Dismissed

Ramhari Arjun Darange v. the State of Maharashtra and Anr.

Bombay HC24 Feb 2020APEAL/50/2020

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Court dismissed an appeal against the Additional Sessions Judge's order rejecting a bail application. The appellant challenged convictions under the SC/ST (PoA) Act for caste-based abuse. The Court upheld the lower court's finding that the offence was committed in public view, negating the bar under Section 18 of the Act.

What did the court decide?

The bail application rejection by the Additional Sessions Judge was upheld; the appeal was dismissed.

Ramhari Arjun Darange Vs the State of Maharashtra and Anr. — Caste Atrocities | Bombay HC (2020)

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Shailaja

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.50 OF 2020

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	Ramhari Arjun Darange	]
	Age: 27 years, Occu:Agriculture	]
	& Photography, Resident of	]
	Umbarepage, Tal: Pandharpur,	]
	District – Solapur.	]	Appellant
	Vs.
1.	The State of Maharashtra	]
	(At the instance of Karkamba	]
	Police Station, Pandharpur,	]
	District Solapur) Notice to be served	]
	on APP, AS, Bombay High Court	]
2.	Sanjay Macchindra Navgire,	]
	Age: 28 years, Occu: Service,	]
	Resident of Karole, Karkamba,	]
	Tal: Pandharpur, Dist. Solapur.	]	Respondents
Mr.	….. Viresh N. Purwant, for the Appellant.
Mr.	A.A. Palkar, A.P.P., for Respondent No.1-S	tate.
Mr.	Ghanshyam S. Jadhav, for Respondent N ….	o.2.

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CORAM: PRITHVIRAJ K. CHAVAN, J.

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RESERVED ON: 24TH FEBRUARY, 2020.

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PRONOUNCED ON: 11^th MARCH, 2020.

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P.C:

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By this appeal under section 14A of the Scheduled Castes

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and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocity) Act, 1989 (for short ‘Atrocity Act’), the appellant has impugned an order dated 3^rd January, 2020 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pandharpur below Exhibit 1 in Criminal M.A. No.1312 of 2019 by which his application under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr. P. C’) came to be rejected.

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The appellant has been booked by Karkamb Police Station

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of the offences punishable under sections 3 (1) (r) and 3 (1) (s) of the Atrocity Act and under sections 323, 341, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘I.P.C’).

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Briefly stated the facts are that respondent No.2-Sanjay Navgire (first informant) had approached the Police on 11^th

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November, 2019. He resides at Village Karole with his parents, wife, brother, sister-in-law and their children jointly. The first informant has also been discharging his function as a Police Patil. The appellant and the first informant were doing business of photography jointly. The first informant had procured certain contracts of video shooting of marriages for the appellant. Since a few customers brought by the first informant could not get their work done which was given to the appellant, the first informant approached the appellant in the month of February, 2019 and inquired about the pending work. It is alleged that the appellant started abusing the first informant and, therefore the first informant had lodged a report against him with the Police. The appellant was enraged with the said report and was in search of an opportunity.

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On 10^th November, 2019, around 9.42 p.m when the first informant was proceeding towards his home on his motorbike by Karole Umberpage road, the appellant came from behind on a motorbike and obstructed the motorbike of the first informant near the streamlight. Thereafter the appellant abused the first informant in filthy language as well as on his caste by uttering the following words

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in Marathi;

^;s egkjk rq>;k vkbZyk >oy]ek>;koj dsl dk dsyh rqyk thop

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ek#u Vkdrks- rq dk; ek>h miMrks*

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At that time, brother-in-law of the first informant namely Sagar Nagnath Shinde came over there and rescued the first informant from the clutches of the appellant. The appellant, however, also drove Sagar Shinde aside and threatened him of dire consequences. Thereafter, the first informant approached Karkamb Police Station and lodged a report.

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Learned Counsel for the appellant, at the outset, drew my attention to sections 3 (1) (r) and 3 (1) (s) of the Atrocity Act contending that the ingredients of these provisions do not attract as the offence was not committed within a public view and was not witnessed by any independent person. As such, there is no bar under section 18 of the said Act. He drew my attention to paragraph 9 of the impugned order by contending that earlier in view of a civil dispute amongst them, a non-cognizable case has been registered against the appellant. According to the learned Counsel for the

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appellant, the first informant had accepted huge amount from several customers and, therefore, they were complaining against him which constrained the appellant to remove the first informant from the job. In view of the said dispute, the first informant had falsely implicated the appellant in this case. It is further contended that the provisions of section 3(2) (v) of the Atrocity Act are not at all attracted.

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Section 3 (2) (v) of the Atrocity Act reads thus;

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“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities._ (1) whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,_

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(v) “commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property [knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belong to such member], shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine”.

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On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the first informant strongly opposed the prayer of the appellant by drawing my attention to the very words uttered by the appellant within public view of which his brother-in-law Sagar Nagnath Shinde is an eye

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witness as well as a chance witness. It is contended that the words uttered by the appellant are so derogatory and insulting and that it would definitely attract not only the ingredients of sections 3 (1) (r) and 3 (1) (s) but also section 3 (2) (v) of the Act. A bare look to the ingredients of sections 3 (1) (r) and 3 (1) (s) reveals that a person who is not a member of the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe if intentionally insults or intimidates with an intent to humiliate a member of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe in any place within public view or if abuse any member of a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe by caste name in any place within public view is said to have committed an offence. Indeed, from a bare look at the statement of the first informant as well as Sagar Shinde, the offence appears to have been committed within public view.

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As already stated, Sagar Shinde though appears to be brother-in-law of the first informant, yet his presence on the spot was incidental as he appears to be a chance witness. Another angle of this case is that if admittedly there was a dispute between the first informant and the appellant on account of their business of photography then there could be every reason for the appellant to

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have a motive to commit the offence which is prima facie clear from the material placed on record. Thus, bar under section 18 would be clearly applicable in this case.

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The learned trial Court in paragraphs 9 and 10 of impugned order has, therefore rightly observed about pre-existing dispute between the first informant and the appellant as well as prima facie material against the appellant for the alleged act of not only abusing the first informant on his caste and insulting him with an intent to humiliate him within a public view but also uttering filthy words qua his mother.

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The law on the point of applicability of Section 18A of the Atrocity Act is no more res integra in view of the latest pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Writ Petition (C) No.1015 of 2018 in the case of Prathvi Raj Chauhan Vs. Union of

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India and others . It would be apposite to refer to sub paragraphs 39, 41 and 42 which read thus;

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The National Commission for Scheduled Castes Annual Report 2015-16, has recommended for prompt registration of FIRs thus:

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"The Commission has noted with concern that instances of procedural lapses are frequent while dealing atrocity cases by both police and civil administration. There are delays in the judicial process of the cases. The Commission, therefore, identified lacunae commonly noticed during police investigation, as also preventive/curable actions the civil administration can take. NCSC recommends the correct and timely application of SC/ST (PoA) Amendment Act, 2015 and Amendment Rules of 2016 as well as the following for improvement:

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“8.6.1 Registration of FIRs - The Commission has observed that the police often resort to preliminary investigation upon receiving a complaint in writing before lodging the actual FIRs. As a result, the SC victims have to resort to seeking directions from courts for registration of FIRs u/s 156(3) of Cr. P.C. Hon’ble Supreme Court has also on more than one occasion emphasized about registration of FIR first. This Commission again reemphasizes that the State / UT Governments should enforce prompt registration of FIRs.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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As to prevailing conditions in various areas of the country, we are compelled to observe that SCs/STs are still making the struggle for equality and for exercising civil rights in various areas of the country. The members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are still discriminated against in various parts of the country. In spite of reservation, the fruits of development have not reached to them, by and large, they remain unequal and vulnerable section of the society. The classes of

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Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been suffering ignominy and abuse, and they have been outcast socially for the centuries. The efforts for their upliftment should have been percolated down to eradicate their sufferings.

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Though, Article 27 of the Constitution prohibits untouchability, whether untouchability has vanished? We have to find the answer to all these pertinent questions in the present prevailing social scenario in different parts of the country. The clear answer is that untouchability though intended to be abolished, has not vanished in the last 70 years. We are still experimenting with ‘tryst with destiny.' The plight of untouchables is that they are still denied various civil rights; the condition is worse in the villages, remote areas where fruits of development have not percolated down. They cannot enjoy equal civil rights. So far, we have not been able to provide the modern methods of scavenging to Harijans due to lack of resources and proper planning and apathy. Whether he can shake hand with a person of higher class on equal footing? Whether we have been able to reach that level of psyche and human dignity and able to remove discrimination based upon caste? Whether false guise of cleanliness can rescue the situation, how such condition prevails and have not vanished, are we not responsible? The answer can only be found by soul searching. However, one thing is sure that we have not been able to eradicate untouchability in a real sense as envisaged and we have not been able to provide down-trodden class the fundamental civil rights and amenities, frugal comforts of life which make life worth living. More so, for Tribals who are at some places still kept in isolation as we have not been able to provide them even basic amenities, education and frugal comforts of life in spite of spending a considerable amount for the protection, how long this would continue. Whether they have to remain in the status quo

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and to entertain civilized society? Whether under the guise of protection of the culture, they are deprived of fruits of development, and they face a violation of traditional rights?

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Having taken into consideration the material on record and in view of the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I do not find any merit in the present appeal. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has rightly and correctly returned his findings while rejecting the application of the appellant. The appeal is devoid of merits and hence dismissed.

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[PRITHVIRAJ K. CHAVAN, J.]

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Ramhari Arjun Darange v. the State of Maharashtra and Anr.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Ramhari Arjun Darange v. the State of Maharashtra and Anr.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

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Parties & counsel

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