Allowed¶74

Ajay v. Gopal Chandra Nigam and 6 Others

Allahabad HC9 Jan 2026CLRE/3/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

impleadment of parties; necessary party; proper party; Order 1 Rule 10 CPC; addition of defendants; suit for declaration and injunction; adopted son; adoption deed challenge; locus to challenge adoption; registered Will; self-acquired property; ancestral house; sale-deed; right crystallized by purchase; non-speaking order; patent error; absence of reasons and findings; civil revision; Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench; Hardoi; Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal (2005) 6 SCC 733; M/s. J. N. Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015; dominus litis (within quoted extract).

What did the court decide?

Impugned order dated 07.10.2024 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division)/FTC, Hardoi in Regular Suit No.188/2017 set aside, undoing the impleadment of private-respondents No.1 and 2; no order as to costs. ¶74

Ajay vs Gopal Chandra Nigam and 6 Others — Allahabad HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

¶74

Issue for consideration

Whether the private-respondents No.1 and 2 can be impleaded in the suit for declaration and injunction, i.e. whether they are necessary and proper parties.

¶33

Court's answer

The private-respondents No.1 and 2 are neither necessary nor proper parties; their application for impleadment has incorrectly been allowed.

¶73

Ratio / Principle

The trial Court allowed the impleadment without even expressing any reason for doing so.

¶73

Key takeaways

No findings were recorded by the trial Court as to whether the private-respondents No.1 and 2 were necessary or proper parties.ratio¶73
Since the right to adopt vests in the parents (Smt. Ranjana Nigam and Ramesh Chandra Nigam), no third party could assail the adoption without showing a direct right.ratio¶69
As regards the Schedule-A property, the right of the private-respondents No.1 and 2 already stands crystallized by their purchase; perhaps no grounds to assail that part.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Civil Revision No. 3 of 2025 (Ajay v. Gopal Chandra Nigam and 6 others) — High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench (Court No. 6), Jaspreet Singh, J., decided January 9, 2026 — Allowed. Challenge to order dated 07.10.2024 of the Civil Judge (Senior Division)/FTC, Hardoi in Regular Suit No.188/2017 allowing private-respondents No.1 and 2 (sons of late Laxmi Narain Nigam, real brothers of Ramesh Chandra Nigam) to be impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC on payment of Rs.500/- cost. The suit was for declaration that the revisionist, as adopted son of Smt. Ranjana Nigam, owned the scheduled properties, with injunction regarding deposits (Schedule-B); the Schedule-A relief stood deleted by amendment, and the respondents had purchased the revisionist's Schedule-A share through Smt. Saroj Tewari (sale-deeds dated 26.03.2022 and 03.07.2024). Relying on Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733 and M/s. J. N. Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015, the Court held the applicants to be neither necessary nor proper parties: their Schedule-A rights stood crystallized by purchase; Schedule-B comprised self-acquired deposits/investments of Smt. Ranjana Nigam covered by a registered Will in favour of the revisionist; the adoption could be assailed only by the adoptive parents or those who gave the child in adoption, absent a direct right; and the impleadment order was non-speaking, rendered without reasons or findings — patently erroneous. Set aside; no order as to costs.

¶1

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW

¶2

CIVIL REVISION No. - 3 of 2025

Ajay

.....Revisionist(s)

Versus

Gopal Chandra Nigam And 6	Others	.....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Revisionist(s)	: A.Z. Siddiqui
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)	: Gauri Suwan Pand Kumar Srivastava, Prakash Srivastava,	ey, A.S.G.I., Dilip Manish Misra, Om Prateek Tewari

¶7

Court No. - 6

¶8

HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

¶9

Heard Shri A.Z. Siddiqui, learned counsel for the revisionist, Shri Gauri Suwan Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents No.1 and 2, Shri Prateek Tewari, learned counsel for the private-respondent No.7 and the respondent No.3 is represented by the panel counsel for the Union of India whereas Shri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel has accepted notice on behalf of the respondent No.4, Shri Manish Mishra, learned counsel has accepted notice on behalf of the respondent No.5, Shri O.P. Srivastava, learned counsel has accepted notice on behalf of the respondent No.6.

¶10

Considering the controversy involved in the instant revision, it reflects that the matter is primarily contested between the revisionist and the respondents No.1 and 2.

¶11

The order impugned dated 07.10.2024 has been passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division)/FTC, Hardoi in Regular Suit No.188/2017, whereby an application for impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, filed by the private-respondents No.1 and 2 has been allowed by the trial Court on payment of cost of Rs.500/-.

¶12

At this stage, contestable issue is regarding veracity and the propriety of the impleadment order which is disputed between the revisionist and the private-respondents No.1 and 2. Thus, this Court does not propose to

¶13

CLRE No. 3 of 2025

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wait for the counsel for the respondents No.3 to 6. who have not appeared though their names were printed in the cause list. So far as the respondent No.7 is concerned, he is represented by Shri Prateek Tewari, who is a proforma party and is present in Court.

¶16

The submission of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that the revisionist as a plaintiff had instituted a suit seeking declaration and injunction against respondents No.3 to 7, who were the original defendants No.1 to 5 in the said suit.

¶17

Initially, the revisionist had claimed a relief for declaration that he being the adopted son of Smt. Ranjana Nigam wife of late Shri Suresh Chandra was the owner of the properties, which were shown in the Schedule annexed as Annexure No.A and B with the plaint. A further decree of injunction was prayed for directing the defendants of the suit to pay the outstanding sum which comprises of deposits as mentioned in Schedule-B within such day and time to be fixed by the Court.

¶18

It is an undisputed fact that insofar as the property which has been shown in Schedule-A is concerned, it is a house situate in Mohalla Bahara Saudagar, Near Bada Choraha, Hardoi, wherein, as per the revisionist he had some share and the same had been sold to Smt. Saroj Tewari by means of the sale-deed dated 26.03.2022. Subsequently, Smt. Saroj Tewari sold the same share to the private-respondents No.1 and 2 herein, vide sale-deed dated 03.07.2024.

¶19

It is further urged that insofar as the property which is the subject matter of Schedule-B is concerned, they are investments as well as certain dues which were payable to Smt. Rajana Nigam as she had invested the same out of her own salary as she was a Government Servant.

¶20

The revisionist also moved an application for amendment whereby the relief relating to the property comprised in Schedule-A was deleted and his claim remained only for the properties/deposits mentioned in Schedule-B.

¶21

At this stage, the private-respondents No.1 and 2 moved an application for impleadment wherein it has been stated that they are the

¶22

CLRE No. 3 of 2025

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sons of late Laxmi Narain Nigam and they were the real brother of Ramesh Chandra Nigam (brother-in-law, 'dever', of Smt. Ranjana Nigam) on the said premise, the application for impleadment was moved indicating that the revisionist was not the adopted son of Suresh Chandra and Smt. Ranjana Nigam. Moreover, they being real brothers, they had a right over the property in question and, therefore, they both are necessary and proper parties.

¶25

It is further urged that on the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court without considering the concept of necessary and proper party has merely recorded the submissions of the parties concerned and allowed the impleadment application without giving any reason. The order impugned is patently erroneous and non-speaking, apart from fact that even otherwise the private-respondents No.1 and 2 are not the proper or necessary parties. In the aforesaid circumstances, it is urged that the impugned order deserves to be set aside after allowing the civil revision.

¶26

Shri Pandey, learned counsel for the private-respondents No.1 and 2 has submitted that insofar as the relationship between the revisionist and the private-respondents No.1 and 2 is concerned, if it is to be treated that the revisionist is son of Suresh Chandra then the plaintiff becomes nephew of the private-respondents No.1 and 2. It is urged that first and foremost the alleged adoption deed which is the basis of the right of the revisionist has never seen the light of the day nor the same has been placed on record of the instant revision. A fact that the revisionist is adopted son of Ramesh Chandra is disputed by the private-respondents No.1 and 2. It was also urged that even the alleged Will of Smt. Ranjana Nigam is fictitious and for the said reason no right can accrue to the revisionist.

¶27

In the given circumstances, the private-respondents No.1 and 2 being the Members of the family have right both in the properties mentioned in Schedule A and B annexed with the plaint, hence, being proper and necessary parties, they are liable to be impleaded and this has been done by the trial Court and such exercise of discretion cannot be said to be a jurisdictional error.

¶28

CLRE No. 3 of 2025

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It is also urged that by merely allowing the impleadment application, rights of the parties are not decided. It is open for the parties to contest the proceedings on merits and even on this account where the revisionist has ample opportunity to contest before the trial Court, stalling of the suit by the instant revision is also bad. Consequently, the revision deserves to be dismissed.

¶31

Shri Prateek Tewari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.7 submitted that he is not concerned with the impleadment or the rejection of the application as he reserves his right to contest the proceedings before the trial Court as he is a proforma defendant No.7 herein.

¶32

The Court has considered the rival submissions of the parties and also perused the material on record.

¶33

The issue as to whether the private-respondents No.1 and 2 can be impleaded in a suit for declaration and injunction is the core issue involved in this revision.

¶34

Before proceeding further, it will be appropriate to notice the dictum of the Apex Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal and others, (2005) 6 SCC 733 , wherein the Apex Court has noticed as under:-

¶35

"7 . In our view, a bare reading of this provision, namely, second part of Order 1 Rule 10 sub-rule (2) CPC would clearly show that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale are the parties to the contract or if they are dead, their legal representatives as also a person who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor. In equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes rights and also regulates the liabilities of the parties. A purchaser is a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to the claim of a vendor is, however, not a necessary party. From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. Tests are — (1) there must be a right to some relief against

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CLRE No. 3 of 2025

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such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party.

¶39

¶40

As noted hereinearlier, two tests are required to be satisfied to determine the question who is a necessary party, let us now consider who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. For deciding the question who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance the guiding principle is that the presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. Thus, the question is to be decided keeping in mind the scope of the suit. The question that is to be decided in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is to the enforceability of the contract entered into between the parties to the contract. If the person seeking addition is added in such a suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged and it would be practically converted into a suit for title. Therefore, for effective adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit, presence of such parties cannot be said to be necessary at all. Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Tasker v. Small [(1834) 40 ER 848 : 3 My & Cr 63] made the following observations: (ER pp. 850-51)

¶41

“It is not disputed that, generally, to a bill for a specific performance of a contract of sale, the parties to the contract only are the proper parties; and, when the ground of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in suits of that kind is considered it could not properly be otherwise. The Court assumes jurisdiction in such cases, because a court of law, giving damages only for the non-performance of the contract, in many cases does not afford an adequate remedy. But, in equity, as well as at law, the contract constitutes the right, and regulates the liabilities of the parties; and the object of both

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CLRE No. 3 of 2025

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proceedings is to place the party complaining as nearly as possible in the same situation as the defendant had agreed that he should be placed in. It is obvious that persons, strangers to the contract, and, therefore, neither entitled to the right, nor subject to the liabilities which arise out of it, are as much strangers to a proceeding to enforce the execution of it as they are to a proceeding to recover damages for the breach of it.”

¶45

(emphasis supplied)

¶46

¶47

From the aforesaid discussion, it is pellucid that necessary parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings and proper parties are those whose presence before the court would be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person.

¶48

Keeping the principles as stated above in mind, let us now, on the admitted facts of this case, first consider whether Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are necessary parties or not. In our opinion, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are not necessary parties as an effective decree could be passed in their absence as they had not purchased the contracted property from the vendor after the contract was entered into. They were also not necessary parties as they would not be affected by the contract entered into between the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3. In the case of Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra [(1995) 3 SCC 147] , it has been held that since the applicant who sought for his addition is not a party to the agreement for sale, it cannot be said that in his absence, the dispute as to specific performance cannot be decided. In this case at para 9, the Supreme Court while deciding whether a person is a necessary party or not in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale made the

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CLRE No. 3 of 2025

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following observation: (SCC p. 150)

¶52

“Since the respondent is not a party to the agreement of sale, it cannot be said that without his presence the dispute as to specific performance cannot be determined. Therefore, he is not a necessary party.”

¶53

(emphasis supplied)

¶54

¶55

That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in sub-rule (2) Order 1 Rule 10 CPC “all the questions involved in the suit” it is abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and the relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise between the plaintiff-appellant and the defendants inter se or questions between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract for sale into a complicated suit for title between the plaintiff-appellant on one hand and Respondents 2 and 3 and Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 on the other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, if passed, cannot, at all, affect the right, title and interest of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 in respect of the contracted property and in view of the detailed discussion made hereinearlier, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would not, at all, be necessary to be added in the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale.

¶56

It is difficult to conceive that while deciding the question as to who is in possession of the contracted property, it would be

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CLRE No. 3 of 2025

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open to the court to decide the question of possession of a third party or a stranger as first the lis to be decided is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the appellant and Respondent 3 and whether contract was executed by the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 for sale of the contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale against Respondents 2 and 3. Secondly in that case, whoever asserts his independent possession of the contracted property has to be added in the suit, then this process may continue without a final decision of the suit. Apart from that, the intervener must be directly and legally interested in the answers to the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. In Amon v. Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd. [(1956) 1 All ER 273 : (1956) 1 QB 357 : (1956) 2 WLR 372] it has been held that a person is legally interested in the answers to the controversies only if he can satisfy the court that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally.

¶60

That apart, there is another principle which cannot also be forgotten. The appellant, who has filed the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is dominus litis and cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law, as already discussed above. For the reasons aforesaid, we are, therefore, of the view that Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are neither necessary parties nor proper parties and therefore they are not entitled to be added as party-defendants in the pending suit for specific performance of the contract for sale."

¶61

Lately, the aforesaid propositions has also been noticed by the Apex Court in M/s. J. N. Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015. Applying the aforesaid principles to the instant case at hand, it would be found that the pleadings as indicated in the plaint is on the premise that Laxmi Narain, who is the common ancestor and upon his

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CLRE No. 3 of 2025

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death, his estate devolved on his sons and daughters. The father of the revisionist i.e. Suresh Chandra Nigam was one of the sons, whereas the private-respondents No.1 and 2 are also sons of Laxmi Narain Nigam.

¶65

The issue as to whether the adoption deed is valid or not can only be challenged by a person, who otherwise would have a right in this regard, i.e. either the adoptive parents or the persons, who gave the child in adoption.

¶66

It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the private-respondents No.1 and 2 that the share of Ramesh Chandra which allegedly was inherited by the revisionist being the son of Ramesh Chandra, adopted son of Ramesh Chandra, was sold by the revisionist in favour of Saroj Kumar Tewari vide sale-deed dated 26.03.2022 and thereafter privaterespondents No.1 and 2 has purchased the same from Saroj Kumar Tewari by means of the sale-deed dated 03.07.2024.

¶67

In this backdrop and undisputed facts if at all any right could accrue to the private-respondents No.1 and 2, it would have been in respect of the property in Schedule A, which is part of the ancestral house. Since, right of the private-respondents No.1 and 2 has already been crystalized as they have purchased the property, then perhaps no grounds to assail insofar as the part of the property mentioned in Schedule-A is concerned.

¶68

So far as the property, which is the subject matter and Schedule-B, they are all deposits and investments made by Smt. Ranjana Nigam in favour of the revisionist. Even if at all for the sake of arguments, the adoption deed is ignored yet the fact remained that Smt. Ranjana Nigam had already executed a registered Will in favour of the revisionist, who also happens to be adopted son. In this regard, the private-respondents No.1 and 2 could not claim any right so far as the self-acquired property of Smt. Ranjana Nigam is concerned.

¶69

Since, the right to adopt is with the parents i.e. Smt. Ranjana Nigam and Ramesh Chandra Nigam, no third party could have assailed that except without showing the direct right.

¶70

In the given circumstances, the private-respondents No.1 and 2 were

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CLRE No. 3 of 2025

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neither necessary nor proper parties, hence, their application for impleadment has incorrectly been allowed apart from the fact that the Court has not even expressed any reason upon which it allowed the said application. No findings has been recorded as to whether the privaterespondents No.1 and 2 were necessary or proper parties.

¶74

In this view of the matter, the impugned order dated 07.10.2024 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division)/FTC, Hardoi in Regular Suit No.188/2017 is patently erroneous and is accordingly set aside. The revision is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

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(Jaspreet Singh,J.)

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January 9, 2026

¶77

Rakesh/-

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Digitally signed by :- RAKESH PRAJAPAT High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Ajay v. Gopal Chandra Nigam and 6 Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Ajay v. Gopal Chandra Nigam and 6 Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

All orders in this case

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