Vivekananda College of Education Vs the State of Ap

¶1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction)

¶2

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SREENIVASA REDDY

¶3

WRIT PETITION NOs: 26846 OF 2024, 15104 OF 2025, 7302 OF 2025, 14944 OF 2025, 15035 OF 2025 AND 15089 OF 2025

¶4

COMMON ORDER:

¶5

As the point involved in all these Writ Petitions is one and the same, at request of all the counsel, they are being disposed of, by way of this Common Order.

¶6

Petitioners in these Writ Petitions are various Colleges of Education. They challenge in the respective Writ Petitions, the proceedings issued by the National Council for Teacher Education, withdrawing the recognition of the respective colleges.

¶7

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for respondents.

¶8

The main ground on which the petitioners challenge the impugned proceedings is that the reason assigned for withdrawal of recognition of petitioners‟ colleges viz. non-submission of relevant documents, does

¶9

SRK, J W.P.Nos.26846 of 2024 and batch

¶10

2

¶11

not fall within the ambit of the grounds mentioned in Section 17 of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (for short, „the NCTE Act, 1993‟); that the action of the NCTE in passing the impugned orders is in violation of the principles of natural justice, and hence, availability of alternative remedy of appeal is not a ground for not entertaining the present Writ Petitions.

¶12

In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on a decision in M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Limited v. the Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority & others¹ , wherein it is held thus:

¶13

“Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the High Courts holding writ petitions as "not maintainable" merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution

¶14

1 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 70

¶15

SRK, J W.P.Nos.26846 of 2024 and batch

¶16

3

¶17

itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the High Court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the High Courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the High Courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court and render a writ petition "not maintainable". In a long line of decisions, this court

¶18

SRK, J W.P.Nos.26846 of 2024 and batch

¶19

4

¶20

has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the "maintainability" of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that "entertainability" and "maintainability" of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to "maintainability" goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of "entertainability" is entirely within the realm of discretion of the High Courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a High Court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a High Court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.”

¶21

SRK, J W.P.Nos.26846 of 2024 and batch

¶22

5

¶23

The learned counsel also relied on a decision in Nimt

¶24

Mahila B.ED. College v. Union of India² , wherein it is held thus:

¶25

“The order passed by the Committee of NCTE is not an administrative order. Since the order is passed under Section 17 of the Act, since Section 17 of the Act requires an opportunity of hearing to be given to the concerned institute, the NCTE functions as a quasi judicial body. One of the requirements of administrative law is that a quasi judicial authority must pass a reasoned order. After all, its decision is subject to further challenge before an appellate authority and /or before a court of law. Considering these aspects of the case, the NCTE is legally bound to state the reasons for concluding that recognition should be withdrawn. However, according to the passage, quoted above, the committee of the NCTE has not given any cogent reason for withdrawing the recognition. Therefore, the said order amounts to a non-speaking order. Hence, it is legally unsustainable.”

¶26

5. On the other hand, it is the contention of the

¶27

learned counsel appearing for NCTE that as the petitioners colleges failed to submit relevant documents,

¶28

2 2009 LawSuit(Raj) 462

¶29

SRK, J W.P.Nos.26846 of 2024 and batch

¶30

6

¶31

as mentioned in the impugned orders, NCTE, in exercise of its powers under Section 17 (1) of the NCTE Act, 1993, cancelled recognition of the petitioners colleges; that against the orders impugned, the petitioners have an alternative remedy of appeal under Section 18 of the NCTE Act, 1993, and on the said grounds, the Writ Petitions are not maintainable.

¶32

Section 17 of the NCTE Act, 1993 deals with „contravention of provisions of the Act and consequences thereof‟. According to Section 17 (1) of the Act, the Regional Committee of the NCTE may withdraw recognition of a recognized institution for the reasons to be recorded in writing, if it is satisfied that the institution contravened any of the provisions of the Act, or Rules, or Orders made or issued thereunder, or any condition subject to which recognition was granted. Section 17 (1) of the NCTE Act, 1993 is extracted hereunder.

¶33

“Contravention of provisions of the Act and consequences thereof: (1) Where the Regional Committee is, on its own motion or on any representation received from any person, satisfied

¶34

SRK, J W.P.Nos.26846 of 2024 and batch

¶35

7

¶36

that a recognized institution has contravened any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules, regulations, orders made or issued thereunder, or any condition subject to which recognition under sub-section (3) of section 14 or permission under sub-section (3) of section 15 was granted, it may withdraw recognition of such recognised institution, for reasons to be recorded in writing.”

¶37

1^st Proviso to the aforesaid Section reads thus:

¶38

“Provided that no such order against the recognised institution shall be passed unless a reasonable opportunity of making representation against the proposed order has been given to such recognised institution.”

¶39

Therefore, the first proviso makes it clear that unless a reasonable opportunity of making representation against

¶40

the proposed order has been given to such recognized institution, the order withdrawing the recognition ought not to have been passed.

¶41

In the cases on hand, the main ground on which the NCTE withdrew recognition of petitioners institutions is non-submission of material documents.

¶42

SRK, J W.P.Nos.26846 of 2024 and batch

¶43

8

¶44

The ground on which the NCTE withdrew recognition of the petitioners institutions does not fall within the grounds envisaged in Section 17 of the Act.

¶45

As regards compliance of principles of natural justice, a clear notice is essential for ensuring that the person aganst whom an action is proposed, has an adequate, informed and meaningful opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. The noticee is able to understand the precise case set up against him, which he has to meet, and the notice shall contain the nature of action which is proposed to be taken for such breach. In the case on hand, none of the aforesaid requirements has been complied with, before taking the extreme step of

¶46

withdrawal of recognition of petitioners institutions. Further, law requires that a substantial opportunity of hearing should be given before any adverse order can be passed. Mere giving an opportunity to file reply, while denying a right of oral hearing, reduces the opportunity of hearing, which is a substantive right, to a mere illusion.

¶47

SRK, J W.P.Nos.26846 of 2024 and batch

¶48

9

¶49

The impugned action of withdrawal of recognition cannot

¶50

be sustained, on that ground alone.

¶51

As regards the availability of alternative remedy

¶52

of appeal, in view of the fact that the impugned action is not in consonance with the provisions of the NCTE Act, 1993 and violative of principles of natural justice, availability of alternative remedy is not a bar to exercise the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

¶53

In view of the foregoing discussion, the

¶54

impugned orders withdrawing the recognition of the petitioners institutions are set aside. However, it is needless to mention that the respondent-authorities are at liberty to issue letters to the petitioners institutions to obtain information and process the same in accordance with law duly following the provisions of the NCTE Act, 1993.

¶55