpur,
DistrictKoriya (C.G.)

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2.c Banarsi, S/o Jaggu Singh (wrongly written as
D/o. Late Jaggu Singh), aged about 33 years, R/o
Pasla, Tah. Baikunthpur,District Kora (C.G.)

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2.dMunni Bai, D/o. Late Jaggu Singh, W/o.
Rajmohan Gond, R/o. Kochila, Tah. Baikunthpur,
District Koria (C.G.)

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2.e Daiya Bai, D/o. Late Jaggu Singh, W/o.
Rambatu Gond, R/o. Salka, Tah. Baikunthpur,
District Koria (C.G.)

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 ---- Appellants/Plaintiffs.

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Versus

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1. Jan Sai (since deceased) through Lrs:-

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1.A. Ganga, W/o late Santosh Kumar, D/o Late Jan
Sai, aged about 35 years, R/o Amapara,
Tahsil Baikunthpur, District Koria (C.G.)

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1.B. Parwati, D/o Late Jan Sai, W/o Fuleshwar,
aged about 28 years, R/o Village – Kaluwa, Tahsil
and District Surajpur (C.G.)

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1.CPrem Kumar, W/o Shivdhari, D/o Late Jan Sai,
aged about 45 years, R/o Village – Nawapara,
District Koria (C.G.)

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1.D. Fulmat Bai, Wd/o Late Jan Sai, aged about
70 years, R/o Village – Palsa, Tahsil – Patna,
District Koria (C.G.)

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2.Ram Sai (since deceased) through Lrs:-

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2.a.Dhanmat, W/o late Ram Sai, aged about 55
years,

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2.b.Lal Sai, W/o late Ram Sai, aged about 45
years,

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2.c.Sant, S/o Late Dharma, aged about 25 years,

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2.d.Anju, D/o Late Dharma, aged about 26 years,

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2.f. Maanmati, W/o Lal Sai, aged about 35 years,

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All R/o Village – Robo, Post- Saraiganna,
P.S. - Baikunthpur, District Koria (C.G.)

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3. Bifaiya Bai (deleted)

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4.Heera Sai, S/o. Late Bira Gond (wrongly
written as Pria Gond), R/o. Village – Jampani,
Tahsil Baikunthpur, District Koria (C.G.)

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5. Mst. Ghuran Bai, D/o. Late Bira Gond (Wrongly
written as Pira Gond), W/o. Shivmangal Singh
Gond, R/o. Village – Fatakpur, Post Gudapara
(Shreenagar), Tah. Surajpur, District Surguja
(C.G.)

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6. Mst. Munni Bai (deleted).

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7.The State of Chhattisgarh, Through
Collector, Koria (C.G.)

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---- Respondents/defendants.

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For Appellants : Shri A.K. Prasad, Advocate.

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For Respondents No. 1(b), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 2(f), 4 & 6
 : Shri Ashok Kumar Shukla, Advocate.

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For Respondent No. 7 : Dr.Veena Nair, Dy. Advocate General.

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

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Judgment [C.A.V.]

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(1)The substantial question of law involved, formulated
and to be answered in this second appeal preferred by
plaintiffs/legal heirs of original plaintiff herein states
as under:

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“Whether the first appellate Court was
justified in reversing the judgment and
decree of the trial Court after having held
that defendants No. 1 to 3 are sons of Jai
Singh and not the sons of Patraj Singh by
recording a finding which is perverse and
contrary to record ?

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(For the sake of convenience, parties would be
referred hereinafter as per their status shown and
ranking given in the suit before the trial Court).

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(2)The dispute relates to the suit land situated at
village Pasla, Tahsil Baikunthpur, District Koria
admeasuring 14.96 acres [6.052 hectare]. The civil suit was
instituted by original plaintiff- Jaljeet [who died during
pendency of suit] stating inter alia that his father Patraj
Singh Gond, during survey settlement, was granted patta in
respect of the suit land and he died in the year 1940 and
his grandmother maintained him as his mother Fulmet Bai
left the village after death of his father and started
residing with one Jai Singh, who was working as village
servant (Harwaha) in the house of Patraj Singh Gond and out
of their illicit relationship, defendants No. 1 to 3 namely

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Jan Sai, Ram Sai & Beera Sai were born. He further pleaded
that Jai Singh also died in the year 1942-43 and thereafter
again his mother Fulmet Bai came to village Pasla and
started residing with him as she became hapless and
helpless after death of Jai Singh and he [original
plaintiff - Jaljeet Gond] allowed her mother – Fulmet Bai
and her three sons (defendants No. 1 to 3 namely Jan Sai,
Ram Sai and Beera Sai) to stay with him and on that
account, names of defendants No. 1 to 3, being uterine
brothers, suit land came to be recorded in the revenue
records jointly being sons of Patraj Singh Gond but they
have no right & title over the suit land. Thereafter,
taking advantage of recording their names in the revenue
records, defendants No. 1 to 3 filed application for
partition under Section 178 of the Chhattisgarh Land
Revenue Code, 1959 before the Tahsildar and the Tahsildair,
on the objection, adjourned the dispute giving them time to
get the title adjudicated leading to filing of the suit. It
was finally prayed that plaintiff is only the son of Patraj
Singh Gond to whom suit property belonged and defendants
No. 1 to 3 are not sons of Patraj Singh Gond out of his
wedlock with Fulmet Bai and if any semblance of right they
have, they deemed to have been extinguished by doctrine of
adverse possession and his exclusive, uninterrupted,
continuous and peaceful possession be declared over the
suit land by appropriate decree.

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(3) Resisting the suit, defendants No. 1 & 2 filed their joint written statement stating inter alia that Patraj Singh Gond & Jaisingh were close relatives and they have jointly acquired the suit property at village Pasla and Patraj Singh died in the year 1940 whereas Jai Singh died in the year 1942 and survey settlement took place in the year 1944-1945 and in the year 1947-48, bandobast patta was granted. It was further pleaded that Fulmet Bai, who was wife of Patraj Singh and mother of the plaintiff, after the death of Patraj Singh started living with their father Jai Singh as a Keep ( j[kSy iRuh ) and both are residing together at village Bheed and therefore, Jai Singh also became Bhumiswami of the the suit property. The defendants No. 1 & 2, by way of amendment dated 18.12.1997, paragraph 17-B was inserted in the written statement stating that their father was late Jai Singh and, therefore, they are entitled for ½ share in the suit property.

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(4)The defendant No. 3- Beerasai separately filed the
written statement and admitted the claim of the plaintiff
and stated that he and defendants No. 1 & 2 are the sons of
Jai Singh, out of relationship of Fulmet Bai (mother of the
plaintiff) with their father Jai Singh and plaintiff is the
sole owner of the property left by Patraj Singh and he has
no right and title over the suit land.

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(5)The trial Court, upon appreciation of oral and

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documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment
dated 19.12.1997, decreed the suit holding that original
plaintiff - Jaljeet Gond is the only son of late Shri
Patraj Singh Gond and the suit property was the exclusive
property of late Patraj Singh; and defendants No. 1 to 3
are the sons of Jai Singh and not the sons of Patraj Singh
and it is the exclusive property of original plaintif –
Jaljeet Gond, being the son of late Patraj Singh and
defendants No. 1 to 3 have no right and title over the suit
property. It was also held that the suit property was not
jointly acquired by Patraj Singh and Jai Singh.

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(6)Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment &
decree of the trial Court, the defendants No. 1 & 2
preferred first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of
Civil Procedure before the First appellate Court.The First
Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of oral and
documentary evidence available on record, held that
defendants are not sons of Patraj Singh but partly allowed
the appeal and held that defendants No. 1 to 3 are also
entitled for ½ share in the suit property and also granted
permanent injunction in part in favour of the plaintiff.

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(7)Questioning the judgment & decree of the first
appellate Court, the plaintiff has preferred instant second
appeal, in which substantial question of law has already
been formulated and set out in opening paragraph of the

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judgment for sake of convenience.

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(8)Mr. A.K. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the
appellants/plaintiffs would submit that the first appellate
Court went wrong in holding that defendants No. 1 to 3 are
also entitled for ½ share in the suit property after having
held that defendants No. 1 to 3 are not the sons of Patraj
Singh but sons of Jai Singh by holding that suit property
was jointly acquired by Patraj Singh and Jai Singh by
recording a finding, which is absolutely perverse to the
record. He would further submit that merely because the
names of the original plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 3
were jointly recorded in the revenue records would not
confer any title to the defendants No. 1 to 3 as neither
joint acquisition nor any joint possession over the suit
land was proved by defendants No. 1 to 3, as such, judgment
& decree passed by the first appellate Court to the extent

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of granting ½ share in the suit property to defendants No.
1 to 3 are liable to be set aside and appeal deserves to be
allowed in part.

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(9)On the other hand, Shri Ashok Kumar Shukla, learned
counsel appearing for Respondents No. 1(b), 2(b), 2(c),
2(d), 2(f), 4 & 6 would submit that the first appellate
Court has rightly granted 1/2 share in the suit property to
the defendants No. 1 to 3 as the suit property was jointly
acquired by father of defendants No. 1 to 3 namely Jai

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Singh along with Patraj Singh, as such, ½ share in the suit
property granted to defendants No. 1 & 2 cannot be taken
exception by the plaintiff in second appeal, as such, the
appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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(10)I have heard learned counsel appearing for the
parties, considered their rival submissions made
hereinabove and went through the record with utmost
circumspection.

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(11) Admittedly, original plaintiff – Jaljeet Gond is the son of Patraj Singh. Fulmet Bai was his married wife. Patraj Singh died in the year 1940 and after the death of Patraj Singh, Fulmet Bai left plaintiff – Jaljeet Gond with his grandmother at village Pasla and went to village Bhadi and started living with one Jai Singh as his keep ( j[kSy iRuh ) and out of cohabition with Jai Singh, gave birth to three children namely Jan Sai, Ram Sai & Beera Sai (died), defendants No. 1 to 3 herein, thereafter, Jai Singh also died in the year 1942-43 and again Fulmet Bai came alongwith her three sons i.e. Jan Sai, Ram Sai & Beera Sai (defendants No. 1 to 3) at village Pasla and started residing with plaintiff Jaljeet Gond and he allowed her mother and her three sons to stay with him. Bandobast patta was granted in the year 1947-48 and thereafter the suit lands, names of plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 3 was jointly recorded in revenue records and taking

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advantage of jointly recording their names alongwith the
plaintiff of suit land in the revenue records, when the
defendants No. 1 to 3 applied for partition, dispute arose
between the parties and the suit was filed by the plaintiff
stating that the suit property is his father's exclusive
property, in which, his uterine brothers i.e. defendants
No. 1 to 3 have no right, title and interest and
declaration be granted that defendants are not sons of
Patraj Singh and his possession be confirmed.

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(11-A) Defendants No. 1 & 2, in their separate written statement, have admitted the fact that plaintiff's mother – Fulmet Bai though started residing with their father Jai Singh as his keep ( j[kSy iRuh ) and in-fact no marriage has ever taken place between Jai Singh & Fulmet Bai. By way of amendment (paragraph 17-B) introduced on 18.12.1997, the defendants No. 1 & 2 admitted that their father is Jai Singh and pleaded the suit property was jointly acquired by their father Jai Singh and Patraj Singh, therefore, they are entitled for half share in the suit property. Defendant No. 3 – Beera Sai supported the claim of the plaintiff stating that he and defendants No. 1 & 2 are the sons of Jai Singh.

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(12)The trial Court by its judgment & decree has clearly
held that the defendants No. 1 & 3 are the sons of Jai
Singh out of his relationship with Fulmet Bai (plaintiff's

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mother) , as such, they are not the sons of Patraj Singh
(plaintiff's father) and further held that mere recording
of the names in the revenue records showing the defendants
No. 1 to 3 as sons of Patraj Singh will not confer any
title to them as the suit property is the exclusive
property of Patraj Singh only and decreed the suit to the
extent of holding that original plaintif – Jaljeet Singh is
only the successor of the property shown in paragraph two
of the plaint and the defendants No. 1 to 3 are not the
sons of Patraj Singh Gond and accordingly confirmed the
exclusive possession of the plaintiff over the suit land.

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(13)The first appellate Court also concurred with the
finding the defendants No. 1 to 3 are not the sons of
Patraj Singh, rather they are sons of Jai Singh. Apart from
this, the point which deserves to be noticed here that even
marriage of Fulmet Bai (plaintiff's mother) with Jai Singh
was never solemnized but they were living together and out
of their wedlock, the defendants No. 1 to 3 were borne as
the Fulmet Bai was a keep of Jai Singh.

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(14) The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Reshamlal Baswan v. Balwant Singh Jwalasingh Punjabi 1 has clearly held that children borne to married woman from illicit relationship is not entitled to benefit under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act and benefit of Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act is available only where there 1 1994 MPLJ 446

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is marriage but not hit by section 11 of the Hindu Marriage

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Act and held as under:-

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“6. The decision of Bombay High Court in
Laxmibai Nagappa Matiwadar and others v.
Limbabai Nagappa Matiwadar2, of course,
supports the contention advanced by the
learned counsel for the appellant. The
question for consideration of the court was
the impact of Section 16(1) and 16(3) of the
Hindu Marriage Act read with the provision of
Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. It has
already been noticed that Section 16 deals
with the offsprings of marriage, which is
void. The Court was of the opinion that 1976
amendment of the Hindu Marriage Act takes
away and eclipses general rule that the
offspring of a marriage, which is null and
void ipso jure is illegitimate. According to
the Court, this was common law doctrine,
inevitably resulting in the effect of
bastardising children and has been superseded
by this provision. Considering the effect of
this amendment, in the context of Section 8,
clause (a) of the Hindu Succession Act, the
Court held that illegitimate children now
given legitimacy would be included within the
meaning of 'son' and 'daughter' n the
Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act. The
Court, therefore, held that though the lady
would not be the widow, her sons and
daughters would be included within the
meaning of the term in Section 8 read with
the schedule. A close reading of this

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2 1983 Mh. L.J. 130

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decision would indicate that it was the
effect of 1976 amendment of Section 16 of the
Hindu Marriage Act that made the difference.
If the said amendment had not been there or
any particular case was not governed by the
said amendment, the learned Judge would not
have decided in the same manner. Since 1976
amendment does not apply to the facts and
circumstances of the case before this Court,
this judgment cannot be of any help to the
appellant. IN fact Dadu v. Raghunath, AIR
1976 Bombay 176, the case before the
amendment and holds on a detailed
considerationofprovisions,that
illegitimate sons even of a Sudra would not
be included within the meaning of the word
'son' or 'daughter' appearing in Schedule to
Hindu Succession Act. Learned Judge had
noticed that before 1956, legitimate children
of a Sudra had enjoyed the status of an heir
and, therefore, it observed surprisingly that
an otherwise dynamic legislation should have
extinguished the intestate succession right
of illegitimate sons of Sudras. Regrettable
it may be, but since it was intended, it
should be accepted as our national
discipline. Sentiments howsoever strong
cannot justify transgressing the limits of
judicial discipline. This being a direct case
on the point should, if at all, conclude the
matter.

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8.Then, is also not correct to say that the
word 'son' has not been defined anywhere. It
has, of course, not been defined in the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, but every word need not

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be defined in the statute itself. The
General Clauses Act defines 'son' and
includes only the adopted son. In case the
illegitimate son was also included within
this definition, a corresponding amendment
would have been made in the definition given
in the General Clauses Act.

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9.In view of the discussion aforesaid, this
Court is unable to hold that the appellant
even as an illegitimate son is a 'son' for
purposes of Section 8 read with schedule to
the Hindu Succession Act and, has, therefore,
right to succeed to the properties of late
Baswan. In the opinion of this Court, he is
not a 'son' within the meaning of the term
and, therefore, not an heir to Baswan. The
appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed,
but without any order as to costs.”

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(15)As such, since the defendants are the sons of Jai
Singh out of illicit relationship with Fulmet Bai and no
marriage of Jai Singh was ever solemnized with Fulmet Bai,
therefore, they are not even the illegitimate children/sons
of Jai Singh for the purpose of Section 16(3) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1956 (henceforth “Act of 1956”). As such, the
findings of the two courts below holding that defendants
No. 1 to 3 are not the sons of Patraj Singh out of his
wedlock with Fulmet Bai is a finding of fact based on
material available on record and it is hereby reaffirmed.

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(16) The first appellate Court interfered with the

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judgment & decree of the trial Court decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff merely on the ground that though the defendants No. 1 to 3 are the sons of Jaisingh with Fulmet Bai but since settlement held in the year 1948, the suit property came to be recorded jointly in the name of plaintiff and defendants and in 1954-1995 Adhikar Abhilekh panji (Ex.D-7), it came to be recorded jointly and, therefore, the defendants are the Bhumiswami of the suit property alongwith the plaintiff. Name of the plaintiff and defendants have been recorded in the Adhikar abhilekh (Ex.D-7) followed by document Ex.P-8 and it has also been recorded that they all are the sons of Patiraj Singh Gond, whereas two courts below have rightly recorded and this Court has also re-affirmed the said finding in preceding paragraphs holding that defendants are not the sons of Patraj Singh and they are the illegitimate sons of Jai Singh. Thus, though the name of plaintiff and defendants have been recorded in the revenue records as sons of Patiraj Singh but in view of the findings recorded by two courts below and of this Court that defendants are not the sons of Patraj Singh, Adhikar Abhilekh Panji 1954-55 (Ex. P-7) & Jamabandi/Record of Rights (Ex.P-8) cannot be further relied upon to hold that the suit property was jointly acquired by Patraj Singh and Jai Singh.

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(17) The finding recorded by the first appellate Court
that the suit property was jointly recorded in the name of

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Jai Singh and Patraj Singh Gond is not borne out from the
record as both are the residents of different villages and
it has also been held that since the Patiraj Singh died
leaving behind Fulmet Bai as his widow, she joined the
company of Jai Singh at village Bheed and they give birth
to defendants No. 1 to 3 without marriage, as such, they
are not illegitimate children for the purpose of Section
16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, but thereafter, she again
joined the plaintiff – Jaljeet Singh Gond and plaintiff in
all magnanimity allowed her mother along with his three
uterine brothers i.e. defendants No. 1 to 3 to stay with
him, thus, it cannot be held that the suit property was
jointly acquired by Patraj Singh and Jai Singh. Even
otherwise, defendants No. 1 to 3 being children of Jai
Singh out of illicit relationship with Fulmet Bai will even
not be illegitimate sons for the purpose of Section 16 (3)
of the Hindu Marriage Act.

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(18) In the matter of Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah (D) Th.
Lrs.v. Muddasani Sarojana3, their Lordships of the Supreme
Court clearly held that entry of possession in some revenue
records simplicitor does not give any right to a person
concerned to retain possession of the property and pointed
out the significance and effect of revenue entry.

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(19)Likewise, the Supreme Court in the matter of Prahlad

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3 (2016) 12 SCC 288

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Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar4 has held that the entries in the
revenue records do not confer title to a property, nor they
have any presumptive value on the title. They only enable
the person in whose favour mutation is recorded, to pay the
land revenue in respect of the land in question.

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(20)In light of above-stated principles of law, it is
clear that merely recording the joint names of plaintiff
and defendants No. 1 to 3 in the revenue records, it cannot
be held that it was jointly acquired by Patraj Singh and
Jai Singh as no oral and documentary has been brought on
record except documents Ex.D-7 & D-8 and those documents
have even not been proved by examining any revenue officer
and no witness of the village has been examined to
demonstrate that at any point of time, it was jointly
acquired by Patraj Singh and Jai Singh. Merely because,
defendants came from their village along with Fulmet Bai to
village Pasla and joined the company of plaintiff – Jaljeet
Singh and thereby their names came to be jointly recorded
in the revenue records along with the plaintiff, it cannot
be held that the suit property was jointly acquired by them
particularly when it has been alleged that Jai Singh was
working with Patraj Singh as Harwaha (village servant) and
it has also been held that defendants No. 1 to 3 are even
not the illegitimate sons of Jai Singh under Section 16(3)
of the Act of 1956, as such, the finding recorded by the

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4 (2019) 10 SCC 259

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first appellate that the suit property was jointly acquired
by Patraj Singh Gond and Jai Singh and since the revenue
records were jointly recorded the names of plaintiff and
defendants No. 1 to 3, they were joint owner of the suit
property is a finding, which are not borne out from the
record and it is a finding, which is perverse to the record
and liable to be set aside.

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(21) The first appellate Court has also drawn adverse inference against the plaintiff from the fact that the plaintiff has made alternative prayer in paragraph 19( v ) (1) of the plaint claiming that in case the plaintiff is not found full owner of the suit property, he should be granted ½ share in the suit property. It is well settled law that party to the suit is entitled to take alternative plea, which is permissible under the law, but it cannot take any inconsistent and destructive plea. However, taking the alternative plea by the plaintiff, would not confer any right or ground to the other side to argue that by taking alternative plea, the plaintiff has admitted the title of defendants. Barring the parties to take alternative pleading would promote multiplicity of the proceedings and allowing the parties to take alternative pleading would avoid the multiplicity of the proceedings, therefore, the adverse inference drawn by the first appellate Court on account of alternative pleading taken by the plaintiff is also clearly impermissible and unsustainable as well.

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(22) The first appellate Court has also taken note of the
plea of adverse possession taken by the plaintiff holding
that plaintiff has failed to prove the ouster of the
defendants from the suit land, again it was alternative
plea taken by the plaintiff, which the trial Court has not
considered and granted and, therefore, the first appellate
Court was not required to deliberate upon the said issue,
which was not brought before the first appellate Court as a
point for determination and, thus, finding recorded by the
first appellate Court in this regard is totally
unnecessary. The first appellate Court has granted decree
for declaration of title and partition to the plaintiff as
well as defendants, which was never claimed by either
parties to the dispute. The plaintiff only claimed the
relief of declaration that plaintiff is legal heir of
Patraj Singh and defendants No.1 to 3 are not the legal
heirs of Patraj Singh and confirmation of possession,
whereas the first appellate Court has exceeded its
jurisdiction by granting relief of declaration of title to
the plaintiff as well as defendants and further granted
relief of permanent injunction, which was not prayed for,
as such, both the reliefs were never claimed by the
plaintiff as well defendants.

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(23) Consequently, judgment and decree of the first
appellate Court to the extent of holding that defendants

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are also entitled for ½ share in the suit property and
granting injunction of ½ share in the suit property in
favour of plaintiff is totally contrary and facts and law
available on the record and to that extent judgment &
decree of the first appellate Court is set aside and that
of trial Court is restored in toto.

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(24) The second appeal is allowed to the extent indicated
hereinabove.

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(25) A decree be drawn up accordingly.

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Sd/-

¶106

 (Sanjay K. Agrawal)
 Judge

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D/-

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Budhram v. Jan Sai (Dead) Through Legal Heirs

Case brief

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Budhram v. Jan Sai (Dead) Through Legal Heirs

Case brief

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