Prem Jitendra Shirsath vs the State of Maharashtra and Others

Challenge in the present Writ Petition is to the order of detention dated 09.10.2025 bearing No. Dandapra/ KAVI/ MPDA/ 09/2025, passed by Respondent No. 2-District Magistrate, Dhule in exercise of powers under Section 3 (1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drugoffenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers, Persons Engaged in Black-Marketing of Essential Commodities, Illegal Gambling, Illegal Lottery and Human Trafficker Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as “MPDA Act” ) and the approval order dated 17.10.2025 as well as confirmation order dated 02.12.2025 bearing No. MPDA – 1025 / CR – 592 / Spl - 3B, passed

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by Respondent No. 1-State Government. By these impugned orders, the petitioner has been directed to be detained for a period of one year holding him as a “dangerous person” within the meaning of Section 2 (b-1) of the MPDA Act, holding his activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

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It seems that the impugned detention order has been passed on a proposal submitted by the respondent No.4 – Police Inspector, Dhule City Police Station, Dhule. The proposal has been routed through respondent No.3 – Superintendent of Police and eventually placed before the respondent No.2 – District Magistrate who in turn found that the petitioner’s detention is necessary to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order. It is pertinent to note that, though the basis for submission of proposal for detention of petitioner is registration of several offences in the last 8 years against the petitioner, however, the impugned detention order is based only on one offence bearing Crime No. 122 of 2025 registered on 17.06.2025 for the offences under Sections 324(4), 299, 333, 352, 351(2), 351(3), 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short “BNS”) and Section 4 of the Maharashtra Medicare Service Persons and Medicare Service Institutions (Prevention of Violence and Damage or Loss to Property) Act,2010

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(for short “Mah. Act No. XI of 2010”), and the two in-camera statements of witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’ are also considered while passing the impugned detention order.

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The details of offences which are considered by the Sponsoring Authority while submission of proposal for detention of

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the petitioner can be summarised as under in tabular form :

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Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the impugned order of detention vitiates for more than one reason. According to learned senior counsel although the impugned detention order refers to release of petitioner on bail in pending cases, copies of bail applications and the bail orders were admittedly neither placed on record nor has been considered by the competent authority. According to the learned senior counsel this lacks the basic principle of subjective satisfaction.

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It is further contended by the learned senior counsel that as far as the solitary offence which has been made basis while passing the impugned detention order, bearing Crime No.122/2025 is concerned, even taking the allegations of the said crime as it is, the same would not amount to an act prejudicial to the public order but at the most it could be said to be an act disturbing the law and order. To buttress his submission he relied on the judgment of the

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Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (1966) 1 SCR 709 ,

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Learned Senior Counsel would further urge that so far as incamera statements of witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’ are concerned, perusal of these statements would show that those are cyclostyled lacking details about dates, places and particulars about the alleged incidents, even otherwise those have been recorded within a span of few days. In short, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the in-camera statements are vague and concocted. It could not have been made basis for passing the impugned order of detention. For that purpose relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Rushikesh @Monya Shamrao Waghere Vs. The Commissioner of Police and Ors. in Criminal Writ Petition No. 2291 of 2025 decided on 17.10.2025.

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Further it is also submitted by the learned senior counsel that there is an unexplained delay of nearly four months between the last offence dated which is 17.06.2025 and the detention order which has been passed on 09.10.2025, thereby snapping the live and proximate link necessary for preventive detention.

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Per contra, the learned APP supports the impugned order of detention of the petitioner as well as the order of approval and confirmation. According to the learned APP the petitioner is a history sheeter, material placed on record would indicate that he is habitual offender and undeterred by preventive action also, who creates terror and the residents within the jurisdiction of Dhule City Police Station and adjoining areas remain in constant fear. It is further submitted that detaining authority has rightly arrived at subjective satisfaction by considering relevant material that, if not prevented, the petitioner is most likely to indulge in further dangerous activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the future. It is further submitted that there is no delay either in passing impugned order or securing approval. He would further submit that Respondent No.2-District Magistrate has adhered to all the mandatory provisions contained in MPDA Act before passing the impugned order of detention. He would further submit that considering the statements of the in-camera witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’, it is evident that there was threat and violence in both the incidents which would have directly affected the public order. 11. Learned AGP would further submit that the allegations made

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in the offences registered against the petitioner coupled with the in-

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camera statements of witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’ shows that the petitioner used to abuse, threaten, assault, carrying weapons openly and also extort money from the residents of that area. He, therefore, submits that Respondent No.2-District Magistrate has rightly considered the entire material placed before him and has arrived at a subjective satisfaction, that the preventive detention of the petitioner is very much warranted.

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Learned APP has also urged that considering the provisions of

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Section 5A of the MPDA Act, even if on some grounds the detention order fails, the entire detention order does not vitiate so long as one ground survives. He would further contend that the authorities have scrupulously followed the entire procedure as contemplated under the MPDA Act while passing the order of detention.

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We are of the considered view that impugned detention order depicts non-application of mind at the hands of respondent No.2 – District Magistrate while appreciating the material. Though the order asserts that the petitioner is on bail in all the pending cases, however, the record does not contain a single copy of any bail application or any bail order. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ameena Begum Vs. The State of Telangana and Ors.; (2023) 9 SCC 587 , Nenavath Bujji and Ors. Vs. The State of

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Telangana and Ors.; (2024) 17 SCC 294 as well as in the case of Saksham s/o Gautam Tate Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.; (Criminal Writ Petition No.1079/2025) decided by this Court on 08.09.2025 (Aurangabad Bench), when a detaining authority takes into account the fact that the detenue is on bail it must examine the bail orders themselves to assess the nature of offences, the conditions imposed by competent Courts while releasing the accused on bail and also to ascertain as to whether there exits a real likelihood of detenue committing similar kind of offence if released on bail. We thus find that non-consideration of all these vital aspects vitiates the subjective satisfaction as required under the provisions of the MPDA Act. In short absence of these documents shows that the petitioner was denied an opportunity to make an effective representation which is mandatory under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

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So far as the reliance placed on the in-camera statements of witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’ are concerned, as observed above we find that those statements are vague as it can be seen that, those are general in nature without specifying the dates, time or places of alleged incidences as required by law. The record also depicts that there is no proper verification of these statements nor the detaining

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authority appears to have applied its mind to its credibility. It is settled position of law that such vague statements that too without any proper verification cannot be made the basis of preventive detention.

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We find that, the basis for passing the impugned detention order is Crime No.122/2025 registered on 17.06.2025 for the offences punishable under Sections 324(4), 299, 333, 352, 351(2), 351(3), 3(5) of the BNS and Section 4 of the Mah. Act No. XI of 2010. Perusal of the allegations in the said offence would show that the petitioner alleged to have arrived at the hospital of the complainant with his unidentified associates. He verbally abused the staff, patients, and their relatives without provocation. He kicked and vandalized the chairs, tables, and fans therein. He forcefully entered the doctor’s cabin and smashed an idol of god that was placed on the table, thereby hurting the religious sentiments of the complainant. He also vandalized medical equipment at the location. The FIR, the panchanama and the statements of witnesses which were the part of the record does not show any independent witness other than the staff members of the hospital. It seems that he has already been released on bail in the said offence immediately on next day of his arrest. Even if this incident would have been viewed

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by the public at large, in that case it would at the most have amount to disturbing a law and order. Here, we are not considering the other merits of the case, but only from the point of view of allegation whether the activity of the petitioner would affect the public order. It is trite law in view of judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (1966) 1 SCR 709 , while explaining the term ‘Law and Order’ and ‘Public Order’ the Hon’ble Apex Court observe thus :

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"54. We have here a case of detention under R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It follows that if such a person is not detained public disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorders or only some of them ? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can

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be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before if can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under R.30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances.

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It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State. By using the expression "maintenance of law and order" the District Magistrate was widening his own field of action and was adding a clause to the Defence of India Rules."

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Thus, ‘Public Order’ refers to disturbances affecting community at large whereas, ‘Law and Order’ can encompass a broader range of disturbances, including those of local and minor nature. In other words the activities must not be minor which is peace of purely local significance, which primarily in the specific individual and only in secondary sense public interest. Thus the underline principle is that the activity of a person should be such

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that it will affect the public order. The three circles referred to by the Hon’ble Apex Court had explained that the activities disturbing law and order may not necessarily disturb the public order.

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We find that there is no material placed on record to substantiate that the petitioner was likely to commit any specific act prejudicial to public order in the immediate future. As can be seen that the alleged incident dated 17.06.2025 at the most could amount to disturbing law and order and certainly not the public order. As rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel the delay between the last offence i.e. 17.06.2025 and the date of passing of detention order on 09.10.2025 clearly show the snapping of live link necessary for preventive detention of the petitioner.

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In the light of above observations, we are of the considered view that the impugned detention order is unsustainable in law so also find that the approval order as well as the confirmation order of the State Government also do not sustain. Hence, we pass the following order :

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ORDER

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I. The Writ Petition stands allowed.

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II. The impugned detention order No. Dandpra/KAVI/

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MPDA/09/2025 dated 09.10.2025 passed by respondent

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No.2 as well as the approval order dated 17.10.2025 and the confirmation order No. MPDA-1025/CR-592/Spl-3B dated 02.12.2025, passed by respondent No.1, are hereby quashed and set aside.

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III. Petitioner – Prem Jitendra Shirsath shall be released

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forthwith, if not required in any other offence.

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IV. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.

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(ABASAHEB D. SHINDE, J.) (SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE , J.)

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habeeb/

Prem Jitendra Shirsath v. the State of Maharashtra and Others

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Prem Jitendra Shirsath v. the State of Maharashtra and Others

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