Allowed

Goldmines Telefilms Pvt. Ltd. v. Reliance Big Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.

Bombay HC24 Sept 2014APP/602/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A dispute over licensed Hindi dubbing and broadcast rights in a Telugu film resulted in temporary protection for the prior licensee. The court allowed the appeal and restrained release and distribution of the Hindi-dubbed version pending suit, subject to a deposit.

What did the court decide?

Temporary injunction restraining defendants from releasing and distributing the Hindi-dubbed version of BHAI pending suit, subject to the appellant making the required deposit within two weeks.

Goldmines Telefilms Pvt. Ltd. Vs Reliance Big… — Intellectual Property | Bombay HC (2014)

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JUDGMENT APPL-458-14

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

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APPEAL (L) NO.458 OF 2014

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NOTICE OF MOTION NO.452 OF 2014

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SUIT NO.194 OF 2014

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Goldmines Telefilms Pvt.Ltd.

...Appellant

(Orig.Plaintiff)

v/s.

Reliance Big Entertainment Pvt.Ltd. and ors.

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...Respondents (Orig.Defendants).

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Mr. Pravin Samdani, Senior Advocate with Ms. Tanmayi Gadre i/by Mr. Kalpesh Joshi for Plaintiff.

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Mr.Virag Tulzapurkar, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rahul Totla i/by Mr. Satyavrat Joshi, for Defendant No.1.

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Mr. N. H. Seervai, Senior Advocate with Mr. S.V. Marne and Ms.Aanchal Singhania for Defendant No.2.

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Mr. Ankit Lohia with Mr.Sumit Raghani i/by M/s. PDS and Associates, for Defendant No.3.

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CORAM: MOHIT S. SHAH, C. J. & M. S. SONAK, J .

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Date of Reserving the Judgment : 5 August 2014 Date of Pronouncing the Judgment : 24 September 2014

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JUDGMENT: ( Per Chief Justice )

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1] This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 15 July 2014 (impugned order) made by the learned Trial Judge of this Court dismissing the Notice of Motion taken out by the appellant/plaintiff seeking temporary injunction against the respondents/defendants from exploiting Hindi dubbing rights, sub-titling rights, satellite rights and cable television broadcast rights in respect of Telugu Feature Film BHAI ('the said film or 'BHAI').

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2] The facts leading to filing of this appeal, broadly stated, are as under:

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(For sake of convenience, the parties in this appeal shall be referred to by their status in the Suit No.194 of 2014, i.e., the appellant shall be referred to as plaintiff and the respondents as defendants).

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(a) The plaintiff and defendant No.1 (Reliance Big Entertainment Pvt. Ltd.) entered into an agreement dated 3 August 2012, by which defendant No.1, assigned several rights in six Telugu films, including the said film to the plaintiff for a total consideration of Rs.80 Lacs. Out of this, an amount of Rs.20 Lacs was to be consideration towards the several rights, including Hindi dubbing rights, sub-titling rights, satellite rights and cable television broadcast rights to the said film. This amount of Rs.20 Lacs was duly paid by the plaintiff to defendant No.1 on 6 August

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2012 together with further amount of Rs.35 Lacs, which represents consideration in respect of two other films, with which, we are not presently concerned.

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(b) On 7 August 2012, defendant No.1 handed over ' link documents' to the plaintiff in respect of five feature films, including the said film . This included the agreement dated 3 August 2012 between defendant Nos. 1 and producer defendant No.2 inter se. The plaintiff and defendant No.1 then entered into an addendum agreement dated 11 October 2012 to assign further rights in respect of feature films like cable T.V. rights, sub-title rights, nonexclusive mobile rights for a term of eleven years and consideration of Rs.3 Lacs on delivery of necessary materials.

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(c) Armed with the aforesaid documentation, plaintiff commenced negotiations with Star India Private Limited ('STAR') for licensing of satellite broadcasting and other allied rights in respect of said film for consideration of Rs.2.50 Crores. On 26 and 27 October 2012, STAR issued public notice/advertisement in 'C omplete Cinema' and 'Trade Guide Magazine ' for the proposed acquisition of rights, including Hindi dubbing rights and satellite broadcasting rights in respect of the said film (BHAI). On 6 November 2012, defendant No.1 addressed communication to STAR, confirming that it was the sole and exclusive owner having full rights and authority to assign rights in respect of the said film. Relying upon this, the plaintiff and STAR eventually entered into an agreement dated 7 February 2013, for licence of satellite

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broadcasting rights in respect of Hindi dubbing version of the said film for a period of five years.

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(d) On 2 July 2013, the plaintiff addressed an e-mail to defendant No.1 enquiring about theatrical release of said film , as in terms of Clause 3.1 of the agreement dated 3 August 2012, the plaintiff was obligated to pay further consideration of 25% at the said stage. Defendant No.1, responded on 3 July 2013 that it was ready with the delivery material for the film ' TALAASH' but was evasive with regard to the status of said film ' BHAI ' . Accordingly, the plaintiff addressed further and specific queries with regard to the said film on 10 and 15 July 2013. This was followed with a meet on 22 July 2013, in the course of which, the director of defendant No.1, reconfirmed that the plaintiff's rights in respect of said film ' were valid and subsisting. By ' e-mail' , the plaintiff duly recorded the discussions and assurances which transpired in the meet of 22 July 2013. As there was ambiguity in compliances, the plaintiff issued public notice on 27 July 2013, publicly asserting rights in respect of the said film .

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(e) It is at this stage that defendant No.1 made a volte face by addressing a letter dated 29 July 2013 to the plaintiff contending that the agreement dated 3 August 2012 and the addendum thereto dated 11 October 2012 were ' void ab initial', being contrary to the link agreement between defendant Nos.1 and defendant No.2 inter se. Along with such letter, defendant

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No.1 also enclosed cheque, in an amount of Rs.22,11,266/- by way of refund. The plaintiff contested the claims in the letter dated 29 July 2013 and returned the cheque to defendant No.1. The plaintiff, also issued yet another public notice dated 3 August 2013, asserting rights in respect of said film. In response, defendant No.2 for the first time, wrote to the plaintiff, claiming that defendant No.1 had reassigned its right in the said film to defendant No.2 under the agreement dated 4 January 2013.

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(f) The plaintiff, on 6 August 2013, called upon defendant No.2 to provide copies of the agreement dated 4 January 2013 or any other documents evidencing the purported reassignment. However, there was no response from defendant No.2. On 20 September 2013, the plaintiff caused legal notice to be served upon the defendants and on 30 September 2013 instituted suit for specific performance of agreement dated 3 August 2012 and addendum agreement dated 11 October 2012 in respect of Hindi dubbing and distribution rights to the said film .

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(g) On 10 October 2013, learned Trial Judge issued adinterim injunction restraining the defendants from releasing the Hindi dubbed version of the said film. By the impugned order dated 15 July 2014, however, the same was vacated and the motion for interim relief, dismissed. Hence, the present appeal.

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3] In making the impugned order, learned Trial Judge has recorded prima-facie findings that defendant No.1 not only held

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out incorrect representations in the agreement dated 3 August 2012, but also made incorrect submissions before the Court. Notwithstanding the same, learned Trial Judge, upon analysis of clause 2.28 of the link agreement dated 3 August 2012 between defendant Nos.1 and 2, inter se , has recorded prima-facie findings that defendant No.1 was not competent to assign any rights in respect of the said film without written documents evidencing mutual/joint decision on the aspect of ' ask and take price' with defendant No.2. Accordingly, it was held that defendant No. 1, despite its assertions to the contrary, had in fact purported to transfer to the plaintiff rights and title, better than what it itself possessed. The learned Trial Judge did not accept the plaintiff's case about collusion between defendant Nos.1 and 2 or that the trade practice did not warrant any written documentation on the aspect of ' ask and take price '. Instead, learned Trial Judge found fault with the plaintiff in not verifying whether the representations held out by defendant No.1 were indeed proper or not. For all these reasons, learned Trial Judge declined interim reliefs and dismissed the notice of motion.

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4] Mr. Pravin Samdani, learned senior advocate for the appellant/plaintiff has assailed the impugned judgment and order, broadly on the following grounds:

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(a) That the material on record overwhelmingly established a clear case of collusion between defendant Nos.1 and 2 for the express purpose of defeating plaintiff's right under the agreement dated

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3 August 2012 (and addendum agreement dated 11 October 2012) which was a back to back agreement with the agreement entered on the same day between defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 1;

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(b) That clause 2.28 of the Link agreement dated 3 August 2012 was required to be interpreted consistent with the trade practice, where ' ask and take price ' was never insisted upon being reduced in writing. The plaintiff had produced documents and relied upon at least 14 instances where the agreement contained similar clauses in respect of ' ask and take price ', but in no case was there any insistence upon written document evidencing joint decision upon the ' ask and take price '. All such instances concerned defendant No.1 itself and therefore, there was absolutely no room to infer that there was no mutual agreement/joint decision in the matter of ' ask and take price ' between defendant Nos.1 and 2, at the stage when defendant No.1 held out representations of exclusive rights and agreed for the assignment thereof vide agreement dated 3 August 2012 and addendum dated 11 October 2012; (c) In making the impugned order, the learned Trial Judge has applied incorrect principles, ignored relevant material on record and recorded findings based upon incorrect inferences, surmises and conjectures.

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5] Mr. Virag Tulzapurkar, Mr. N.H. Seervai, learned senior advocates and Mr. Ankit Lohia, learned advocate for defendant Nos.1 to 3, in unison contended that applying the principle in the case of Wander Ltd. & anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd. - 1990 (supp) SCC 727 , the appellant-plaintiff has made out no case whatsoever warranting any interference with the impugned order. It was submitted by the counsel for respondent/defendant Nos.1 and 2, defendant No.1 had no authority to assign Hindi dubbing rights or distribution rights to the plaintiff, without obtaining the consent from defendant No.2 and some written document evidencing mutual/joint decision on the aspect of ' ask and take price ' . In such a situation, they submitted that any lack of commercial morality or probity on the part of the party which has purported to assign rights and title, much in excess of what it itself possessed, is quite irrelevant. The plaintiff, in such a case, must succeed or fail on its own case and cannot take advantage of weakness in the defendants' case to obtain any injunctive relief.

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6.1] Mr. Seervai for defendant No.2 submitted that under link agreement dated 3 August 2012 between defendant Nos.1 and 2, i nter se , defendant No.2 had assigned only 50% right in the said film to defendant No.1.

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6.2] The learned counsel for defendant Nos.1 and 2 asserted that there was never any ' ask and take price ' determined and recorded in writing.

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7] As regards solemn representations held out by defendant No.1 to the plaintiff as regards exclusive rights, both in the agreement as well as correspondence, learned counsel for defendant No.1 submitted that the same were held out under the bonafide belief that defendant No.2 would not object to the agreement between defendant No.1 and the plaintiff. However, once defendant No.2 raised objections, defendant no.1 had no option but to void the agreements with the plaintiff and refund the consideration received.

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8] Learned counsel for defendant No.3 submitted that defendant No.3 had already dubbed the said film in Hindi and further paid substantial consideration to defendant Nos.1 and 2 for such dubbing and distribution rights in respect of said film. For all these reasons, learned counsel for defendant Nos.1 to 3 submitted that the plaintiff had neither made out any prima-facie case nor was balance of convenience in favour of grant of any injunctive relief to the plaintiff. On the contrary grave and irreparable prejudice, incompensable in terms of money would be occasioned to defendant No.3, should any injunctive relief be granted to the plaintiff.

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9] With a view to appreciate rival contentions, it is necessary to refer to the relevant clauses in the agreements between the parties. The agreements between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 and the Link agreement between defendant Nos.1 and 2, inter se are both dated 3 August 2012 and are stated to be

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' back to back' agreements. Therefore, reference to some of the clauses in the Link agreement would be appropriate for analysing their impact upon the agreement between plaintiff and defendant No.1 (Goldmine agreement).

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10] Some of the relevant clauses of the link agreement dated 3 August 2012 as between defendant Nos.1 and 2, inter se, read thus:-

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“WHEREAS:

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C. ASPL (defendant No. 2 )is desirous of producing one (1) cinematograph film in Telugu Language tentatively titled “Bhai” (hereinafter referred to as 'Film') ASPL (defendant No. 2) has agreed to assign the Rights (as defined hereinafter) in the Film to RE (Reliance Entertainment) (defendant No. 1) in lieu of a consideration and on the terms and conditions set out hereinafter. D. … … … …

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1.1.8 “Intellectual property” shall mean all forms of intellectual property subsisting under the laws of India in relation to the Film and all analogous rights subsisting under the laws of each and every jurisdiction throughout the world. Intellectual Property includes copyrights, rights of privacy and other forms protected rights and any licenses and permission in connection therewith, in each and any part of the world and whether or not registered or registrable and for the full period thereof, and all extensions and renewals thereof, and all applications for registration in connection with the foregoing.

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1.1.10 “ s aid Rights/Distribution Rights ” includes all rights of any nature whatsoever in the Script and the Film, in perpetuity, worldwide, in all form, format and media including but not limited to the remake rights in any Indian/foreign language, prequel rights, sequel rights. Subtitling and Dubbing rights in all languages of the world,

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novelization rights, live stage rights, Intellectual Property Rights, whether now known or discovered in the future, all the Worldwide Distribution and Marketing Rights across all media platforms (past, present and future). Including but not limited to Theatrical rights for the whole world in all forms of theatrical exploitation in 70mm/35mm Digital Print include theatrical Video rights, All non-theatrical Rights, All commercial and non-commercial Electronic Media Rights, All Video copyrights in all formats and all media, Karaoke, Electronic Video Projection Rights, All Ancillary Rights, All internet Rights, Website, IPTV, Broadband, All Multimedia Rights, All video Streaming Rights, All Cable Rights, All Terrestrial Television Rights including all Doordarshan Network Channel and all Regional Network Channels, All mobile telephone Rights via all medium, All Telecommunication Rights, All movie and movie Character based Games development rights, All computer games rights, Hotel and Commercial Establishment rights, High Seas & surface Transports rights, Air Borne Rights, Rental Rights, Publishing Rights, Merchandising Rights Clipping rights of songs and scenes (both audio visuals), Recording, Embodying, Communication, Processing, Mechanical, Synchronization, All Public Performance Rights, All Communication and broadcasting Rights all Music Audio copyrights and all rights related to Music Rights, Performing Copyrights, its Songs, Music, music, sound track, Radio Station, Public Places, Gramphone Companies etc. all Satellite Broadcasting Rights including Pay TV Rights, Pay per view, Pay per Day, FTA , DTH, Subscription TV. All Satellite Delivery Rights and rights of redistribution via any and all medium for Multiple Telecast, All video on Demand Rights via all medium, method & manner, NVOD, MOD, MVOD, SVOD, All mobile TV Rights, All Digital Rights etc. in all the languages existing in the world, for the entire term of the copyright and the entire territory of the world and any and all allied, incidental, and ancillary rights, in and to the

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Films now known or hereinafter invented/discovered in perpetuity.”

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1.1.11 …........ …..........

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1.1.12 “Term” shall mean a permanent and perpetual period.

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2. PRINCIPAL UNDERSTANDING & PRODUCTION SERVICES

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2.1.

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2.2 ASPL (defendant No. 2) agrees to assign the said Rights of the Film for the Term as defined in Clauses 1.1.12 and RE (defendant No. 1) Agrees to acquire the said Rights of the Film in lieu of a consideration as mentioned in Clause 5 herein below. Further, ASPL agrees to assign 50% Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and all other underlying rights relating to the Film to RE for the term as defined in Clause 1.1.12 Remaining 50% of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and all other underlying rights relating to the Film shall be owned/held by ASPL for the Term.

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2.27 The Parties agree that RE shall solely control and exploit all the Distribution Rights assigned by ASPL to RE of the Film.

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2.28 Subject to the terms hereof, RE shall solely exploit all the Distribution Rights and shall solely execute all Distribution Agreements with regards to the Distribution Rights for the entire world with third parties. Parties shall jointly / mutually decide ASK and TAKE prices and terms and conditions relating to sale of all Distribution Rights for the entire world with third parties. The ASK and TAKE price mutually decided by the Parties shall be documented and signed off by the Parties. Further at any stage, if one of the Parties herein gets a best offer then in such event Agreement will be executed with such best offer. Once such ASK and

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TAKE prices, best offers are decided and finalized by the Parties then RE shall solely execute all distribution Agreements with third Parties. In the event any deal is not within the ASK and TAKE prices as decided by the Parties, RE shall require prior written approval of the ASPL to execute such deals below the TAKE price.

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3. CONSIDERATION

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3.1 In Consideration of the exclusive assignment by ASPL (defendant No.2), in favour of RE (defendant No.1) of the said Rights as defined in Clause 1.1.10 herein above, 50% IPR and 50% Negative right in and to the Film for the Term and within the Territory, and subject to ASPL fulfilling its obligations as set forth in this agreement, RE agrees to pay to ASPL all inclusive amount not exceeding_______ including a Contingency fund of ___________ as mentioned in detail in Schedule 3 herein (“Consideration”) subject to tax deduction at source and as per Cash flow Schedule (annexed as Schedule 3)._

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3.2 The Parties agree that 80% of the Consideration shall be paid by RE to ASPL towards acquisition of the Theatrical Rights of the Film and remaining 20% of the Consideration shall be paid by RE to ASPL towards acquisition of all other Rights defined in Clause 1.1.0 for the Film.

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10. ASSIGNMENT & SUB-LICENSING

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Neither Party to this Agreement will assign this Agreement or its benefits without the prior written consent of the other Party. It is however, agreed that RE shall be entitled to sub license the Distribution Rights of the Film to any third party as per Clause 2.28 herein. Parties agree that such sub-licensees shall not get any credit in the Film.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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16.1 …......... …........... 16.2 …......... …...........

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16.3 No Waiver: Save and except as expressly provided in this Agreement, no exercise, failure to exercise, or delay in exercising any right, power or remedy vested in any Party under or pursuant to this Agreement shall constitute a waiver by that Party of that or any other right, power or remedy.”

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[emphasis supplied]

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11] Similarly, some of the relevant clauses in the Goldmine agreement dated 3 August 2012 between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 read as under:

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“WHEREAS:

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(i) The Licensor (defendant No. 1) is the exclusive worldwide distributor of the cinematograph film in color and in Telugu language as mentioned in Annexure-A of this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “the said Film”;

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(ii) The Licensor hereby represents that it has the requisite rights, free from all encumbrances, for exploitation of all distribution rights with respect to the said Film;

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(iii) The Licensee (plaintiff) is, engaged in the exhibition of cinematograph films and other audio visual contents on media platforms;

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(iv) The Licensee has approached the Licensor with a request to grant exclusive Satellite Rights (defined hereunder) with regard to the Hindi dubbed version (defined hereunder) of the said Film for a Consideration and for the Term (defined hereunder) and in the Territory.

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(v) The Licensor as the exclusive worldwide distributor of the said Film has agreed to license the exclusive Satellite Rights of the Hindi dubbed version in respect of the said Film to the Licensee for the Term in the Territory on such terms and conditions as agreed hereunder.

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2. GRANT OF RIGHTS

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2.1. Subject to the receipt of the Consideration as set out herein below, the Licensor grants to the Licensee the sole and exclusive Satellite Rights in the Dubbed version of the said Film in Hindi Language only (“Hindi Dubbed version”), in the Territory, during the Term of this Agreement. For sake of clarity it is stated herein that Rights Granted to the Licensee are only for the Hindi dubbed version of the Telugu Language Films as mentioned in Annexure-A and that the Licensee shall not have the right to further dub the films in any other language of the world.

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3. CONSIDERATION

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3.1 The total consideration for licensing to the Licensee the Satellite Rights in the Hindi Dubbed version in the Territory, during the Term shall be an amount of Rs.80,00,000/- (Rupees Eighty Lacs only) plus applicable taxes (“Consideration”) subject to Tax deduction at source (TDS), at applicable rate. The Consideration shall be paid to the Licensor by the Licensee as mentioned in Annexure-B of this Agreement.

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3.2 The Licensee shall solely bear all costs and expenses and it shall also be the sole responsibility of the Licensee to dub the said Film in Hindi Language from Original Language and Censor such dubbed Film for exploitation of the Satellite Rights in the Hindi dubbed version. The copyright in Hindi dubbed version shall at all times vest with the Licensor at no extra cost.

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4. ASSIGNABILITY

The Licensee shall have the right to sub-license the Satellite Rights in the Hindi dubbed version to any third party without prior approval of the Licensor. The revenues received by the Licensee from exploitation of the Satellite Rights in the Hindi dubbed version shall remain with the Licensee and the Licensee shall not be liable to share the same with the Licensor. The Consideration as aforesaid shall be the full and final amount payable by the Licensee to the Licensor towards grant of the satellite broadcasting rights of the Hindi dubbed version of the said film.

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7. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

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7.1.1 Licensor (defendant No.1) is fully entitled to assign the Satellite Rights of the Hindi dubbed version and have not prior to signing of this Agreement granted, assigned, transferred or encumbered in any way and in any manner whatsoever the aforesaid Satellite Rights in the Hindi Dubbed version to any other person to the prejudice of the Licensee.

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7.1.2 The Licensor shall deliver the Materials to the Licensee within the timeline as agreed by the parties in Annexure-B of this Agreement.

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7.1.3 The Licensor has the full power and authority to enter into, and fully perform its obligations under this Agreement and, that its performance under this Agreement, will not violate the rights of any third party.

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11.4 The Parties acknowledge that in addition to their rights under this Agreement and under any applicable law, each Party shall be entitled to injunctive and other equitable relief to prevent or curtail any actual or threatened breach by the other Party of the provisions of this Agreement.

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12.9 Disclosure By Parties: The Parties hereto state and affirm that they have, prior to and at the time of entering into this Agreement, made full disclosure of all material circumstances and information known to them with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement and transaction which would be likely to influence the conduct or decision of the other Party;

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As regards the consideration of Rs.80 lakh, the payment schedule was as under:-

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PAYMENT SCHEDULE

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25% of consideration value plus applicable taxes on the date of execution of the Agreement.

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25% of consideration value plus applicable taxes on the date of general theatrical release in India.

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50% on consideration value plus applicable taxes on delivery of materials.

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12] At the stage of entering into agreement dated 3 August 2012 and addendum dated 11 October 2012, defendant no.1 clearly held out that it was exclusive worldwide distributor in respect of the said film, that it had requisite rights, free from all encumbrances for exploitation of all distribution rights in respect of said film and in pursuance of same defendant No.1 was granting to the plaintiff various rights, including inter alia sole and exclusive satellite rights in the Hindi dubbed version of the said film without any restrictions during the licence period. Further, in the Goldmine agreement dated 3 August 2012, it was specified that the plaintiff shall have the right to sub-licence the said rights in the Hindi dubbed version to any third party without prior

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approval of defendant No.1 and the revenues received by the plaintiff from the exploitation thereof shall be retained entirely by the plaintiff, without any obligation to share the same with defendant No.1. In Clause (7) of the agreement, defendant No.1 represented and warranted that it was fully entitled to assign the Satellite Rights of the Hindi dubbed version and had not prior to signing of the Agreement, granted assigned, transferred or encumbered in any way and in any manner whatsoever, such right to any other person to the prejudice of the plaintiff. Defendant No.1 further represented and warranted that it had full power and authority to enter into and fully perform its obligation under the agreement and that its performance under the agreement will not violate the rights of any third party. Under Clause 12.9 of the agreement, the parties stated and affirmed that they have, prior to and at the time of entering into the agreement, made full disclosure of all material circumstances and information known to them with respect to the subject matter of the agreement and the transaction which would be likely to influence the conduct or decision of the other party. Under Clause 11.4 of the agreement, the parties acknowledged that any addition to their rights under their agreement and under any applicable law, each party shall be entitled to injunctive and other equitable reliefs to prevent or curtail any actual or threatened breach by the other party of the provisions of the agreement.

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13] There is no dispute that at the stage of execution of the Goldmine agreement dated 3 August 2012, the plaintiff had paid and defendant No.1 had received 25% of the consideration in accord with the payment schedule set out in the agreement dated 3 August 2012, corresponding to Rs.20 Lac qua the said film. It is not the case of the defendants that the plaintiff was at any stage unwilling to comply with any of its obligations under the agreement, including payment of balance consideration. In fact, the material on record establishes that on 2 July 2013, the plaintiff addressed an e-mail to defendant No.1 enquiring about the general theatrical release of the said film, because in terms of clause 3.1 read with the payment schedule to the agreement dated 3 August 2012, the plaintiff was obligated to pay consideration of 25% at that stage.

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14] Apart from the various representations and warranties held out by defendant No.1 in the agreement dated 3 August 2012, defendant No.1, in its correspondence also, asserted the position that it had exclusive rights, inter alia, to the Hindi dubbing, distribution and telecast rights in respect of the said film. STAR, with whom the plaintiff was negotiating for the assignment of telecast rights, issued public notices in cinema trade magazines on 26 and 27 October 2012. In response, defendant No.1 addressed specific communication dated 6 November 2012 to STAR, confirming that it had exclusive rights in respect of the said film, which had been duly assigned by it, in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant No.2, despite being a player in the film industry,

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submitted no response to the public notices objecting to proposed acquisition of rights by STAR to the said film or asserting its own rights in respect thereof.

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15] Throughout the period between 3 August 2012 and 3 August 2013, neither defendant No.1 nor defendant No. 2 raised any issues with regard to the Goldmine agreement dated 3 August 2012 and addendum dated 11 October 2012 entered into between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 in relation to the said film. Throughout this period, as noted earlier, the plaintiff asserted their rights in respect of the said film. Taking into consideration the circumstance that the Goldmine agreement dated 3 August 2012 was entered into ' back to back ' with the Link agreement dated 3 August 2012 between the defendant No.2 and defendant No. 1 and considering the public notice of STAR in two film trade magazines in October 2012, it is difficult to accept, that defendant No.2 had no knowledge whatsoever about the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. There is no explanation whatsoever on the part of defendant No.2, as to its silence during this entire period. There is no explanation for the lack of response or reaction on the part of defendant No.2 to the public notices dated 26 and 27 October 2012 issued by STAR in film trade journals for acquisition of certain rights in respect of said film from the plaintiff. This unexplained silence, along with several other circumstances, to which reference shall be made hereafter suggest that defendant Nos.1 and 2 have colluded with each other to raise the bogey of non-compliance with the provisions

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contained in clause 2.28 of Link agreement dated 3 August 2012, with a view to defeat the plaintiff's rights under the Goldmine agreement dated 3 August 2012 and addendum dated 11 October 2012.

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16] As noted earlier, defendant No.1, on the one hand assured STAR that it had exclusive rights in respect of the said film, which exclusive rights, it had assigned in favour of the plaintiff. On the other hand, there is on record, e-mail communication dated 24 November 2012 from defendant No.1 to defendant No.2, which records that consequent upon defendant No.2 guaranteeing an amount of Rs.1.50 crores for all Hindi and North Indian language rights in respect of the said film, defendant No.1 will cancel the agreement made with ' a third party for Hindi dubbing rights', in respect of said film. This e-mail dated 24 November 2012 reads thus:

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“Dear Mahesh,

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As per our discussions yesterday, 23^rd November 2012, we confirm that:

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Annapurna Studios will guarantee an amount of Rs.1.50 crores for all the Hindi and North Indian language rights of the film Bhai as per the standard agreement for Hindi and North Indian language rights.

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Annapurna Studios will take the risk on themselves for any down side or upside of Rs.1.50 crores.

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To be more clear, Annapurna Studios will pay Project Bhai Rs.1.50 cr towards the Hindi and North Indian languages rights of film Bhai irrespective of what price Annapurna Studios fetches for the same. This will be formalised by exchange of letters or an agreement to this effect.

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	In view of this Reliance will cancel the agreement made with a third party for Bhai Hindi Dubbing rights. Please confirm the same. Regards,
	K. Umapathy Rao
	Chief Financial Officer.

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[emphasis supplied]

¶189

17] The aforesaid e-mail communication dated 24 November 2012, at least establishes that defendant No. 2 had the knowledge about defendant No.1 having created third party rights in respect of the said film. Almost a month prior to such communication, STAR had already published public notices in cinema trade magazines declaring its intention to acquire rights in respect of said film from the plaintiff. In such circumstances, it cannot be accepted that defendant No.2 had no knowledge whatsoever about dealings of defendant No.1 in relation to the said film. Even then defendant No.2 chose not to lodge any objection to the plaintiff or STAR about its alleged rights.

¶190

Further, it is pertinent to observe that the e-mail communication dated 24 November 2012 makes no reference whatsoever to any non-compliance with the provisions of clause 2.28 of the link agreement dated 3 August 2012.

¶191

18] We, therefore, find considerable merit in the submission of learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that under the link agreement dated 3 August 2012, defendant No. 2 had assigned all its distributors' rights in the said film in favour of

¶192

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defendant No.1, particularly Dubbing Rights and Distribution Rights, retaining to itself only 50% intellectual property rights for the term, which has been defined as ' in perpetuity '.

¶195

19] The two expressions 'Intellectual Property' and ' said rights/distribution rights' have been distinctly defined under clause 1.1.8 and 1.1.10 respectively of the link agreement dated 3 August 2012. The expression ' said rights/distribution rights ' as defined under clause 1.1.10 is fairly wide in its scope and ambit. In the first place, the definition is 'inclusive'. Secondly, the expression includes all rights of any nature whatsoever in the script and the film, in perpetuity, worldwide, in all form, format and media including but not limited to the remake rights in any Indian/Foreign language, subtitling and dubbing rights in all languages of the world, all satellite broadcasting rights, pay TV rights and so on. In contrast, the expression ' Intellectual Property' as defined under clause 1.1.8 includes copy rights, rights of privacy licences and permissions in connection therewith and renewal thereto. Clause 2 of link agreement spells out the principal understanding between the parties. Clause 2.2 provides that defendant No.2 has assigned ' said rights' of the film for the term as defined under clause 1.1.12 in lieu of consideration as mentioned in clause 5 (sic-clause 3) of the agreement. Further, defendant no.2 has assigned 50% of ' Intellectual Property Right' and and other underlying rights relating to the said film to defendant No.1 and that remaining 50% of the ' Intellectual

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Property Right' and all other underlying rights relating to the said film shall be retained by defendant No.2.

¶201

20] As noted earlier, the expressions ' said rights' and 'Intellectual Property Right' have been distinctly defined under the link agreement vide clauses 1.1.10 and 1.1.8. Clause 2.2 of the link agreement, which reflects the principal understanding between the parties, records that defendant No.2 has assigned 'said rights' in the said film for the term i.e., in perpetuity. Thereafter, the next sentence starts with the word ''further” and there is reference to assignment of 50% of 'Intellectual Property Right'. The expression ' said rights', considering its width amplitude as well as what it expressly includes, undoubtedly encompasses within its width, Hindi dubbing rights and telecast rights in respect of the said film. T herefore, the link agreement dated 3 August 2012 assigns in favour of defendant No.1 exclusive rights in matters of Hindi dubbing and telecast rights to the said film. By the Goldmine agreement dated 3 August 2012, therefore, it cannot be said that defendant No.1 assigned rights to the plaintiff, over and above what it itself possessed.

¶202

21] There are other provisions in the link agreement dated 3 August 2012, which also support the aforesaid position. For example, clause 2.27 provides that defendant No.1 shall solely control and exploit all distribution rights assigned by defendant No.2 to defendant No.1 in respect of the said film. Clause 3.1,

¶203

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which deals with the consideration, also makes reference to exclusive assignment by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 of ' said rights as defined in clause 1.1.10 herein above '. This clause 3.1 makes separate reference to 50% of ' Intellectual Property Right' and 50% of negative rights to the said film. In so far as 'said rights' are concerned, there is no reference to assignment of only 50% rights. Clause 4, which deals with revenues and production fee provides that all revenues for the film shall be disbursed by defendant No.1 firstly towards recoupment of consideration and marketing and distribution expenses; secondly towards recoupment of return on investment on entire defendant No.1's investment in the film; thirdly, in recoupment of its commission and only thereafter the balance revenues, if any, be shared between defendant Nos.1 and 2 in the prescribed ratio. All these provisions indicate that the entire venture was to be funded by defendant No.1 in consideration of exclusive rights to the said film in their entirety, save and except 50% ' Intellectual Property Right' and 50% negative rights which were retained by defendant No.2 unto itself. Therefore, in so far as Hindi dubbing rights or telecasting rights, which defendant No.1assigned in favour of plaintiff are concerned, it cannot be said that the assignment was in excess of what defendant No.1 itself possessed by virtue of link agreement dated 3 August 2012.

¶207

22] In Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb – AIR 1960 Supreme Court 953, the Supreme Court has held that in the interpretation of documents,

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which present some ambiguity, task is to ascertain intention of the parties to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the Courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot be next taken away and that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later clause. Therefore, where there is ambiguity, it is the duty of the Court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantor's document it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee. Applying aforesaid principle we are not prepared to accept that defendant No.1, by agreement dated 3 August 2012, had assigned rights, better than what it itself possessed.

¶212

23] Mr. N.H. Seervai, learned senior counsel for defendant No.2 placed reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court in Mahabir Gope vs. Harbans Narain Singh – AIR 1952 Supreme Court 295, State of Punjab vs. Surjit Kaur (dead) through Lrs. & ors. - (2012) 12 SCC 155 and the decision in Rajendrakmar Bhandari vs. Poosammal – AIR 1975 Madras 379 to submit that no party can transfer any title, better than what it itself possess. Obviously, there can be no dispute as to such proposition. However, in the present case, it does appear that the entire rights in the said film, save and except 50% of the ' Intellectual Property Rights' had been

¶213

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¶215

assigned by defendant No.2 to defendant No.1 under link agreement dated 3 August 2012. Therefore, proposition that no man can transfer a title better than what he himself possess, is not at all applicable.

¶216

24] Mr. Seervai also placed reliance upon the decisions in Powell v. Head – (1879) 12 Ch.D. 686 and the decision of the King's Bench Division in Cescinsky v. George Routledge & Sons Limited – (1916) 2 K.B.325 and the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Angath Arts Pvt. Ltd. vs. Century Communications Ltd. & anr. - 2008 (4) Mh.L.J. 926, which lay down that a joint owner of a copyright, cannot grant licence for its reproduction without the consent of the other owners. Again there can be no dispute as regards the proposition. However, as noted earlier, defendant No.2 had assigned its entire rights in the matters of Hindi dubbing, distribution and telecasting to defendant No.1. Defendant No.1, in turn had assigned such rights to the plaintiff. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the principle set out in the said decisions, is clearly not attracted.

¶217

25] We then come to the issue of compliance with the provisions of clause 2.28 of the link agreement dated 3 August 2012. If the principle propounded by the Supreme Court in Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah (supra) is applied, then it cannot be accepted that the assignment of rights was dependant upon the parties jointly and mutually recording the ' ask and take

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price '. However, even if the compliance with this clause is to be regarded as a pre-condition, then in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said , that there was any breach in the compliance of the provisions contained in clause 2.28 of the link agreement dated 3 August 2012. In this regard, reference is required to be made to almost fourteen instances placed on record by the plaintiff, concerning defendant No.1 itself. In each of such instances, there were clauses akin to clause 2.28 of the link agreement, but there was no written document in respect of settlement as to ' ask and take price'. Learned Trial Judge, after taking note of such instances, however, inferred that the plaintiff took a commercial risk in the matter. With respect, however, we are unable to share this view of the learned Single Judge. The fourteen instances involving defendant No.1 itself, in almost identical circumstances, suggest the existence of a trade practice as regards non-insistence upon any writing to establish settlement in matters of ' ask and take price'. Even if there was a trade practice of insisting upon a written document regarding ' ask and take price' , in the facts of the present case defendant No.1 being the Financier of the Film, the Goldmine agreement between defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff having been executed on the same day on which the link agreement between defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 1 was executed, indicate that defendant No.2 was aware of the Goldmine agreement between defendant No.1 and the plaintiff, or at least that defendant no.1 had already created some third party rights in respect of the said film. Such awareness, is also evident from the e-mail communication dated 24 November

¶223

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Besides, on 26 and 27 October 2012, STAR had also issued public notices in cinema trade journals for acquisition of certain rights in respect of said film. If therefore, there was no settlement with regard to 'ask and take price' as between defendant Nos.1 and 2, it is reasonable to expect that defendant No.2 would have certainly reacted at an earlier point of time. The absence of any reaction, is indicative of collusion between defendant Nos.1 and 2, inter se. Defendant No.1 was admittedly financier of the project. As noted earlier, defendant No.1 made several positive assertions with regard to tis exclusive rights in the said film, both in the agreements as also the correspondence between the parties. Later on however, defendant No.1 made attempts to resile from the representations solemnly held out on the specious plea that there was no strict compliance with the provisions contained in Clause 2.28 of the Link agreement dated 3 August 2012 between defendant Nos.1 and 2 inter se. I n fact, learned Trial judge as also critically noted such conduct on the part of defendant No.1. Such criticism, is undoubtedly justified. However, we see no reason as to why defendant No.2 should escape such criticism. The material on record, prima-facie establishes that defendant No.1 and 2 have acted in concert, in order to defeat the plaintiff's rights under the agreement dated 3 August 2012.

¶227

26] Defendant Nos.1 and 2 rely upon agreements dated 4 January 2013, by which defendant No.1 is purported to have reassigned its rights to the said film to defendant No.2. This agreement did not surface upto August 2013, when for the first

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time defendant No.2 made a reference to the same in its response to plaintiff's public notice dated 3 August 2013. If really such an agreement was entered into between defendant Nos.1 and 2, inter se, then there is no explanation as to why defendant No.1 offered to refund consideration of over Rs.20 Lacs to the plaintiff only in July 2013. In the meeting held on 22 July 2013, defendant No.1 had admitted that the plaintiff's rights under the agreement dated 3 August 2012 are valid and subsisting. This position was recorded by the plaintiff in the e-mail addressed on 23 July 2013. It is only after a period of almost six days that defendant No.1 attempted to retract from this position. In the meanwhile, defendant No.1 throughout asserted that it had exclusive rights in respect of said film and conducted itself accordingly. All these circumstances, when cumulatively considered, establish that the plaintiff has made out a strong prima-facie case.

¶233

27] In response to the query from the Court as to the costs involved for dubbing of Telugu film into Hindi, learned counsel for defendant No.3 stated that such cost would be in the range of Rs.6 Lacs only. Admittedly, any agreement between defendant Nos.1 and 2 on one hand and defendant Nos.3 and 4 on the other, is post the agreements between the plaintiff and defendant No.1. There is material on record which suggests that the plaintiff has acted in pursuance of the agreement dated 3 August 2012. In terms of clause 11.4 of the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No.1, each party is entitled to injunctive and other

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equitable relief to prevent or curtail any actual or threatened breach by the other party of the provisions of the agreement. The circumstance that defendant Nos.3 and 4 have dubbed said film in Hindi at a cost hardly of Rs.6 Lacs or that the said defendants have paid some consideration to defendant Nos.1 and 2, is really not sufficient to defeat prior rights of the plaintiff in respect of said film. Thus construed, the plaintiff has not only made out a strong prima-facie case, but also balance of convenience is in favour of grant of injunctive relief.

¶238

28] In Wander Ltd. & anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd. - 1990 (Supp) SCC 727, the Supreme Court has held that in an appeal against an interlocutory order, the appellate Court should ordinarily not interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, the learned trial Judge has not declined to confirm the ad-interim relief on the ground of balance of convenience or irreparable loss, but on the ground that the plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case on merits.

¶239

29] In M/s. National Chemicals and Colour Co. & Ors. vs. Reckitt and Colman of India Limited & Anr. - AIR 1991 Bom. 76, a Division Bench of this Court comprising Justice Sujata Manohar (as Her Ladyship then was) and Justice Kenia dealt with the contention that the appellate Court should not lightly interfere with the discretion exercised by the Trial Court. The Division Bench held that even in appeal against interlocutory order, the appellate Court is required to adjudicate prima facie upon merits

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of the case and is entitled to take a different view upon prima facie adjudication of merits of the dispute between the parties. The aforesaid decision is based upon an earlier decision of the Division Bench of this Court comprising Justice Lentin and Justice P.B. Sawant (as His Lordship then was) in Hiralal Parbhudas vs. Ganesh Trading Company & Ors. AIR 1984 Bom. 21 8, in which, it was observed as follows:

¶245

“21. It was finally urged by Mr. Kale that the discretion exercised by the Deputy Registrar under Section 56 of the Act in the respondents' favour should not be lightly disturbed and the appellate Court should therefore not disturb the judgment and order of the learned single Judge. We ask ourselves; Pray where at all arises the question of discretion. To start with, the Deputy Registrar did not exercise any discretion under Section 56 in rejecting the appellants' application for rectification. It must be remembered that the concept of discretion is distinct from that of adjudication. When the Deputy Registrar rejected the appellants' application for rectification on the ground that the two marks are not deceptively similar, she did not use any discretion but adjudicated upon the rival contentions of the parities. It would be trite to say that exercise of discretion can arise in favour of a party when adjudication by the Registrar is against that party. In the present case, the Deputy Registrar's adjudication was in fact in favour of the respondents, with the result that there was no occasion for the Deputy Registrar to exercise any discretion. If the Deputy Registrar had held that the two marks were deceptively similar (which she did not ) but that in exercise of her discretion she did not consider it necessary to pass an order for rectification, it could be said that the Deputy Registrar having exercised the discretion in favour of the respondents, interference with such discretion was not called for. Nothing of the kind can be said in the present case where in fact the Deputy Registrar has held that the two marks are not deceptively similar. In any event, this Court having come to the conclusion that the two

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marks are deceptively similar, this cannot be a case for the exercise of discretion in favour of the respondents as their case is not founded on truth and also in view of the uncontroverted evidence of actual deception perpetrated and confusion caused.”

¶251

(emphasis supplied)

¶252

30] Therefore, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, we set aside the impugned order and restrain the defendants by way of temporary injunction from releasing and distributing the Hindi Dubbed Version of the Telugu film ' BHAI' during pendency of the suit. This shall be subject to the appellant depositing in this Court an amount of Rs.6 Lacs, which corresponds to the amount expended by defendant No. 3 towards dubbing of film in Hindi, within a period of two weeks from today.

¶253

31] Appeal is, therefore, allowed in the aforesaid terms.

¶254

CHIEF JUSTICE

¶255

(M.S.SONAK, J.)

¶256

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Goldmines Telefilms Pvt. Ltd. v. Reliance Big Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.

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Goldmines Telefilms Pvt. Ltd. v. Reliance Big Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.

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