The Executive Engineer, Raigad vs Sumati Sakharam Manve (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. Sandhya Sitaram Pawar and ORS.6

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2025:BHC-AS:48803

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Diksha Rane 73 IA 96802024.doc

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

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INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 9680/2024 WITH INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 9679/2024 IN FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 18926/2023

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THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, RAIGAD ..APPLICANT VS SUMATI SAKHARAM MANVE (DECEASED) THR. LRS. SANDHYA SITARAM PAWAR AND ORS. ..RESPONDENTS

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Mr. Mahesh Pawar i/b. Ms. Chaitrali Deshmukh for applicant. Mr. A. R. Patil, Addl. G. P. for respondent nos. 6 & 7 – State.

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CORAM : RAJESH S. PATIL, J. DATE : 12 NOVEMBER 2025.

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P.C. :

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INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 9679/2024 IN FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 18926/2023 :-

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1. This application is filed by the Acquiring Body for seeking condonation of delay.

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2. Office remark shows that the respondents have been duly served.

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3. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

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4. The Supreme Court in the judgment of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katji and Others reported

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in 1987 SC 1353 , has held that:

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Diksha Rane 73 IA 96802024.doc

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“Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every house’s delay. Every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.”

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5. The Supreme Court in the case of S. Ganesharaju (Dead) through Lrs V. Narasamma (Dead) through Lrs reported in (2013) 11 SCC 341 , more specifically, paragraph Nos. 12 and 13, of the said judgment held that a liberal construction to the cause of delay should be given. The said paragraphs are reproduced herein below:

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The expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show malafides in not approaching the court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given go-by.

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The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

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6. Bombay High Court in the judgment of Kamalbai Narasaiyya

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Shrimal and Another Vs. Ganpat Vithalrao Gavare reported in 2007

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(1) MH. L.J. 807 , paragraph Nos.13 and 15 has held:

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Diksha Rane 73 IA 96802024.doc

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The factual position is manifestly clear on bare perusal of the application for condonation filed by the petitioners before the learned District Judge. The only relevant statement in the application is thus:

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“The delay caused in preferring the appeal is of six months. The caused delay is not intentional one. The appellants are poor and helpless persons. If the delay is not condoned appellant may cause irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money. The suit was for recovery of possession and present appellants are tenants. If the delay is not condoned then appellants will become shelterless.”

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The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be erased from section of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of section 5 of the Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such “sufficient cause” stated in the application and as such no interference in the impugned order is called for.”

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7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering

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the law as laid down in the above referred judgments and after going through contents of the documents on record, I am convinced that this application requires to be allowed.

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8. Present application is allowed in terms of prayer clause (b) and disposed of accordingly .

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FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 18926/2023

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9. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

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10. Admit.

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Diksha Rane 73 IA 96802024.doc

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11. The appellant to file private paper-book within one year from today. A copy of the same to be served on other side.

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12. Soft copy of R & P be sent by the trial Court to the High Court

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within 4 weeks from today. Original R & P should be preserved by the trial Court till further orders of this Court. Original R & P to be sent to the High Court when called for.

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13. Parties to file a compilation of documents, short synopsis along

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with their preposition of law and authorities relied upon by them within one week from today.

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INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 9680/2024 IN FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 18926/2023

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14. At the request of learned counsel Mr. Pawar, stand over to 10 December 2025 .

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(Rajesh S. Patil, J.)

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