Dismissed

Louis Anthony Dias and 4 Others v. the State of Maharashtra and 9 Others

Bombay HC4 Mar 2014WP/1285/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In Public Interest Litigation filed under Article 226, the petitioners challenged an High Power Committee (HPC) dismissal of their appeal against a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. The court held that the petitioners waived their bias complaint by participating in HPC hearings without raising objections earlier. The court also upheld the scheme's validity under relevant Development Control Regulations.

What did the court decide?

The petition challenging the High Power Committee's order was dismissed. No status quo order was granted to enable further appeal to the Supreme Court.

Louis Anthony Dias and 4 Others Vs the State of Maharashtra… — Land Acquisition | Bombay HC (2014)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

¶5

WRIT PETITION LODGING NO.542 OF 2014

¶6

Louis Anthony Dias and ors. ...Petitioners. vs. State of Maharashtra and ors. ...Respondents.

¶7

Mr. Y.K.Tiwari and Ms. Harbans Kaur i/by Satyan Dube for the Petitioners.

¶8

Smt. Iman K.Calcuttawala, A.G.P. for State of Maharashtra. Mr. J.G.Reddy, A.G.P. for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3.

¶9

Mr. Rafique Dada, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. Prasad Dhakephalkar, Sr. Advocate i/by Kishore Thakkar & Co. for Respondent No.4.

¶10

Mr. Vineet Naik, Sr. Counsel along with Mr. Lalan Gupta i/by M/s. Dhurve Liladhar & Co. for Respondent No.5. Mr. D. S. Sakhalkar i/by Manoj Shukla for Respondent Nos.7 & 8. Ms. S.M.Modle for Respondent Nos. 9 and 10- B.M.C.

¶11

CORAM : MOHIT S. SHAH, C.J. AND M.S. SANKLECHA, J.

¶12

DATE : O4 MARCH 2014

¶13

ORAL JUDGMENT : ( Per Chief Justice ):-

¶14

By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners (five in number) challenge the order dated 7 February 2014 passed by High Power Committeerespondent No.3-(HPC) dismissing the petitioners' appeal challenging the slum rehabilitation scheme sanctioned by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority-respondent No.1(SRA) under Regulation 33(14)(D) of the Development Control Regulation 1991 (“'DCR”).

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The SRA has granted/sanctioned a Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 13 December 2012 in favour of respondent No.4 developer (developer). The LOI dated 13 December 2012 sanctions the scheme for land admeasuring for Floor Space Index (FSI) at 18615.12.sq.meters in Santacruz (W), Mumbai for construction in the following manner :-

¶19

I) 18615.12sq.meters by way reconstruction for the accommodation for the Members/Occupants of respondent No.5 Society i.e. Bombay Catholic Co-op. Housing Society (Society) on the basis of permissible FSI 1.00.

¶20

II) 13961.34 sq. meters by way of free sale component on the basis of permissible FSI of 0.75; and

¶21

III) 13961.34 sq. meters being handed over to SRA for a Permanent Transit Campus (PTC) on the basis of permissible FSI of 0.75.

¶22

So far (I) and (II) above, in the aggregate would result in construction of 673 tenements. So far as (III) above, it would result in construction of 530 tenements as Permanent Transit Tenements for the benefit of slum dwellers.

¶23

It is the case of the SRA as well as respondent No.4Developer and respondent No.5-Society that about 530 PTC tenements are to be constructed by the developer at its own cost and handed over to SRA on permanent basis.

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The buildings on the land of respondent No.5 Society were constructed in the year 1930 or thereafter. The petitioners (five in number) are tenants of respondent No.5- society who have mounted the present challenge against the redevelopment project after having already lost in several rounds of litigation.

¶28

A) The buildings on the land of the respondent No.5-society admeasuring 5.1/2 acres were constructed in the year 1930 or thereafter. On 25 September 1966 the society passed a resolution for demolition of existing structures so as to construct new tenements. That resolution was challenged by the some of the members of the society before the Registrar of the Co-op. Societies, Mumbai but their prayer was rejected. The above order of the Registrar of Co-op Societies and the said resolution were assailed before this Court in Misc. Application No.250 of 1972 filed inter alia by the petitioners herein. That application was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 17 April 1972.The learned Single Judge held that the petitioners therein (some of whom are also petitioners herein) had no proprietary interest in the land and the tenements belong to society as the absolute owner of the property. The said Judgment of the learned Single Judge was confirmed in appeal by the order of Division Bench dated 25 July 1972.

¶29

B) Next round of litigation was again initiated by some tenant members of the society some time in the year 1979 seeking bifurcation of the society. That round of litigation led to an order dated 31 May 2010 of the Minister of Co-operation, State of Maharashtra. Before the

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Minister, the tenant members who had made the application for bifurcation decided to withdraw their application for bifurcation of land of society as the Minister's order records their willingness to co-operate with the society for its redevelopment.

¶34

C) However, notwithstanding the aforesaid stand of association of tenant members to co-operate with the respondent No.4-society for redevelopment, the present petitioners had filed a suit challenging the resolution dated 6 December 2009 of the society for redevelopment of the respondent No.5-society's property and the conveyance dated 7 December 2009 executed in favour of respondent No.4 developer. In the notice of motion filed by the petitioners in the above suit, a learned Single Judge granted interim injunction against the Co-operative society's resolution dated 6 December 2009.

¶35

The appeals filed by respondent No.5 society and respondent No.4 developer came to be allowed by Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (Chief Justice) was party by order dated 9 August 2012. In the said Judgment, this Court noted the observations made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the Judgment rendered on 19 April 1972 in petition filed by some of the present petitioners and/or its predecessors challenging the resolution dated 25 September 1966 of the society for demolishing and constructing new building as an entirely frivolous petition. The Court held that it was the Co-operative Society alone which was the absolute owner of the property and as the absolute owner of the property it is the co-operative society which alone has all ownership rights and that the petitioners did not have even a

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prima facie case. This Court further held that out of 69 tenant members only 15 persons had filed suits and the entire redevelopment project was held up by a microscopic minority of members of respondent No.5society. The total members are 230 out of whom 161 are allotee members and 69 are tenant members. This Court also noted that respondent No.4 Developer had kept amount of Rs.70 crores in escrow for the last about 3 years under the agreement dated 7 December 2009 and thereafter paid to respondent No.5- Society which has also paid capital gain tax of Rs.11crores on the Rs.70 crores received from respondent No.4-developer. This Court further noted that the petitioner herein (plaintiffs in the suit) were litigating for 40 years over the issue which was settled in the year 1972 itself and that the litigation was really being instigated by a rival builder one Mr. Chavan who was supported by only about 8 or 10 members of the respondent society. This Court held that redevelopment project for which the decision was taken as far as back in 1966 could not be allowed to be stalled at the instance of a microscopic minority of the members.

¶40

D) The above Judgment dated 9 August 2012 of this Court was challenged before the Supreme Court in CA No.2683/2013 with other appeals. By Judgment dated 22 March 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals after observing, inter alia, as under:-

¶41

“It is therefore, natural to infer, that that the tenant members are agreeable to the redevelopment of 5.5 acres of land compromising of Willingdon East in the manner contemplated by the resolution of the Catholic Society dated 6.12.2009 and the consequential conveyance deed dated 7.2.2009 which

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is impugned in the suits filed by the tenant members . This also prima facie shows that that the action of the tenant members prima facie seems to lack bonafides. We therefore, affirm the determination rendered by the High Court in the impugned order, that it was for the Catholic Society to decide who should be given the redevelopment rights and not the tenant members who are a small minority of 15 persons (the number having now diminished to 5) who have initiated the litigation out of which the present proceedings have arisen. As of now therefore, it is possible to prima facie infer, that the petitioners/appellants' claim before the High Court does not seem to be bonafide. They also do not prima facie seem to have genuinely initiated the instant litigation. In the above view of the matter, the opinion recorded by the High Court that all arguments of the plaintiff based on law and equity vanished, upon the offer made by Mr. B.Y. Chavan cannot be stated to be unjustified”.

¶46

(emphasis supplied)

¶47

It is pertinent to note that the 15 tenant-members (including the present 5 petitioners) were supported by a rival builder Mr. B.Y.Chavan. It appears that during the pendency of appeals before the Supreme Court, certain with prejudice proposals were exchanged between the appellants (petitioners herein) and respondent Nos.4Developer and respondent No.5-Society. However, no settlement was reached and the Apex Court by a detailed Judgment dated 22 March 2013 running into 40 pages dismissed appeals filed by the present petitioners.

¶48

In the mean time after the Judgment of this Court dated 9 August 2012, the application made by respondent No.4-Developer for redevelopment under DCR 33(14)(D) of DCR was sanctioned by SRA.

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On 13 December 2012, LOI was issued by SRA. Regulation 33(14)(D) of DCR provides that where the owner of the land/ possessor of land agrees to provide PTC to SRA then additional FSI will be available for construction on the land in question. The SRA after sanctioning a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme for eligible hutment dwellers has to provide transit accommodation to them till the permanent rehab tenements are constructed. On construction of such rehab tenements the eligible slum dwellers move from the transit accommodation to their permanent tenements. However, since the slum rehabilitation schemes contemplate reconstruction of homes in the very area where the slums are situated (in situ rehabilitation), SRA finds it difficult to provide transit accommodation and therefore, Regulation 33(14)(D) of the DCR provides an incentive to owners of land to provide land and construct flats which can be used by SRA as Permanent Transit Camp. Accordingly, the developer and society would avail benefit of above additional FSI under the above regulation. SRA authorities sanctioned the scheme by order dated 13 December 2012. This would ensure 673 tenements would be constructed in the aggregate for members of respondent No.5 society and also free sale tenements on the one hand and another 530 permanent tenements to house eligible slum dwellers in transit till they receive their permanent tenements.

¶53

Therefore, the petitioners herein challenged Slum Rehabilitation Scheme sanctioned by the SRA before the HPC. In appeal before the HPC the petitioners sought to raise a further objection that in view of the project being included in proposed Heritage precincts, the Municipal Corporation had instructed SRA to issue stop work notice

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to respondent No.4 developer till clearance from the Mumbai Heritage Conversation Committee (MHCC). Accordingly, the CEO of SRA granted stay order dated 6 June 2013. However, the same was subsequently withdrawn by CEO,SRA on 24 July 2013 on the ground that in the proposed Heritage list the property in question has not been classified but just shown as “NA” . Therefore, the HPC by order dated 7 February 2014 dismissed the petitioners' appeal. The petitioners have challenged the said order of HPC dated 7 February 2014 by filing this petition.

¶58

When the matter reached admission/hearing before another Bench of this Court, as the issue related to heritage precinct the said Bench observed that the petition be placed before this Bench as all matters relating to Heritage precinct are being taken up by this Bench.

¶59

The first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that since CEO of SRA who has passed the order dated 26 July 2013 withdrawing the stop work notice was a member of HPC, the impugned order dated 7 February 2014 of HPC is bad. It is submitted that there is a clear breach of principle of natural justice that no person shall be Judge in his own cause. Besides the appeal itself becomes illusory as it is an appeal from Ceaser to Ceaser.

¶60

The above contention has been seriously opposed by the learned Counsel for the respondents by pointing out that the petitioners were aware of the fact that CEO of SRA was one of the five members of HPC. This is evidenced by the fact that the order dated 14 August 2013

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of HPC continuing the ad-interim stay granted by this Court on 2 August 2013 was sanctioned by members of the HPC including Mr. Nirmal Deshmukh who is specifically mentioned in the order by name and also by his designation as Chief Executive Officer SRA/Member High Power Committee (signed) It is submitted that after getting the stay in their favour the petitioners participated at the hearing before the HPC on as many as three occasions duly represented by Advocates. Thereafter only when the final order dated 7 February 2014 went against them, they have raised this objection. Learned Counsel have heavily relied upon the Judgment dated 30 March 2012 of Division Bench of this Court (Coram- Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sharad A. Bobde and Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.D. Dhanuka,) in Writ Petition No.2437 of 2011 in Advani Builders Private Limited Vs. Slum Rehabilitation Authority and ors. wherein the facts were identical. The CEO of SRA had passed the order which was impugned in the appeal before HPC and the same officer was also a member of the HPC. In that case also HPC had also granted interim stay in favour of the petitioner and after the HPC dismissed the appeal the petitioner raised objection about bias only in the writ petition challenging the decision of the HPC. This Court held as under:-

¶65

“15. It is equally well settled that an objection that a decision maker is biased or acting as a judge in his own cause cannot be reserved and a party cannot allow the proceedings to go on and then use it as a trump card to have the decision vitiated if it goes against him. In Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi (AIR 1957(SC) 425 the Supreme Court observed as follows:

¶66

“8. The alleged bias in a member of the Tribunal

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does not render the proceedings invalid if it is shown that the objection against the presence of the member in question had not been taken by the party even though the party knew about the circumstances giving rise to the allegations about the alleged bias and was aware of his right to challenge the presence of the member in Tribunal. It is true that waiver cannot always and in every case be inferred merely from the failure of the party to take the objection. Waiver can be inferred only if and after it is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and was aware of his right to take the objection in question. As Sir John Romilly, M.E. has observed in Vyvyan v. Vyvyan :(ER P.817).

¶71

Waiver or acquiescence, like election, presupposes that the person to be bound is fully cognizant of his rights, and that being so, he neglects to enforce them, or chooses one benefit instead of another, either but not both, of which he might claim.

¶72

If, in the present case, it appears that the appellant knew all the facts about the alleged disability of Shri. Chhangani and was also aware that he could effectively request the learned Chief Justice to nominate some other member instead of Shri. Chhangani and yet did not adopt that course, it may well be that he deliberately took a chance to obtain a report in his favour from the Tribunal and when he came to know that the report had gone against him he though better of his rights and raised this point before the High Court for the first time. In other words, though the point of law raised by Shri. Daphtary against the competence of the Tribunal be sound, it is still necessary for us to consider whether the appellant was precluded from raising this point before the High Court by waiver of acquiescence.

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From the record it is clear that the appellant never raised this point before the Tribunal and the manner in which this point was raised by him even before the High Court is somewhat significant. The first ground of objection filed by the appellant against the Tribunal's report was that Shri. Chhangani had pecuniary and personal interest in the complainant Dr. Prem Chand. The learned Judges of the High Court have found that the allegations about the pecuniary interest of Shri. Chhangani in the present proceedings are wholly unfounded and this finding has not been challenged before us by Shri. Daphtary. The learned Judges of the High Court have also found that the objection was raised by the appellant before them only to obtain an order for a fresh enquiry and thus gain time. It may be conceded in favour of Shri. Daphtary that the Judgment of the High Court does not in terms find against the appellant on the ground of waiver though that no doubt appears to be the substance of their conclusion. We have, however, heard Shri. Daphtary's case on the question of waiver and we have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that the appellant waived his objection deliberately and cannot now be allowed to raise it.”

¶77

The above passage was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of P. D.Dinakaran (1) supra, where the petitioner's knowledgeful silence was held as militating against the bonafides of his objection to the appointment of the member of the Committee which was to enquire in his conduct while dismissing the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.”

¶78

In the present case as in the case before the Division Bench in Advani Builders case the petitioners (appellants) before the High Power Committee were represented by Advocate and therefore, the observations made by the Division Bench will apply with equal force.

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The other objection raised before the Division Bench in Advani Builder (supra) was that there can be no waiver of principle of natural justice as it is integral to Article 14 of the Constitution. In support reliance was placed upon the decision in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel AIR 1985 1416.The Division Bench of this Court in Advani Builder(supra) dealt with the above objection as under :-

¶83

“22. The two main principles of natural justice “audi alteram partem” and “nemo debet judex in causa sua” which may be said to involve conferral of a right to be heard before being condemned and the right to an impartial unbiased tribunal. These rights are given for the advancement of justice and promotion of fair play in action. They apply to judicial, quasi judicial and administrative action. It is well settled that these rights can be waived, vide Manak Lal and P.D.Dinkaran (supra).After all, if a person does not want to be heard or does not care if a biased tribunal judges him, there is nothing in the law which prevents him from waiving the rights. This position is firmly established in the decided cases. In a case concerning audi alteram partem a man may well say that he does not want a show cause notice or charges framed against him, or to file a reply to a show cause notice or charges, or that he does not want to be heard or to cross examine witnesses deposing against him. He may keep silent and simply wait for the decision to come. That is because this rule of natural justice exists so that no man may be condemned unheard and must have a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. He may not insist on the right or avail of the right, if opportunity is given and waive it. Such waiver is embedded in the body of law relating to audi alteram partem. In a case concerning nemo debet judex in cause sua in relation

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to which a considerable body of law has been judicially developed. If a man, having a reasonable apprehension that the judge is biased, chooses to remain silent and does not object to the presence of the judge and allows the proceedings to come to an end against him, and thus takes his chance, he cannot be heard to say later that the judge was biased,. He has waived his right to an impartial and unbiased tribunal. Therefore, when the rules of natural justice are said to be part of Article 14 to the extent indicated in Tulsiram Patel's case, the principle of waiver is equally an integral part of Article 14.”

¶88

The learned Counsel for the petitioners however relies upon the decision of this Court dated 6 August 2012 in Writ Petition Lodging No.1840 of 2012 wherein on similar facts to the present case the order of HPC was set aside and restored to the file of HPC for fresh disposal. It is submitted that the above decision is rendered subsequent to Advani Builders (supra) and must be followed. We do not accept the above submission as the order dated 6 August 2012 was passed on the agreement between the parties that the impugned order be set aside and the proceeding may be remanded. Hence, the said order being in the nature of a consent order cannot be cited as precedent particularly when Advani Builders' case (supra) decided by another Division Bench of this Court has considered the issue of waiver which was never urged in the above case.

¶89

Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties we find considerable substance in the submissions made on behalf of respondent Nos. 4 and 5. The petitioners were aware of the composition of the HPC because the stay order dated 14 August 2013 was signed by

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its members including the CEO of SRA who was shown as Member of the HPC both by name and designation. The petitioners were represented before the HPC by an Advocate and after interim stay was granted by the HPC there were as many as three hearings but in none of those hearing did the petitioners raise any objection regarding CEO of SRA being one of the members of the HPC. In the present facts, we would proceed on the basis that the petitioners were aware of all the facts which form the basis of real likelihood of bias of one of the five members of the HPC, yet they did not raise any objection and proceeded with the hearing. It is only now when the final order was pronounced by HPC on 7 February 2014 that in the present petition for the first time the allegations about the bias of one of the members of the HPC is made and its composition for hearing the petitioners' appeal is challenged.

¶94

The facts in the case of Advani Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra) were identical to the facts of the present case and following the said decision we are not persuaded by the petitioner's contention that the impugned order of the HPC was vitiated on account of non compliance with principles of natural justice or on the basis of breach of Article 14 of the Constitution.

¶95

In any view of the matter, it is well settled that while exercising our extra ordinary jurisdiction which is discretionary, the purpose is to achieve ends of justice. A writ Court is not only a Court of law but also a Court of equity as observed by the Apex Court in Ramesh Chander Shukla vs. Vikram Cement 2008(14) SCC 58 . Further as

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observed by the Supreme Court in Roshan Deen vs. Preeti Lal (2002) I SCC 100.

¶100

“The very purpose of such constitutional powers being conferred on the High Courts is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The look out of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the by product of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law.”

¶101

Therefore, keeping in view the facts as narrated above which establishes that a small microscopic number of tenant members are time and again frustrating the will of the majority to redevelop the property since 1966. Thus in the present facts justice does not appear to be on the side of the petitioners.

¶102

Moreover, even if the impugned order of HPC were to be set aside, the matter would again be required to be remanded to HPC without having CEO-SRA as its member for reconsideration on merits of the matter. We have, therefore, heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length on merits as well.

¶103

Coming to the merits of the controversy, it is necessary to note that HPC in Paragraph 3 of the impugned order dated 7 February 2014 has noted that though the petitioners have challenged the slum rehabilitation scheme sanctioned by CEO of SRA under Regulation 33(14)D of the DCR 1991 on various grounds as stated in their Appeal

¶104

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¶106

No.10/2013, during the course of several hearings before HPC, the Advocate for the appellants stated that the appeal had arisen primarily because Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai had issued a notice on 31 July 2012 regarding proposed Heritage List which includes the said property as a proposed Heritage Precinct. It was the petitioners' case before the HPC that inspite of the above, the SRA proceeded to grant approval for the implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme under Regulation 33(14)D of DCR 1991.

¶107

The learned Counsel for the respondents particularly respondent Nos. 4 and 5 i.e. the developer and the society have raised preliminary objection that Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai had issued notice regarding proposed Heritage precinct on 31 July 2012 i.e. not only before this Court pronounced Judgment on 3 August 2012 in appeal but also long before the appeal was heard by the Supreme Court. It is submitted that in the above circumstances it was open to the petitioners to raise this challenge earlier before the Supreme Court as hearing before the Supreme Court was continued for about 4 months and the parties had exchanged their proposals. Attention is particularly invited to proposal dated 3 February 2013 of the petitioners which indicated that they were not opposed to redevelopment but they wanted 25% of the land to be given to tenant members and the construction on the land would be put up by the tenant members through their own developer. It is therefore, stated that the stand of petitioners objection to the demolition of the property on the ground that it was proposed to be listed as heritage is not genuine.

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In the alternative, it is submitted by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 i.e. the Developer and the Society that in the order dated 3 February 2014 this Court has held that the proposal for redevelopment is not required to be sent to the Mumbai Heritage Conservation Committee (MHCC) if the property in question is not proposed to be declared as Grade I or Grade II Heritage building. It is submitted that rehabilitation scheme has been sanctioned under Regulation 33(14)D of DCR 1991 which is to be treated as slum rehabilitation scheme as provided in Regulation 33(10) of DCR 1991 and therefore, also the question of sending the redevelopment proposal to MHCC would not arise.

¶112

It is further submitted that in any view of the matter notice dated 31 July 2012 issued by the Corporation classifies the property in question with the words “N.A.”. Further, as per the reply given by the Municipal Corporation in response to the query under RTI Act “NA” means “not applicable”. It is also vehemently submitted that the property in question is neither proposed as Grade I nor Grade II nor Grade III Heritage building nor is the area proposed to be declared as Heritage precincts. Hence, the question of sending the proposal to MHCC would not arise.

¶113

We find substance in all the above three submissions made on behalf of the respondents and accept the same.

¶114

The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that

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the scheme in question could not have been sanctioned as SRA scheme when there is no slum on the property in question. We are not impressed by this argument. Regulation 33(10)(II)(iv) and 33(14)D of the Regulation 1991 reads as under :

¶119

“33(10)(I) Eligibility for redevelopment Scheme(a)....to (b)....

¶120

(II) Definition of Slum, Pavement, and Structure of hut.(i)....to (iii)...

¶121

(iv) Any area required or proposed for the purpose of construction of temporary or permanent transit campus and so approved by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority shall also be deemed to be and treated as Slum Rehabilitation Areas and projects approved in such areas by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority shall be deemed to be Slum Rehabilitation Projects.”

¶122

33(14)D-Provisions relating to Transit Camp tenements for Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. (A).... to (C)....

¶123

(D) Or, the additional FSI could be used in the following manner:-

¶124

Serial No. (1)	Location (2)	Addl.FSI (3)	FSI for tenements for SRA (4)	FSI for free sale component (5)
1	Suburbs and extended Suburbs	1.50	0.75	0.75
2	Difficult areas comprising of Dharavi and such other areas as maybe	1.66	0.71	0.95

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3	Island city applicable only to	1.00	0.75	0.43
	Government and Public Sector
	undertakings.

¶129

Even in areas where the normally permissible FSI is less than 1.0, the additional FSI for permanent transit shall be mentioned as in 14(D) above and the ratio between FSI for transit camps to be given free of cost and for sale shall remain the same as in the Table herein above.”

¶130

It is therefore seen that where owner of the land agrees to provide a portion of the land to construct PTC thereon and handover the constructed tenements to SRA, such scheme is to be treated as slum rehabilitation scheme and the incentive of FSI is to be given accordingly on that basis.

¶131

Having considered the above, we have no doubt that the scheme sanctioned by SRA in favour of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 i.e. Developer and Society is squarely covered by Regulations-33(10) read with Regulation 33(14)(D). Therefore, we do not find any substance in the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the scheme could not have been sanctioned as slum rehabilitation scheme.

¶132

Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also invited our attention to provisions of Section-3 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement,Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (“Slum Act”) which read as under:

¶133

“3(1) The State Government may, by notification in the

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Official Gazette appoint any person to be the Competent Authority for the purposes of this Act, for such area as may be specified in the notification.”

¶138

It is submitted that in view of the above, SRA could not be treated as competent authority in respect of the property in question. However, we are of the view that once scheme is covered by the provisions of Regulation 33(10) of the DCR 1991 it is to be treated as Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. Therefore, SRA would have jurisdiction to deal with the scheme more particularly in view of the consequential powers conferred on the SRA under Sections-3A, and 3B(3)(d) of the Slum Act for achieving the object of rehabilitation of slums.

¶139

We therefore, do not find any merit in the contentions raised by the petitioners. No other contentions are raised. The petition is therefore, dismissed.

¶140

At this stage learned Counsel for the petitioners prays for directions that the respondents be asked to maintain status quo for a period of 4-weeks in order to enable the petitioner to challenge this order before the Apex Court. We find that no ad interim stay has been granted during the pendency of this petition. Hence, upon dismissal of the petition there cannot be any justification for acceding to the request made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners.

¶141

CHIEF JUSTICE

¶142

(M.S. SANKLECHA, J.)

Louis Anthony Dias and 4 Others v. the State of Maharashtra and 9 Others

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Louis Anthony Dias and 4 Others v. the State of Maharashtra and 9 Others

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