The Chief of Personnel Naval Headquarters, Vs Shri Revu Raju

The Chief of Personnel Naval Headquarters, Ministry of Defence Talkatora Stadium Annexe, New Delhi - 110001 (Erst by The Vice Admiral, Chief of personnel Easter Naval Command) Visakhapatnam

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The Flag Officer, Commanding-in-Chief Headquarters, Eastern Naval Command, Naval Base, Visakhapatnam - 530014

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The Material Superintendent,, Material Organisation, Visakhapatnam - 530008

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...Appellants

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AND

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Shri Revu Raju, S/o Late Shri Appanna, R/o. D.No. 36-94-105, Babuji Nagar, Kancharapalem Post.

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The Central Government Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour Court Hyderabad, Camping at Visakhapatnam.

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(no relief is sought against 2'"'^ respondent).

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Wm$

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...RESPONDENTS / r, rf.-1 Petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 1855 days in filing the present Writ Appeal.

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WRIT APPEAL NO: 175 OF 2025 ^

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Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 30.12.2019 in W.P.No.450 of 2012 on the file of High Court.

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lA NO: 2 OF

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Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the order dated 30.12.2019 in W.P No. 450/2012 passed by the learned single judge..^

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Counsel for the Appellants: SRI PASALA PONNA RAO, DEPUT>^ SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA Counsel for the Respondent No.1: TADDI NAGESWARA RAO^ Counsel for the Respondent No.2:--

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The Court made the following: JUDGMENT

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APHC010095052025

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E HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ATAMARAVATI [3545] (Special Original Jurisdiction)

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TUESDAY,THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

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WRIT APPEAL NO: 175/2025

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Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent to allow the Writ Appeal by setting aside the order dated 30.12.2019 passed by Learned Single Judge in W.P.No. 450 of 2012

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Between;

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1.THE CHIEF OF PERSONNEL NAVAL HEADQUARTERS,, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, TALKATORA STADIUM ANNEXE, NEW DELHI - 110001 (ERST BY THE VICE ADMIRAL, CHIEF OF PERSONNEL EASTER NAVAL COMMAND) VISAKHAPATNAM

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2.THE FLAG OFFICER, COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF HEADQUARTERS, EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND, NAVAL BASE. VISAKHAPATNAM - 530014

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3.THE MATERIAL SUPERINTENDENT,, MATERIAL ORGANISATION, VISAKHAPATNAM - 530008

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...APPELLANT(S)

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AND

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1.SHRI REVU RAJU, S/0 LATE SHRI APPANNA, R/0. D.NO.^36-94- 105, BABUJI NAGAR, KANCHARAPALEM POST.

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2.THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD, CAMPING AT VISAKHAPATNAM. (NO RELIEF IS SOUGHT AGAINST 2ND RESPONDENT).

...RESPONDENT(S):

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lA NO: 1 OF 2025

1 Petition under Section 1'51 CPC praying that in the^{circumstances} stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition,^{theHighCourtmaybe} pleased pleased to condone the delay of 1855 days in^filingthe present Writ Appeal lA NO: 2 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the^{circumstances} stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition,^{theHighCourtmaybe} pleased pleased to suspend the order dated 30.12.2019 in W.P No. 450/2012 passed by the learned single judge

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Counsel for the Appellant(S):

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1. Pasala Ponna Rao,DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

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Counsel for the Respondent(S):

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1 .TADDI NAGESWARA RAO

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The Court made the following;

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

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&

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

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I.A.No.01 of 2025

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In/And

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WRIT APPEAL No.175 of 2025

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COMMON ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice A. Hari Haranadha^Sarma)

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I.A.No.01 of 2025

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This application is filed for condonation of delay^{of(1855)daysfor} filing the appeal against the orders dated 30.12.2019 in W.P.No.450 of I 2012.

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The applicants /petitioners herein are the respondents 1 to 3 in W.P.No.450 of 2012.

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Heard Sri Ch.Dhanunjaya, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the applicants herein and Sri Tadi Nageswara^Rao,learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/Writ Petitioner.

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Factual Matrix:-

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[i] The Writ Petition No. 450 of 20.12 was filed^byoneRevu Raju/respondent No.1 herein. He was initially appointed as Unskilled Labourer in the office of the O'"' petitioner herein^{[arrayedas3'^respondentin} the Writ Petition] and his services were regularised.

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[ii] When a complaint was made by the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Tribes Employees Association, the Disciplinary Authority addressed a letter to the Revenue authorities for furnishing of certain information as to the caste status of the petitioner. The District Collector, Vizianagaram on the basis of information furnished by Mandal Revenue Officer, S.Kota, addressed a letter dated 04.01.1989 to the 3'"^ respondent, informing that there is variation in the signature of the Tahsildar on the Caste Certificate produced and particulars of the issuance of Caste Certificate were not available in the Register maintained, accordingly, the Certificate is not confirmed.

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[iii] Thereafter, Charge Sheet was issued by the department, framing articles of charge, touching production of fake Caste Certificate to derive the benefits against the reserved vacancy, by producing a bogus Caste Certificate. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report on the strength of the same and removal of the Writ Petitioner from the service was ordered.

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[iv] Questioning the same, the Writ Petitioner approached the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, at Hyderabad by way of filing Industrial Dispute vide L.C. No. 134 of 2004, the said case was ordered t against the Writ Petitioner, concluding that the enquiry conducted by the Management against the petitioner was legal and valid^andthere was^no illegality.

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[V] Questioning the same, the Writ Petition was moved by^the petitioner- Revu Raju vide W.P.No.7991 of 2009 before^thisCourt.

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[Vi] Considering that the industrial dispute is still pending^andthe petitioner questioned the initial order, the Writ Petition^{wasdismissedby} this Court giving liberty to the petitioner to raise^{allthecontentionsagainst} the final Award. Thereafter, the Tribunab passed the final Award dated 24.02.2011 dismissing the Industrial Dispute raised by the petitioner upholding the enquiry of the employer/appellapts herein.

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[vii] Questioning the same, the Writ Petition No.450^{of2012isfiled,} by complaining that the procedure and provisions relating^totheenquiry contemplated under the Andhra Pradesh Community Certificate^Act,1993 for issuing, verifying, and cancelling community certificates^forScheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Backward Classes^(BC)and Rule 9 of the Andhra Pradesh (SC, ST, and BC) Community^andDateof Birth Rules, 1997 etc. are not followed.

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[viii] Said Writ Petition was allowed observing that^{properprocedure} was not followed and there is a go-by to the mandatory^{rules,hence,the} orders of the Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court^are set aside and directed that the petitioner shall be reinstated into^service. However, the respondents can proceed in accordance with law. The^{OrdersintheWrit} Petition are dated 30.12.2019. Questioning Said Orders^{thepresentWrit} Appeal was presented on 21.02.2025 with a delay of^(1855)days.

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For condonation of the said delay , present application is filed. 6. The respondent/writ petitioner opposed the application contending that the delay of (1855) days which is about 5 years, is not properly explained as against the legal mandate of explaining day to day delay; the reason offered by the petitioner/appellant is improper, there is inordinate delay and reasons are insufficient. Hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed.

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Now the point for consideration IS, Whether there are sufficient grounds to condone the delay of (1855) days in filing the Writ Appeal, against the orders dated 30.12.2019 passed In .WRNo.450 of 2012?

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Precedential Guidancer-

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[i] In Majji Sannemma Alias Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi and Ors.' the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the tests to be applied in case Of condonation of delay. It was a case of condoning the delay of 1011 days in filing an appeal and the High Court while condoning the delay Observed that what happens at best is to give opportunity to the parties to canvass their respective cases, in the event of condoning the delay. Further, it was a case of the petitioner that she was suffering from ill-health from 01.01.2017 to 15.03.2017 and she was advised to take bed rest for the said period. However, the appeal was filed in the year 2021. For the

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(2021) 18 see 384

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period not covered under the sick/ ill health, no explanation is offered. However, in the said case delay was condoned by this^{Courtandmatter} was taken up to Apex Court. In that context, the Hon’ble Apex Court has referred to five judgments covering the jurisprudence relating to the condonation of delay vide para 7, which reads as under...

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“7. At this stage, a few decisions of this Court on delay in filing the appeal are referred to and considered as under: 7.1. In Ramlal [Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1961 SCC^OnlineSC39 (1962) 2 SCR 762 AIR 1962 SC 361] , it is observed and held as under: (AIR^pp. 363-64, para 7)

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“7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear,^inmindtwo important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right^{infavourofthedecree-holderto} treat the decree as binding between the parties. In^{otherwords,whentheperiodof} limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder^{hasobtainedabenefitunderthe} law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and^{thislegalright} which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should^{notbelight-heartedly} disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to^{thecourttocondonedelayand} admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately^{conferredonthecourt} in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf^{shouldbeexercisedtoadvance} substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras^{HighCourtinKrishnav.} Chathappan [Krishna v. Chathappan, 1889 SCC Online^Mad1] : (SCC Online Mad para 2)

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... Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which‘in^{respectofjurisdiction} is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power^{anddiscretionoughttobe} exercised upon principles which are well understood;^{thewords“sufficientcause”} receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable^{totheappellant.’}

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7.2. In P.K. Ramachandran [P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 see 556] , while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the^{courthastoexercisediscretion} judiciously.

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7.3. In Pundlik Jalam Patil [Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 see 448 (2009) 5 See (eiv) 907] it is observed as under (See p. 450)

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"... the laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but^{atthesametimelawsof} limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are^{meanttoseethatthe} parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that^the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.” 7.4. In Basawaraj [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81] it^isobserved and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances^ofeachcase. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona^fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed

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that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature.

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7.5. In Pundlik Jalam Patil [Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 see 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] , it is observed by this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground ofequity. Delay defeats equity. The courts help thdse who are vigilant and “do not slumber over their rights”

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[ii] The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ManiBen Devraj Shah Vs. Muiycipal Corporation of Brihan, MumbaF, has elaborately considered the point relating to condone the delay and the applicability of the Limitation Act particularly ‘sufficient cause’ in terms of Section 5 of Limitation Act, by referring to various judgments vide Para 14 to 25 of the judgment, which reads as follows -

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“14. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions and carefully scrutinised the record. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.

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The expression “sufficient cause” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-

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^ (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 157

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and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years this Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay.

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What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages, of litigation apart from the cost.

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What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.

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In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decisionmaking process but no premium can be given, for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.”

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[iii] In Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer^, Hon’ble Apex Court held that -

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'(2013) 10 see 765

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“16. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation.^ It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” See Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta [AIR 1966 SC 529], AIR p. 535, para 14 and Rohitash Kumar \j. Om Prakash Sharma [(2012) 13 SCC 792,: AIR 2013 SC 30] .)

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[iv] Further, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafaf Academy'^, the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down certain parameters vide para 21 of the judgment, which are as follows

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“21. from the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

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21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, juptice-oriented^, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

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21.2. (ii) The terms “Sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to^{thefactthattheseterms} are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (Hi) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

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21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of

‘^(2013) 12 SCC 649

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21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

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21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

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21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the .former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it mpy not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

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21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

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21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged In the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessqrily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully^scrutinised and^the approach should be ba^ed on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

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21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

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To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

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22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

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Ik 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The Increasing tendency to perceive delay^{asanon-seriousmatter} and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner regulres to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” [V]. In Union of India and Another Vs. Jahangir Byranijl Jeejeebhoy (D) through His Lrs..® Hon’ble Apex Court has while referring to the cases of locus classicus like Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited.^, vide para 30 and Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [cited 4 supra], vide para 33, finally held that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party and the parties seeking delay I condonation have to prove that they are reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and it is the vital test for condoning the delay, vide para 35.

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Analysis of the reasons mentioned in the present case:-

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The reasons stated by the deponent for the delay of (1855) days, in para 13 of the accompanying affidavit filed in support of the petition, are as follows:-

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I respectfully submit that, after receipt of the copy^oftheorder in the above writ petition these petitioners have persuaded^thesame with the higher authorities for appropriate action. Finally the authori^ 2024 see Online 5C 489 ® (2012) 3 see 563

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ties of these petitioners have instructed to challenge the learned single judge order by filing an Appeal as provided under law. Due to Covid19 and administrative reasons we could not file the appeal within the limitation period. Hence, there is a delay of (1855) days in filling the ” present appeal. This delay is neither wilful nor wanton.

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The deponent when received the copy of the Order, when made the correspondence with the higher authorities, when the approval/instructions were received to challenge the orders of the learned Single Judge, are all left to the imagination of the Court and no dates are mentioned, With regard to the reason of Covid , as per Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 and the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court therein limitation starts to run from 15.03.2020 and the purpose of orders dated 23.03.2020 served. But the present application for condonation of delay was filed on 03.03.2025.

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Therefore, we are of the considered view that the petitioner/app^ellant failed to make out any valid reason, let alone sufficient reason one for the condonation of the inordinate deiay of (1855) days. Hence, the present petition fails in satisfying the tests contemplated under the precedential guidance referred above. Accordingly, the petition fails and the point framed is answered in these terms.

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