the effect that there is no need to grant a prior opportunity to the delinquent before permitting the sanction. Apart from this, both the standing counsel for the ACB and the Government Pleader relied upon a Division Bench judgment of the A.P. High Court in K.Srinivasulu (8 supra). This case, in the opinion of this Court, squarely applies to the facts and circumstances in this case. In the case also, there was a G.O. issued which directed the initiation of departmental enquiry. Learned counsel in that case argued that once the Government directs the initiation of the departmental proceedings, it must be inferred that the sanction to prosecute is rejected. However, the Division Bench refused to consider its submission. The memo and the G.O. in that case did not state explicitly that the sanction of prosecution of respondent No.4 was refused. Since the G.O. and the memo did not state that the sanction to prosecute was refused, the Court set aside the same and directed the State to take fresh look at the request for sanction under the provisions of the Act. If the present case is examined against the backdrop of this Division Bench judgment, it is clear that in the initial G.O. relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, dated 07.12.2013, it is clear that there is no express statement that the permission for prosecution under the Act is negatived. It merely states that the Secretary to the Government merely decided to conduct a disciplinary enquiry. Even in K.Rama Krishna Raju (3 supra), the learned single
