Dismissed

Shahid Hussain Iqbal Shaikh @ Kanya Babu v. A.N. Roy and Ors.

Bombay HC21 Feb 2005WP/2314/2004

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court in criminal writ petition challenged a detention order issued against the petitioner under the MPDA Act while he was already in judicial custody. The petitioner argued the order was vitiated as bail was impossible due to rejected applications. The court held the detention order was valid as the detaining authority duly considered cogent material regarding the likelihood of future ba

What did the court decide?

The criminal writ petition challenging the detention order is dismissed. The rule is discharged with no order as to costs.

Shahid Hussain Iqbal Shaikh @ Kanya Babu Vs… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Bombay HC (2005)

¶1

[1]

¶2

INTHE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

¶3

 APPELLATE SIDE
 CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.2314 OF 2004

¶4

 Shahid Hussain Iqbal Shaikh
 @ Kanya Babu, Age: 22 years,
 r/o Room No.C/1, Chawl No.4,
 Yash Mistry Chawl, Parsiwadi,
 Ghatkopar (West),
 Mumbai-400 086.
 {At present detained in Nasik
 Road Central Prison, Nasik} .... Petitioner
 - Versus -
 1. Shri A.N. Roy,
 Commissioner of Police,
 Brihan Mumbai.
 2. The State of Maharashtra
 3. The Superintendent,
 Nasik Road Central Prison,
 Nasik. .... Respondents
 Shri U.N. Tripathi for the Petitioner.
 Shri D.S. Mhaispurkar, Addl. Public
 Prosecutor, for the Respondents.

¶5

[2]

¶6

CORAM: R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR &

¶7

 P.V. KAKADE, JJ.

¶8

DATED: FEBRUARY 21, 2005

¶9

ORAL JUDGMENT (Per R.M.S.Khandeparkar, J.):

¶10

 1. Heard. The petitioner/detenu challenges the order
 of detention dated 6-9-2004 issued against him by the
 respondent No.1 in exercise of the powers conferred by
 sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Maharashtra
 Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords,
 Bootleggers, Drug-offenders and Dangerous Persons Act,
 1981, hereinafter referred to as "the MPDA Act" r/w the
 Government Order, Home Department (Special)
 No.DDS-1303/10/Part-II/SPL-3(B), dated 23-6-2004 and
 stated to have been issued with a view to preventing the
 petitioner/detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial
 to the maintenance of the public order.

¶11

 2. The challenge to the impugned order of detention is
 on the ground that the detaining authority failed to
 apply its mind to the fact that the petitioner had been
 in judicial custody for more than five months and had

¶12

[3]

¶13

 not applied for bail for nearly three months and there
 was no possibility of the petitioner being released on
 bail and that, therefore, the order of detention was not
 warranted and that the same discloses that the
 subjective satisfaction stated to have been arrived at
 for the purpose of detention of the petitioner is
 vitiated. On the other hand, it is the case of the
 respondents that the point relating to the availability
 of bail was considered by the detaining authority before
 issuing the order of detention and therefore there is no
 case for interference in the impugned order on the
 alleged ground.

¶14

 3. It is the contention on behalf of the petitioner
 that the order of detention is thoroughly unwarranted
 and unjust since the petitioner was already in custody
 consequent to registration of the C.R. No.117/04 as
 well as C.R. No.126/04 with effect from May, 2004 and
 further that considering the nature of the allegations
 in the complaints, there was no likelihood of release of
 the petitioner on bail. The learned Advocate for the
 petitioner has submitted that in both the cases the
 petitioner had in fact applied for bail and the same was
 rejected by the Sessions Court as well as by this Court
 taking into consideration the allegation regarding the
 role stated to have been played by the petitioner in the

¶15

[4]

¶16

 alleged incidents and considering the seriousness of the
 offence. Being so, according to the learned Advocate
 for the petitioner, the detaining authority ought to
 have considered that there was no possibility of
 availability of bail to the petitioner even though
 successive applications for bail are not barred. The
 detaining authority having not considered the same, the
 impugned order is clearly vitiated. Further submission
 is that there was no justifiable ground for the
 detaining authority to arrive at the subjective
 satisfaction regarding the need for issuance of the
 detention order to detain the petitioner in preventive
 custody. Reliance is placed in the decisions in the

¶17

 matters of Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate,
Burdwan and another, reported in AIR 1964 SC 334,

¶18

Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat and another v. Union of
India and others, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1196,
Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin v. Government of the

¶19

National Capital Territory of Delhi and others, 1994

¶20

 Supp (1) SCC 597, Rajesh Gulati v. Govt. of NCT of

¶21

Delhi and another, reported in 2002 SCC (Cri.) 1627 and
 an unreported decision of the Division Bench of this
 Court in the matter of Smt. Chandradevi Jaiswal v.

¶22

Shri M.N. Singh and others {Criminal Writ Petition
 No.973 of 2001} delivered on 5-9-2001.

¶23

[5]

¶24

 4. The learned A.P.P., on the other hand, has submitted
 that the detaining authority was fully aware of the fact

¶25

 that the petitioner was already in judicial custody
 pursuant to the complaints registered against him and
 his bail application having been rejected by the
 Sessions Court as well as by this Court. However, the
 detaining authority, taking into consideration the
 availability of the facility of successive bail
 applications to the persons in custody and considering
 the fact that the offences for which the petitioner was
 in custody were not punishable with life imprisonment or
 death sentence, the availability of bail being not
 totally ruled out, considered it necessary to issue the
 detention order against the petitioner. Reliance is
 placed in the decisions in the matters of Ahamed Nassar
v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, reported in (1999) 8
 SCC 473, Amritlal & Ors. v. Union Government, Ministry

¶26

of Finance & Ors., reported in 2001 (I) L.J. 401 and an
 unreported decision of the Division Bench of this Court
 in the matter of Shri Mohamed Hussein @ Langda Hussein

¶27

s/o Abxubakar Sheikh v. Shri M.N. Singh and others
 {Criminal Writ Petition No.1262 of 2002} delivered on
 24-7-2003.

¶28

 5. The fact that the petitioner was in judicial custody
 consequent to registration of the C.R. Nos.117 and 126

¶29

[6]

¶30

 of 2004 in the month of May, 2004 is not in dispute. It
 is also not in dispute that the bail applications filed
 by the petitioner were rejected by the Sessions Court as
 well as by this Court in relation to the said
 complaints. It is also not in dispute that there is no
 bar against filing successive bail applications. The
 contention, however, is that mere availability of bail
 application cannot be a ground to justify the subjective
 satisfaction of the detaining authority for the purpose
 of issuance of the detention order when the person to be
 so detained is already in jail consequent to rejection
 of his bail application and further that the allegations
 against him are of a serious nature which may not
 justify grant of bail, whereas it is the defence of the
 respondents that in the absence of offence being
 punishable with life imprisonment or death sentence and
 taking into consideration the overall view taken and the
 principle followed by the Courts in relation to bail
 matters being the bail and not jail, the availability of
 bail to the petitioner cannot be ruled out and therefore
 there was proper consideration of the said aspect of the
 matter while arriving at the subjective satisfaction
 regarding the necessity for issuance of the order of
 detention against the petitioner.

¶31

 6. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, referring

¶32

[7]

¶33

 to the decision of the Apex Court in Rameshwar Shaw’s

¶34

 case (supra), has submitted that the Apex Court therein
 has clearly ruled that before an authority comes to the
 finding regarding the necessity of detaining a person in
 custody to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial
 manner, it is necessary that the authority should be
 satisfied that if such person is not detained, he would
 act in a prejudicial manner and that itself would
 disclose the inevitable necessity to curtail his freedom
 which would require the authority to take into
 consideration whether at the time of issuance of the
 detention order such person is already in custody or a
 free citizen. Undoubtedly, in Rameshwar Shaw’s case the
 Apex Court had held that before an authority can
 legitimately come to the conclusion that the detention
 of the person is necessary to prevent him from acting in
 a prejudicial manner, the authority has to be satisfied
 that if the person is not detained, he would act in a
 prejudicial manner and that inevitably postulates
 freedom of action to the said person at the relevant
 time and if the person is already in jail, it cannot
 rationally be postulated that if he is not detained, he
 would act in a prejudicial manner. However, the Apex
 Court before arriving at the said conclusion had
 observed that:

¶35

[8]

¶36

 "As abstract proposition of law, there
 may not be any doubt that S.3(1)(a) does
 not preclude the authority from passing
 an order of detention against a person
 whilst he is in detention or in jail;
 but the relevant facts in connection
 with the making of the order may differ
 and that may make a difference in the
 application of the principle that a
 detention order can be passed against a
 person in jail. ...... the question as
 to whether an order of detention can be
 passed against a person who is in
 detention or in jail, will always have
 to be determined in the circumstances of
 each case."

¶37

 The basis for issuing an order of detention under
 Section 3(1) of the Act being the satisfaction of the
 detaining authority in that regard based on the facts
 disclosed from the materials placed before the detaining
 authority before issuance of such order, and the same
 were totally absent in the case of Rameshwar Shaw, as
 the detenu therein was arrested on 25-1-1963 and ever
 since he was in custody. Even on 15-2-1963, when the
 order of detention was served on him, he was in jail

¶38

[9]

¶39

 custody. After referring the facts of the said case,
 the Apex Court has observed that:

¶40

 "The first stage in the process is to
 examine the material adduced against a
 person to show either from his conduct
 or his antecedent history that he has
 been acting in a prejudicial manner. If
 the said material appears satisfactory
 to the authority, then the authority has
 to consider whether it is likely that
 the said person would act in a
 prejudicial manner in future if he is
 not prevented from doing so by an order
 of detention. If this question is
 answered against the petitioner, then
 the detention order can be properly
 made."

¶41

 With the above observations it has been held that:

¶42

 "The satisfaction that it is necessary
 to detain a person for the purpose of
 preventing him from acting in a
 prejudicial manner is thus the basis of
 the order under S.3(1)(a), and this

¶43

 [10]

¶44

 basis is clearly absent in the case of

¶45

 the petitioner."

¶46

 Obviously, the detaining authority in the case of
 Rameshwar Shaw had not addressed itself to the relevant
 issue and, therefore, the Apex Court had observed that
 the basis for issuance of the order under Section 3(1)
 i.e. the necessity to detain a person for the purpose
 of preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner
 inspite of he being already in custody were absent and
 the detaining authority therein had failed to apply its
 mind to the said aspect of the matter, and therefore the
 detention order was held to be bad in law.

¶47

 7. In the case in hand, the affidavit in-reply filed by
 the respondents disclose that the detaining authority
 was aware of the fact that the petitioner was in
 judicial custody in respect of the said two C.Rs in
 which he was arrested. The authority was also aware of
 the fact that the detenu had applied for bail in the
 Sessions Court as well as in the High Court and both the
 applications were rejected. The detaining authority was
 also aware that there is no embargo or bar for filing
 successive bail applications and further the fact that
 the Courts have entertained such applications in case of
 failure to file the chargesheet in time or with the

¶48

 [11]

¶49

 passage of time, or on medical grounds, besides the fact
 that the C.Rs registered against the petitioner did not
 disclose the offences punishable with life imprisonment
 or death sentence. Obviously it is the case of the
 respondents that the fact that the detenu can be
 released on bail as the facility of bail was available
 to the detenu was considered by the detaining authority.
 However, the grievance of the learned Advocate for the
 petitioner is that mere consideration of availability of
 bail facility does not amount to taking into

¶50

 consideration the cogent materials for the subjective
 satisfaction regarding the need of the petitioner being
 subjected to order of detention inspite of he being
 already in custody. The contention is that it is not
 the mere availability of the bail facility but the
 consideration of the substance of accusation which could
 entitle a person to get the bail which ought to have
 been considered and in the absence thereof the
 subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority
 stands vitiated and consequently the order of detention
 is rendered bad in law, and in that connection attention
 is drawn to the decision in Dharmendra Suganchand
Chelawat’s case (supra).

¶51

 8. The Apex Court in Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat’s
 case, after considering various earlier decisions,

¶52

 [12]

¶53

 including Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah
 {AIR 1986 SC 315}, Rameshwar Shaw {supra}, Masood Alam
v. Union of India {AIR 1973 SC 897}, Dulal Roy v.
District Magistrate, Burdwan {AIR 1975 SC 1508}, Vijay
Kumar v. State of Jammu & Kashmir {AIR 1982 SC 1023},
Alijan Mian v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad {AIR 1983
 SC 1130}, Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra {AIR
 1986 SC 2177}, Binod Singh v. District Magistrate,
Dhanbad, Bihar {AIR 1986 SC 2090}, Smt. Shashi Aggarwal
v. State of U.P. {AIR 1988 SC 596}, Vijay Kumar v.
Union of India {AIR 1988 SC 934} and N. Meera Rani v.
Govt. of Tamil Nadu {AIR 1989 SC 2027}, held that:

¶54

 "The decisions referred to above lead to

¶55

 the conclusion that an order for
 detention can be validly passed against
 a person in custody and for that purpose
 it is necessary that the grounds of
 detention must show that (i) the
 detaining authority was aware of the
 fact that the detenu is already in
 detention; and (ii) there were
 compelling reasons justifying such
 detention despite the fact that the
 detenu is already in detention . The
 expression "compelling reasons" in the

¶56

 [13]

¶57

 context of making an order for detention
 of a person already in custody implies
 that there must be cogent material
 before the detaining authority on the
 basis of which it may be satisfied that
 (a) the detenu is likely to be released
 from custody in the near future and (b)
 taking into account the nature of the
 antecedent activities of the detenu, it
 is likely that after his release from
 custody he would indulge in prejudicial
 activities and it is necessary to detain
 him in order to prevent him from
 engaging in such activities."

¶58

 Obviously therefore, the learned Advocate for the
 petitioner is justified in contending that the detaining
 authority must consider cogent materials to arrive at
 his subjective satisfaction regarding the need for
 issuance of order of detention of a person who is
 already in custody. At the same time, it is to be noted
 that consideration of the cogent materials has to be
 appreciated by the Court in writ jurisdiction from the
 point of view of subjective satisfaction of the
 authority and not as if sitting in appeal or review of
 the decision arrived at by the detaining authority.

¶59

 [14]

¶60

 Bearing this in mind, one has to ascertain whether in
 the case in hand the detaining authority had considered
 cogent materials for the purpose of arriving at the
 subjective satisfaction regarding the need of the
 petitioner to be brought under the net of detention
 order inspite of the fact that the petitioner was
 already in judicial custody.

¶61

 9. As already observed above, the detaining authority
 has clearly disclosed that the fact that the petitioner
 was already in judicial custody, that his bail
 applications were rejected by the Sessions Court as well
 as by this Court, that there is no bar or embargo
 against filing successive bail applications, that the
 complaints against the petitioner did not disclose the
 offence punishable with life or death sentence, that
 normally the Courts are inclined to grant bail to such
 accused in case of delay in filing the chargesheet or
 with passage of time or even after the filing of the
 chargesheet that many a times the accused are released
 on temporary bail on the ground of medical reason, etc.,
 and all these aspects were considered by the detaining
 authority before passing the order of detention. It is
 to be noted that consideration of cogent materials is

¶62

 for the purpose of subjective satisfaction of the
 detaining authority regarding the need of clamping the

¶63

 [15]

¶64

 detention order on a person. Such a satisfaction is not
 on par with that of a judicial officer’s order on the
 bail application of an accused.

¶65

 10. Attention was also drawn to the decision in
Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin’s case (supra) wherein the
 detention order was held to be bad as it fell short of
 the requirement enunciated by the Apex Court in
Kamarunnissa v. Union of India {(1991) 1 SCC 128}. In
Kamarunnissa’s case (supra) the ruling of the Apex Court
 was to the effect that:

¶66

 "detention orders can validly be passed
 against detenus who are in jail,
 provided the officer passing the order
 is alive to the fact of the detenus
 being in custody and there is material
 on record to justify his conclusion that
 they would indulge in similar activity
 if set at liberty."

¶67

 In Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin’s case the Apex Court had
 held that the requirements of the decision in
 Kamarunnissa’s case were not satisfied because in the
 said case the grounds of detention did not disclose that
 the release of the detenu on bail was likely or that it

¶68

 [16]

¶69

 was imminent. In other words, the ruling of the Apex
 Court in Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin’s case is to the
 effect that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by
 the detaining authority should disclose consideration of
 the likelihood of release of the detenu or such a
 release being imminent and if this aspect is disclosed,
 the order of detention cannot be held to be vitiated.

¶70

 11. Reverting to the facts of the case in hand, as
 already narrated above, the same clearly discloses
 various aspects regarding the availability of the bail
 being considered by the detaining authority, including
 the fact that the offences for which the petitioner was
 in judicial custody were not punishable with life
 imprisonment or death sentence, coupled with the fact
 that there is no bar or embargo against the filing of
 successive bail applications and normal trend is that
 the Courts normally grant bail whenever there is either
 delay in filing the chargesheet or even after the filing
 of the chargesheet on consideration of the nature of the
 offences. As already observed above, while considering
 this aspect, the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot
 review the decision of the detaining authority. Being
 so, the sufficiency of the materials to arrive at the
 subjective satisfaction regarding the need for issuance
 of the detention order against the person who is already

¶71

 [17]

¶72

 in custody cannot be the subject-matter for adjudication
 in writ jurisdiction.

¶73

 12. Attention was also drawn to para 13 of the decision
 in Rajesh Gulati’s case (supra) wherein the Apex Court
 has held that:

¶74

 "the detaining authority’s satisfaction
 consisted of two parts - one: that the
 appellant was likely to be released on
 bail and two: that after he was so
 released the appellant would indulge in
 smuggling activities. The detaining
 authority noted that the appellant was
 in custody when the order of detention
 was passed. But the detaining authority
 said that "bail is normally granted in
 such cases". When in fact the five
 applications filed by the appellant for
 bail had been rejected by the courts
 (indicating that this was not a "normal"
 case), on what material did the
 detaining authority conclude that there
 was "imminent possibility" that the

¶75

 appellant would come out on bail? The
 fact that the appellant was subsequently

¶76

 [18]

¶77

 released on bail by the High Court could

¶78

 not have been foretold."

¶79

 Undoubtedly therefore, in Rajesh Gulati’s case, five
 bail applications were rejected and it apparently
 discloses that it was not a case where the bail could
 have been granted and yet the detaining authority
 concluded that there was imminent possibility of the
 detenu coming out on bail. As already observed above,
 the Apex Court in Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat and
Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin’s case has clearly held that
 it should be either "the likelihood of release" or the
 "imminent possibility of release". In the case in hand,
 the detaining authority has nowhere stated that there
 was imminent possibility of the petitioner being
 released on bail. The specific averment in that regard
 is that he could be likely to be released on bail. It
 is not the case of successive bail applications and
 refusal thereof. Besides, as already observed above,
 the detaining authority has also taken into
 consideration the fact that the allegations against the
 petitioner in the complaints filed against him do not
 disclose the offences punishable with life imprisonment
 or death sentence and therefore the possibility of he
 getting the bail in case of delay in filing the
 chargesheet or even after the filing of the chargesheet,

¶80

 [19]

¶81

 including the possibility of availing such facility on
 medical grounds was duly considered.

¶82

 13. The decision in Smt. Chandradevi Jaiswal’s case
 (supra) is of no help to the petitioner. That was a
 case wherein the Division Bench had held that the Apex
 Court had held in Chelawat’s case that there should be a
 positive assertion in the grounds of detention that the
 detenu is in detention, however, in Chandradevi’s case
 there was no positive assertion that the detenu was in
 custody. Apparently, that was in a totally different
 set of facts and a different point for consideration and
 therefore the same is of no help to the petitioner in
 the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and the
 points involved in the matter.

¶83

 14. In Ahamed Nassar’s case (supra), the Apex Court,
 after taking note of various decisions, including the
 decision in Kamarunnissa as well as in Rivadeneyta
 Ricardo Agustin’s cases, as well the facts of the case
 before the Apex Court, held that:

¶84

 "...... in spite of rejection of the

¶85

 bail application by a court, it is open
 to the detaining authority to come to
 his own satisfaction based on the

¶86

 [20]

¶87

 contents of the bail application keeping
 in mind the circumstances that there is

¶88

 likelihood of the detenu being released
 on bail. Merely because no bail
 application was then pending is no
 premise to hold that there was no
 likelihood of his being released on
 bail. The words "likely to be released"
 connote chances of being bailed out, in
 case there be pending bail application
 or in case if it is moved in future is
 decided. The word "likely" shows it can
 be either way."

¶89

 Obviously therefore, each case will have to be decided
 based on the facts of that case and what could be the
 relevant material would vary according to the facts of
 each case.

¶90

 15. In Amritlal’s case (supra) the decision of the Apex
 Court was based on the peculiar facts of the case
 wherein the Court also considered the scope of the
 expression "likelihood of the petitioner being released
 on bail" to mean "available cogent material for coming
 at the subjective satisfaction regarding the release of
 the accused on bail. In that regard, it was observed by

¶91

 [21]

¶92

 the Apex Court thus: "Available cogent material is the
 likelihood of having a bail application moved in the
 matter but not obtaining a bail order." Obviously the
 detaining authority did not apply its mind to the issue
 as to whether there was a possibility of the accused
 (detenu) being released on bail in the matter and passed
 the order merely on the basis that the application for
 bail could be moved by the accused (detenu). The said
 decision does not help either the petitioner or the
 respondents. Similar is the case in relation to the
 decision in the matter of Shri Mohamed Hussein @ Langda
Hussein (supra) which is purely in the facts of that
 case and does not help either of the parties.

¶93

 16. In a recent decision in the matter of Union of
India v. Paul Manickam and another, reported in (2003)
 8 SCC 342, the Apex Court while dealing with the issue
 in relation to the need for consideration of
 availability of bail to the person who is already in
 custody and how to deal with such a situation in case
 there is necessity of issuing detention order against
 such person, it has held therein thus:

¶94

 "Where detention orders are passed in
 relation to persons who are already in
 jail under some other laws, the

¶95

 [22]

¶96

 detaining authorities should apply their
 mind and show their awareness in this

¶97

 regard in the grounds of detention, the
 chances of release of such persons on
 bail. The necessity of keeping such
 persons in detention under the
 preventive detention laws has to be
 clearly indicated. Subsisting custody
 of the detenu by itself does not
 invalidate an order of his preventive
 detention, and the decision in this

¶98

 regard must depend on the facts of the
 particular case. Preventive detention
 being necessary to prevent the detenu
 from acting in any manner prejudicial to
 the security of the State or to the
 maintenance of public order or economic
 stability etc., ordinarily, it is not
 needed when the detenu is already in
 custody. The detaining authority must

¶99

 show its awareness to the fact of

¶100

 subsisting custody of the detenu and
 take the factor into account while

¶101

 making the order. If the detaining

¶102

authority is reasonably satisfied with
cogent materials that there is

¶103

 [23]

¶104

likelihood of his release and in view of
his antecedent activities which are
proximate in point of time, he must be
detained in order to prevent him from
indulging in such prejudicial
activities, the detention order can be
validly made. Where the detention order
 in respect of a person already in
 custody does not indicate that the
 detenu was likely to be released on

¶105

 bail, the order would be vitiated."

¶106

 (emphasis supplied)

¶107

 17. As the facts of the case in hand disclose that the
 materials which were considered by the detaining
 authority were cogent materials which included the fact
 that the offences for which the petitioner was arrested
 did not contain the offence punishable with life
 imprisonment or death sentence, that there is no bar or
 embargo upon filing successive bail applications, that
 it is only one application for bail which was rejected
 by the Sessions Court and the High Court, that normally
 the practice followed by the Courts is to grant bail in
 case there is any delay in filing the chargesheet or
 even after the filing of the chargesheet considering the

¶108

 [24]

¶109

 nature of the allegations and the possibility of
 releasing the accused on medical grounds and, therefore,
 the detaining authority in the case in hand cannot be
 accused of not considering the cogent materials for the
 purpose of subjective satisfaction necessary to justify
 the detention of the petitioner. The analysis of the
 materials and the opinion formed by the detaining
 authority discloses that the detaining authority was
 subjectively satisfied on the basis of the cogent
 materials that there was likelihood of release of the
 petitioner on bail and considering his antecedent
 activities which obviously were proximate in point of
 time, the order passed by the detaining authority cannot
 be said to be invalid or that the satisfaction was
 arrived at without cogent materials.

¶110

 18. As there is no other ground on which the impugned
 order is challenged, since the ground of challenge is
 devoid of substance, the petition fails and is hereby

¶111

 dismissed. The rule is discharged with no order as to
 costs.

¶112

 [25]

¶113

 (R.M.S.Khandeparkar, J.)

¶114

 (P.V.Kakade, J.)

Shahid Hussain Iqbal Shaikh @ Kanya Babu v. A.N. Roy and Ors.

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Shahid Hussain Iqbal Shaikh @ Kanya Babu v. A.N. Roy and Ors.

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