Allowed

Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation v. Udhav Maruti Bhosale and Ors.

Bombay HC19 Jan 2006SA/471/2004

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this second appeal, the Bombay High Court held that civil courts lack jurisdiction to question the validity of land acquisition notifications under the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act. It set aside a lower appellate order finding procedural breaches, noting the acquisition process and possession were legally compliant.

What did the court decide?

The special civil suit for declaration and injunction was dismissed, setting aside the District Judge's order.

Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation Vs Udhav… — Land Acquisition | Bombay HC (2006)

¶1

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

¶2

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

¶3

 SECOND APPEAL NO. 471 of 2004

¶4

 Maharashtra Industrail Ddevelopment

¶5

 Corporation, Mumbai 38 ..Appellant

¶6

 (Orig. Deft no.3)

¶7

V/s

¶8

 1. Udhav Maruti Bhosale

¶9

2. Bhanudas Maruti Bhosale

¶10

 3. The State of Maharashtra

¶11

 4. The Special Land Acquisition

¶12

 Officer, No.1, Solapur .... Respondents

¶13

 (Nos.1 and 2 Orig.Plffs

¶14

 and Nos.3 and 4 Orig.

¶15

 deft nos.1 and 2)

¶16

 Ms Deepa Chavan i/b Little and Co. for Appellant

¶17

 Mr.S.V.More,AGP for Respopndent nos.3 and 4

¶18

 Mr.Nitin Jamdar for Respondent nos.1 and 2

¶19

 CORAM:S.R.SATHE,J.

¶20

 DATED:19th Jan. 2006

¶21

ORAL JUDGMENT :-

¶22

 1. The Appellant, Maharashtra Industrial Development
 Corporation, (for the sake of convenience hereafter
 referred to as MIDC) the original defendant no.3 has
 preferred this appeal against the judgment and order
 passed by the District Judge, Solapur in Regular Civil
 Appeal no.357 of 2000 whereby the appeal was allowed and
 the judgment and order dismissing the plaintiffs’ Special
 Civil Suit NO.1 of 1993 for declaration and permanent
 injunction was set aside and it was declared that award
 bearing NO.LAQ/VC/179 dated 1-9-1989 is illegal and void
 and defendants nos.1 to 3 were restrained from taking
 possession of the suit lands from the plaintiffs.

¶23

 2. For the sake of convenience hereafter the parties
 shall be referred to as the plaintiffs and defendants.

¶24

 . The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are as
 under :

¶25

 3. The lands bearing Block No.118 admeasuring 37 Ares
 and Block No.120 admeasuring 4 Hector 23 Ares situated at
 village Chincholi kati, Taluka Mohol, district solapur
 were owned and possessed by the original plaintiff no.1
 and original plaintiff nos.1 and 2 respectively. They
 were taking bagayat crop in the same.

¶26

 4. In the year 1988 or thereabout the State of
 Maharashtra, original defendant no.1 decided to apply the
 provisions of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act,
 1961 (hereafter referred to as the MID Act) to the lands
 situated at village Chincholi kati, Taluka Mohol. The
 suit lands were included in the said area. As the lands
 were to be acquired for the Industrial development, the
 Government of Maharashtra issued notice under Section
 32(2) of MID Act to the plaintiffs on 16-8-1988. As per
 provisions of the MID Act before issuing Notification
 under Section 32(1) regarding acquisition of the land it
 is necessary for the State Government to issue notice
 under Section 32(2). However, according to the
 plaintiffs, the State Government issued Notification
 under Section 32(1) prior to the issuance of notice under
 Section 32(2) of MID Act and as such there was breach of
 provisions of MID Act. When the plaintiffs received
 notice under Section 32(2) of MID Act they replied the
 same and raised objection for acquisition of their lands.
 According to the plaintiffs without giving any
 opportunity to them to place their grievance personally
 before the concerned authority, the Government of
 Maharashtra took further steps. However, no notice was
 given to the plaintiffs regarding handing over possession
 or for fixation of compensation. The defendants fixed
 compensation of Rs.7,400/- for Block No.118 and
 rs.93,600/- for Block No.120 and accordingly passed award
 on 1-9-1989. However, plaintiffs came to know about the
 same for the first time on 10-11-1989. At that time

¶27

 plaintiffs also noticed that though it was mentioned in
 the said Award that compensation has been fixed with the
 consent of the plaintiff. No agreement was arrived at
 between the State of Maharashtra and plaintiffs.

¶28

 5. When plaintiffs took 7 x12 extracts of the suit lands
 they found that name of MIDC, the original defendant no.3
 was entered in the said extracts in holders (Kabjedar)
 column. According to the plaintiffs it was in fact
 necessary for the defendants to issue notice to them for
 handing over possession but no such notice was issued and
 false entries were made in the name of defendant no.3.
 Plaintiffs, therefore, issued notice under Section 80(1)
 of C.P.C. to the defendants and accordingly filed
 Special Civil Suit NO.1 of 1993 in the Court of the Civil
 Judge, S.D., Solapur and prayed for declaration that
 award passed in LAQ/VC/279 is illegal and void ab-initio.
 They also prayed for permanent injunction restraining
 defendants from taking possession of the suit lands.

¶29

 6. The defendant nos 1 to 3 filed their joint written
 statement at Exh.17B and opposed the suit claim. They
 denied plaintiffs allegations that suit lands are Bagayat
 lands and that plaintiffs had spent about Rs.40,000/- for
 constructing a well. The Defendants contended that
 proper procedure was followed by them while acquiring the
 suit lands and opportunity was given to the plaintiffs to
 put forth their grievance by issuing notice under Section
 32(2) of MID Act. The defendants contended notice under

¶30

 Section 32(1) was issued after issuance of notice under
 Section 32(2) of the MID Act. After following necessary
 procedure under the MID Act and considering objections
 raised by the plaintiffs the defendant nos.1 and 2
 acquired the lands of plaintiffs and award was passed.
 Not only that but after following due procedure, the
 defendant nos.1 and 2 took the possession of the suit
 lands and the same was handed over to the defendant no.3.
 As a result of the same, the names of plaintiffs were
 deleted from the record of rights and the name of the
 defendant no.3 was entered. Thus, according to the
 defendants the plaintiffs lost their right, title and
 interest in the suit property and as such they were not
 entitled to get any relief. The defendant therefore
 prayed for dismissal of the suit. On these pleadings,
 the learned trial Judge framed issues at Exh.--. In
 order to prove the suit claim, Bhanudas Maruti Bhosale,
 original plaintiff no.2 was examined on behalf of the
 plaintiffs.As against this on behalf of defendants
 Special Land Acquisition Officer, C.B.Hule was examined.
 Defendants also produced certain documents. After
 considering the evidence adduced by both the parties the
 learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that original
 defendant nos.1 and 2 had followed the due procedure as
 per the MID Act and award was passed. He also hold that
 the defendants took possession of the suit lands and the
 suit lands vest in the defendants. He therefore held
 that plaintiffs are not entitled for declaration and
 injunction. Naturally he dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit.

¶31

 7. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order the
 original plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Appeal NO.357 of
 2000 in the Court of District Judge, Solapur. After
 hearing the arguments advanced by both the Advocates, the
 learned District Judge,Solapur came to the conclusion
 that notice under Section 32(2) was not issued prior to
 the notice under Section 32(1) of MID Act and as such
 there was breach of the provisions of the MID Act and the
 award passed is illegal. He also held that no personal
 hearing was given to the plaintiffs as contemplated under
 Section 32(b) of MID Act. According to him, no proper
 procedure for taking possession was followed, no notice
 was given to the plaintiffs for handing over possession
 and actual possession was in fact not delivered by the
 plaintiffs to the defendants. He, therefore, held that
 lands are in possession of the plaintiffs and award
 passed in LAQ/VC/1979 dated 1/9/1989 is illegal and void.
 He, therefore, set aside the order of dismissal passed by
 the trial Court and passed decree for declaration and
 injunction in favour of the plaintiffs.

¶32

 8. It is the above mentioned order that is being
 challenged in this Second appeal by the original
 defendant no.3 i.e. MIDC.

¶33

 9. In this appeal before me, Ms.Deepa Chavan, learned
 Advocate for the appellants has urged three points.

¶34

 Firstly, she submitted that having regard to the
 provisions of MID Act, the Civil Court had in fact no
 jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether proper
 procedure under the said Act was followed or not and the
 suit filed by the plaintiffs was in fact not maintainable
 as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. Secondly, she
 canvased before me that finding recorded by the first
 Appellate Court to the effect that there was breach of
 Section 32(2) of MID Act is against the evidence on
 record. Lastly, she submitted that the first Appellate
 Court did not properly appreciate the evidence and
 wrongly held that procedure required for acquisition of
 land under MID Act was not followed by the defendants.
 She therefore, submitted that the appeal be allowed and
 the order passed by the first appellate court be set
 aside and the suit be dismissed.

¶35

 10. As against this, Shri Nitin Jamdar,learned Advocate
 for Respondents supported the judgment and order passed
 by the first appellate court and submitted that issue
 with regard to the jurisdiction was not at all taken by
 the defendants in the trial Court as well as in the first
 appellate Court and the Appellant should not be allowed
 to agitate the said question for the first time in second
 appeal. He also submitted that defendants had failed to
 prove that proper procedure required under MID Act was
 followed. He, therefore, submitted that appeal be
 dismissed.

¶36

 11. In view of the submission made before me following
 substantial questions of law are involved in this matter.

¶37

 A. Whether Civil court had jurisdiction to go into the
 question of validity or legality of the notifications
 issued by the defendants under MID Act regarding
 acquisition of the suit lands and the procedure followed
 by the defendants in that behalf?

¶38

 B Whether the finding of the first appellate court that
 there was breach of provision of Section 32(2) of MID Act
 is against the evidence on record?

¶39

 C Whether proper procedure was followed by the defendants
 for acquisition in question?

¶40

 12. The first and foremost objection raised by the
 learned Advocate for the Appellants is that the Civil
 Court had in fact no jurisdiction to entertain the suit
 filed by the plaintiffs. It is an admitted fact that
 issue with regard to the jurisdiction of civil Court was
 not raised by the defendants either in the trial court or
 even in the first appellate court and the same is raised
 for the first time in this second appeal. Naturally,
 question arises whether the defendants can be permitted
 to agitate the said issue at this juncture.

¶41

 13. The learned Advocate for the plaintiffs has drawn my
 attention to a case, Rameshchand Ardawatiya V/s Anil

¶42

 Panjwani (2003) 7 SCC 350 wherein, Their Lordships have
 observed:

¶43

 "where there is a special tribunal conferred with
 jurisdiction or exclusive jurisdiction to try a
 particular class of cases even then the civil court
 can entertain a civil suit of that class on
 availability of a few grounds. An exclusion of
 jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be
 readily inferred. An objection as to the exclusion
 of the civil court’s jurisdiction for availability
 of an alternative forum should be taken before the
 trial court and at the earliest, failing which the
 higher court may refuse to entertain the plea in
 the absence of proof of prejudice."

¶44

 . Even from the bear reading of the above observations
 and in particular from the use of word "may", it is very
 clear that it is not a rule of law that if objection with
 regard to jurisdiction is taken for the first time in the
 appellate court and not taken before the trial court at
 the earliest occasion, the same cannot be entertained.

¶45

 14. In fact, in a case, Chandrika Misir and another V/s
 Bhaiyalal- AIR 1973 SC 2391 - Their Lordships of the Apex
 Court have held that where the court is inherently
 lacking in jurisdiction the plea as to jurisdiction may
 be raised at any stage, even if it was not raised in
 trial Court. There are also several reported cases in

¶46

 which also it is held that merely because issue regarding
 jurisdiction isnot raised at the earliest, the same
 cannot be agitated later on. In Ajit Mohinder Singh and
 Ors V/s Smt.Bhani and another AIR 1987 P & H 167 it is
 observed "question whether civil Court had or did not
 have jurisdiction can be raised even in second appeal for
 the first time where Court is inherently lacking
 jurisdiction. Then in Mohanlal V/s Ratna AIR 1971 RAJ
164 - it is observed that plea of lack of jurisdiction of
 civil Court can be raised at any stage when it goes to
 the root of the mater and more so when it does not
 require investigation of facts. I therefore feel that it
 is necessary to consider the said issue.

¶47

 15. The learned Advocate for the defendants submitted

¶48

 that the present suit in question is in respect of
 acquisition of land under MID Act. According to her, the
 said provisions in the act are in the nature of complete
 code in itself and the same is meant for the public
 purpose. She further submitted that provisions with
 regard to acquisition in MID Act and the provisions in
 the Land Acquisition Act are same and there are
 authoritative pronouncements wherein it has been held
 that civil court has no jurisdiction to decide the
 validity or legality of the Notification issued under the
 Land Acquisition Act. For this purpose, she has placed
 reliance on a case State of Bihar V/s Dhirendra Kumar and
 Ors. AIR 1995 SC 1955. That was a case arising out of
 Land Acquisition Act wherein Their Lordships have

¶49

 observed :

¶50

 2A. The question is whether a civil suit

¶51

 is maintainable and whether ad interim
 injunction could be issued where
 proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act
 was taken pursuant to the notice issued
 under S. 9 of the Act and delivered to the
 beneficiary. The provisions of the Act are
 designed to acquire the land by the State
 exercising the power of eminent domain to
 serve the public purpose........ Thus, it
 could be seen that the Act is a complete
 code in itself and is meant to serve public
 purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to
 think, as presently advised, that by
 necessary implication the power of the
 civil Court to take cognizance of the case
 under Section 9 of C.P.C. stands excluded
 and a civil Court has no jurisdiction to go
 into the question of the validity or
 legality of the notification under S. 4,
 and declaration under S. 6 except by the
 High Court in a proceeding under Article
 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil
 suit itself was not maintainable."

¶52

 . There is another case - Laxmi Chand and others V Gram
 Panchayat, Kararia and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 523 wherein also

¶53

 Their Lordships have observed :

¶54

 3. It would thus be clear that the scheme of the

¶55

 Act is complete in itself and thereby the
 jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance
 of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary
 implication, stood barred. The Civil Court thereby
 is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on
 the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under
 the Act. The only right that an aggrieved person
 has is to approach the constitutional Courts, viz.
 the High Court and the Supreme court under their
 plenary power under Articles 226 and 136
 respectively with self imposed restrictions on
 their exercise of extraordinary power. Barring
 thereof, there is no power to the Civil Court."

¶56

 16. It is true that in the above mentioned two rulings
 Their Lordships were considering the provisions of Land
 Acquisition Act and not MID Act. However, if we take
 into consideration the relevant provisions with regard to
 acquisition of lands under both the Acts the same are
 absolutely similar. In fact there are some such sections
 in this act wherein it is clearly mentioned that
 procedure laid down in the Land Acquisition Act be
 followed. Section 34 of MID Act says:

¶57

 34.(1) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the

¶58

 Collector determining the amount of compensation
 may, within sixty days from the date of such
 decision, in so far as it affects him, by written
 application to the Collector require that the
 matter be referred by him for determination of the
 Court as defined in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
 in its application to the State of Maharashtra, and
 when any such application is made the provisions of
 Part III of the said Act shall mutatis mutandis
 apply to further proceedings in respect thereof.

¶59

 (2) The decision of the court on such reference,
 and subject only to such decision, the decision of
 the Collector determining the amount of the
 compensation, shall be final.

¶60

 17. Under the circumstances, though there is no specific
 provision excluding jurisdiction of Civil Court, in such
 matters of acquisition of land, by implementation and by
 applying analogy of the Land Acquisition Act it has to be
 said that powers of Civil Court to take cognisance of the
 case under Section 9 of Code of Civil Procedure stand
 excluded and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go
 into the question of the validity or legality of the
 Notification issued under Section 31, 32(1), 32(2) and
 other Sections in Chapter VI of MID Act. From the
 perusal of the plaint it is quite evident that the
 plaintiffs challenged the award on the ground that the
 proper procedure was not followed for acquisition of the

¶61

 suit lands. So, I am of the view that such suit is in
 fact not maintainable in the civil Court. So, on the
 ground jurisdiction alone the order passed by the first
 Appellate Court shall have to be set aside.

¶62

 18. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that
 civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the issue of
 validity and legality of the Notifications under MID Act
 still then from the material on record it appears that
 order passed by the learned District Judge is not legal
 and correct. The first Appellate Court has held that
 there was breach of Section 32(1) of MID Act as the
 notice under Section 32(2) of the said Act was not issued
 prior to issuance of notice under Section 32(1) of the
 said Act.

¶63

 19. In order to decide whether the said finding is
 correct or not it would be worthwhile to see relevant
 provisions of Sections 32(1) and 32(2):

¶64

 32(1) - If, at any time in the opinion of the State
 Government, any land is required for the purpose of
 development by the Corporation, or for any other
 purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act,
 the State Government may acquire such land by
 publishing in the Official Gazette a notice
 specifying the particular purpose for which such
 land is required, and stating therein that the
 State Government has decided to acquire the land in

¶65

 pursuance of this section.

¶66

 32(2) - Before publishing a notice under
 sub-section 91), the State Government shall by
 another notice call upon the owner of the land and
 any other person who in the opinion of the State
 Government may be interested therein, to show
 cause, within such time as may be specified in the
 notice, why the land should not be acquired.

¶67

 20. From the bear reading of the above sections it is
 very clear that notice under Section 32(2) has to be
 issued prior to issuing Notification under Section 32(1)
 of MID Act. The learned District Judge has observed that
 Notification under Section 32(1) of MID Act was issued on
 27-3-1987 while the individual notices under Section
 32(2) of MID Act were issued on 16-8-1988. So far as the
 notice under Section 32(2) is concerned, it is correct
 that it was issued on 16-8-19878. However, the evidence
 on record does not indicate that notice under Section
 32(1) of MID Act was issued on 27-3-1987. On the
 contrary, the defendants have produced at Exh.58 the
 Notification published in Official Gazette dated
 15-6-1989. From the perusal of the same it is very clear
 that Notification under Section 32(1) is issued on
 15-6-1989 i.e. after the notice under Section 32(2) of
 MID Act was issued. So, I have no hesitation to hold
 that there was no breach of the provisions of Section
 32(1) or Section 32(2) of MID Act in the instant case.

¶68

 21. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that they
 were not given personal hearing as contemplated under
 Section 32(3) of MID Act. It would be worthwhile to see
 what the said Section says. It runs as under:

¶69

 3. After considering the cause, if any, shown by
 the owner of the land and by any other person
 interested therein and after giving such owner and
 person an opportunity of being heard the State
 Government may pass such orders as it deems fit.

¶70

 . While considering this point one has to see the notice
 issued to the plaintiffs on 16-8-1988 which is at Exh.43.
 In this notice it is mentioned :

¶71

 (If you desire to have personal hearing then within a
 period of one month from the receipt of this notice, by
 getting the time fixed, you may appear before the

¶72

 undersigned personally or through power of attorney on
 any working day in between 11-00 a.m. to 1-00 p.m.)

¶73

 22. Thus from the above mentioned paragraph 7 of the
 said notice Exh.43 it is very clear that opportunity was
 provided to the plaintiffs to have personal hearing and
 it was left open to them to appear at any day during
 working hours by getting an appointment. Admittedly,
 this notice has been received by the plaintiffs and they
 have also given reply to the same. However, it is not
 their case that as per para 7 of the said notice they had
 asked for any time and the defendants refused to give
 such time or that they had approached the defendants but
 they did not attend to them. When such is the position
 it cannot be said that there was no opportunity to the
 plaintiffs to putforward their case or that principles of
 natural justice were not followed. While advancing
 submission on this point, the learned Advocate for the
 defendant no.3 has led her hands on a case Madhav
 Ramchadnra Nanivadekar and Anr. V/s Special Land
 Acquisition Officer NO.2 and Ors - 1998(4) Bom.C.R. 171
 wherein in similar circumstances the Division Bench of
 this Court observed that when there was no demand for
 personal hearing by the land holder it can be held that
 enquiry under Section 5A of Land Acquisition Act was
 initiated as a result for failure of giving personal
 hearing to the Petitioners. In fact in Rambhai Lakhabai
 Bhakt V/s State of Gujarat and others AIR 1995 SC 1549
 the Apex Court has held that in a case where the claimant

¶74

 filed his objection to a notice under Section 4 and did
 not ask for a personal hearing it would be obvious that
 he did not intend to avail the benefit of personal
 hearing while submitting the objections. If personal
 hearing was asked for and was not given it would be a
 different matter. Thus taking into consideration the
 above position of law and the facts of the present case
 it cannot be said that the defendants had not given to
 plaintiffs as opportunity of personal hearing and that
 there was breach of Section 32(3) of MID Act.

¶75

 23. The plaintiffs had also alleged that the defendants
 had not issued notice in respect of the land bearing
 Block No.120. However, it is pertinent to note that
 admittedly, the plaintiffs had given reply to the
 defendants notice (exh.44) and therein clearly admitted
 that they received notice under Section 32(1) in respect
 of both the lands. So, under such circumstances merely
 because there is no copy of notice issued in respect of
 land bearing Block No.120 on record it cannot be said
 that the defendants had not issued notice in respect of
 the said land. So, there is obviously no substance in
 the allegation made by the plaintiffs in this behalf.

¶76

 . Much is made about the fact that the defendant had not
 issued notice to hand over possession of the suit lands
 under Section 32(5) of MID Act. For this purpose it
 would be necessary to see the said Section. It runs as
 follows :-

¶77

 32(5) Where any land is vested in the State
 Government under sub-section (4), the State
 Government may by notice in writing, order any
 person who may be in possession of the land to
 surrender or deliver possession thereof to the
 State Government or any person duly authorised by
 in in this behalf within thirty days of the service
 of the notice.

¶78

 (6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with
 an order made under sub-section (5), the State
 Government may take possession of the land, and may
 for that purpose use such force as may be
 necessary.

¶79

 24. The first appellate court has observed that the
 defendants though alleged that possession was taken by
 drawing a panchanama and Kabjepavati was also prepared,
 the plaintiffs failed to produce and prove the said
 document. However, from the judgment of the trial Court
 it is very clear that panchanama with regard to the
 possession is produced by the defendants along with
 Exh.57. Besides this there is official record to show
 that possession was taken through Talathi. The
 defendants witness has also categorically stated that
 possession was obtained by drawing panchanama. It is
 true that he had no personal knowledge and he had deposed
 on the basis of the record. So, under such circumstances

¶80

 due weightage shall have to be given to the defendants
 evidence in this behalf. Moreover, when defendants had
 followed all other procedure viz. issuing notifications
 under Section 31 and 32(1) and notices under Section
 32(2) it cannot be said that they would not take the next
 steps of securing possession. Besides this, we do find
 that name of defendant no.3 has been entered in the
 record of rights in column of holder (Kabjedar). It is
 true that in column of Kul and Khand there is entry in
 the name of the plaintiffs. However, merely freom that
 we cannot jump to the conclusion that defendants had not
 taken the possession. We cannot ignore the fact that
 once necessary notifications were issued and notices were
 given to the plaintiffs, the suit lands vest absolutely
 in the State Government free from all encumbrances as per
 provisions of Section 32(4) of the MID Act.So, under such
 circumstances merely because there is some entry in the
 name of plaintiffs in column of ’Kul and Khand’ we cannot
 jump to the conclusion that the defendants had not taken
 possession of the lands in question. So, the finding of
 the first Appellate Court in that behalf is not
 sustainable.

¶81

 25. Thus, from the perusal of the entire evidence and
 cosnidering the position of law it is very clear that the
 award in respect of the suit lands was passed on
 1-9-1989. Defendants also took the possession so there
 is no sufficient evidence to hold that the defendants had
 failed to follow proper procedure for acquiring the suit

¶82

 lands. The finding recorded by the first Appellate Court
 that the defendants committed breach of provisions of
 Section 32 of MID Act is not legal and correct and as
 such the same shall have to be set aside,. Thus looking
 to the case from any angle it is very clear that
 plaintiffs are not entitled to get declaration and
 injunction as prayed.

¶83

 . In this view of the matter, the appeal is allowed.
 The order passed by the District Judge, Solapur in
 Regular Civil Appeal No.357 of 2000 is set aside and
 Special Civil Suit No.1 of 1993 is dismissed.

¶84

 . Parties to bear their own cost.

¶85

 . At this stage the learned Advocate for the

¶86

 Respondent-plaintiffs submits that as plaintiffs want to
 approach the Apex Court the above order be stayed for a
 period of 12 weeks. Having regard to the fact that I

¶87

 have already held that the property in question is not
 actually in possession of the plaintiff and it vests in
 the present Appellants and they have taken possession of
 the same by following due procedure, there is no need to
 grant stay. Hence prayer in that behalf is rejected.

¶88

 (S.R.SATHE,J)

¶89

 ---00---

¶90

 Note: While giving authetnicated/certified copy of this
 order please insert Marathi version on page no.16 (Copy
 enclosed).

Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation v. Udhav Maruti Bhosale and Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation v. Udhav Maruti Bhosale and Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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