place, as I have noted, none of these decisions say that as a matter
of law a contested testamentary proceeding can be dismissed on a
prima facie view taken at an interim stage, especially when the trial
is ongoing. Secondly, and this I must say this since Mr. Nevatia
insists, in my view the pleadings is more than sufficient. Sub-
paragraph (b) of amended Paragraph 13 makes it clear in no
uncertain terms that the loss or misplacing of Snehalata’s Will was
subsequent to her death. It is stated that the Will has not been
destroyed or cancelled. The Petitioners did not and could not
function as executors prior to Snehlata’s death. Any statement of
loss or misplacement of her Will by definition could, therefore, only
be a statement that they could make after they became her
executors, i.e., after her demise. No matter how strictly Mr. Nevatia
want to read a statute, his fine-grained submissions must, I think,
invariably yield to sound common sense. There is absolutely no
other way to read paragraph 3(b) of the amended plaint. Any other
interpretation would result in a rank absurdity and would amount to
saying that the Petitioners, as executors, are seeking probate of a
non-existent Will.
