Allowed

B. M. C. v. Rampher D. Pathak

Bombay HC3 Aug 2005WP/1547/2003

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Writ petition challenging Industrial Court order dismissing appeal against Labour Court’s interim injunction restraining eviction from staff quarters. Court set aside order but directed eviction only via due process with three-month notice period.

What did the court decide?

Impugned order set aside. Petitioner restrained from evicting respondent except by following due process of law and must give three months’ notice after communication of lawful eviction.

B. M. C. Vs Rampher D. Pathak — Labour and Industrial Disputes | Bombay HC (2005)

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 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY

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 ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

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 WRIT PETITION NO. 1547 of 2003

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 Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation .. Petitioner

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 versus

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 Mr.Rampher D. Pathak .. Respondent

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 Mr.S.K. Talsania i/b M/s.Crawford Bayley & Co. for

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 the petitioner

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 None for the respondent.

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 CORAM : D.G. KARNIK,J.

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 DATED : 3rd August 2005.

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 P.C.:

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 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
 Perused the affidavit of service filed on record.

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 None present for the respondent though served.

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 2. By this petitioner, the petitioner

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 challenges the judgement and order passed by the
 Industrial Court on 3rd March 2003 dismissing the
 petitioners’ appeal. The facts lie in a narrow
 compass and are brief summarily below:-

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 3. The respondent was employed as a Bus
 conductor in the transport undertaking run by the
 petitioner Municipal Corporation. Services of the
 respondent were terminated for a misconduct after
 holding an enquiry. The respondent challenged the
 order of termination by filing of an application
 under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act (for short
 ’the BIR Act’). During the pendency of a proceedings
 before the labour court under the BIR Act, the
 respondent filed an application praying for an
 interim relief praying that he be taken back in
 service till the matter was finally disposed of by
 the Court. By an order dated 9th August 2002, the
 Labour Court rejected the application and refused the
 interim relief of injunction by way of an interim
 reinstatement in service pending final decision of
 the application. However, the Labour Court directed

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 that the petitioner shall not evict the respondent
 from the quarter he was occupying till the final
 disposal of the main application. The aggrieved

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 respondent filed an appeal before the Industrial
 Court. By an order dated 3rd March 2003 the
 Industrial Court dismissed the appeal. That order is
 impugned in this petition.

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 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner firstly
 submits that the Labour Court exceeded its
 jurisdiction in granting a relief of injunction
 restraining the petitioner from evicting the
 respondent from the staff quarter. He further
 submits that the respondent had not even asked for
 any relief regarding the quarters in his interim
 application. The petitioner had no opportunity of
 meeting a case regarding the eviction of the

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 respondent from his quarters and as such, the Labour
 Court ought not to have granted any relief which was
 not even asked for in the interim application. He
 further submits that in any event, the question of
 eviction from a staff quarter was not a subject
 matter of a dispute before the Labour Court under the
 BIR Act. Allotment of a staff quarter was not a
 condition of service and was purely a matter of
 discretion. No employee can claim that he should be
 allotted a staff quarter as of a right. Even a
 person who continues to be in the employment can be

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 evicted from the staff quarter if the staff quarter
 is otherwise required by the employer-petitioner and
 therefore assuming that the respondent was reinstated
 still the petitioner would have a right to evivt him
 under the conditions of service. The labour court
 therefore had no jurisdiction to pass an order
 regarding the staff quarter.

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 5. I have perused the application for interim
 relief made by the respondent before the Labour
 Court, a copy of which is annexed as Exhibit-A2 to
 the petition. Though there is an averment in the
 application that the respondent was occupying the
 staff quarter, no prayer was made by the respondent
 that he should not be evicted from the staff quarter.
 The petitioner is therefore right in submitting that
 it had no opportunity to present the case that the
 allotment of a staff quarter was discretionary and
 under the conditions of service any employee in
 service could also be evicted from the staff quarter
 and there was no right of allotment of a staff
 quarter to an employee. In my view, the Labour Court
 ought not to have granted an relief which was not
 even prayed for by the respondent.

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 6. It however cannot be disputed that the
 petitioner is a public body and would not be entitled
 to evict the respondent without due course of law.
 Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
 petitioner has no intention of evicting the
 respondent without following the due process of law.
 He however submits that the petitioner must be
 permitted to adopt the due course of law by
 initiating necessary proceedings before the
 appropriate authority in accordance with the law. I
 see no reason why the petitioner be not permitted to
 commence the necessary proceedings in accordance with
 law. In my view, the order passed by the Labour
 Court restraining the petitioner absolutely from
 evicting the respondent was improper especially when
 the proceedings before the Labour Court were not
 relating to the quarter but only related to the
 termination.

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 7. For these reasons, the petition is allowed

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 and the impugned order is set aside. However, the
 statement of the learned counsel for the petitioner
 that the petitioner shall not evict the respondent
 except by following the due course of law is noted
 and recorded. Accordingly, it is ordered that the

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 petitioner shall not evict the respondent from the
 quarter except by following due process of law and
 for a period of three months after the date of the
 communication of the order of eviction, if any,
 passed in accordance with law.

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 8. Rule is made absolute to the extent

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 mentioned above.

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 D.G. KARNIK, J

B. M. C. v. Rampher D. Pathak

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

B. M. C. v. Rampher D. Pathak

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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