Dismissed

FPA-50/BOM/2003 of Yasmin Hanif Landa v/s The Competent Authority, Mumbai

ATFP20 Jul 2018FPA-50/BOM/2003

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Appellate Tribunal set aside a previous order and held that the Competent Authority did not need to establish a specific link or nexus between the forfeited properties and the offence. The Tribunal also rejected the appellants' claim that tenanted properties could not be forfeited, finding the tenancy agreements to be a facade for fraudulent conveyance.

What did the court decide?

The appeals were rejected and the forfeiture of the nine properties as detailed in the impugned order dated 12.08.2003 was upheld.

FPA-50/BOM/2003 of Yasmin Hanif Landa v/s The Competent… — Property and Title | ATFP (2018)

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APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR SAFEMA, FEMA, PMLA, NDPS, PBPT ACT AT NEW DELHI

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Date of Decision: 20. 07.2018

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FPA-46/BOM/2003
Abida Ahmed Dossa	…	Appellant
FPA-47/BOM/2003
Haroon Ahmed Merchant	…	Appellant
FPA-48/BOM/2003
Rehmat Haroon Merchant	…	Appellant
FPA-49/BOM/2003
Sabira Salim Memon	…	Appellant
&
FPA-50/BOM/2003
Yasmin Hanif Landa	…	Appellant
Versus
The Competent Authority, Mumbai	…	Respondent

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Advocates/Authorized Representatives who appeared

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For the Appellants	:	Shri S.K. Srivastava, Advocate & Shri Shekhar Gupta, Advocate
For the Respondent	:	Shri R.N. D’ Souza, Joint Commissioner & Shri Stanley Joseph, Inspecting Officer
CORAM
SMT. ANANYA RAY	:	MEMBER
JUDGMENT

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49& 50/BOM/2003

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Shri Mohd. Ahmed Umer Dossa was detained under COFEPOSA by the Government of Maharashtra vide its order dated 23.03.1993. He is therefore a person covered under Section 2(2) (b) of the SAFEMA, 1976. In

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 1 of 17

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addition, seven of his close relatives were also issued a show cause notice under Section 6 of the SAFEMA as they were relatives of Mr. Dossa within the meaning of Section 2 (2) (c) of SAFEMA. All the above were issued show cause notice inter alia to indicate the sources of their income, earnings or assets out of or by means of which nine properties mentioned therein were acquired. The case was adjudicated by the Competent Authority, SAFEMA by its order dated 12.08.2003, in which he forfeited the following properties to the Central Government against which the present appeals have been filed:

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(i) Room Nos. 28-31, 6^th /7^th floor, White House, 53/57, Narayan Dhuru Street, Mumbai – 3 (including the ownership/tenancy rights vested therein).

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(ii) Room Nos. 12-15, 3^rd floor, White House, 53/57, Narayan Dhuru Street, Mumbai – 3 (including the ownership/tenancy rights vested therein).

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(iii) Room Nos. 16-19, 3^rd floor, White House, 53/57, Narayan Dhuru Street, Mumbai – 3 (including the ownership/tenancy rights vested therein). (iv) Room No. 20, 3^rd floor, White House, 53/57, Narayan Dhuru Street, Mumbai – 3 (including the ownership/tenancy rights vested therein).

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(v) Room Nos. 25-27, 5^th floor, White House, 53/57, Narayan Dhuru Street, Mumbai – 3 (including the ownership/tenancy rights vested therein). (vi) Room No. 3, 3^rd floor, Hamid Bldg., B Block, 92-98, Maulana Azad Road, Mumbai (including the ownership/tenancy rights vested therein).

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 2 of 17

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(vii) Flat No. 243/B, 3^rd floor, Ramzan Ali Manzil, 12-A, Saint Andrews Road, Bandra, Mumbai – 400050.

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The appellant inter alia has raised the following issues in the appeal and during the hearing:

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That principles of natural justice has been flouted since no personal hearing was given and that reliance was placed on the predecessors records of hearing;

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The main issue of nexus between the property forfeited and the offence has not been established. That Section 6 of SAFEMA talks of ‘reason to believe’ which has not been

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established by the Competent Authority.

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The Competent Authority has proceeded on presumptions and assumptions.

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That the properties in question are all rented properties and do not belong to the appellant, and hence could not be forfeited as the landlord is not an affected party.

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That the TADA Court has released the same properties in 1995. Because of the same properties cannot be again forfeited under SAFEMA.

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Thereafter the provisions of Bombay Rent Act were also relied upon by the appellant.

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They relied on the following judgments:

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a. (2008) 14 SCC 186 Aslam Mohd. Merchant vs. Competent Authority &Ors. to Saifuddin Pittalwala.

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b. Saifuddin Pittalwala vs. Competent Authority (ATFP) dated 27.03.1992.

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 3 of 17

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c. Arvind Meharm Patel vs. Competent Authority, 1992(196)-ITR-0396-ATFP dated 27.03.1992.

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d. Veetrag Investments vs. Premium Brass 2002 (4).BOM.C.R.169. The limited issue relied upon on this judgment is that commercial tenanted property cannot be forfeited.

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In response, the respondent submitted that:

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a. The principles of natural justice has been fully adhered to as recorded in the impugned order itself. A personal hearing was fixed on 19.06.2001 and on request of the Chartered Accountant of the appellant the hearing was adjourned to 29.06.2001 on which date they appeared for the hearing. They requested on that day to keep the SAFEMA proceedings in abeyance as they have filed a case in the Bombay High Court as the properties are attached by the TADA Court. Accordingly, the matter was adjourned to 31.07.2001. and thereafter on their request to 12.09.2001, 09.10.2001, 21.11.2001, 06.12.2001.On 06.12.2001 they appeared for a personal hearing an inter alia requested for an adjournment to 25.02.2002 thereafter further personal hearing given on 31.07.2002, 02.08.2002 and 16.08.2002, 27.08.2002. A fresh personal hearing was again granted on 24.06.2003.

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b. that the issue relating to nexus has already been decided by this Appellate Tribunal vide order dated 03.01.2011 in appeal FPA nos. 30 to 39/BOM/2000 in the present appellants group case of Abdia Mohd. Dossa vs.

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 4 of 17

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Competent Authority, Mumbai. The said order was passed after considering the cited judgment in the case of Aslam Merchant. The relevant paras are:

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“11. We have considered the contentions raised by both sides. Several infirmities were noticed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Aslam Mohammad Merchant‟s case, in initiation of proceeding under Merchant‟s case, in initiation of proceedings under the NDPS Act. No such infirmities were there in the show cause notice issued in this case. Aslam Mohammad Merchant‟s case was decided under the NDPS Act. The definition of „illegally acquired property‟ under both the Acts are different. Section 68B(g) of the NDPS Act defines „illegally acquired property‟ as property acquired wholly or partly out of any income, earning or assets derived or obtained from or attributed to the contravention of the terms of that Act. In SAFEMA, „illegally acquired property‟ is very widely defined. It is defined as follows in Section 3(1)(c) of the Act as follows:"

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Moreover, in the Aslam Merchant case, the crux of the decision was that the show cause notices did not record any ‘reason to believe’ which is not the case in the present order. Detail reasons have been recorded in the show cause notice.

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c. It was submitted that the definition of illegally acquired property under SAFEMA was totally different and wide as compared to the definition of illegally acquired property under the NDPS Act (as was the case in Aslam Mohd. Merchant). They relied on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Attorney General of India vs. Amratlal Prajeevan Das & Ors. (AIR 1994 2179 SC). The Supreme Court held “the definition of illegally acquired properties in ………… SAFEMA is undoubtedly wide. It means and includes any property acquired by such person whether before or after the

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 5 of 17

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commencement of this Act……….. Secondly, it takes in property which may have been acquired partly from out of legal activity in which case of course the provision in Section 9 would be attracted. Illegal activity is not confined to violation of the laws mentioned in Section 2 but all laws which Parliament has power to make……….. We can take note of the fact that persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange manipulations do not keep regular and proper accounts with respect to such activity or its income or of the assets acquired there from…..... In law it is not possible to say that the definition is arbitrary or is couched in unreasonably wide terms………. The idea is to forfeit the illegally acquired properties of the convict/detenue irrespective of the fact that such properties are held by or kept in the name of or screened in the name of any relative or associate as defined in the said two explanations (Section 2). They also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court dated 21.01.2014 in Civil appeal Nos. 772-773 of 2014 in the case of Biswanath Bhattacharya vs. UOI & Anr.

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d. That, it is not clear if the properties are held by the appellant in tenancy, then why were they litigating for the said properties as tenancy would not give any permanent rights to them on the said properties. That if one sees the tenancy agreement in the present cases, copies of which have been placed by the appellant and is on record, the conditions are such that clearly shows that the ownership itself is with the appellant notwithstanding the word tenants

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 6 of 17

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being used in the agreement. Para4 of the agreement dated 31.07.1991 for example states (a) the tenant shall be entitled to sublet and/or to give the said premises on lease and licence to any person or persons or party of his choice for such period and/or such terms and conditions as the tenant shall deem fit and proper; (b) the tenant shall be entitled to carry out additions, alterations of temporary and permanent nature in to or upon the said premises at his/her own costs subject to the necessary permission from the Municipal Corporation of Gr. Bombay. That it is common knowledge that no tenants are allowed to sublet premises or carry out additions and alterations to the structure even of a permanent nature until they have vested interest in the same. Moreover, the quantum of rent being extremely meagre shows that it was only a facade to prove that it was a rented premise. e. That the word property as defined in Section 3 (e) of SAFEMA ‘includes any interest in property moveable or immoveable’. The definition of property is comprehensive and includes any interest whatsoever that may exist in the property. In this connection, a reference was made to the description given by Mulla’s Transfer of Property Act as “ownership consists of a bundle for rights, the various rights and interests may be vested in different persons viz, a mortgagor, a mortgagee, a lesser and a lessee or a tenant for life…………, absolute ownership is an aggregate of component rights such as the right of possession, the right of enjoying the usufruct of the land and so on. These

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 7 of 17

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subordinate rights the aggregate of which make up an absolute ownership are called interests in property. Therefore, there can be no argument on the point that tenancy with all the ancillary rights is a tangible right capable of being transferred.

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f. With regard to the contention that the TADA Court had released these properties, they stated that the proceedings under TADA Court were for entirely different purpose and cannot have any effect on proceedings under SAFEMA. The definition of properties, the offences etc. are much wider and different under SAFEMA.

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I have given my careful consideration to the arguments placed before me both in writing and during the hearing. I have also perused the documents as available on record. The appellants seems to have filed a number of cases in various legal forums like the Bombay High Court etc. but it was confirmed by the ld. Counsel for the appellant that none of them have stayed the proceedings in the present five appeals. Accordingly, I proceed to decide the case. That Mr. Mohd. Ahmed Umer Dossa was detained under COFEPOSA by the Government of Maharashtra vide its order dated 23.03.1993 is not in dispute. That he is a person covered under Section 2(2) (b) of SAFEMA, 1976 is also not in dispute. The appellants in all the present five appeals are relatives of Mr. Mohd. Ahmed Umer Dossa and therefore covered under Section 2 (2) (c) of SAFEMA is also not in dispute. The crux of the arguments in the present appeals are:

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 8 of 17

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a. that the seven properties in question decided by the impugned order are all tenanted properties and hence cannot be forfeited

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b. that the nexus between the forfeited properties and the offence/offender has not been established,

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c. that the principles of natural justice has not been followed.

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Dealing with the issue of nexus, a reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Aslam Mohd. Merchant vs. Competent Authority dated 08.07.2008 in criminal appeal No. 1053/2003 & others. A perusal of the judgment would show that the judgement was delivered in the context of Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short NDPS). In this judgment reference was made to an earlier Supreme Court Division Bench judgment of Kesar Devi vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2003) 7 SCC 427] but that was dissented without giving any reasons. Kesar Devi judgment is therefore still a good law. In the Kesar Devi judgment which was in the context of SAFEMA itself it was held “The condition precedent for issuing a notice by the Competent Authority under Section 6 (1) (of SAFEMA) is that he should have reason to believe that all or any of such properties are illegally acquired properties and the reasons for such belief have to be recorded in writing. The language of the Section does not show that there is any requirement of mentioning any link or nexus between the convict or detenue and the property ostensibly standing in the name of the person to whom the notice has been issued. Section 8 of the Act which deals with burden of proof is very important.

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It lays down that in any proceedings under the Act, the burden of proving that any property specified in the notice served under Section 6 is not illegally acquired property,

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 9 of 17

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shall be on the person affected. The combined effect of Section 6(1) and Section 8 is that the competent authority should have reason to believe (which reasons have to be recorded in writing) that properties ostensibly standing in the name of a person to whom the Act applies are illegally acquired properties, he can issue a notice to such a person. Thereafter, the burden of proving that such property is not illegally acquired property will be upon the person to whom notice has been issued. The statutory provisions do not show that the competent authority, in addition to recording reasons for his belief, has to further mention any nexus or link between the convict or detenue (as described in Subsection (2) of Section 2 ) and the property which is sought to be forfeited in the sense that money or consideration for the same was provided by such convict or detenue. If a further requirement regarding establishing any link or nexus is imposed upon the competent authority, the provisions of Section 8 regarding burden of proof will become otiose and the very purpose of enacting such a Section would be defeated.

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10. The requirement of establishing a "link or nexus" between the illegally acquired money of the convict or detenue as described in Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act and the properties sought to be forfeited is sought to be derived from certain observations made by this Court in Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas (supra) in paragraph 44 of the Reports. If paragraph 44 is read as a whole, it will be clear that no such requirement of establishing any link or nexus on the part of the competent authority has been laid down therein. In the said paragraph, the Bench dealt with contention of the counsel for the petitioners that extending the provisions of SAFEMA to the relatives, associates and other "holders" is again a case of overreaching or of over-breadth, as it may be called – a case of excessive regulation. The relevant part of para 44 (page 92 of the Reports) is being reproduced below:

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"……. The language of this section is indicative of the ambit of the Act. Clauses (c) and (d) in Section 2 (2) and the Explanations (2) and (3) occurring therein shall have to be construed and understood in the light of the overall scheme and purpose of the enactment. The idea is to forfeit the illegally acquired properties of the convict/detenue irrespective of the fact that such properties are held by or kept in the name of or screened in the name of any relative or associate as defined in the said two Explanations. The idea is not to forfeit the independent properties of such relatives or associates which they may have acquired illegally but only to reach the properties of the convict/detenue or properties traceable to him, wherever they are, ignoring all the transactions with respect to those properties. By way of illustration, take a case where a convict/detenue purchases a property in the name of his relative or associate – it does not matter whether he intends

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 10 of 17

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that such a person to be a mere name lender or whether he really intends that such person shall be the real owner and/or possessor thereof – or gifts away or otherwise transfers his properties in favour of any of his relatives or associates, or purports to sell them to any of his relatives or associates – in all such cases, all the said transactions will be ignored and the properties forfeited, unless the convict/detenue or his relative/associate, as the case may be, establishes that such property or properties are not "illegally acquired properties" within the meaning of Section

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3(c). ………………………………………………… ….…………… It is equally necessary to reiterate that the burden of establishing that the properties mentioned in the show-cause notice issued under Section 6 , and which are held on that date by a relative or an associate of the convict/detenue, are not the illegally acquired properties of the convict/detenue, lies upon such relative/associate. He must establish that the said property has not been acquired with the monies or assets provided by the detenue/convict or that they in fact did not or do not belong to such detenue/convict. We do not think that Parliament ever intended to say that the properties of all the relatives and associates, may be illegally acquired, will be forfeited just because they happen to be the relatives or associates of the convict/detenue. There ought to be the connecting link between those properties and the convict/detenue, the burden of disproving which, as mentioned above, is upon the relative/associate. ………….."

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In a subsequent judgment the Supreme Court again dealing with the provision of SAFEMA in the case of Union of India vs. ChampaBai Devichand Saha & Ors. [(2011) 14 SCC 451] dated 08.08.2011 has observed as under:

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7. The appellant submitted that Rajnikant R. Belekar had not considered Section 6 (1) of SAFEMA. It was also submitted that the decision in Aslam Mohammad Merchant, relied upon in Rajnikant R. Belekar, dealt with the words “illegally acquired property” defined in Section 68-B(g) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act”, for short), which was materially different from the definition of “illegally acquired property” under Section 3 (1) (c ) of SAFEMA; and that therefore the decision in Aslam Mohammad Merchant, was not of much assistance and this aspect was ignored by Rajnikant R. Belekar. It was submitted that Rajnikant R. Belekar was wrongly decided. It was submitted that the principles relating to SAFEMA have been laid by this Court in Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas, Fatima Mohd. Amin v. Union of India,

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 11 of 17

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Kesar Devi v. Union of India and other cases and the High Court had not considered any of those decisions.

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8. We find considerable merit in the submission of the appellant. The High Court has not referred to the facts, nor considered the validity of the notices issued under Section 6 of the Act and the orders of forfeiture under Section 7 of the Act with reference to the facts and provisions of SAFEMA and the decisions of this Court. The impugned order cannot therefore be sustained.

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7. In the case of Biswanath Bhattacharya vs. Union of India &

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Ors. Civil appeal nos. 772-773/2014 dated 21.01.2014, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

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The conviction or the preventive detention contemplated under Section 2 is not the basis or cause of the confiscation but the factual basis for a rebuttable presumption to enable the State to initiate proceedings to examine whether the properties held by such persons are illegally acquired properties. It is notorious that people carrying on activities such as smuggling to make money are very clandestine in their activity. Direct proof is difficult if not impossible. The nature of the activity and the harm it does to the community provide a sufficiently rational basis for the legislature to make such an assumption. More particularly, Section 6 specifically stipulates the parameters which should guide the competent authority in forming an opinion, they are; the value of the property and the known sources of the income, earnings etc. of the person who is sought to be proceeded against. Even in the case of such persons, the Act does not mandate such an enquiry against all the assets of such persons. An enquiry is limited to such of the assets which the competent authority believes (to start with) are beyond the financial ability of the holder having regard to his known and legitimate sources of income, earnings etc. Connection with the conviction is too remote and, therefore, in our opinion, would not be hit by the prohibition contained under Article 20 of the Constitution of India.

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41. If a subject acquires property by means which are not legally approved, sovereign would be perfectly justified to deprive such persons of the enjoyment of such ill-gotten wealth.

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Hence, it has been clearly laid down that there is no need for any nexus between the property forfeited and the offence/offender. The

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 12 of 17

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condition in Section 6 of SAFEMA is that if the Competent Authority has reason to believe (the reason for such belief is to be recorded in writing) that all or any of such properties are illegally acquired properties it may serve a notice upon such person………. to indicate the sources of his income, earnings or assets, out of which or by means of which he has acquired such property……… and to show cause why all or any of such properties as the case may be should not be declared to be illegally acquired properties and forfeited to the Central Government. Hence, while there is no requirement for a nexus, the burden of proof that the properties are not illegally acquired is on the convict/offender.

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With regard to the issue that the properties which were forfeited are not owned by the appellants but are only tenanted properties, the conduct of the appellants needs to be reflected upon. In the stay petition filed before this Tribunal praying for stay of the impugned order they have given an undertaking not to dispose, alienate, or create any third party interest in the said properties till the disposal of the appeals. Such an undertaking clearly brings out that they are in full control and ownership of the properties as they have filed no authorization or otherwise from any other person authorising them to file such an undertaking on their behalf. Moreover, in the criminal writ petition no. 932/2001 and 1461/2003 filed before the Bombay High Court, one of the appellant i.e. Mrs. Abida Mohd. Dossa (in FPA-46/BOM/2003) has stated that she has filed suits in the Hon’ble High Court for a declaration that she is the owner of the properties mentioned in the show cause notice (dated 05.02.2001). While the WP No. 1461/2003 has been filed against the impugned order dated 12.08.2003 the WP 932/2001 has been filed against the show cause notice dated 05.02.2001.

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 13 of 17

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Moreover, if one peruses one of the rent agreement dated 31.07.1991 which the ld. Counsel for the appellant had specifically shown during the hearing to show that they were tenants, the language of the agreement is such that it can throw light on the situation. Para 4 of the agreement reads as under:

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The TENANT SHALL:

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a) be entitled to sub-let and/or to give the said premises on lease and licence to any person or persons or party of his choice for such period and/or such terms and conditions as the tenant shall deem fit and proper;

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b) be entitled to carryout additions, alteration of temporary and permanent nature in to or upon the said premises at his/her own costs subject to the necessary permission from the Municipal Corporation of Gr. Bombay;

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c) be entitled to change the user of the said premises and/or to use the said premises for any lawful purposes subject to the consent/permission from Bombay Municipal Corporation and other concerned authorities for the change of user;

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From the above, it can be seen that the so-called tenant have been given all rights like subletting to any person of his choice for any period with any terms and conditions as the so called tenant deems fit. It also allows the so-called tenant to carry out additions, alterations even of permanent nature in or upon the said premises at his/her own costs subject to the necessary permission from the Municipal Corporation. The so-called tenant is also entitled to change the user of the said premises. It is common knowledge that no tenants are given such extensive freedom and rights on a property which does not belong to them. Incidentally, nothing has been brought to my notice showing that the so-called landlord has contested the impugned order. These all goes to prove that the actual ownership lies with the appellants and the tenancy agreement etc. are only a facade.

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FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 14 of 17

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Their reliance on the TADA designated courts judgment does not help them in the present case.

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The intent and objective of TADA and SAFEMA are not pari materia. As per Section 3 of the TADA, whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people……………. does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite etc. in such a manner as to cause, or is likely to cause death, injury, damage, destruction, disruption of any life, property, supplies or services essential, are liable to punishment ranging from imprisonment to death of the person perpetrating such activities.

¶97

As per Section 8 of the said Act:

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(1) Where a person has been convicted to any offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder, the Designated Court may, in addition to awarding any punishment, by order in writing, declare that any property, movable or immovable or both, belonging to the accused and specified in the order, shall stand forfeited to the Government free from all encumbrances.

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(2) Where any person is accused of any offence under this Act or any rule made thereunder, it shall be open to the Designated Court trying him to pass an order that all or any properties, movable or immovable or both belonging to him , shall, during the period of such trial, be attached, and where such trial ends in conviction, the properties so attached shall stand forfeited to Government free from all encumbrances.

¶100

Accordingly it is clear that the intent and purpose of TADA is totally different than in SAFEMA, and the property that can be attached under TADA should belong only to the accused, while in SAFEMA it can be also of his relatives, associates etc. as per Section 2 (2) (c) (d) of SAFEMA. Moreover, both of these Acts being Special Acts with different intent and purpose it cannot override each other and therefore in a way make it redundant.

¶101

FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 15 of 17

¶103

The Supreme Court in the case of KSL and Industries Ltd. vs. Arihant Threads Ltd. & Ors. [(2015) 1 SCC 166], at para 42 quoting from its earlier judgment in Ram Narain vs. Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd. (AIR 1956 SC 614), stated:

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“7……. It is therefore desirable to determine the overriding effect of one or the other of the relevant provisions in these two Acts, in a given case, on much broader considerations of the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein.”

¶105

It had concluded at para 51 of its judgment (in the case of KLC and Industries Ltd. vs. Arihant Threads Ltd. & Ors.) by quoting from its earlier judgment in RBI vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. at para 3:-

¶106

“Interpretations must depend on the text and context. They are the basis of interpretations…………. A statute is best interpreted where we know why it was enacted………….

¶107

That the purpose and intent of TADA and SAFEMA are entirely different, and hence to say even for the sake of argument that the decision of the designated court under TADA will have an overriding effect on proceedings under SAFEMA, is not legally maintainable.

¶108

On the issue of principles of natural justice, the ld. Representative of the respondent has already brought out and as recorded at para 3 supra the number of times they were heard. There is no bar on the adjudicating authority to fall back on the records available before him which could include notes recorded by his predecessors while adjudicating any case as long as he himself has also heard the party. The appellants are not disputing that the adjudicating authority who has passed the order dated 12.08.2003 has heard them before finalising and

¶109

FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 16 of 17

¶111

deciding the case. Moreover he has issued a detailed speaking order. Hence I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order on this ground.

¶112

On the basis of the above discussions, I do not find any merits in the appeals and uphold the forfeiture of the properties as detailed in the impugned order dated 12.08.2003. The appeals are therefore rejected and accordingly dismissed.

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(Ananya Ray) Member

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New Delhi, 20^th July, 2018

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‘A’

¶116

FPA-46, 47, 48, 49 & 50/BOM/2003

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Page 17 of 17

FPA-50/BOM/2003 of Yasmin Hanif Landa v/s The Competent Authority, Mumbai

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FPA-50/BOM/2003 of Yasmin Hanif Landa v/s The Competent Authority, Mumbai

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