Dev Mani Pandey Vs State of U.P.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 32750 of 2018

Dev Mani Pandey

	.....	Applicant(s)
	Versus
State of U.P.		.....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s)	: Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, Utsav Singh	Shyam Lal,
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)	: Brijesh Chandra Naik, G.A.

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Court No. - 84

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HON'BLE JAI PRAKASH TIWARI, J.

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Heard Sri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Brijesh Chandra Naik, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2, as well as the learned AGA for the State and perused the record.

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This application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed w0ith the prayer to quash the charge-sheet dated 19.03.2018, cognizance order dated 18.08.2018, as well as entire proceedings of Case No. 2363 of 2018 (State vs. Dev Muni Pandey), arising out of Case Crime No. 62 of 2018, under Sections 376, 506 IPC, Police Station Kalwari, District Basti, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate-II, Basti, on the basis of compromise, so far it relates to the present applicant.

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Learned counsel for the applicant submits that applicant and opposite party no. 2 are living together as husband and wife. He further submits that in compliance of the order dated 8.5.2024 passed by this Court, the parties filed compromise deed before the court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Court No. 11, Basti, and the concerned court vide its order dated 30.05.2024 verified the said compromise in the presence of the applicant and opposite party no.2, copy of which is on record alongwith the verification order.

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Learned Additional Government Advocate have submitted that since the parties have entered into compromise, which has also been verified by the trial court, therefore, no useful purpose would be served if the

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proceedings of the aforesaid case go on further.

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Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2, is also present. He has no objection to the statement, made above.

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Considering the fact that applicant and opposite party no.2, both are major and willingly married and are living as husband and wife. This Court in the case of Application U/S 482 No.41580 of 2022 (Fakre Alam @ Shozil Alam Vs. State of U.P. and 3 others) observed that even if the offence like rape, cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise but if from perusal of record, no case is made out under Section 376 I.P.C. even if the charge sheet is filed under Section 376 I.P.C., the proceedings, on the basis of compromise can be quashed.

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The Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another (2012) 10 SCC 303 observed in paragraph no. 61 as under:-

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"The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the

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offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

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Similarly, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan AIR 2019 SC 1296 observed in paragraph no.13.4 as under:-

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"iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the

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circumstances stated hereinabove;"

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Therefore, in such peculiar facts and circumstances, it would be unfair and contrary to interest of justice to continue with impugned criminal proceeding.

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In view of the above facts and legal position as well as law laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another (supra) , and State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan (supra) , the he charge-sheet dated 19.03.2018, cognizance order dated 18.08.2018, as well as entire proceedings of Case No. 2363 of 2018 (State vs. Dev Muni Pandey), arising out of Case Crime No. 62 of 2018, under Sections 376, 506 IPC, Police Station Kalwari, District Basti, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate-II, Basti, is hereby quashed.

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In view of the aforesaid observations, the application is allowed.

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(Jai Prakash Tiwari,J.)

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April 20, 2026

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Brijesh

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Digitally signed by :- BRIJESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Dev Mani Pandey v. State of U.P.

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Dev Mani Pandey v. State of U.P.

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