Dismissed

Adari Abbai Naidu v. Mari Satyanarayana

Andhra Pradesh HC18 Dec 2020CRP/4034/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This revision petition challenged the dismissal of an application to refer signatures to a handwriting expert. The court held that since the respondent made a judicial admission regarding the signature, no proof was required under Section 58, and the expert reference was wrongly dismissed. Consequently, no further reference was needed, as the trial court must decide the case based on admitted fact

What did the court decide?

No order referring the disputed signature to a handwriting expert.

Adari Abbai Naidu Vs Mari Satyanaraya… — Contract and Commercial Disputes | Andhra Pradesh HC (2020)

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HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4034 of 2014

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ORDER :

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This revision is filed assailing the order, dated 02.09.2014, passed in I.A.No.26 of 2011 in O.S.No.26 of 2001 by the II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Anakapalli, whereby the petition filed by the petitioner/plaintiff under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to refer the disputed signature on Ex.A1agreement of sale, dated 07.02.1998, allegedly executed by the respondent/defendant, for comparison with that of the standard signature on the relinquishment deed, dated 07.02.1998, and also the signatures obtained in the open court, to the handwriting expert for his opinion, was dismissed.

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Heard both sides.

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The petitioner/plaintiff filed the impugned petition alleging that the suit viz., O.S.No.26 of 2001 was filed for specific performance of agreement of sale, dated 07.02.1998. During trial, the witnesses were examined; suit is being contested; and a written statement was also filed by the respondent/defendant in the main suit. But in the written statement, a specific plea was raised alleging that the agreement of sale was created on the blank signed papers. However, in the cross-examination of DW1, he blindly denied the signature while contending that the document is a forged one. Therefore, the circumstances compelled this petitioner to file the

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application to refer the disputed signature along with admitted signature for comparison of the disputed signature on Ex.A1agreement of sale, dated 07.02.1998, with that of the standard signature on the relinquishment deed, dated 07.02.1998, and also the signatures obtained in the open court, to the handwriting expert for examination and his opinion to substantiate his case.

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The respondent filed counter contending that when the suit is coming up for arguments from 16.06.2010, the petition was filed for the above relief at a belated stage and requested to dismiss the petition.

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The trial court, upon hearing the argument of both the counsel, dismissed the petition on the ground that it is a belated one and that in the written statement, the defendant himself admitted that the document was created on the blank signed papers and declined to grant the relief in the petition.

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Aggrieved by the impugned order, the present revision is filed raising various contentions. One of the major contentions being the delay is not a ground and that when an admission is made about the signature; it is for the respondent to prove the circumstances. However, the petitioner himself took the task of referring the disputed signatures to the expert along with the admitted signatures for examination and opinion to clear the doubt in the mind of the court. But the court obviously for different reasons dismissed the

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petition and, consequently the order is illegal and arbitrary and requested to set aside the same.

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During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the admission made by the defendant is a judicial admission and cannot be withdrawn. However, it was not the case of the respondent at any stage that the signature appearing on Ex.A1 is not that of the defendant, but contended that the agreement of sale was created on blank signed papers. The specific sentence in the written statement is extracted hereunder:

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“The defendant submits that the agreement of sale, in question, is created making use of the signatures of the defendant on blank papers referred to above and the defendant never received or intended to execute any document in respect of particular schedule of the property in favour of anybody much less the plaintiff.”

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This judicial admission is sufficient to conclude that the petitioner himself admitted the signature on the document, while contending that it is created on blank signed papers. Whether it was created on blank signed papers or not is a question of fact to be decided at the conclusion of the trial on completion of evidence. The petitioner is requested to refer the disputed signature on Ex.A1 along with the admitted signature appearing on the relinquishment deed, dated 07.02.1998, and the signature obtained in the open court to the expert for examination and opinion. When the petitioner himself admitted the signature on Ex.A1, absolutely, there is no dispute with regard to the signature though it was denied in the cross-examination of DW1. When such is the denial, the evidentiary

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value of such denial has to be examined by the trial court at the end of trial while pronouncing the judgment. According to Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, the facts admitted need not be proved. Section 58 of the Act reads as follows:

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“58. Facts admitted need not be proved — No fact need to be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings: Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.”

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Thus, an admitted fact need not be proved, since, the respondent directly admitted the signature appearing on Ex.A1 while contending that it was created on blank signed papers. Therefore, such fact need not be proved in view of Section 58 of the Act. On the other hand, the Apex Court had drawn distinction between a judicial admission and evidentiary admission. A judicial admission is an admission in the pleadings and evidentiary admission is an admission during the evidence. But here admission is a judicial admission in the written statement as to the signature appearing on Ex.A1.

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In support of his submissions, the counsel for the petitioner relied on Arjun Khiamal Makhijani etc., vs. Jamnadas c. Tuliani & ors¹ and Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. & others vs. Gopa

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1 1989(4) SCC 612

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Raju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu² . The relevant portion in the ruling of Chairman & Managing Director’s case (2 supra), reads as follows:

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“12. In our view, therefore, on the facts of this case and as discussed earlier, no case was made out by the respondents, contesting defendants, for amending the written statement and thus attempting to go behind their admission regarding 5 out of 7 remaining items out of 10 listed properties in Schedule A of the plaint." 19. Hiralal (supra) has been recently noticed by this Court in Sangramsinh P. Gaekwar & Ors. v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (Dead) through LRs. & Ors. [(2005) 11 SCC 314], wherein it is stated : "215. Admissions made by Respondent 1 were admissible against her proprio vigore. 216. In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam this Court held : "... Admissions if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong." (See also Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad.)”

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Therefore, in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid rulings and also in view of Section 58 of the Evidence Act, the petitioner is not required to prove the genuineness of the signature appearing on Ex.A1-agreement of sale, dated 07.02.1998, and mere denial in the cross-examination of DW1 is not a sufficient ground to refer the disputed signature on Ex.A1 with that of the standard signature on the relinquishment deed, dated 07.02.1998, and also the signatures obtained in the open court, to the handwriting expert and for his opinion. Therefore, this court

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2 (2008) 5 SCC 569

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holds that there is no need to refer the document to the handwriting expert. However, it is left open to the trial court to decide the validity and genuineness of the agreement of sale-Ex.A1, but not the genuineness of the signature. Therefore, absolutely no need to refer the signatures for examination by the expert and for opinion. Hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed as I find no infirmity in the orders. However, the trial court is directed to keep in mind the observations made herein while deciding the suit.

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With the above observations, the Civil Revision Petition is disposed of. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.

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__________________________________________ JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY December 18, 2020 LMV

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HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

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130

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CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4034 of 2014

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December 18, 2020

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