Allowed

Shyam Kumar Gujrati v. Board of Revenue,M.P. Ors.

Chhattisgarh HC1 Sept 2014WP/1084/1999

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court held that bye-laws cannot automatically cancel a registered sale deed; such cancellation requires a civil decree. Consequently, the society lacked authority to allot the plot to the petitioner, and he is directed to be given an alternative plot or have his consideration returned with interest.

What did the court decide?

Directed the society to allot another plot of the same area to the petitioner or return the purchase consideration paid by him along with 6% interest.

Shyam Kumar Gujrati Vs Board of Revenue,M.P. Ors. — Cooperative Societies | Chhattisgarh HC (2014)

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I N THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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AMENDED WRIT PETITION No. /²⁰⁰⁵ In Writ Petition No. 1084 of 1999

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PETITIONER Shyam Kumar Gujrati, Aged about 72 years, S/o. Shri Ram Chandra Gujrati, C/o. Kiran Chandra Sujoria, F— 1, (Dr.Bung1aw), Jail Colony, Central Jail, $tation Road, Raipur (C.G.) VERSUS § 1. Board of Revenue, State of Chhattisgarh, Shankar Nagar, Anand Nagar, Raipur (C.G.) The Joint Registrar,. Cooperative Societies, Rajpur, Division Raipur (ca) The Sub Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Near Cooperative Central Bank, Head OEce, Opposite ’K‘atchari Ofiice, Old GE. Road, Raipur (C.G.) Anupam Shakaii Girha Nlrman Sam ati Maryadit, Raipur Registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, Under the MP. Cooperative Societies Act and its

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	office at Anupam Nag (C.G.)	ar, Raipur
5.	Anjl Kumar Bansal,	S/o. G.C.
	Bansal, C/o. ^{Bansal Br}	^{others, 19}
	Civic Center, BHILAI Durg (C,G.)	, District
6.	Satyavan Alva, Aged	about 4O
	yaars, S/o. Chiman	Das Alva,
	C/o. Alva Brothers,	Wholesale
	Kirana Merchant,	Gudhiyari,
	Raipur (C.G. )
	Sudama Prasad, ^Alva,	^{Aged about}
	42 years, S/o. ^Chjma	^{n Das Alva,}
	C/o. Alva Brothers,	Wholesale
	Kirana Merchant,	Gudhiyari,
	Raipur (C.G.)

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH : BILASPUR Single Bench: Hon’ble Shri^{ManindraMohanShrivastava,J.}

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Petitioner . Shyam Kumar Gujrati

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Versus

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§§espondents Board of Revenue and others

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Writ Petition under Article 226/227 of^{theConstitutionofIndia}

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Present:-

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Shri Kishore Bhaduri with Shri^{ChandreshShrivastava,counselfor} the petitioner. Shri Siddharth Rathod, Deputy Government Advocate for the State/respondents No.2 8r, 3.

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Shri M. D. Sharma, counsel^{forrespondentNo.4.}

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Shri B. P. Singh, counsel for respondent^No.5.

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Shri Sunil Otwani, counsel^{forrespondentsNo.68L7.}

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ORAL ORDER

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(Passed^{on01-09-2014)}

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This petition under Article 227 of^{theConstitutionofIndiais} preferred^{againstorderdated} 15—09—1998 passed by the^Boardof Revenue, by which, the Board of Revenue has upheld the order by the Joint Registrar as well as that of the Deputy passed _ Registrar passed in favour of respondent No.5 in the matter of raised by the petitioner against the Society and the dispute respondent No.5 relating to interest in respect of Plot^No.I—2 (the subject plot). 2. The facts necessary^{fordecisionofthecontroversyinvolvedin} the petition are^{thattherespondentNo.4istheco—operativesociety} constituted under the Chhattisgarh Co-operative Societies Act, “the 1960 (In short Act”) with the object of providing housing facility to its members by allotting them plot/construction of houses.

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The respondent No.4—co—opearative society had initially allotted a plot admeasuring^{90’x60’infavourofrespondentNo.5,} a member of the society,^{leadingtosaleofthe} plot^{infavourofthat} respondent Vide registered^{saledeeddated07—06—1982.}

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As the allegations and counter-allegations are there in the pleadings^ofthe parties,^{therespondentNo.5wasallegedtohave} violated the terms and conditions of the sale deed as well as provisions^{containedinCluse43ofthebye-lawsoftheSocietyin} as much as he failed to raise construction Within the time stipulated. The society therefore treated such allotment made in favour of the respondent^{No.5ascancelledandthen,} proposed^to allot subject plot^tothe petitioner.^The proposal^{ofallotmentsent} by the society to the^{DeputyRegistrarseekinghis} permission^under letter dated 26—06—1987 (Annexure^{P—2)wassanctionedandVideits} order dated 02—07-1987,^{theDeputyRegistrar} granted^sanctionto the society to sell subject plot to^the petitioner.^{Eventually,asale} ‘ deed was executed by the society in favour of the petitioner^on 2I7—O8-1987, which was duly registered, resulting in transfer of \i property.

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While-the matter stood thus, the petitioner filed a dispute, purporting^{tobeadisputeunderSection64oftheActbeforethe} Deputy Registrar.^The petitioner^{soughtreliefofdeclarationofhis} ownership and also^{torestraintherespondentNo.5frominterfering} with his possession on the strength of the pleadings that the respondent No.5^{hadfailedtocomplywiththeconditionssubjectto}

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which, plot was sold to him and therefore, the socetyi had cancelled his allotment and the subject plot was thereafter validly allotted in favour of the petitioner followed by execution of sale deed duly registered under the law.

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In that proceeding, the society came out with a stand that as respondent No.5 failed to carry out its obligations under the terms and conditions of sale deed and bye-laws and to raise construction within the time stipulated, his allotment stood cancelled. The society thereafter allotted the plot to the petitioner.

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In that proceeding, the respondent No.5 as a respondent therein, stated that cancellation of his allotment was illegal and without authority of law because he was^not given^{opportunityof} hearing by the society within the stipulated^{timebeforecancellation} of his plot^and proceeded to execute sale deed in favour of the Vide order dated 20—07—1994, the Deputy Registrar petitioner. dismissed the claim of the petitioner^{holdingthatthecancellation} _ of allotment of respondent^{No.5wasillegalandthe} petitioner^did not get^{anyright.Theorder} passed^{bytheDeputyRegistrarwas} l ,vchallenged^bythe petitioner^by filing an appeal before the Joint Registrar though, unsuccessfully.^The petitioner^{thenfiledrevision} before the Board of^{Revenue.TheBoardofRevenuealsodismissed} the revision Vide^orderdated 15—09—1998 on similar reasoning as stated by the Deputy Registrar^{andtheJointRegistrarandthatthe} cancellation of allotment of respondent No.5^was illegal and the petitioner^was not entitled to protect his possession by way of allotment which^{wasillegal.Itisthisorderwhichhasbeencalledin}

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question^{bythepetitionerinthispetitionunderArticle227ofthe} Constitution^ofindia.

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argued that three Co:

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for the petitioner

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cdunsel

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1. Learned of

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in exercise

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i11ega1ity

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serious

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committed

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Courts

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operative that the

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in holding

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and also acted perversely

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jurisdiction illegal^on the

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No.5^was

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of^respondent

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of allotrnent

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cancellation of hearing.

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any opportunity

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that he was not afforded

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K ground of' the

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Learned^{counselforthepetitionercontendsthattheaction} allotment^{ofrespondentNo.5,} proposing

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canceling^the

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societyⁱⁿ of^{sanctionbythe}

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allotment^{ofthatplottothepetitioner,} grant and subsequent

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in favour of the petitioner

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Registrar

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Deputy execution^{ofsaledeedanditsregistrationinfavourof thepetitioner} were^{neversubjectedtoanychallengebytherespondentNo.5in} to be

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which was required

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The only question,

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any proceeding. instituted^at

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determined^{bytheDeputyRegistrarintheproceedings} the^{instanceofthepetitionerwaswhethertheallotmentandsale}

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l, ‘1 deed^{infavourofthepetitionerstandingasitis,theinterferenceby} of his right

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enjoyment

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No.5 with the petitioner’s

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respondent

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”emanating from such allotment^{andsalewaspermissibleornot.It} is their^{submissionthatalltheauthoritiestransgressedthebounds} of

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the submission

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to examine

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in venturing

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of his jurisdiction that before

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his own grievance

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No.5 regarding

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respondent cancellation^{ofhisallotment,hewasnotaffordedanyopportunity} into

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This issue, it is urged that, could^notbe gone

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of^hearing. initiated^{bythepetitioner.}

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collaterally^{inaproceedings}

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(Q9

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Next limb of petitioner’s submissions is based on the consequences said to be flowing on account of violation of the terms and conditions of sale deed and the provisions contained in clause 43 of the bye-laws. Learned counsel for the petitioner‘ submits^{thatevenonthefactsandinthelightofsuchprovisionsof} ( bye—laws and terms and conditions of the sale, no case was made out in favour of respondent No.5 in as much as Clause^43ofbye- law clearly obliged the respondent No.5 to raise construction^within the time stipulated therein. Upon such failure, it was for the respondent No.5 to seek extension of time, which too was limitedⁱⁿ terms of period. In the event, construction was not completed within the time stipulated and no extension was sought, by operation of bye—laws, the allotment^{infavourofrespondentNo.5} and also the sale in his favour, stood automatically cancelled. Therefore, the grievance of respondent No.5 before the Deputy Registrar had no legs to stand. Learned^{counselforthe} petitioner relying upon the provisions containedⁱⁿ Section 12 85 13 of the Transfer^{ofPropertyAct,} 1882 (In^{short’theActof1882’)andthe} ;t ,{Wdecisions^{oftheSupremeCourtinthecase} of Indu Kakkar Vs. Haryana State Industrial Development^{CorporationLtd.} and Anotherl, submits that the sale deed executed in favour of respondent No.5 was a conditional^{one.AsrespondentNo.5failed} to fulfill the conditions, as stated in Clause^{43ofthebye—laws,were} also incorporated in the sale deed executed in his favour, the interest in the property ceased to exist^{andinsuchcases,} it was

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1 (1999)^2SCC37

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fully Within^the jurisdiction^{0fthesocietytoseekresumptionofplot} and allot^tothe petitioner.

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The other^{submissionoflearnedcounselforthepetitioneris} i that the^{respondentNo.5ceasedtobethememberofthehousing} society,^{themomenttheallotmentinhisfavourstoodcancelledby} operation^ofthe provisions^{containedinbye-lawsreadwithterms} and conditions^{ofthesaledeedbecauseapersonremainsmember} of the housing^{societyaslongashehasbeenallottedandholdsa} \ membership is co-terminus with the conditions of plot. The cancellation of allotment of plot. In support of his submission, learned^{counselforthe} petitioner^{laysemphasisontheprovisions} contained in Section 8 of the Act. He further submits that the dispute^raisedbythe petitioner^Withthe society and. respondent No.5 is^{coveredWithintheambitandscopeofdisputespecifiedin} Section^{64oftheAct.Accordingtohim,thebye—lawsofthesociety} were binding^{betweenthesocietyandtherespondentNo.5andthat} e operated^{tobringtheallotmenttoautomaticend.Learnedcounsel} for^{thepetitionerhasalsorelieduponthedecisionoftheSupreme} \ " Court in the case of .Co-operative Central^Bank Limited^and others Vs. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh and othersz.^{ItislastlycontendedthatoncetheSocietyhasmade} allotment^{infavourofthepetitionerfollowedbyexecutionofsale} deed in^{hisfavourbytheSociety,intheabsenceoftherebeingany} declaration^{soughtbyanyoftherespondentagainstthepetitioner,} the petitioner’s^{rightisfullycrystallizedandenforceablebyhimby}

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2 AIR 1970 SC 245

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seeking adjudication under Section 64 of the Act as against the respondents, who are acting against the interest of the petitioner. 5. Per contra, submission of learned counsel for the respondent— Society is that the society has throughout supported the cause of‘ i the petitioner by justifying its act. Learned counsel for the society submitted that the “respondent No.5 had failed to fuliill its obligations as required under bye—laws and the terms and conditions of sale, and therefore, the Society was left with no other option but to treat his allotment as cancelled under Clause 43 of the bye—laws and proceed to allot it to the petitioner. He submits that the respondent No.5 could not have raised any issue with regard to validity of sale in favour of the petitioner because that could be raised by respondent No.5 only by yvay of suit in an independent proceedings before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. For this proposition, learned counsel placed reliance in the case of Kusum S. Verma and another Vs. Pritam Singh Gulati and another3 and Manju Ramtake (Smt.) and another Vs. Smt. Manda Vaidya and others". ) In respect of submission \ regarding validity of bye—laws, learned counsel placed reliance in the case of Dukhuram Gupta Vs. Co-operative Agricultural Association5.

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Learned counsel for respondent No.5 submits that the respondent No.4 had not only allotted a plot in his favour but thereafter, the Society executed sale deed resulting in transfer of

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3 199s (1) MPLI 57s

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4 2000 R.N. 23 5 1960 WLJ 433

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title and ownership in his favour. Thereafter, it was not permissible for the society to cancel the allotment much less any authority under the law to declare that the sale deed is cancelled.^According to him, once the sale deed is executed and registered under the

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law,^{theonlycourseopenforthesocietywastoseekdeclaration} against the respondent No.5 by filing a suit before the Court of competent jurisdiction and for cancellation^{ofsaledeed.According} to him, the Co-operative Courts ignored this fundamental^aspect

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) but the Co—operative Court ultimately held in favour of the respondent No.5 because in any case, the Society had not given any notice to respondent No.5. Therefore, viewed from any angle, the allotment and sale made in favour^{oftherespondentNo.5alone} has existence in the eye of law and all subsequent acts of the Society in favour of the petitioner^{wereinconsequentialintheeyes} of law.

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Supporting the case of respondent^{No.5,learnedcounselfor} respondent No.6 & 7, purchasers subsequent to filing of this

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petition^{beforethisCourtsubmitsthatthesaledeedinfavourof} the respondent No.5 could not be cancelled or treated to be cancelled by the society. Therefore, the Society had no authority and jurisdiction to proceed^to make^{anyallotmentofthe} subject plot^{infavourofthe} petitioner^{muchlessexecutesaledeedinhis} favour, In support of his submission,^{learnedcounselreliesupon} the judgment in the case of Madhyam Vargiya Grih Nirman

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Sahakari Sanstha Vs. Vasantrao and another6, V. K. Munshi Vs. Raipur Co-operative Housing Society Limited and another7.

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It is not in dispute that initially the subject plot No.1—3 was sold by respondent-society in favour of respondent No.5 namely Anil Kumar Bansal vide registered sale deed dated 07—06—1982.^By Virtue of this registered sale deed, the title and ownership of the subject plot was transferred by the society in favour of^respondent No.5. But, thereafter, the society treated the allotment made in favour of respondent No.5 as cancelled. Neither the petitioner nor the society have placed on record any order passed^{bytheauthority} under the law, canceling such allotment.^{Thesubmissionoflearned} counsel for the petitioner that the^{communicationofthesocietyto} the Deputy Registrar, Co—operative Societies, Raipur dated 26—06—1987 (Annexure P—2) is an evidence of cancellation of allotment as also cancellation of sale deed,^{beingmisconceivedboth} on facts and law, is liable to be rejected. Present is not a case, where the Society had cancelled the allotment made^infavourof respondent No.5 even before execution of sale deed in favour of respondent No.5. Present is a case where^{theallotmentofsubject} plot to respondent No.5 was followed by sale of the plot by registered sale deed. Once sale^{deedwasexecutedbythesocietyin} favour of respondent No.5, the title^{andownershipinthe} property validly transferred in favour^{ofrespondentNo.5.Theonlycourseof} action permissible under the law for the society, in such an

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6 AIR 1988 MP 94 72001 (1)MPHT514

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eventuality, was to seek cancellation of the instrument of sale by filing a suit for cancellation of instrument as provided under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 through a decree of Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. 9 No provision of any law has been brought to the notice of this Court either by the petitioner or by the respondent-society which would authorize the co-operative society to cancel the instrument of / sale. No such authority under any law vested in society, under which, the society, without taking recourse to ordinary civil remedy of seeking cancellation of instrument of sale, could itself cancel the instrument.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently, urged that clause 43 of the bye—laws of the society read with terms and conditions of the sale provided for automatic cancellation of instrument of sale upon failure of the respondent No.5 to construct house within a period of three years. According to him, the respondent No.5 should have either completed the construction three years or upon his failure could have requested the ‘%uithin society to grant some more time to complete the construction Within upper limit of further two years. Once the respondent No.5 failed to construct the house within maximum permissible period of five years, the plot stands reverted and surrendered in favour of the society. According to him, these very conditions were incorporated in the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent No.5. The argument has been developed by taking recourse to the provisions

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contained in Section 31 of the Act of 1882 and it has been submitted that the transfer of interest in the property was created with the condition superadded that such interest shall cease to exist, if no construction was raised as required under Clause 43 of the bye-laws. In the considered opinion of this Court, such a ground could be raised to seek cancellation of instrument in a properly constituted civil suit by one of the parties to the instrument. The interest of respondent No.5 does not come to an end resulting in automatic cancellation of instrument without there being decree passed by the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction in a suit brought before it. The society instead of seeking cancellation of instrument by taking recourse to the remedy available to it under the law, itself created the instrument as cancelled. Thus, there was no cancellation of instrument of sale in the eye of law.

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Reliance placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Indu Kakkar (supra) is misconceived. That was a case where the Supreme Court examining whether the conditions that the industrial unit shall be established within the specified period, failing which, interest shall cease, is a valid condition. In that case; the Corporation had executed registered deed in favour of the allottees which was disputed by the Corporation on the ground that the allottee had failed to fulfill the conditions which led to filing of a suit’by the allottee for declaration that order of resumption is illegal and void. In the present case, the society, as noticed'above, has failed to place before this Court any power derived from any

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I /, _A

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:Wti:‘{_: _ ”an; own:

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statute, rules and^{regulationshavingforceofthelaw,underwhich,} it could resume plot.

¶103

Relying upon the judgment^{oftheDivisionBenchoftheHigh} Court of Madhya^{PradeshinthecaseofDukhuramGupta} (supra), 1L has been contended^{thateventhoughbye—lawsframedbythe} society are not^at par^{withthelaworstatutoryrulesorregulations,} nevertheless^{itbindsthesocietyanditsmembers.Thestandofthe} society has been^{supportedbythe} petitioner^{alsoonsimilarlines.} These submissions^{arehoweverliabletoberejectedbecausebye—} laws, it is well settled,^{donothavetheforceoflawandthatdoes} not by itself, without anything^more, operates so as to result in automatic cancellation^{ofinstrumentofsale.}

¶104

In the case of Co-operative Central Bank Limited and

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others (supra), it^{hasbeenheld:—}

¶106

10.^“We are unable^{toacceptthesubmissionthatthe} bye-laws of a cooperative society framedⁱⁿ pursuance of the provisions^{oftheActcanbeheldtobelawortohave} the force of law.^{Ithasnodoubtbeenheldthat,ifastatute} gives power^{toaGovernmentorotherauthoritytomake} rules, the rules so^{framedhavetheforceofstatuteandare} to be deemed to^{beincorporatedasa} part^{ofthestatute.} That principle, however,^{doesnotapplytobye—lawsofthe} nature that a^{CooperativesocietyisempoweredbytheAct} to make. The^{bye-lawsthatarecontemplatedbytheAct} can be merely those which govern the internal management, business^{oradministrationofasociety.They} may be binding between^the persons^{affectedbythem,but} they do not have the^{forceofastatute.”}

¶107

\ @

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¶109

The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya^{PradeshintheeaseofDukhuRamGupta(supra)does} not support^{thecontentionsoflearnedcounselforthepetitioner.or} . ghe^{societyinasmuchasbye—lawsframedbythesocietyunderthe} powers^{conferredonit‘bytheActarenotpartofstatutenorcanbe} placed^{attheparwiththestatutoryrulesandregulations.Bye—laws} are usually^{framedbyasociety,asinthepresentcase,inorderto} carry out purposes^{ofthesocietyandstatuteandstatutoryrules} framed stand^{onentirelydifferentfooting.Thesubmissionsbased} on provisions^{containedinclause43} of bye-laws^andtermsand conditions^{ofthesaledeedexecutedinfavourofrespondentNo.5} read with^{Section31oftheActof1882couldprovidethesocietya} to seek^{cancellationofinstrumentofsaleby} filing a suit ground by reference to before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction those provisions^{andtermsandconditionsofsale.Thesocietyby} itself, in the absence of any power conferred on it under the of the Act, could not treat the sale as having been provisions (automatically cancelled.

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Irresistible^{conclusion,therefore,isthataslongassaledeed} executed^bythe society^{infavouroftherespondentNo.5wasnot} cancelled,^ina properly^{constitutedproceedingsthroughadecreeof} Civil Court,^{inasuitforcancellationofdisputeunderSection31of} the Act^{of1882,broughtbythesociety,titleandownershipofthe} plot^{remainedwiththerespondentNo.5.Therefore,thesocietyhad}

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¶112

no authority to execute sale deed in favour of the petitioner in respect of the same plot as it^{wasalreadydivestedoftitleinsubject} plot.

¶113

l 1. Learned counsel for the petitioner and^{therespondent—society} laidy considerable emphasis on^{thesubmissionthatasrespondent} No.5 had not taken any proceedings against the action of the society in allotting subject plot to the petitioner, order dated 02-07—1987 granting permission in^favourofthe petitioner, it was m" not permissible for the Deputy Registrar While deciding dispute under Section 64 of^theActto go^intothe question^astowhether the action of the society^{incancelingallotmentofrespondentNo.5} was legal or not.

¶114

Irrespective of whether respondent No.5 had taken any proceedings^{beforetheRegistrarorbeforeanyotherCourtoflaw} against execution of sale deed by the society in favour of the w petitioner^or grant^of permission^{bytheDeputyRegistrarinfavour} of the petitioner, the fact^{remainsthatthere} is no decree of Civil l.) " Court of competent jurisdiction canceling instrument of sale executed by the society in favour of the^{respondentNo.5.Oncesale} deed was executed by^{thesocietyinfavourofrespondentNo.5,} it no longer remained a dispute^{whichcouldbeadjudicateduponby} a Co—operative Court/Deputy Registrar^inexerciseof power^under Section 64 of the Act. Had it been a case of mere cancellation^of allotment without execution of^{saledeedbythesocietyinfavourof} the respondent No.5, the issue of cancellation^{couldbeexamined}

¶115

‘ by the^{DeputyRegistrarinproceedingsunderSection64.But,once} the sale^{deedwasexecuted,itnolongerconfinedtomanagementof} business of society under Section 64 of the Act. Therefore, contention^{oflearnedcounselforthepetitionerthatasthesaleof-} Riot^wasone of the business of the sdciety^asdeflnedin clause 3(ka) and^{3(kha),therefore,withintheambitandscopeofdispute} under^Section64 of the^{Act,hastoberejected.Forthatreason,} there^{wasnobaroffilingasuitunderSection82oftheAct.This} of High Court of Madhya , View finds support^from the judgment Pradesh in the cases of Madhyam Vargiya Grih Nirman Sahakari^{SansthaandKusumS.Vermaandanother(supra).} The petitioner, in fact, sought declaration that he be declared owner^ofthe plot^{indispute,whichcouldnotbegrantedtohim,} unless^{therewascancellationofinstrumentofsaleexecutedbythe} society^{infavouroftherespondentNo.5.}

¶116

One of the^{submissionsoflearnedcounselforthepetitioneris} that as the respondent No.5 failed to carry out necessary within the time stipulated resulting in automatic Mchnstruction cancellation of sale executed by the society in his favour, respondent^{No.5ceasestobeamemberofthesociety,deservesto} be rejected.^Reliance placed^{ontheprovisionscontainedinSection} for 19 (C) is wholly^{misconceivedinlaw.Thatprovisionprovides} expulsion^{ofmembers.Thereisnomaterialonrecordtoshowthat} the managing committee of the society passed a resolution expelling respondent No.5 from the membership of the society.

¶117

¶118

Section 19(C), on its proper^{construction,} provides^{forexpulsionof} member by resolution and there is nothing in that provision to show that a member shall, by operation of law, ceases to be member, if he has failed to carry out construction^{withinthetime} stipulated.^Amember automatically ceases to be member of the society by operation of law^as provided^underSection 19(B) of the Act, if after having been admitted as member of the society he subsequently becomes subject to any disqualification under l Section‘ 19(A) of the Act. None of the disqualifications, as \ exhaustively enumerated in Section 19~A, are applicable in the present case. Even under bye—laws, no such provision exist to support the submission^{oflearnedcounselforthe} petitioner^thatin such an eventuality, a person shall automatically ceases to be a member of the society.

¶119

¶120

Resultantly, I am inclined to hold that no relief could be granted^tothe petitioner^{inaproceedingsinstitutedbyhimunder} Section 64 of the Act. Present^{isacasewherethesocietysoldthe} siubject land to the respondent^{No.5andthereafter,it} proceeded^to s sold the same plot to the petitioner,^{withouttherebeinganydecree} from the Civil Court canceling^{earlierinstrumentofsaleinfavourof} respondent No.5. Considering^this particular^{aspect,itwouldbein} the interest of justice^{todirectthesocietytoallotanyother} plot^of the same area, if available as on the date,^tothe petitioner^andif there is 'no such plot available, to return entire consideration paid to it by the petitioner. Considering that the petitioner^had paid

¶121

¶122

considerations^{tothesocietywaybackintheyear} 1987,^towards purchase of the plot^{andvaryingrate} of interest for the last 27 the society shall return the consideration amount to the years, petitioner^{withinterest @6%.}

¶123

qrw

¶124

\t13. In the result,^though I am^{notinclinedtointerferewiththe} order passed^{bytheBoardofRevenuewiththedirectionsasabove} in favour^ofthe petitioner^{andagainstthesociety,thispetitionis} finally disposed^off.

¶125

-
Sdl-
_
g
Mamndra Mohan Shrivastava
fail“;
‘E
Judge

Shyam Kumar Gujrati v. Board of Revenue,M.P. Ors.

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Shyam Kumar Gujrati v. Board of Revenue,M.P. Ors.

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