Dismissed

Rajesh Vashdev Adnani v. the State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Bombay HC18 Mar 2005WP/2482/2004

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This judgment dismissed a writ petition challenging a detention order under COFEPOSA. The court held that an order based on multiple grounds remains valid if sufficient material supports the sustainable heads, rejecting the argument that deficiency in one head invalidates the entire order. The detention under the smuggling head was upheld.

What did the court decide?

The petition challenging the detention order was dismissed; the detention order remains valid.

Rajesh Vashdev Adnani Vs the State of… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Bombay HC (2005)

¶1

[1]

¶2

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 APPELLATE SIDE
 CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.2482 OF 2004

¶3

 Rajesh Vashdev Adnani,
 25 years, an Indian Inhabitant,
 residing at 14, Satkartar
 Society, 3rd Floor,
 S.V. Road, Khar (W),
 Mumbai-52. .... Petitioner

¶4

 - Versus -

¶5

 1. The State of Maharashtra,
 through the Secretary to
 the Govt. of Maharashtra,
 Home Department, Mantralaya,
 Mumbai-400 032.

¶6

 2. Neela Satyanarayana,
 the Principal Secretary
 to the Government of
 Maharashtra, Home Department
 (Appeals and Security),
 and Detaining Authority,
 Mantralaya, Mumbai-400 032.

¶7

 3. The Superintendent of Prison,
 the Mumbai Central Prison,
 Arthur Road, Mumbai.

¶8

 4. The Superintendent of Prison,
 Nasik Road Central Prison,
 Nasik. .... Respondents

¶9

 Sarvasri Mukul Rohatagi with Harishankar,
 Maqsood Khan and Yogesh Rohira for the
 Petitioner.
 Shri D.S. Mhaispurkar, Addl. Public Prosecutor,
 for the Respondents.

¶10

CORAM: R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR &
 P.V. KAKADE, JJ.
DATED: MARCH 18, 2005

¶11

ORAL JUDGMENT (Per R.M.S.Khandeparkar, J.):

¶12

[2]

¶13

 1. Heard. Perused the records. The petitioner
 challenges the order of detention dated 3-11-2004 issued
 by the respondent No.2 against Vashdev Gobindram Adnani,
 the father of the petitioner herein, under Section 3(1)
 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention
 of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, hereinafter called as
 "the COFEPOSA".

¶14

 2. The facts relevant to be noted are that on

¶15

 20-8-2004, on the basis of the intelligence report, the
 detenu on being intercepted by the officers of the DRI
 after he had passed through the customs area to board
 the flight to Singapore, foreign currency of USD
 81000.00, Euro 7600.00 was seized from the detenu along
 with 366.00 Singapore Dollars, totally equivalent to
 Indian currency of Rs.40,08,244.50 ps. The same was
 seized under panchnama under the provisions of the
 Customs Act, 1962 and in the statement recorded under
 Section 108 of the Customs Act, the detenu claimed that
 the seized currency was brought by him from Singapore
 after necessary declaration and the same was being
 carried back to Singapore. The impugned order of
 detention came to be passed on 3-11-2004 and it was
 actually executed by arrest and detention of the detenu
 on 2-12-2004.

¶16

 3. It is the case of the petitioner that the impugned

¶17

[3]

¶18

 order of detention has been based on two heads of
 detention as available under Section 3(1)(i) and (iii)
 of the COFEPOSA. While Clause (i) relates to preventing
 the detenu from smuggling goods in future, the Clause
 (iii) relates to preventing the detenu from engaging in
 transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods in
 future. It is the case of the petitioner that the
 records before the detaining authority nowhere disclosed
 any material which could reveal that the detenu was
 engaged in transporting or concealing or keeping
 smuggled goods and therefore there was no occasion for
 the detaining authority to get herself subjectively
 satisfied about the need for issuance of the detention
 order in terms of Section 3(1)(iii) of COFEPOSA. Since
 the impugned order is a composite order passed under
 Section 3(1)(i) and (iii) and as the materials on record
 did not disclose any justification for being
 subjectively satisfied about the need for issuance of
 the order in terms of Section 3(1)(iii), the entire
 order discloses non-application of mind by the detaining
 authority and therefore the entire order is liable to be
 quashed as bad in law. On the other hand, it is the
 case of the respondents that the statement of Navin
 Tanna reveal that the detenu had contacted him and had
 acquired the smuggled currency and the same currency was
 kept by the detenu with his servant and further carried
 with him while trying to go abroad and therefore the

¶19

[4]

¶20

 same discloses the activities of the detenu which reveal
 that he was engaged in the activity of transporting and
 concealing and keeping foreign currency which in turn
 discloses smuggling within the meaning of the said
 expression under the COFEPOSA and therefore no fault can
 be found with the impugned order of detention, besides,
 merely because the order is bad on one head, it would
 not render the order on another head to be bad in law.

¶21

 4. While assailing the impugned order of detention, the
 learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the
 impugned order of detention has been based on two heads,
 one being for preventing the detenu from smuggling goods
 in future and another being to prevent him from engaging
 in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods
 and since the grounds of detention apparently reveal
 total non-application of mind in relation to requirement
 for issuance of the order of detention against the
 detenu to prevent him from engaging in transporting or
 concealing or keeping smuggled goods in the absence of
 any material being placed on record before the detaining
 authority disclosing the involvement of the detenu in
 such activities, the entire order of detention is liable
 to be declared as bad in law. He has further submitted
 that the provision of Section 5A of the COFEPOSA cannot
 be attracted in case of defective head being applied for
 issuance of the order of detention though the said

¶22

[5]

¶23

 provision of law may apply in case of defective grounds
 in support of the detention order. It is his further
 contention that undoubtedly under Section 3 of the
 COFEPOSA a detention order can be issued under the
 different heads enumerated thereunder but when the order
 is issued under more than one head, the grounds in
 support of such order should disclose the materials in
 support of each of the heads on which such order is
 issued and in case of absence of such materials and
 grounds in support of any one head on which such
 composite order is issued, would render the entire order
 to be bad in law. Referring to the grounds in support
 of the detention order, the learned Advocate for the
 petitioner has submitted that the same apparently
 disclose that the materials which were placed before the
 detaining authority did not include any material which
 could reveal that the detenu was ever engaged in the
 activity of transporting or concealing or keeping
 smuggled goods as such. In the absence of iota of
 evidence regarding the involvement of the detenu in
 transporting or concealing or keeping of smuggled goods,
 there was no occasion for the detaining authority to
 arrive at the subjective satisfaction about the need for
 issuance of the detention order against the detenu in
 terms of the provision comprised under Section 3(1)(iii)
 of the COFEPOSA and as the impugned order having been
 issued under the said head along with another head,

¶24

[6]

¶25

 namely, under Section 3(1)(i) of the COFEPOSA, the
 entire order is vitiated and therefore the detenu is
 liable to be released forthwith. Drawing attention to
 the statement of Navin Tanna, it was sought to be
 contended that it nowhere discloses that the foreign
 currency which is stated to have been obtained by the
 detenu from him could be said to be smuggled goods. It
 is his further contention that the foreign currency
 which has been seized from the detenu nowhere discloses
 that the same could be said to be smuggled goods within
 the meaning of the said expression under the COFEPOSA so
 as to enable the application of the provision of Section
 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA and therefore it being a
 settled law that if one head of detention falls to the
 ground, the entire order also would fall to the ground
 and applying the same to the order in question, same is
 liable to be quashed. Various decisions are sought to
 be relied upon in support of the contention to which
 reference will be made in the course of the judgment.

¶26

 5. Refuting the contention on behalf of the petitioner,

¶27

 it is sought to be argued by the learned A.P.P. that
 undisputedly the detention order has been issued under
 two heads, one to prevent the detenu from smuggling
 goods in future and another to prevent him from engaging
 in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods
 in future and therefore it cannot be disputed that the

¶28

[7]

¶29

 order would fall under Section 3(1)(i) as well as under
 Section 3(1)(iii) of COFEPOSA. However, according to
 the learned A.P.P. the grounds in support of the
 detention order themselves reveal that the detenu was
 engaged in transporting and keeping smuggled goods and
 further the very fact that the detenu while travelling
 to Singapore via an Air India flight was found carrying
 US Dollars and Euro currency concealed in his handbag
 without declaring to the customs authorities as is
 otherwise required to be declared under the law, not
 only discloses attempt on the part of the detenu to
 smuggle foreign currency out of India but also discloses
 the activity to smuggle goods within the meaning of the
 said expression under the provisions of COFEPOSA read
 with the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. It his
 contention that the materials which were placed before
 the detaining authority reveal that the foreign currency
 which was handed over to the detenu by Navin Tanna was
 undisputedly the currency which was purchased by the
 detenu from Navin Tanna and that the detenu for the
 purpose of business of tours and travel used to
 frequently travel to Hong Kong, Singapore, Philippines
 etc., and the investigation has revealed that the detenu
 had been engaging in such activities without necessary
 declaration regarding the possession of such foreign
 currency with him to the Government authorities as well
 as without declaration in that regard in the income-tax

¶30

[8]

¶31

 returns. Besides, his engagement in such activities is
 also revealed from his admission that he used to keep
 the foreign currency with his girlfriend by name Sharda.
 In any case, according to the learned A.P.P., the
 challenge being restricted to only one head of
 detention, even assuming that there are no sufficient
 materials to justify the detention under the said head,
 the entire order cannot be said to be bad in law as the
 order of detention based on each ground is an
 independent order and the same principle would apply to
 the order under different heads and therefore, according
 to the learned A.P.P., there is no case for interference
 in the impugned order of detention. Reliance is also
 placed in some of the decisions to which reference will
 be made in the course of the judgment.

¶32

 6. Undoubtedly, the challenge to the order of detention
 is on the sole ground that if out of two heads of
 detention one head of detention falls to the ground, the
 entire order falls to the ground. It is also not in
 dispute that the order of detention has been issued on
 two heads, namely, to prevent the detenu from smuggling
 goods in future by applying the provision of law under
 Section 3(1)(i) of the COFEPOSA and secondly, to prevent
 the detenu from engaging in transporting or concealing
 or keeping smuggled goods, which is under Section
 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA. The challenge is restricted

¶33

[9]

¶34

 to the head under Section 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA
 which relates to preventing the detenu from engaging in
 transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods and
 the challenge is on the ground that there were no
 material before the detaining authority to justify the
 subjective satisfaction for issuance of the detention
 order on the said head. In the circumstances, the point
 for consideration which would arise is that in a case
 where the order of detention is issued on two heads of
 detention and if one head of detention falls to the
 ground, whether the entire order would fall to ground,
 as sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioner.

¶35

 7. Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA provides that the
 Central Government or the State Government or any
 officer of the Central Government, specially empowered
 for the purposes of the said section by that Government,
 or any officer of the State Government, not below the
 rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially
 empowered for the purposes of the said section by that
 Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any
 person, including a foreigner, that, with a view to
 preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to
 the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or
 with a view to preventing him from (i) smuggling goods,
 or (ii) abetting the smuggling of goods, or (iii)
 engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping

¶36

 [10]

¶37

 smuggled goods, or (iv) dealing in smuggled goods
 otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing
 or keeping smuggled goods, or (v) harbouring persons
 engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting the smuggling
 of goods, it is necessary so to do, make an order
 directing that such person be detained. The proviso
 thereto provides that no order of detention shall be
 made on any of the grounds specified in the said
 sub-section on which an order of detention may be made
 under Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in
 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 or
 under Section 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of
 Illicit in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

¶38

 Ordinance, 1988 (J & K Ordinance 1 of 1988). The
 sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides that when any
 order of detention is made by a State Government or by
 an officer empowered by a State Government, the State
 Government shall, within ten days, forward to the
 Central Government a report in respect of the order.
 The sub-section (3) of Section 3 provides that for the
 purpose of Clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution,
 the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a
 detention order of the grounds on which the order has
 been made shall be made as soon as may be after the
 detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and
 in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be
 recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from

¶39

 [11]

¶40

 the date of detention.

¶41

 8. As far as the expressions "detention order" and
 "smuggling" in the COFEPOSA are concerned, they are
 defined under Section 2(b) and 2(e) respectively.
 Accordingly, "detention order" means an order made under
 Section 3 of the COFEPOSA and the expression "smuggling"
 has been given the meaning as is found in Clause (39) of
 Section 2 of the Customs Act, 1962. Accordingly, it
 means any act or omission which will render such goods
 liable to confiscation under Section 111 or Section 113.

¶42

 9. Section 5A of the COFEPOSA provides that where a
 person has been detained in pursuance of an order of
 detention under sub-section (1) of Section 3 which has
 been made on two or more grounds, such order of
 detention shall be deemed to have been made separately
 on each of such grounds and accordingly (a) such order
 shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely
 because one or some of the grounds is or are vague,
 non-existent, not relevant, not connected or not
 proximately connected with such person, or invalid for
 any other reason whatsoever, and it is not, therefore,
 possible to hold that the Government or officer making
 such order would have been satisfied as provided in
 sub-section (1) of Section 3 with reference to the
 remaining ground or grounds and made the order of

¶43

 [12]

¶44

 detention, and (b) the Government or officer making the
 order of detention shall be deemed to have made the
 order of detention under the said sub-section (1) after
 being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with
 reference to the remaining ground or grounds.

¶45

 10. Bare perusal of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA would,
 therefore, disclose that the detaining authority is
 empowered to issue an order of detention either on any
 one or more of the heads mentioned in the said section.
 Undoubtedly, once such an order is issued on more than
 one head, the grounds in support of such detention order
 will have to disclose the necessary materials to sustain
 the order on each of the heads on which such an order is
 issued. Certainly in case the grounds fail to disclose
 support to any one or more of such heads, the order in
 relation to those heads to which the grounds do not
 support, would not be sustainable. The point, however,
 which is canvassed is that on account of lack of support
 to one of the heads the same would affect and invalidate
 the entire order of detention. The contention in this
 regard is two-fold. Firstly, that the provisions of
 Section 5A of the COFEPOSA are not attracted in such
 cases, and secondly, such an order would disclose
 non-application of mind by the detaining authority while
 arriving at the subjective satisfaction regarding the
 need for issuance of the detention order on the relevant

¶46

 [13]

¶47

 heads.

¶48

 11. As regards the non-applicability of Section 5A of
 the COFEPOSA, it can hardly be disputed that Section 5A
 specifically relates to the grounds in support of the
 detention order and it does not relate to the heads
 which are enumerated under Section 3. Besides, it is
 well-settled that an order of detention, even though
 issued under one head, when supported by more than one
 ground, it is equivalent to number of grounds and the
 order would be construed as consisting of as many orders
 as the grounds are. Section 5A is essentially in
 relation to the grounds in support of the detention.
 The question than arises, merely because Section 5A
 refers to the grounds in support of detention, can it be
 said that once the order passed under different heads is
 found to be defective in relation to one of the heads,
 irrespective of the grounds supporting other heads, it
 would render the entire order to be bad in law? In that
 connection, the second limb of the argument is that such
 an order would disclose non-application of mind by the
 detaining authority while arriving at the subjective
 satisfaction regarding the need for detaining the detenu
 by applying various heads under Section 3 of the
 COFEPOSA.

¶49

 12. Whether the subjective satisfaction arrived at by

¶50

 [14]

¶51

 the detaining authority regarding the need for issuance
 of the detention order is vitiated or not cannot be a

¶52

 pure question of law. It will depend upon the facts of
 each case and would primarily depend upon the materials
 which are considered by the detaining authority while
 arriving at such subjective satisfaction. Being so, it
 would depend upon each case and will have to be
 ascertained by referring to the materials which were
 considered by the detaining authority and which are
 revealed from the grounds in support of the order and
 the explanation given by the detaining authority in the
 replies filed to the petition. Therefore, it is
 difficult to accept the general proposition as such that
 in case the order is issued on more than one head
 invariably in each and every such case, moment one of
 the heads of detention falls to the ground, the entire
 order would fall to the ground. There can be cases
 where it can be shown that the subjective satisfaction
 is arrived at in relation to the one head based on
 certain facts whereas the satisfaction in relation to
 another head is based on totally different facts or
 along with the facts which are also considered in
 relation to the first head. If the facts which lead to
 the satisfaction relating to each head can be segregated
 from each other in relation to each head, it would be
 difficult to accept the contention that the order of
 detention passed on more than one head, if found to be

¶53

 [15]

¶54

 defective in relation to one of the heads, then it would
 automatically fall to the ground in relation to all the

¶55

 heads. Therefore there cannot be any general
 proposition as such that moment the order passed under
 more than two heads if fails to satisfy in case of one
 head, when challenged before the Court, would
 automatically fail in its entirety, even when the other
 heads can be shown to have been justifiably arrived at
 on the basis of the materials placed before the
 detaining authority. It is to be noted that the learned
 Advocate for the petitioner has not pointed out a single
 judgment directly on the point either of the Apex Court
 or of any High Court in this regard. All the judgments
 which have been cited are in relation to different
 issues based on which inference is sought to be drawn
 that moment the order based on more than two heads is
 found to be unsustainable on one head, when challenged
 before the Court, then the entire order should be held
 to be defective and invalid. Such a proposition cannot
 be accepted.

¶56

 13. In the unreported decision in the matter of Smt.
Padmavati Jayantilal Soni v. The Union of India and
others {Cri.W.P. No.200 of 1986} delivered by the
 Division Bench of this Court on 11-6-1986, which is
 relied upon by the petitioner, the order of detention
 was issued to prevent the detenu from smuggling goods,

¶57

 [16]

¶58

 abetting the smuggling of goods and engaging in
 transporting smuggled goods. The decision is on the
 point about the absence of material before the detaining
 authority to hold that the hashish which was seized was
 smuggled goods within the meaning of the said expression
 under the COFEPOSA read with the Customs Act. The
 decision is not on the issue regarding the point
 canvassed on behalf of the petitioner pertaining to the
 order under one of the heads being defective would
 affect the entire order.

¶59

 14. In an unreported decision in the matter of Babulal

¶60

Dhanji Makwana v. The State of Maharashtra {Criminal
 Writ Petition No.1051 of 2002} delivered on 8-4-2003 by
 the Division Bench of this Court, the order under
 challenge was issued under the COFEPOSA with a view to
 prevent the detenu from smuggling goods and acting in
 any manner prejudicial to the conservation of foreign
 exchange, in future. It was the contention on behalf of
 the detenu that considering the materials on record, the
 role of the detenu was at the most of a carrier of
 smuggled goods The argument was sought to be countered
 by contending that the term "smuggling of goods" has a
 wider meaning under the Customs Act, 1962 and would mean
 any act or omission which will render such goods liable
 to confiscation under Section 111 or Section 113 of the
 Customs Act and therefore includes all facets of
 smuggling of goods and the activities mentioned in

¶61

 [17]

¶62

 Clause (i) to (v) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the
 COFEPOSA. However, the said argument was rejected by
 the Division Bench relying upon an unreported decision
 of the Division Bench of this Court in Hajiramal
Veerchand Jain v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
 {Criminal Writ Petition No.320 of 1984}. It was clearly
 held that "Keeping smuggled goods or dealing in smuggled
 goods did not constitute smuggling of goods or abetment
 thereof within the meaning of clause (i) and (ii) of
 sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and

¶63

 hence merely for keeping smuggled goods or dealing in
 smuggled goods, he cannot be detained for preventing him
 from abetting smuggling of goods." Obviously, the
 materials placed before the detaining authority were not
 sufficient to arrive at the subjective satisfaction
 regarding the involvement of the detenu in smuggling of
 goods or the abetment of smuggling of goods but merely
 those of a carrier of smuggled goods.

¶64

 15. In Sophia Gulam Mohd. Bham v. State of
Maharashtra and others, reported in 1999 (6) SCC 593,

¶65

 the order of detention was issued with a view to prevent
 the detenu from smuggling of goods, whereas the grounds
 of detention indicated that the activities which were
 carried out by the detenu were not carried individually
 by him but he was acting as a carrier for a group of
 persons who were the main financiers and organisers of

¶66

 [18]

¶67

 the smuggling activities. The nexus between the detenu
 and the said persons was sought to be established based
 on the documents recovered from the premises searched by
 the investigating agencies. Besides, the affidavit
 filed by the detaining authority in support of the
 detention order disclosed a statement contrary to the
 contents of the grounds in support of the detention
 order.

¶68

 16. In the unreported decision in the matter of
Hajarimal Veerchand Jain v. The State of Maharashtra &

¶69

others {Criminal Writ Petition No.329 of 1984} delivered
 on 12-11-1984, which was relied upon by the Division
 Bench in Babulal Dhanji Makwana’s case, the Division
 Bench referring to the facts of that case had observed
 that merely purchasing from seamen, may be unknown, the
 goods which were already smuggled goods, would neither
 amount to smuggling nor abetment thereof, and therefore,
 there can be no justification for concluding that the
 person purchasing such goods was smuggling such goods or
 was abetting smuggling of goods and therefore the
 detention of such person on the ground that it is
 necessary to prevent him from doing so in future, would
 not be justifiable.

¶70

 17. In the unreported decision of the Division Bench of
 this Court in the matter of Smt. Kamla Kantilal Jain v.

¶71

 [19]

¶72

The Union of India and others {Criminal Writ Petition
 No.1295 of 1989} delivered on 25-1-1990, while dealing
 with the issue as to whether there was material before
 the detaining authority to come to the conclusion that
 the detenu was likely to engage in abetting the
 smuggling of goods in future, observed that the order of
 detention disclosed that the detenu had been detained
 with a view to prevent him from abetting the smuggling
 of goods but there was no material at all before the
 detaining authority that the detenu in that case had
 been abetting the smuggling of goods.

¶73

 18. In Haroon Raidhan Sama v. State of Gujarat and
others, reported in 1986 (2) Crimes 155, the Division
 Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that where
 detention was on the ground of abetting the smuggling of
 charas but the detenu was only engaged in transporting
 and concealing charas, the detention order was bad for
 vice of non-application of mind to the said vital aspect
 by the detaining authority.

¶74

 19. In A. Sowkath Ali v. Union of India and others,

¶75

 reported in 2000 (7) SCC 148, while referring to Section
 5A of the COFEPOSA Act it was sought to be contended
 that the order of detention should not be deemed to be
 invalid or inoperative merely on the ground that some
 extraneous materials were placed before the detaining

¶76

 [20]

¶77

 authority since such extraneous materials have no
 bearing on the validity of the impugned order which can
 be sustained on the material set out in the grounds of
 detention itself, it was held that "What Section 5-A
 provides is that where there are two or more grounds
 covering various activities of the detenu, each activity
 is a separate ground by itself and if one of the grounds
 is vague, non-existent, not relevant, not connected or
 not proximately connected with such person or invalid
 for any other reason whatsoever, then that will not
 vitiate the order of detention." It was further held
 that Section 5-A applies where the detention is based on
 more than one ground, not where it is based on a single
 ground. Referring to the facts of the case under
 consideration before the Apex Court it was held that "it
 is a case of one composite ground. The different
 numbers of the ground of detention are only paragraphs
 narrating the facts with the details of the document
 which is being relied on but factually, the detention
 order is based on one ground, which is revealed by
 Ground (1)(xvi) of the grounds of detention which we
 have already quoted hereinbefore. Thus on the facts of
 this case Section 5-A has no application in the present
 case".

¶78

 20. In Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal v. Police
Commissioner and another, reported in 1989 (2) SCC 370,

¶79

 [21]

¶80

 which is a decision in relation to the detention under
 the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act,
 1985 and where the detenu was sought to be detained with
 a view to prevent him from acting in any manner
 prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and
 dealing with the contention regarding the non-placement
 of the material fact before the detaining authority
 before issuance of the order of detention, it was held
 that the same amounted to non-application of mind by the
 detaining authority which resulted in vitiating the
 subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority
 rendering the order of detention to be invalid.

¶81

 21. It is thus seen that none of the above decisions
 sought to be relied upon are on the point which is
 sought to be canvassed. Being so, none of the said
 decisions support the proposition which is sought to be
 canvassed that if the order of detention is based on two
 or more different heads and if one of the heads of
 detention falls to the ground, the entire order should
 fall to the ground.

¶82

 22. It is necessary to ascertain whether on the basis
 of the materials which are referred to in the grounds of
 detention, the order on two different heads, namely
 under Clause (i) and Clause (iii) can be independently
 supported or justified. The view that we are taking in

¶83

 [22]

¶84

 this regard is inevitable considering the provisions of
 law comprised under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA which
 empowers the authority to issue detention order either
 on one of the heads mentioned therein or on two or more
 of the heads enumerated thereunder. It is also settled
 law of principle, as rightly submitted by the learned
 A.P.P. that when the order of detention is supported by

¶85

 more than one ground, such an order is to be construed
 as comprising of as many orders as there are grounds in
 support of such order. In fact, the Apex Court in

¶86

Attorney General for India and others v. Amratlal

¶87

Prajivandas and others, reported in (1994) 5 SCC 54, the
 decision sought to be relied upon by the learned A.P.P.,
 has clearly ruled that "Where the order of detention is
 based on more than one ground, the first part creates a
 legal fiction, viz., it must be deemed that there are as
 many orders of detention as there are grounds which
 means that each of such orders is an independent order."
 Same principle will apply in case of orders under each
 of the heads enumerated under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA.
 If each ground in support of the detention order tends
 to constitute separate order and consequently results in
 as many number of orders as there are grounds in support
 of detention, then the sequitur that follows is that
 when the detention is on more than one head, there would
 be as many orders as there are heads. For example, even
 though the detention is only on two heads with three

¶88

 [23]

¶89

 grounds, in support of each head, then there would be as
 many as three orders on each head. Therefore, assuming
 that three grounds in support of one head fail,
 consequently three orders in respect of such head would
 fail; nevertheless three remaining orders in relation
 to the other head would survive. In this regard, it is
 also necessary to take note of the relevant observations
 by the Apex Court in Amratlal Prajivandas’ case (supra)
 which reads thus:-

¶90

 "Though ordinarily one act may not be
 held sufficient to sustain an order of
 detention, one act may sustain an order
 of detention if the act is of such a
 nature as to indicate that it is an
 organised act or a manifestation of
 organised activity. The gravity and
 nature of the act is also relevant. The
 test is whether the act is such that it
 gives rise to an inference that the
 person would continue to indulge in
 similar prejudicial activity. That is
 the reason why single acts of
 wagon-breaking, theft or signal
 material, theft of telegraph copper
 wires in huge quantity and removal of
 railway fish-plates were held

¶91

 [24]

¶92

 sufficient. Similarly, where the person
 tried to export huge amount of Indian
 currency to a foreign country in a
 planned and premeditated manner, it was
 held that such single act warrants an
 inference that he will repeat his
 activity in future and, therefore, his
 detention is necessary to prevent him
 from indulging in such prejudicial
 activity. If one looks at the acts the
 COFEPOSA is designed to prevent, they
 are all either acts of smuggling or of
 foreign exchange manipulation. These
 acts are indulged in by persons, who act
 in concert with other persons and quite
 often such activity has international
 ramifications. These acts are preceded
 by a good amount of planning and
 organisation. They are not like
 ordinary law and order crimes. If,
 however, in any given case a single act
 is found to be not sufficient to sustain
 the order of detention that may well be
 quashed but it cannot be stated as a

¶93

 principle that one single act cannot
 constitute the basis for detention. On
 the contrary, it does. In other words,

¶94

 [25]

¶95

 it is not necessary that there should be

¶96

 multiplicity of grounds for making or

¶97

 sustaining an order of detention."

¶98

 23. Once it is clearly held that an order of detention
 can even be sustained on a single ground, the contention
 that an order of detention issued on more than one head,
 merely because it becomes unsustainable in relation to
 one of such heads, the entire order would be rendered
 bad in law, cannot be accepted. If one of such heads is
 sustainable, there being one ground clearly disclosing
 in support to such head and sufficient for arriving at
 the subjective satisfaction regarding the need for
 issuance of the order of detention on such ground,
 merely because the other grounds become unsustainable,
 the entire order cannot be held to be bad in law. As
 observed above, of course, it would depend on the facts
 of each case revealed from the grounds of detention.

¶99

 24. In the case in hand, undisputedly the impugned
 order of detention has been passed on two different
 heads, namely, under Section 3(1)(i) and 3(1)(iii) of
 the COFEPOSA. The challenge is essentially to the
 detention order issued under the head comprised under
 Section 3(1)(iii). It is sought to be contended that
 the order in relation to another head is bad only
 because once the order in relation to the head under

¶100

 [26]

¶101

 Section 3(1)(iii) fails, the entire order becomes
 unsustainable and not because the order under the head
 comprised under Section 3(1)(i) to be either not borne
 out from the materials on record or is not supported by
 the grounds of detention or otherwise illegal. Being
 so, once the contention that when the order issued on
 more than one head, and one of the heads of the
 detention falls to the ground, the entire order falls to
 the ground is rejected and there being no challenge to
 the detention on another head, the challenge in the
 petition to the detention order obviously fails.
 Nevertheless, considering the fact that it is a
 detention order which imposes restraint on the free
 movement of the detenu, it would be appropriate to
 consider whether the grounds in support of the detention
 makes out the case for subjective satisfaction of the
 detaining authority for issuance of the detention order
 under the head enumerated under Section 3(1)(i) of the
 COFEPOSA.

¶102

 25. The grounds in support of the detention clearly
 refer to the fact that the detenu while he was about to
 leave for Singapore via Flight No.AI-480, scheduled to
 leave CSI Airport, Sahar, Mumbai at 01:50 hours on
 20-8-2004, the detenu was found carrying USD and Euro
 currencies concealed in his hand-bag without declaring
 the same to the customs authorities. In fact, the

¶103

 [27]

¶104

 detenu was intercepted after he had cleared the A, B, C
 procedure and had proceeded towards the escalator
 leading to the security check area and on search, he was
 found carrying USD 81,000.00, Euro 7,600.00 and some
 Singapore dollars in his hand-bag. A detail examination
 of the baggage led to the seizure of the foreign
 currency of USD 81,000.00, Euro 7,600.00 and 366
 Singapore dollars, totally equivalent to Indian currency
 of Rs.40,08,244.50 ps. The said foreign currency as was
 being smuggled out of the country, without declaring to
 the customs authorities, the same was seized under the
 reasonable belief that it was liable for confiscation
 under the Customs Act, 1962. The fact that the detenu
 was carrying such foreign currency, without any
 declaration, was also confirmed by the statement of the
 detenu recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act,
 1962. Based on the various facts narrated in the
 grounds which were revealed in the course of the
 investigation, the detaining authority had arrived at
 the finding that the detenu has indulged in smuggling
 activities and the same is clearly apparent from the
 attempt on the part of the detenu to carry the foreign
 currency along with him while attempting to board the
 aircraft which was to leave for Singapore. These
 materials, revealed from the grounds and reiterated in
 the affidavit in-reply filed by the detaining authority,
 clearly disclose that there were sufficient materials

¶105

 [28]

¶106

 before the detaining authority to arrive at the
 subjective satisfaction regarding the need for issuance
 of the detention order in relation to the head of
 "smuggling of goods" under Section 3(1)(i).

¶107

 26. Any currency of any country other than India found
 in our country would be a foreign currency.
 Undoubtedly, there are certain regulations in relation
 to such currencies and how to deal with such currency
 and the procedure for holding such currency by the
 persons in India. Such a person carrying foreign
 currency while trying to leave the country, unless it is
 shown that he was lawfully entitled to hold the currency
 and to carry such currency out of India and, that too,
 without making any declaration to the customs
 authorities, it would apparently disclose that there was
 an attempt to smuggle such currency out of India. Being
 so, there were sufficient materials available before the
 detaining authority to arrive at the subjective
 satisfaction regarding the head enumerated under Clause
 (i) of Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA independently of the
 grounds relating to transporting or keeping of the
 foreign currency under Section 3(1)(iii) which is stated
 to be not supported or established from the grounds of
 detention. Being so, the order in relation to the head
 comprised under Section 3(1)(i) of the COFEPOSA
 independently finds support from the materials on record

¶108

 [29]

¶109

 revealed from the grounds of detention and therefore
 merely because the order under the head comprised under
 Section 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA is not sustainable,
 the entire order cannot be held to be bad in law or
 invalid.

¶110

 27. For the reasons stated above, therefore, we do not
 find any justification for interference in the impugned
 order of detention and hence the petition fails and is
 hereby dismissed. The rule is discharged with no order
 as to costs.

¶111

 (R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.)

¶112

 (P.V. Kakade, J.)

Rajesh Vashdev Adnani v. the State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Rajesh Vashdev Adnani v. the State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Kamlesh S. Mishra Vs the State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Babasaheb Pandit Patil Vs the State of Maharashtra

Babasaheb Pandit Patil Vs the State of Maharashtra

Modi Xerox Limited and Ors. Vs Ms. Niloo Makhija

Jitendra Manubhai Parekh Vs the State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Paresh Manharlal Desai Vs the State of Maharashtra and Ors.