matters relating to “admission” and “grant of interim orders”; however, such order of the Chairman did not authorize him to vacate an interim order which had been passed earlier by a Division Bench of the Tribunal. Here, jurisdiction conferred on a Single Bench to ‘grant interim order’ in an urgent case could not have been construed as conferring jurisdiction to vacate an interim order previously granted by a Division Bench. 5. Leaving aside all considerations, it has not been explained as to how after the advent of the 1993 Rules, a matter pertaining to a disciplinary case could be placed on the board of a Single Bench presided over by the Member (Administrative). No order either under Section 5(6) of the Act or under Rule 154 (c) and/or (d) passed by the Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal to that effect has been brought to our notice whereby the Member (Administrative) presiding over a Single Bench was conferred jurisdiction to hear a matter, which is otherwise required to be heard by a Division Bench in terms of the 1993 Rules. The Tribunal, evidently, has breached the law. 6. For the reasons aforesaid, we have no doubt in our mind that the order impugned has been passed by the Member (Administrative) upon wrongful assumption of jurisdiction. The said order, accordingly, stands set aside. 7. We are informed at this stage by Mr. Pandian, learned advocate for the respondents that a subsequent order dated November 16, 2021 has been passed by a Division Bench of
