8 To bring the case within Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, all the ingredients mentioned in it, must be found. It is to be noted that the word `fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, is not defined in the IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for passion to cool down. In this case, the dying declaration (Exh. 15) shows that both the parties had a verbal alteration, due to which, the appellant was furious. The appellant did not come to the spot armed with a weapon. But he poured kerosene which was available in the house on Mahananda and set her on fire. There was no premeditation on the part of the appellant. The appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. However, we are not inclined to accede to the submission of Ms. Dandekar that the case would fall under Section 304 Part-II of IPC. In our view, the case would fall under Section 304 Part-I of IPC, because, we are of the opinion that the appellant did not just have the knowledge that his act is likely to cause death but in fact, the appellant intended to cause death of his wife Mahananda. We say so on the basis of the injuries as seen from the evidence of PW-7 Dr. Patil. From his evidence, it is noticed that burn injuries were extensive in nature. Looking to all the facts, we are of the considered opinion that the case cannot fall under Section 304 Part-II of IPC.
