Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Thru. Authorized Signatory,S.M.Arya vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Infrastructure Industrial Development Govt. Lko. and Another

Heard Shri Amrendra Nath Tripathi Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Sachin Upadhyay Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Devendra Mohan Shukla, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. representing the opposite party No.1 - the State of U. P. and Shri Kartikey Dubey, the learned counsel the opposite party No.2 – Smt. Manisha Gupta.

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By means of the instant Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner- Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “GNIDA”)has challenged the validity of an order dated 30.01.2024 passed by the opposite party No.1 in Case No.581/77-4-24/123 Appeal/23 under Section 41(3) of U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act read with Section 12 of U. P. Industrial Area Development Act.

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WRIC No. - 409 of 2026

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The revision was filed by the opposite party no. 2 challenging the validity of an order dated 06.03.2023 passed by GNIDA inter alia stating that on 31.03.2011 she was allotted a plot of land measuring 1,000 square meter for construction of a nursery school for a total premium of Rs.60,00,000/-. 10% of the premium amount was to be paid within 60 days and the balance amount was to be paid in 16 half yearly installments from 30.11.2011 to 30.05.2021. There were encroachments on the land. On 27.05.2011, the allottee had requested for removal of the encroachments. GNIDA had issued a defaulter notice dated 07.06.2013 demanding Rs.16,16,745 without removal of encroachments and without execution of a lease-deed. In reply to the notice, the allottee stated that she had made timely payment of the first seven installments totaling to Rs.21,59,000/- and no amount was balance to be paid by her. GNIDA issued another notice dated 12.09.2014 demanding Rs.12,02,876/- and the allottee sent a reply dated 27.02.2014 demanding benefit of zero period. Without taking any decision on the allottee’s request, GNIDA issued another demand notice dated 30.01.2015 for Rs.18,43,714/-. The allottee stated that she has again requested for zero period benefit vide letter dated 16.01.2017. She stated that physical possession of the land could not be delivered because of a stay order passed by a Court. Without considering the allottee’s letters, GNIDA again issued defaulter notices on 24.04.2017, 08.05.2017 and 11.07.2017. GNIDA sent a letter dated 21.07.2017 stating that all the allottees have already been granted zero period benefit and that there was no encroachment on the land in question. GNIDA demanded Rs.60,39,873/- towards additional compensation. The allottee sent a reply stating that she had not been handed over physical possession of the land and, therefore, she should be given zero period benefit till date. Without considering this request, GNIDA issued letters dated 30.08.2017 and 15.09.2017 raising modified demands. Through a letter dated 18.01.2018 GNIDA informed that the allottee’s demand was not covered by the zero period policy of GNIDA and, therefore, the allottee should pay Rs.93,83,690/-. As per the averments made by the allottee before the revisional authority, she made

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a demand for execution of the lease deed for the first time on 25.03.2019 and in its reply, GNIDA informed through a letter dated 29.07.2019 that lease plans of plot nos. NS-14 and NS-6 had been issued. On 29.01.2020 GNIDA required the allottee to compete the requirements for execution of the lease-deed. On 31.01.2020, GNIDA sent a letter to the allottee demanding Rs.1,23,24,908/- and Rs.2,47,129/- towards additional compensation. On 19.02.2020, the allottee sent a letter to GNIDA stating that she has deposited Rs.21,54,000/-; that she has not been given the benefit of zero period since 21.10.2011 till 23.08.2012; that there are encroachments on the land and that she should be given the benefit of zero period till date.

5.

The allottee filed Writ C No. 1673 of 2020 which was disposed off by means of an order dated 22.01.2021 directing GNIDA to dispose off the allottee’s representation. Thereafter the allotment was canceled by the impugned order dated 06.03.2023. The allottee challenged the cancellation order on the ground that GNIDA had not handed over physical possession of the land and it had not executed the lease-deed. For these reasons, the cancellation order was liable to be set aside and the allottee was entitled to get zero period benefit.

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GNIDA filed a reply inter alia stating that the allottee had deposited merely Rs.20,04,000/- towards premium and was in default of Rs.2,19,63,032/- and Rs.12,38,310/- towards additional compensation. There was no encroachment on the land. The allottee has committed default in payment of the dues and, therefore, the allotment has been canceled.

¶28

The revisional authority held that as per the calculation sheet provided by GNIDA, the allottee had made timely payment of the first four installments of lease-premium and thereafter she has not paid the installments since 30.11.2013. There is nothing on record as to why did GNIDA not hand over possession of the and to the allottee immediately after her request. There is no reason as to why did GNIDA not provide a

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check-list for execution of the lease-deed when the allottee had paid the first four installments. GNIDA did not perform its duty properly and the check-list was issued with a delay of eight years whereas it ought to have been issued immediately after deposit of the allotment amount. This had delayed the execution of lease deed and commencement and completion of the project for the fault of GNIDA and, therefore, the allottee is entitled to zero period benefit till date. The revision was allowed directing GNIDA to calculate the dues and get the same deposited within 60 days and thereafter execute a lease-deed in favour the allottee.

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The learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 raised a preliminary objection that the petition suffers from latches and it should be dismissed as such. Upon this objection being raised, the petitioner has filed a supplementary affidavit stating that the opposite party no. 2 had filed Writ C No.11360 of 2025 for implementation of the order dated 30.01.2024 passed in revision, which was disposed off by means of an order dated 01.12.2025 directing GNIDA to comply with the revisional order, subject to any Writ Petition being filed against the revisional order. Immediately thereafter the Writ Petition was presented on 13.01.2026.

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In reply to this preliminary objection, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that firstly there is no unreasonable in filing the Writ Petition and secondly, where an order has been obtained by concealment of a relevant fact or where a jurisdictional error has been committed, a Writ Petition would not be dismissed merely on the ground of delay.

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I am of the considered view that the Writ jurisdiction is extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction and one of the factors affecting the exercise of discretion are that the Courts ordinarily do not entertain writ petitions filed with inordinate delays. However, where a jurisdictional error has been committed or an order has been obtained by concealment of a relevant fact due to which a public body would be affected adversely, the Court may exercise its discretion by entertaining the Writ Petition in spite of some delay in its filing, which is not inordinate.

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Therefore, I proceed to examine the facts of the case to examine whether any such ground is made out as may warrant entertaining the Writ Petition in spite of some delay in its filing or whether it is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay only.

Assailing validity of the revisional order, Sri. Amrendra Nath Tripathi, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the validity of the aforesaid allotment cancellation order dated 06.03.2023 was already under challenge in Writ-C No.10929 of 2023 filed by the allottee before a Division Bench of this Court sitting at Allahabad, in which the opposite parties have been granted time to file a counter affidavit. A party cannot avail two remedies for the same relief simultaneously. Therefore, the revision was not maintainable during pendency of Writ C No. 10929 of 2023.

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The second submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the opposite party no. 2 was obliged to disclose all the relevant facts before the revisional authority, yet she concealed the fact that the order under challenge in the revision was already under challenge in Writ C No. 10929 of 2023 before this Court at Allahabad. By her conduct of concealment of a material fact of pendency of a Writ Petition before this Court for the same relief, the opposite party no. 2 has disentitled herself from being granted any discretionary relief.

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In reply to the petitioner’s objection regarding the revision having been filed by concealing the fact of pendency of Writ C No. Writ-C No.10929 of 2023 before this Court at Allahabad, the opposite party no. 2 has stated in paragraph 3 of her short counter affidavit that “ although the statutory remedy could have been availed even during pendency of the writ petition, the answering respondent fairly admits that it was her duty to disclose the same, which could not be done due to an inadvertant mistake. It is further submitted that non-disclosure of the said fact has no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the order dated 30.01.2024, as the same was passed on the basis of admitted facts and after affording

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due opportunity of hearing to the parties .” The opposite party no. 2 has alleged that the petitioner has also concealed certain documents from this Court and, therefore, the petitioner cannot raise the plea of concealment of fact by the opposite party no.2.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

On merits of the case, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the opposite party no. 2 had committed defaults is payment of installments of the lease premium and interest and, therefore, the allotment made in her favour has rightly been canceled.

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Regarding the claim of the opposite party no. 2 for the zero period benefit, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the she does not fulfil the conditions of this benefit under the policy and this claim has rightly been rejected for valid reasons.

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Replying to the aforesaid submissions, Sri. Kartikey Dube, the learned Counsel for the opposite party no. 2, has conceded that the opposite party no. 2 ought to have disclosed the fact of pendency of the Writ Petition, but he has submitted that the concealment was not deliberate and this was merely due to inadvertence. He has submitted that the non-disclosure of pendency of the Writ Petition in revision would have no bearing on the outcome of the revision and, therefore, this inadvertent non-disclosure of an immaterial fact is inconsequential.

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In Jai Singh v. Union of India : (1977) 1 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the appellant cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter at the same time.

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In A. P. State Financial Corpn. v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills : (1994) 2 SCC 647, it was held that: -

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“15. The Doctrine of Election clearly suggests that when two remedies are available for the same relief, the party to whom the said remedies are available has the option to elect either of them but that doctrine would not apply to cases where the ambit and scope of the two remedies is essentially different. …

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18. There is no equity in favour of a defaulting party which may justify interference by the courts in exercise of its equitable extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to assist it in not repaying its debts. The aim of equity is to promote honesty and not to frustrate the legitimate rights of the Corporation which after advancing the loan takes steps to recover its dues from the defaulting party. ... A court of equity, when exercising its equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution must so act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud and the courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith, as far as it lies within their power. Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law. …”

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(Emphasis added)

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18.

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In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan : (2006) 2 SCC 641,

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the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: -

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“23. The “doctrine of election” is a branch of “rule of estoppel”, in terms whereof a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. The doctrine of election postulates that when two remedies are available for the same relief, the aggrieved party has the option to elect either of them but not both .”

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(Emphasis added)

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Applying the doctrine of election to the present case, the opposite party no. 2 had two remedies available against the allotment cancellation order dated 06.03.2023 – (1) filing a Writ Petition before the High Court and (2) filing a revision before the State Government. The opposite party no. 2 elected to file Writ-C No.10929 of 2023, which was entertained by a Division Bench of this Court sitting at Allahabad. It was during pendency of the Writ Petition that the opposite party no. 2 has filed the revision against the same order dated 06.03.2023. The opposite party no. 2 having elected to file a Writ Petition, filing of a revision before the State Government against the same order which was under challenge in the Writ Petition before this High Court, is not permissible in law. The revision was liable to be rejected for this reason alone.

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Now I proceed to deal with the submission whether the fact of pendency of the Writ Petition was a material fact or not and whether its non-disclosure would have any effect. Sri. Dubey has submitted that the opposite party no. 2 had got the statutory right of filing a revision against the allotment cancellation order and this right would not be effected by the pendency of the Writ Petition and, therefore, the fact of pendency of the Writ Petition was not a material fact and the opposite party no. 2 is not guilty of concealment of any material fact. He has placed reliance upon a sentence from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Kolanjiammal v. Revenue Divisional Officer : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2455, stating that “ The interim orders of the High Court did not preclude the appellant from pursuing the statutory remedy ”.

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The factual matrix of Kolanjiammal case (Supra) was that in 1972-73, Late Ramaswamy Udayar had successfully bid for arrack shops but later he defaulted on payments. The District Collector obtained an ex-parte decree for recovery of money in the year 1987. Ramaswamy died in the year 1988. The authorities issued auction notices in 2005 to recover the alleged dues with interest. The widow and son of the deceased filed separate writ petitions challenging the recovery notices. Thereafter the authorities conducted an auction in July 2005. The appellant challenged the auction-sale of properties. The Court noted that while the appellant had deposited various amounts during pendency of the Writ Petitions/Writ Appeals, she had not filed any petition under Sections 37-A or 38 of the Revenue Recovery Act to set aside the sale within the prescribed 30-day period. The auction, held on 29.07.2005 and confirmed on 23.07.2008, could not be challenged belatedly, as more than 4 years had passed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the appeal while holding that: -

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“15. In the present case, the auction sale took place on 29.07.2005 and the confirmation of sale was made on 23.07.2008. The appellant admittedly did not file any application before the competent authority within the 30-day limitation prescribed under Sections 37-A or 38 of the Revenue Recovery Act. Therefore, the bar of limitation applies squarely and the High Court was correct in

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holding that belated interference with the sale, after more than four years, was impermissible.

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16. The appellant has argued that the auction was conducted during the pendency of Writ Petition No. 25194 of 2005 and that the High Court's interim order staying the confirmation of sale rendered any statutory application unnecessary. This contention is misconceived. The record reveals that while the High Court had granted limited interim protection against confirmation of sale, there was no order staying the conduct of the auction itself. Consequently, the auction held on 29.07.2005 was not in violation of any subsisting judicial restraint. Moreover, the stay on confirmation does not suspend the statutory obligation to seek redress within 30 days as per Sections 37-A or 38 of the Revenue Recovery Act. The appellant's failure to avail herself of the specific statutory mechanism cannot be excused merely because parallel proceedings were pending before the High Court.”

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The above observation has been made in Kolanjiammal (supra) in light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, which are in no manner similar to the facts of the present case. In Kolanjiammal (supra), the Writ Petition was filed challenging the recovery and the Court held that pendency of the Writ Petition challenging recovery proceedings did not create a hurdle in instituting proceedings challenging the auction sale. It is significant that challenging recovery proceedings and challenging the auction sale are not one and the same thing, whereas in the present case, the revision and the Writ Petition were filed against one and the same allotment cancellation order. Therefore, observations made in the judgment in the case of Kolanjiammal (supra) would not apply to the facts of the present case.

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The learned Counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has also relied upon the judgment in the case of Arunima Baruah v. Union of India : (2007) 6 SCC 120, in which services of the appellant had been terminated without complying with the principles of natural justice. She filed a suit and an application for injunction. A notice was issued to the defendant but no order of ad interim injunction was passed. She filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court without disclosing pendency of the suit. However, before the writ petition came up for preliminary

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hearing, she filed an application for withdrawal of the suit. The writ petition came up for preliminary hearing on 18.04.2001. A notice was issued therein. The suit was dismissed as withdrawn by an order dated 30.04.2001. The writ petition, however, was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court by an order dated 29.11.2002, in view of gross concealment of fact of filing of the suit. Allowing the appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: -

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“12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question.

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18. There is another doctrine which cannot also be lost sight of. The court would not ordinarily permit a party to pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same subject-matter. (See Jai Singh v. Union of India [(1977) 1 SCC 1].) But, where one proceeding has been terminated without determination of the lis, can it be said that the disputant shall be without a remedy?

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22. In this case, however, suppression of filing of the suit is no longer a material fact. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court may be correct that, in a case of this nature, the Court's jurisdiction may not be invoked but that would not mean that another writ petition would not lie. When another writ petition is filed disclosing all the facts, the appellant would be approaching the writ court with a pair of clean hands, and the Court at that point of time will be entitled to determine the case on merits having regard to the human right of the appellant to access to justice, and keeping in view the fact that judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution of India.

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24. For the reasons aforementioned, while we uphold the judgment of the High Court, are of the opinion that in the event the appellant files a fresh writ application, the same may be considered on its

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own merits. The appeal is dismissed with the aforementioned observations. No costs.”

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It is significant that in Arunima Baruah (supra) the suit had already been dismissed as withdrawn long before hearing of the Writ Petition whereas in the present case, the Writ Petition remained pending since before filing of the revision till its decision and it is still pending. The opposite party no. 2 did not disclose the fact of pendency of the Writ Petition before the revisional authority and she did not bring the facts of filing of the revision to the knowledge of this Court by filing an application for withdrawal of the Writ Petition before hearing of the revision. Therefore, the facts of the present case are in no manner similar to the facts of Arunima Baruah (Supra).

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Further, even in Arunima Baruah (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed the order of the High Court dismissing the Writ Petition on the ground of concealment of the fact of pendency of the suit at the time of filing of the Writ Petition, but as the suit had been dismissed as withdrawn long before hearing of the Writ Petition and yet the Writ Petition had not been decided on its merits, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the order dismissing the Writ Petition without deciding the merits of the case, would not attract the bar of res judicata .

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The learned Counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has lastly relied upon an order of Delhi High Court in Deen Dayal Anand Kumar Saraf v. Paras Agarwal : 2024 SCC OnLine Del 6299, which is an interlocutory order passed on an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 seeking vacation/discharge of the ex parte ad-interim order, in which it has been observed that “ Nondisclosure of the fact, which if disclosed, would not be unfavourable to the case of the party that has failed to disclose the same, does not warrant denial of any discretionary relief.” Firstly, it is not a judgment and is not a binding precedent and secondly, had the opposite party disclosed before the revisional authority that a Writ Petition against the order under challenge in the revision was pending, the revisional authority would not have entertained the revision and this disclosure would certainly have been unfavourable to the opposite party no. 2.

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Therefore Deen Dayal Anand Kumar Saraf (supra) does not help the opposite party no. 4

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In P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. , (2004) 11 SCC 672, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court consisting of five Hon'ble Judges held that: -

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“ 145. A decision is an authority for the questions of law determined by it. While applying the ratio, the court may not pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment divorced from the context in which the said question arose for consideration. A judgment, as is well known, must be read in its entirety and the observations made therein should receive consideration in the light of the questions raised before it . [See Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills (2002) 3 SCC 496 : (2002) 110 Comp Cas 20 , Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi (1996) 6 SCC 44 , Nalini Mahajan (Dr.) v. Director of Income Tax (Investigation) (2002) 257 ITR 123 (Del) , State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 139 : (1992) 87 STC 289 , A-One Granites v. State of U.P. (2001) 3 SCC 537 and Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 111.

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146. Although decisions are galore on this point, we may refer to a recent one in State of Gujarat v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal (2004) 5 SCC 155 wherein this Court held:

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“ It is trite that any observation made during the course of reasoning in a judgment should not be read divorced from the context in which it was used .”

(Emphasis added)

28.

As has already been noted above, the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the opposite party are based on the peculiar facts and the point in issue to be decided was also not similar to the points involved in the present case. Therefore, those judgments would not apply to the facts of the present case.

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The learned Counsel for the petitioner authority has relied upon the judgment in the cases of Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy : (2010) 8 SCC 383, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: -

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“36. ... even in judicial proceedings, once a fraud is proved, all advantages gained by playing fraud can be taken away. In such an

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eventuality the questions of non-executing of the statutory remedies or statutory bars like doctrine of res judicata are not attracted. Suppression of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the court. Every court has an inherent power to recall its own order obtained by fraud as the order so obtained is non est.”

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30. In Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh

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Education Society : (2013) 11 SCC 531, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “ It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision-making to the court.”

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In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that filing of a revision against the cancellation order dated 06.03.2023 during pendency of the writ petition challenging the same order and that too by concealing the fact of filing of the Writ Petition, amounts to concealment of a material fact, which vitiates the revisional order. The revisional order can be quashed on the limited ground that it was obtained during pendency of the Writ Petition any by concealing the fact of pendency of the Writ Petition. Therefore, I turn down the preliminary objection that the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed in view of the some delay in its filing, which is not inordinate.

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However, as the opposite party no. 2 has filed a short counter affidavit containing averments in 110 paragraphs, annexing 49 annexures and running into 177 pages containing all her pleas and the learned Counsel for the parties have advanced detailed submissions on the merits of the case also, I proceed to examine the merits of the case.

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A copy of the letter of allotment dated 31.03.2011 has been annexed as Annexure No. 4 to the petition which states that with reference to the application no. 1349 submitted by the opposite party no. 2, she was allotted plot no. BS-14, Sector 2, measuring 1,000 square meters for establishment of a nursery school, at the rate of Rs.6,000/- per square meter. The total premium for the plot was Rs.60,00,000/-. The payment schedule was as follows: -

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Installment	Due date	Beginning Principal Amount	Premium Amount	Interest Amount	Total Amount of Installment
1	2	3	4	5	6
Installment no. 1	30.11.2011		0	3,51,000	3,51,000
Installment no. 2	30.05.2012		0	3,51,000	3,51,000
Installment no. 3	30.11.2012		0	3,51,000	3,51,000
Installment no. 4	30.05.2013		0	3,51,000	3,51,000
Installment no. 5	30.11.2013	54,00,000	2,01,839	3,51,000	5,52,839
Installment no. 6	30.05.2014	51,98161	2,14,958	3,37,880	5,52,839
Installment no. 7	30.11.2014	49,83,203	2,28,931	3,23,908	5,52,839
Installment no. 8	30.05.2015	47,54,272	2,43,811	3,09,028	5,52,839
Installment no. 9	30.11.2015	45,10,461	2,59,659	2,93,180	5,52,839
Installment no. 10	30.05.2016	42,50,802	2,76,537	2,76,302	5,52,839
Installment no. 11	30.11.2016	39,74,265	2,94,512	2,58,327	5,52,839
Installment no. 12	30.05.2017	36,79,753	3,13,655	2,39,184	5,52,839
Installment no. 13	30.11.2017	33,66,098	3,34,043	2,18,796	5,52,839
Installment no. 14	30.05.2018	30,32,056	3,55,755	1,97,084	5,52,839
Installment no. 15	30.11.2018	26,76,301	3,78,879	1,73,960	5,52,839
Installment no. 16	30.05.2019	22,97,421	4,03,507	1,49,332	5,52,839
Installment no. 17	30.11.2019	18,93,915	4,29,734	1,23,104	5,52,839
Installment no. 18	30.05.2020	14,64,180	4,57,667	95,172	5,52,839
Installment no. 19	30.11.2020	10,06,513	4,87,416	65,423	5,52,839
Installment no. 20	30.05.2021	5,19,098	5,19,098	22,741	5,52,839

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The allotment letter states that the general terms and conditions published through the open ended scheme for allotment of institutional property shall form a part of the letter. GNIDA issued a notice dated 04.09.2012 to the allottee stating that she had committed default in payment of installments due on 30.11.2011 and 30.05.2012. The second notice dated 07.06.2013 says that the allottee had committed default in payment of first four installments as per the records of GNIDA, but in case the allottee had paid the amount, she should send photocopies of the receipts to reconcile the account.

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On 21.06.2013 GNIDA sent a notice to the allottee stating that in Writ Petition No. 37443 of 2011 titled Gajraj and others versus State of U.P. and others and other connected matters, an order was passed on 21.10.2011 for payment of additional compensation to the tenure holders and GNIDA had been granted liberty to recover this amount from the allottees. Accordingly, the allottee was liable to pay additional

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compensation at the rate of Rs.550/- per square meter totaling to Rs.5,50,000/- in four equal installments in the following manner: -

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Details	Amount of installment	Due Date
Installment No. 1	1,37,500	01.08.2013
Installment No. 2	1,37,500	01.02.2014
Installment No. 3	1,37,500	01.08.2014
Installment No. 4	1,37,500	01.02.2015

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36.

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The letter directed the allottee to deposit the amount on the due dates, failing which interest shall be payable at the rate of 15% per annum.

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Thereafter GNIDA issued three more default notices dated 12.09.2014, 30.01.2015 and 08.07.2015 to the allottee.

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38.

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The allottee sent a letter dated 16.01.2017 to GNIDA stating that she was unable to carry out any activity on the plot because there was encroachment on it. She stated that imposition of 13% per annum interest was not justified. She requested that either the payment be rescheduled or she be given the benefit of zero period.

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39.

¶141

A copy of the note-sheet of the record of GNIDA has been annexed as Annexure no. 11 to the petition, wherein it has been recorded that there was no encroachment on the land. Towards one side of the plot boundary wall of O.H.T. had been constructed and the road in front of the plot was being constructed. This was communicated to the allottee through a letter dated 30.03.2017, wherein it was also stated that it appeared that the allottee was making a mis-statement in order to evade payment of interest. The letter directed the allottee to deposit Rs.30,87,134/- towards unpaid installments and interest.

¶142

¶143

The allottee sent another letter dated 29.09.2017 demanding zero period benefit, the lease plan and physical possession of the land for execution of the lease-deed.

¶144

16

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WRIC No. - 409 of 2026

¶146

¶147

GNIDA sent a letter dated 18.01.2018 to the allottee stating that as per the zero period policy, its benefit can be given only if - (1) possession could not be handed over or construction could not be raised due to a stay order passed by a Court and (2) lease-deed could not be executed in furtherance of any Government Order / order passed by the Board of GNIDA. The allottee’s claim was not covered by the policy. This letter communicated and demanded the following dues: -

¶148

Sl.No.	Details	Defaulted amount
1	Amount payable till 31.01.2018 towards premium	Rs.70,98,521/-
2	Amount payable till 31.01.2018 towards additional compensation	Rs.8,53,758/-
	Point Nos. (1+2) Total amount payable till 1-2 18% GST on the aforesaid amount	Rs.79,52,279/- Rs.14,31,411/-
	Total amount	Rs.93,83,690/-

¶149

The allottee filed Complaint No. 10201822437/2018 before the Real Estate Regulatory Authority claiming waiver of installments and interest on installments, execution of a lease-deed and zero period benefit till execution of the lease-deed, physical possession of the plot and permission to raise construction on the plot. The complaint was dismissed as not maintainable by means of an order dated 13.03.2019.

¶150

GNIDA sent a letter dated 30.08.2019 to the allottee demanding payment of additional compensation alongwith interest.

¶151

¶152

On 29.01.2020 GNIDA sent a letter to the allottee asking her to deposit the entire dues and execute the lease deed within 30 days. Upon failure of the allottee to deposit the amount of dues, GNIDA issued a defaulter / cancellation notice dated 31.01.2020 stating that the allottee had committed default in payment of Rs.1,23,24,908/- and Rs.2,47,129/towards additional compensation. The allottee was directed to deposit the amount within 15 days, failing which the allotment would be canceled.

¶153

The allottee filed Writ C No. 16783 of 2020 before this Court sitting at Allahabad challenging the validity of the notice dated

¶154

17

¶155

WRIC No. - 409 of 2026

¶156

29.01.2020, which was disposed off by means of an order dated 22.01.2021 directing GNIDA to decide the petitioner’s representation and it was provided that no coercive action will be taken against the allottee will a decision is taken by GNIDA.

¶157

¶158

The representation was rejected by means of an order dated 06.03.2023 passed by GNIDA and the allotment was canceled due to default in payment of Rs.2,19,63,032/- towards dues of GNIDA and Rs.12,38,310/- towards additional compensation.

¶159

The allottee filed Writ C No. 10929 of 2023 before this Court sitting at Allahabad and on 02.05.2023, a Division Bench of this Court passed an order granting six week’s time to the respondents to file a counter affidavit and the petitioner - allottee was granted two weeks time to file a rejoinder affidavit.

¶160

¶161

During pendency of Writ C No. 10929 of 2023 before this Court sitting at Allahabad, the allottee – opposite party no. 2 filed the Revision under Section 12 of the U. P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 read with Section 41(3) of the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 challenging the cancellation order dated 06.03.2023, without disclosing the fact that a challenge to the same order had already been made by filing Writ C No. 10929 of 2023 which was pending consideration of a Division Bench of this Court sitting at Allahabad. The revisional authority directed the petitioner to submit para-wise comments on the prescribed format. The petitioner submitted the following calculation of the defaulted amount: -

¶162

Particul ar	Rate	period		Days	Due Date	Installment s	Total due	Amount Paid	Balance Amount	Payment dated
Registrat Amount	ion					3,00,000	3,00,000	3,00,000
Allotme nt Money					30-05-2011	3,00,000	3,00,000		3,00,000
Penal Interest	0.00%	31-05-2011	31-05- 2011	1				3,00,000		31-05- 2011
Penal Interest	0.00%	01-06.2011	21-10- 2011	143
Penal Interest	0.00%	22-10-2011	22-11- 2011	32				3,51,000	(3,51,000)	22-11- 2011
Penal	0.00%	23-11-2013	30-11-	8					(3,51,000)

¶163

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WRIC No. - 409 of 2026

¶165

Interest Installm ent - 01 Penal Interest	0.00%	01-12-2011	2011 25-05- 2012	177	30-11-2011	3,51,000	3,51,000	3,51,000	(3,51,000)	25-05- 2012
Penal Interest	0.00%	26-05-2012	30-05- 2012	5					(3,51,000)
Installm ent - 02					30-05-2012	3,51,000	3,51,000
Penal Interest	0.00%	31-05-2012	24-08- 2012	86
Penal Interest	0.00%	25-08-2012	23-10- 2012	60
Penal Interest	0.00%	24-10-2012	30-11- 2012	38				3,51,000	(3,51,000)	30-11- 2012
Installm ent - 03 Penal Interest Installm ent - 04	0.00%	01-12-2012	30-05- 2013	181	30-11-2012 30-05-2013	3,51,000 3,51,000	3,51,000 3,51,000		3,51,000
Penal Interest	0.00%	31-05-2013	31-05- 2013	1				3,51,000		31-05- 2013
Penal Interest	0.00%	01-06-2013	30-11- 2013	183
Installm ent - 05					30-11-2013	3,52,839	3,52,839		5,52,839
Penal Interest	0.00%	01-12-2013	30-05- 2014	181					5,52,839
Installm ent - 06 Penal Interest	0.00%	31-05-2014	30-11- 2014	184	30-05-2014	3,52,839	3,52,839		11,05,678 11,05,678
Installm ent - 07					30-11-2014	3,52,839	3,52,839		16,58,516
Penal Interest	0.00%	01-12-2014	30-05- 2015	181					16,58,516
Installm ent - 08					30-05-2015	3,52,839	3,52,839		22,11,356
Penal Interest	0.00%	31-05-2015	30-11- 2015	184					22,11,356
Installm ent - 09					30-11-2015	3,52,839	3,52,839		27,64,195
Penal Interest Installm ent - 10	0.00%	01-12-2015	30.05- 2016	182	30-05-2016	3,52,839	3,52,839		27,64,195 33,17,034
Penal Interest	0.00%	31-05-2016	30-11- 2016	184					33,17,034
Installm ent - 11					30-11-2016	3,52,839	3,52,839		38,69,873
Penal Interest	0.00%	01-12-2016	30-05- 2017	181					38,69,873
Installm ent - 12					30-05-2017	3,52,839	3,52,839		44,27,712
Penal Interest	0.00%	31-05-2017	30-11- 2017	184					44,27,712
Installm ent - 13					30-11-2017	3,52,839	3,52,839		49,75,550
Penal Interest	0.00%	01-12-2017	03-05- 2018	181					49,75,550
Installm ent - 14					30-05-2018	3,52,838	3,52,838		55,28,389
Penal Interest	0.00%	31-05-2018	30-11- 2018	184					22,28,389
Installm ent - 15					30-11-2018	3,52,839	3,52,839		60,81,227
Penal Interest	0.00%	01-12-2018	30-05- 2019	181					60,81,227
Installm ent - 16					30-05-2019	5,52,839	5,52,839		66,34,066
penal Interest	0.00%	31-05-2019	30-11- 2019	184					66,34,066
Installm ent - 17					30-11-2019	5,52,839	5,52,839		71,86,905
penal Interest	0.00%	01-12-2019	30-05- 2020	182					71,86,905
Installm					30-05-2020	5,52,840	5,52,840		77,39,745
ent - 18 penal	0.00%	31-05-2020	30-06-	31					77,39,745

¶166

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WRIC No. - 409 of 2026

¶168

Interest 2020
penal 0.00% 01-07-2020 30-11- 153 77,39,745
Interest 2020
Installm 30-11-2020 5,34,391 5,34,391 82,74,136
ent - 19
penal 0.00% 01-12-2020 30-05- 181 82,74,136
Interest 2021
Installm 30-05-2021 54,41,154 5,41,154 88,15,290
ent - 20
penal 0.00% 31-05-2021 29-11- 183 88,15,290
Interest 2021
penal 0.00% 30-11-2021 29-05- 181 88,15,290
Interest 2022
penal 0.00% 30-05-2022 30-06- 32 88,15,290
Interest 2022
penal 0.00% 01-07-2022 15-11- 138 88,15,290
Interest 2022
penal 0.00% 16-11-2022 31-12- 46 88,15,290
Interest 2022
penal 0.00% 01-01-2023 15-05- 135 88,15,290
Interest 2023
penal 0.00% 16-05-2023 15-11- 184 88,15,290
Interest 2023
penal 0.00% 16-11-2023 30-01- 76 88,15,290
Interest 2024
penal 0.00% 31-01-2024 30-07- 182 5,71,424 5,71,424 93,86,714
Interest 2024
penal 13.00% 31-07-2024 30-12- 154 5,14,855 5,14,855 99,01,569
Interest 2024
penal 13.50% 01-01-2025 30-01- 30 1,09,867 1,09,867 1,00,11,436
Interest 2025
penal 13.50% 31-01-2025 28-02- 29 1,07,383 1,07,383 1,01,18,819
Interest 2025
Total 1,08,19,290 13,03,529 1,21,22,819 20,04,4000
Default Amount as on 28-02-2025 - 1,01,18,819

¶169

It was also informed that the allotment can be restored subject to payment of Rs.2,72,46,000/- towards total premium, 10% of this amount, i.e., Rs.27,24,600 towards restoration charges and Rs.4,90,428/18 % GST.

¶170

The opposite party no.2 has annexed copies of seven receipts with her short counter affidavit, the particulars whereof are as follows: -

¶171

Date	Amount
24.03.2011	3,05,000/-
31,05.2011	3,00,000/-
29.09.2011	1,50,000/-
22.11.2011	3,51,000/-
25.05.2012	3,51,000/-
30.11.2012	3,51,000/-
30.05.2013	3,51,000/-

¶172

Even as per the case set up by the allottee, after depositing the initial allotment amount, she has deposited only four initial installments of lease premium, which comes to 35.98% of the lease premium. Her

¶173

20

¶174

WRIC No. - 409 of 2026

¶175

claim of deposit of seven installments is incorrect. The number of total installments to be deposited was twenty. She did not deposit any amount towards lease premium or interest since 31.05.2013. Thus the opposite party no. 2 allottee has admittedly remained a defaulter in spite of issuance of repetitive demand notices.

53.

The claim of the opposite party no. 2 regarding zero period benefit is not covered by the zero period policy, as it can be granted only if - (1) possession could not be handed over or construction could not be raised due to a stay order passed by a Court and (2) lease-deed could not be executed in furtherance of any Government Order / order passed by the Board of GNIDA. GNIDA had rightly rejected this claim and had informed the rejection through its letter dated 18.01.2018 stating that the allottee’s claim was not covered by the policy.

¶181

The claim of the opposite party no. 2 that there were encroachments on the land, has been denied by GNIDA and the denial has not been challenged by adducing any evidence so as to enable this Court to decide this disputed question of fact. Therefore, this Court has to accept the contention of GNIDA that there was no encroachment on the land.

¶182

The revisional authority has blamed GNIDA for delay in handing over the possession stating that GNIDA could not assign any reason for this delay, but it has ignored the plea of GNIDA that the opposite party No.2 had committed default in payment of the dues and, therefore, she was not entitled to get possession of the land. The mere delay in providing check list would not justify the failure of the opposite party No.2 to pay the dues of GNIDA in spite of repetitive demand notices.

¶183

As the allottee-opposite party No.2 remained in default of the dues of GNIDA in spite of repetitive demand notices, finding of the revisional Court that the delay has occurred only because the delay caused by GNIDA in providing the check list, is patently unsustainable in law.

¶184

21

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¶186

In view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition is allowed . The impugned revisional order dated 30.01.2024 passed by the opposite party no. 1 in Revision No.581/77-4-24/123 Appeal/23 (Annexure No.1 to the Writ Petition) is hereby quashed .

¶187

February 12, 2026

¶188

-Amit K-

¶189

(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)

¶190

Digitally signed by :- AMIT KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Thru. Authorized Signatory,S.M.Arya v. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Infrastructure Industrial Development Govt. Lko. and Another

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Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Thru. Authorized Signatory,S.M.Arya v. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Infrastructure Industrial Development Govt. Lko. and Another

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