Dismissed¶51

Lucknow Developmet Authority, Lucknow Thru. Secy., v. Ram Sevak and Others

Allahabad HC7 Jan 2026FAPLD/137/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Condonation of delay; insufficient cause; bureaucratic delay by State instrumentality; parity between government and private litigants; Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board, MANU/SC/1262/2025; Section 5 Limitation Act; Section 74 RFCTLARR Act 2013; Section 18 Land Acquisition Act 1984; compensation enhancement Rs. 18.36 to Rs. 115 per square foot; Amar Shaheed Path Gomtinagar Vistaar Phase-1A, Village Ujariwayon, Lucknow; Lucknow Development Authority; FAPLD No. 137 of 2024; appeal dismissed for delay and laches; Prashant Kumar, J.; Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench.

What did the court decide?

None; the delay condonation application (and the subsequent application) was rejected and the appeal was dismissed. ¶51

Lucknow Developmet Authority, Lucknow Thru. Secy., vs Ram… — Land Acquisition | Allahabad HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None; the delay condonation application (and the subsequent application) was rejected and the appeal was dismissed.

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Issue for consideration

Whether the delay in filing the First Appeal under Section 74 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 against the compensation-enhancement decree (office report: 198 days; appellant claims 171 days) should be condoned, i.e., whether the explanation offered constitutes sufficient cause. +1 more

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Court's answer

Neither the original delay-condonation application nor the subsequent (better-affidavit) application shows sufficient cause; the delay is attributable solely to the bureaucratic set-up of the appellant-Authority's own office.

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Ratio / Principle

Applying the ratio in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board, lapses or delay by the Government or its agencies should not be condoned as a matter of right; the State is under a higher duty to act in time, repeated indulgence on the ground of bureaucratic inefficiency erodes the object of the Limitation Act, and the vital test is whether the applicant proves it acted with reasonable diligence.

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Key takeaways

The application for condonation of delay, and also the subsequent application for delay condonation, stand rejected for failure to show sufficient cause.ratio¶48
Since the delay was not condoned, the First Appeal suffers from delay and laches and is dismissed.ratio¶51

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench), Prashant Kumar, J. — First Appeal (Defective) No. 137 of 2024, decided January 7, 2026: The Lucknow Development Authority's first appeal under Section 74, RFCTLARR Act 2013, against the decree dated 16.01.2024 in the Section 18 (Land Acquisition Act, 1984) reference enhancing compensation for land at Amar Shaheed Path, Gomtinagar Vistaar Phase-1A, Village Ujariwayon, Lucknow, from Rs. 18.36 to Rs. 115 per square foot, was filed 198 days late as per office report (appellant claimed 171 days). The explanations — delayed certified copy (issued 09.02.2024), internal movement of files, permission of the Vice Chairman (27.02.2024), and availability of the complete record only on 10.06.2024 — showed the delay arose solely from the Authority's own bureaucratic processes and disclosed no sufficient cause. Relying on Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board, MANU/SC/1262/2025 (extracting paras 189, 210, 249 and 261–264: the State and its instrumentalities are entitled to no preferential treatment; administrative lethargy and laxity can never be a sufficient ground for condonation; constitutional courts must not become surrogates for State laxity), the Court held that governmental lapses cannot be condoned as a matter of right and that the vital test is proof of reasonable diligence. The delay-condonation application and the subsequent better-affidavit application were rejected, and the appeal was dismissed as suffering from delay and laches.

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW

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FIRST APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 137 of 2024

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Lucknow Development Authority, Lucknow Thru. Secy.,

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.....Appellant(s)

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Versus Ram Sevak And Others .....Respondent(s) Counsel for Appellant(s) : Rajnish Kumar Singh, Bhanu Bajpai, Mukund Tewari Counsel for Respondent(s) : Amardeep Yadav Court No. - 20

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HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

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C.M. Application No. IA/2/2024 - Condonation of Delay

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Heard Shri Mukund Tewari, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Bhanu Bajpai, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Amardeep Yadav, learned counsel for respondents and perused the record.

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As per office report, the instant appeal has been filed with the delay of 198 days, however learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that there is delay of only 171 days.

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The First Appeal along with the delay condonation application has been filed by the appellant-Lucknow Development Authority under Section 74 of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 against the judgment and decree dated 16.01.2024 and formal order dated 05.02.2024 in reference under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, 1984, Amar Shaheed Path Gomtinagar Vistaar Phase-1A, Village Ujariwayon, Pargana Tehsil and District Lucknow, Award dated 24.09.2009 in Misc. Case No.141 of 2011, Ram Sevak and others Vs. State of U.P. through Collector and another whereby compensation has been enhanced from Rs.18.36

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FAPLD No. 137 of 2024

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per square feet to Rs. 115 per square feet.

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The reason for condonation of delay shown in the affidavit is that the order was passed on 16.01.2024 but the certified copy of the same was issued on 09.02.2024. Thereafter the Vice Chairman, Lucknow Development Authority has granted permission to file the appeal on 27.02.2024 and the matter was referred to the counsel on 23.03.2024 and thereafter the instant appeal was filed on 22.10.2024. Thus, there was no inordinate delay occurred in filing the appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that he has filed a better affidavit (C.M. Application No.1777 of 2026.), in the Registry explaining the delay, however the same is not on record. A copy of the same has been provided in the Court by learned counsel for the appellant.

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After going through the delay condonation application as well as the affidavit filed along with the same, in which delay has been explained that certified copy of the order was made available on 09.02.2024. After reviewing the matter, the Pairokar of the appellant-Lucknow Development Authority visited the office of Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Lucknow but he could not find out the entire file/records in the office; rather only partial record was made available to him. The copies of the entire record were made available only on 10.06.2024. On receipt of the entire records, the matter moved to the various departments/Sections of the appellant/Lucknow Development Authority and after obtaining approval of the authority concerned, the matter was sent to the lawyer concerned for filing the appeal on 02.08.2024 and thereafter the appeal was filed on 24.10.2024.

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Shri Mukund Tewari, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 and he further placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shanti

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FAPLD No. 137 of 2024

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Mishra (1975) 2 SCC 840. He further submits that the delay in filing the instant appeal is genuine and bonafide and the cause shown in the affidavit filed along with delay condonation application is sufficient

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Per contra , Shri Amardeep Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the instant appeal has been filed with delay and laches and that mere explanation for delay cannot be said to be procedural laches. He further submits that it is only after the respondents have filed objection on the delay in filing the appeal, a better affidavit has been filed by the appellant which is nothing but a way to fulfill the lacuna which was left while filing the instant appeal.

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

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This is a local matter of Lucknow Development Authority, Lucknow.

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As per office report, the instant appeal has been filed with delay of 198 days, however learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that there is delay of only 171 days. The delay explained/reasons shown in the application for condonation of delay filed along with the appeal and that also the subsequent application (C.M. Application No.1777 of 2026.) for condonation of delay affidavit does not show the sufficient cause. A perusal of the affidavit accompanied with delay condonation application shows that the delay is only of the bureaucratic set up of the appellant/authority's own office.

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board; MANU/SC/1262/2025 , categorically stated that the State or its instrumentality cannot claim special treatment or preferential handling in litigation. The State must be treated equally with private litigants and follow the same rules and regulations. The delay by the State must not be condoned unless justified, promoting accountability and diligence in public litigation. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "

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FAPLD No. 137 of 2024

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189. This was followed by Indian Oil Corpn (supra) wherein this Court sowed the seeds for the shift in approach of the courts in matters where condonation of delay was sought by the State or its instrumentalities, inasmuch as it held that the Government and its various functionaries cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants, and held that the pragmatic and justiceoriented approach of the courts should be confined only to cases where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction on part of the State.

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***

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210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation.

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***

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249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration." (emphasis added)

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21. In conclusion, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra) held that administrative lethargy and laxity can

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FAPLD No. 137 of 2024

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never stand as sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below:

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"261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

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262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

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263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its

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FAPLD No. 137 of 2024

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elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.

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264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law."

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(emphasis added)

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In view of ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shivamma (supra) , the lapses or delay by the Government or its agencies should not be condoned as a matter of right. It is further held in Shivamma (supra) that the delay should not be condoned merely on the presumption that if the delay is not condoned the government and the public institutions run a risk of a meritorious matter being thrown out. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that the State is under a higher duty to act in time in every matter which it litigates hence, the repeated indulgence in condoning the delay on the ground of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the very object of the Limitation Act. It would amount to giving immunity or "cart blanche" power to the State to act as it pleases. The public interest lies not in condoning the delay. Steps should be taken for compelling the state and its instrumentalities for being efficient responsible and to take a time bound action. The Court further held that when it comes to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not a freepass to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The vital test for condoning the delay is for the party that is praying for such condonation to prove that it was reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter.

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FAPLD No. 137 of 2024

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Accordingly, the aforesaid application for condonation of delay and also the subsequent application for delay condonation do not show the sufficient cause to condone the delay.

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