recommendations of the Standing Committee that we have made a distinction in the ‗burden of proof‘ so that it does not fall heavily on persons who are not charged with offence of money-laundering. If you look at the original section in the parent Act, section 24, when a person is accused of having committed the offence, the burden of proving that the proceeds of crime are untainted property shall be on the accused. This was a drastic provision. Simply by an accusation that he had committed an offence of money-laundering, the burden of proof was shifted to the accused. He may not even be charged at that time. This was what we found to be an onerous provision and an unfair provision. And, what we have now done is to tone down this provision. In (a) and (b), you asked me as to why (b) was there. Now, (a) and (b) will make a distinction. In (a), there is a person charged with the offence of money-laundering — the principal offence under the Act. In (b), it is any other person who is brought before the Court. Therefore, in the case of (a), we maintain the rigour of the section. We borrow from the Evidence Act, ‗shall presume‘, and ‗shall presume‘, as you know, means that the court shall regard that the fact is proved unless it is disputed. So, we maintain the rigour of the section. But, we use the well-accepted phrase ‗shall presume‘. In the case of any other person, we borrow the phrase ‗may presume‘; the court may presume, may not presume and evidence to the contrary can be let off. So, we have now made a distinction between a person charged with the main offence of moneylaundering, and persons who are charged with other offences because, as you know, under sections 43 and 44, all other offences shall be tried by the same court which tries offence of money laundering.
