Allowed

P.v.Rama Rao v. Lam Ratna Raju

Andhra Pradesh HC7 Nov 2024LPA/7/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Letters Patent Appeal against contempt-case directions requiring the Corporation to consider waiting-list candidates and appoint the respondent conductor. The Division Bench held contempt jurisdiction cannot modify or supplement the earlier writ order; the remedy was a fresh writ petition against the rejection proceedings.

What did the court decide?

Order dated 24.06.2013 in C.C.No.277 of 2013 set aside; appellant free of its directions; writ petitioner may challenge proceedings dated 14.03.2012 by appropriate proceedings; no costs.

P.v.Rama Rao Vs Lam Ratna Raju — Contempt of Court | Andhra Pradesh HC (2024)

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APHC010655702014

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction)

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[3494]

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FRIDAY, THE EIGHTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NINALA JAYASURYA

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THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM

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LETTERS PATENT APPEAL No. 7 of 2014

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Between:

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P.V. Rama Rao, S/o P.Gopala Krishna Rao, aged about 52 years, Regional Manager, APSRTC, Guntur Region, Guntur, Guntur District.

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... Appellant/ Respondent

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and

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Lam Ratna Raju, S/o Krupanandam, Aged 40 years, R/o No.6-19, Medikonduru, Guntur District. ... Respondent/ Petitioner

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Counsel for the appellant : Sri M. Solomon Raju Counsel for the respondent : Sri P. Ravinder

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This Court made the following:

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NJS,J & JS,J LPA No. 7 of 2014

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JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble Smt. Justice Sumathi Jagadam)

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Questioning the notification vide proceedings No. P2/684(1)10RM(G) dated 21.04.2010 issued by the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation for the appointment of 244 conductors, the respondent/writ petitioner, who was shortlisted in the earlier notification dated 05.12.2008, filed W.P.No.14926 of 2010 inter-alia contending that his candidature was overlooked.

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In the notification dated 05.12.2008, 99 candidates remained dropouts. The Departmental Selection Committee issued Proceedings No.P2/684(04)/2009-RM(G), dated 05.03.2009, calling 137 candidates, i.e., from Sl.No.397 to 535 to appoint them as conductors in the Guntur Division. The writ petitioner was shown at Sl.No.137 in the waiting list. The Department has considered 99 contract conductors, and the waiting list stopped at Sl.No.495. There are 30 candidates over and above the writ petitioner.

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On 13.02.2012, W.P.No.14926 of 2010 was disposed of with the following directions:

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“In the circumstances, the petitioner is directed to make a representation to the respondents within a period of two weeks from today and on such representation, the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner if any further dropouts are there in the earlier notification or if any vacancies are existing in the earlier

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NJS,J & JS,J LPA No. 7 of 2014

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notification or in any other vacancy if he comes within the zone of consideration as per the APSRTC Rules.”

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Subsequently, the case of the petitioner was rejected, by a speaking order dated 14.03.2012.

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Aggrieved by the said rejection, the writ petitioner has filed C.C.No.277 of 2013, making the appellant herein an eo-nomine party to the contempt case. On 24.06.2013, a learned Judge disposed of the said case with the following directions:

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“In the above circumstances, the respondent is directed to issue notices to the remaining candidates in the waiting list and fill up the posts. If no other candidate above the petitioner comes forward, the petitioner will be given an appointment order. The said process would be completed within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. This order cannot be taken as precedent by the respondent for other notifications.”

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Aggrieved by the orders dated 24.06.2013, the appellant has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal inter alia on the ground that the Regional Manager, the appellant herein, issued proceedings dated 14.03.2012 rejecting the writ petitioner's case, and in such circumstances, the remedy is to challenge said proceedings, that the direction in the order dated 24.06.2013 is contrary to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2014) 3 SCC 373.

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NJS,J & JS,J LPA No. 7 of 2014

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Heard Sri M. Solomon Raju, learned counsel for the appellant. There is no representation on behalf of the respondent.

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The counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge, while passing orders in the contempt case, has come to the conclusion that there is no need to challenge the rejection proceedings dated 14.03.2012 by way of a separate writ petition and clarification to the earlier order dated 13.02.2012 would suffice, issued the directions referred to supra, that the same are not sustainable in the light of the decision cited above.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman & MD., ONGC, Vs. M. George Ravishekaran¹ , inter alia , held as under:

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“ 19 . The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. The Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such

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1 (2014) 3 SCC 373

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NJS,J & JS,J LPA No. 7 of 2014

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directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or wilful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the Bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly [(2002) 5 SCC 352 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 703] , V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju [(2004) 13 SCC 610 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 907] , Bihar Finance Service House Construction Coop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami [(2008) 5 SCC 339] and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV [(2006) 1 SCC 613].

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20. Applying the above settled principles to the case before us, it is clear that the direction of the High Court for creation of supernumerary posts of Marine Assistant Radio Operator cannot be countenanced. Not only the Courts must act with utmost restraint before compelling the executive to create additional posts, the impugned direction virtually amounts to supplementing the directions contained in the order of the High Court dated 02.8.2006. The alterative direction i.e. to grant parity of pay could very well have been occasioned by the stand taken by the Corporation with regard to the necessity of keeping in existence the cadre itself in view of the operational needs of the Corporation. If despite the specific stand taken by the Corporation in this regard the High Court was of the view that the respondents should be absorbed as Marine Assistant Radio Operator nothing prevented the High Court from issuing a specific direction to create supernumerary posts of Marine Assistant Radio Operator. The same was not done. If that be so, the direction to create supernumerary posts at the stage of exercise of the contempt jurisdiction has to be understood to be an addition to the initial order passed in the Writ Petition. The argument

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that such a direction is implicit in the order dated 02.08.2006 is self defeating. Neither, is such a course of action open to balance the equities, i.e. not to foreclose the promotional avenues of the petitioners, as vehemently urged by Shri Rao. The issue is one of jurisdiction and not of justification. Whether the direction issued would be justified by way of review or in exercise of any other jurisdiction is an aspect that does not concern us in the present case. Of relevance is the fact that an alternative direction had been issued by the High Court by its order dated 02.08.2006 and the appellants, as officers of the Corporation, have complied with the same. They cannot be, therefore, understood to have acted in wilful disobedience of the said order of the Court. All that was required in terms of the second direction having been complied with by the appellants, we are of the view that the order dated 02.08.2006 passed in W.P. No.21518 of 2000 stands duly implemented. Consequently, we set aside the Order dated 19.01.2012 passed in Contempt Petition No. 161 of 2010, as well as the impugned order dated 11.07.2012 passed in Contempt Appeal No.2 of 2012 and allow the present appeal.”

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10. In Director of Education, Uttaranchal Vs. Ved Prakash Joshi² ,

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the Apex Court held as under:

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“While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a Court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take the view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. A similar view was taken in K.G.Derasari and Anr. V. Union of India and Ors. (2001 (10) SCC 496). The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the concerned party to approach the higher Court if according to him the same is not legally tenable.

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2 (2005) 6 SCC 98

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NJS,J & JS,J LPA No. 7 of 2014

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Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher Court. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the judgment or order. Right or wrong, the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the Court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt the Court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is alleged. In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional direction or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible. In that view of the matter, the order of the High Court is set aside.” (emphasis supplied)

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When a similar situation has arisen, the Division Bench of the High Court of Tamilnadu at Madras in G. Subramanian Vs. Mr. K. Phanindra Reddy (L.P.A.No.6250 of 2022 dated 10.02.2023) observed thus:

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“27. The question whether an order passed in the writ petitions can be altered so as to modify its fulcrum, has been the subject matter of various decisions of this Court. It is trite law that in a contempt jurisdiction, the court must concern itself the compliance or disobedience of the order passed in the writ petitions and it cannot either enlarge the scope of the order passed in the writ petitions nor can it restrict or curtail the rights of the parties already granted in the writ petitions or modify or alter either the reasoning or the ratio of the order passed in the writ petitions.................”

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Given the above judgments, it is not permissible for the Court to

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examine the correctness of the proceedings dated 14.03.2012 in a

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NJS,J & JS,J LPA No. 7 of 2014

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contempt case when the appellant has considered the request made by the respondent/writ petitioner and passed a detailed order. The remedy available to the respondent is to question the proceedings dated 14.03.2012, if he is aggrieved, by the way of a writ petition but not a contempt case. The learned Single Judge, overlooking the said aspect, has directed the appellant to issue notices to the remaining candidates in the waiting list and fill up the posts, if no other candidate above the writ petitioner/respondent comes forward, and to give appointment orders to him. The said directions are beyond the order dated 13.02.2012 and not sustainable in law.

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The exercise of contempt jurisdiction has to be confined to the determination of the alleged violation of the initial order passed in the writ petition. No finding is recorded by the learned Single Judge that the rejection proceeding is contrary to the order in the writ petition and the appellant acted in wilful disobedience of the said order of the Court in the writ petition. Even otherwise also, the Court ought not to have issued directions referred to supra, which amounts to modification of the earlier orders in exercise of its contempt jurisdiction, not permissible in terms of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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