17.07.1980, could not be looked at by the Courts, as it was not a legal or valid document at all. It was submitted that there was no question of the said agreement being relied upon, on the basis that it was not claimed to be void by the Original Plaintiffs. The learned Counsel submitted that the contents of the agreement dated 17.07.1980, itself showed that it was a document purporting to divide the property in question by metes and bounds and that therefore, under Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act, it was indeed compulsorily registrable. By relying upon Section 17 r/w 49 of the Registration Act, the learned Counsel submitted that the aforesaid document was not admissible and the Courts below correctly held against the Appellants in that regard. It was further submitted that the agreement was never acted upon and it was not signed by the Defendants, other than the Original Defendant No. 1. It was further submitted that the Plaintiff No. 1, had entered the witness box and explained the context in which he had signed the agreement dated 17.07.1980. On the contention raised on behalf of the Appellants pertaining to Section 17 (2) (i) of the Registration Act, the learned Counsel appearing for the contesting Respondents submitted that the same was not applicable, for the reason that there was nothing to indicate in the contents of the said agreement that it could qualify to be a composition deed. In fact, it was submitted that the agreement was without consideration and that this aspect clearly indicated the dishonest nature of submissions raised on behalf of the Appellants. The learned Counsel appearing for the contesting Respondents relied upon judgment
