previous award had become ineffective by the passage of time, the rights flowing therefrom had not been wiped out. The award directed payment of certain dearness allowance which, if not paid, created a debt in favour of the workmen and it was a binding debt which could be enforced by a civil suit and that the penalty clause in the Act did not bar such a suit. This case is evidently an authority for the proposition that the termination of the award or the lapsing of the award has not the effect of wiping out the liabilities flowing from the award. Mr. Bhabha, on behalf of the employer, contended that this case was decided under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, under Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 19, before those Sub-sections were amended. It is undoubtedly true that by Act 48 of 1950, Sub-sections (3) and (4) have been amended and Sub-sections (5), (6) and (7) have been added. Under the Act, as it originally stood, every award lapsed at the expiry of one year; by amended Act every award becomes quasi-permanent, subject to termination by either party by giving notice of two months' duration. But whether the award lapses at the expiry of the period provided under the Act or is terminated by notice served by the employer or the employee, the consequence of termination must in our judgment be the same. If the rights flowing from the award are not wiped out even after it has lapsed, it is difficult to appreciate why they are
