Executive Engineer, Kadwa Canal, Sinchan Bhavan, Nashik vs Ahilaji Pandurang Shinde Since Deceased Thr.Lrs. 1.1 to 1.8 and Ors.

“Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every house’s delay. Every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.”

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Supreme Court in the case of S. Ganesharaju (Dead) through Lrs

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V. Narasamma (Dead) through Lrs reported in (2013) 11 SCC 341 ,

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more specifically, paragraph Nos. 12 and 13, of the said judgment held

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that a liberal construction to the cause of delay should be given. The

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2 of 5

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Anand

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FA(ST) 34117-2024 (Prod).doc

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said paragraphs are reproduced herein below:

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The expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show malafides in not approaching the court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given go-by.

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The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

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6. Bombay High Court in the judgment of Kamalbai Narasaiyya Shrimal and Another Vs. Ganpat Vithalrao Gavare reported in 2007 (1)

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MH. L.J. 807 , paragraph Nos.13 and 15 has held:

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The factual position is manifestly clear on bare perusal of the application for condonation filed by the petitioners before the learned District Judge. The only relevant statement in the application is thus:

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“The delay caused in preferring the appeal is of six months. The caused delay is not intentional one. The appellants are poor and helpless persons. If the delay is not condoned appellant may cause irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money. The suit was for recovery of possession and present appellants are tenants. If the delay is not condoned then appellants will become shelterless.”

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The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be erased from section of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of section 5 of the Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such “sufficient cause” stated in the application and as such no interference in the impugned order is called for.”

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3 of 5

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Anand

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FA(ST) 34117-2024 (Prod).doc

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According to me, considering the submissions made in the

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Interim Application and the law laid down in above Judgments, a case is made out to allow the Interim Application.

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The Interim Application is allowed in terms of prayer clause (b) and disposed of accordingly.

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INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 3978 OF 2025

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Mentioned. Not on board. Taken on board.

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This Interim Application is filed by the State seeking stay to the execution of the Judgment and Award dated 04.05.2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Niphad, District – Nashik in Land Acquisition Reference No. 51 of 2012.

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Subject to the State depositing the entire award amount along with accrued interest in the Reference Court within a period of 12 weeks from today, there will be stay to the execution of the Judgment and Award dated 04.05.2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Niphad, District – Nashik in Land Acquisition Reference No. 51 of 2012.

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FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 34117 OF 2024

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