Bablu @ Chandra Shekhar Yadav Vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. of Home Lko. and 3 Others

"Wherefore, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash order dated 20.8.2025, passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge Lalganj, Pratapgarh in Criminal Revision No. 124 of 2025 (02 of 2025) "Bablu @ Chandra Shekhar Yadav Versus State of U.P. & 3 others" as well as the order dated 12.6.2025 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lalganj, Pratapgarh in Complaint No. 634 of 2025 under section 323, 504, 427, 506, 452, 379 IPC, Police Station- Lalganj District Pratapgarh, by which the leaned trial court has rejected the application under section 311 Cr.P.C. moved by the petitioner, as contained in Annexure No. 1&2 respectively to this petition, in the interest of justice."

¶14

The brief facts, which are relevant for disposal of present application at admission stage and borne out from the record, are as under.

¶15

(i) An application in terms of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was preferred by the applicant.

¶16

(ii) The aforesaid application was treated as complaint case and vide order dated 12.08.2011, the private opposite parties, namely, Rajaram s/o Ayodhya Prasad Yadav, Jai Singh Yadav and Udai Singh Yadav both s/o Rajnath Yadav were summoned to face the trial for the offence under Sections 323, 504, 506, 427, 452, 379 I.P.C.

¶17

(iii) The statement of applicant in terms of Section 244 Cr.P.C. was recorded on 21.08.2015 and thereafter the charges were framed under Sections 323, 504, 506, 452, 427, 379 I.P.C.

¶18

(iv) After framing of charge, the applicant was provided opportunity to produce evidence as required under Section 246 Cr.P.C.

¶19

(v) After examination of witnesses of fact, an application under Section 24-ब was preferred by the applicant for summoning the following formal witnesses.

¶20

(a) Record Keeper of Police Office, Pratapgarh.

¶21

(b) Dr. M.S. Beg, who examined the injured at Primary Health Centre, Lalganj (in short 'PHC').

¶22

NA528 No. 1141 of 2025

¶23

2

¶24

(c) Radiologist District Hospital, Pratapgarh.

¶25

(vi) On 14.04.2016, as stated by learned counsel for the applicant Shri Lalji Yadav, the application under Section 24-ब was allowed.

¶26

(vii) It is to be noted that order dated 14.04.2016, which ought to have been placed on record, has not been placed on record.

¶27

(viii) Despite allowing the application 24-ब the applicant failed to take steps in the matter and for this very reason the matter.

¶28

(ix) After lapse of about 9 years from the order dated 14.04.2016 whereby the request/prayer of the revisionist to summon Dr. M.S. Beg was allowed, another application in terms of Section 311 Cr.P.C. was preferred. The prayer sought in the said application is extracted hereinunder.

¶29

"अतः श्रीमान जी से प्राथर्ना है िक मामले को न्यायसंगत िविनिश्चत हेतु ताित्वक साक्ष्य डा० एम०एस० बेग ग्राम मेंहदी टोला थाना खैराबाद, जनपद सीतापुर मो0नं0- 9451010738, व 9415525446 को तलब कर बयान कराने की कृपा की जाय, एवं पिरवादी तात्विरक साक्षी को समन करने हेतु सव् य तैयार हो, यिद डा०एम०एस० बेग का िकसी कारण उनकी उपिस्थित सुिनिश्चत न की जा सके, तो मामले के न्यायसंगत िविनिश्चत हेतु चोटिहत बबलू उफर् चन्द्रशेखर एवं कौिशल्या देवी के मेिडको लीगल रिजस्टर िदनांक 14/05/2010 रिज० नं0- 15543 व 15542 सी०एच०सी० लालगंज मय फामार्िसस्ट को न्यायिहत मे तलब करने की कृपा की जाय।"

¶30

It is to be noted that for summoning of Dr. M.S. Beg in terms of order dated 14.04.2016, the applicant failed to take steps and this finding of the revisional court has not been impeached by placing appropriate document/evidence on record.

¶31

Taking note of the aforesaid aspect of the case, Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lalganj, Pratapgarh (in short 'Magistrate') vide impugned order dated 12.06.2025 rejected the said application. The relevant portion of the order dated 12.06.2025 is extracted hereinunder.

¶32

"पत्रावली पेश हुयी। पुकार पर उभयपक्ष मय िवद्वान अिधवक्तागण उपिस्थत।

¶33

पिरवादी के िवद्वान अिधवक्ता द्वारा धारा 311 सी०आर०पी०सी० के तहत इस आशय का प्राथर्ना पत्र प्रस्तुत िकया गया िक डॉक्टर एम०एस० बेग को साक्षी के तौर पर न्यायालय में तलब िकया जाए।

¶34

सुना एवं पत्रावली का अवलोकन िकया।

¶35

पत्रावली के अवलोकन से िविदत है िक प्रस्तुत प्रकरण वषर् 2012 से लिम्बत है एवं अिभयुक्तगण का आरोप िदनांक 21.08.2015 को िवरिचत िकया गया है। िदनांक 21.08.2015 से ही पत्रावली प्रितवादी के साक्ष्य अन्तगर्त धारा 246 दं०प्र०सं० हेतु िनयत है। दस वषोर्ं से अिधक समय व्यतीत हो चुका है। पत्रावली के अवलोकन से यह भी िविदत है िक िवगत कई तारीखों से पिरवादी लगातार अनुपिस्थत भी रहा है। वतर्मान समय में पत्रावली में अिभयुक्तगण का बयान अन्तगर्त धारा 313 दं०प्र०सं० िदनांक 28.05.2025 को अंिकत िकया गया है एवं सफाई साक्ष्य के तौर पर अिभयुक्तगण द्वारा साक्षी सागर पाल की मुख्य परीक्षा अंिकत करायी गयी है। अतः समस्त तथ्यों एवं पिरिस्थितयों को दृिष्टगत रखते हुए न्यायालय इस अिभमत का है िक पिरवादी द्वारा प्रस्तुत प्राथर्ना पत्र अंतगर्त धारा 311 सी०आर०पी०सी० मात्र मामले को लिम्बत रखने के उद्देश्य से प्रस्तुत िकया गया है। अतः पिरवादी द्वारा प्रस्तुत प्राथर्ना पत्र िनरस्त िकये जाने योग्य है।

¶36

आदेश

¶37

पिरवादी द्वारा प्रस्तुत प्राथर्ना पत्र अन्तगर्त धारा 311 सी०आर०पी०सी० िनरस्त िकया जाता है। पिरवादी को साक्षी सागर पाल से िजरह हेतु अंितम अवत्तर पत्रावली िदनांक 05.07.2025 को पेश हो।"

¶38

The order dated 12.06.2025 passed by the Magistrate was challenged by the applicant by way of filing Criminal Revision No.124 of 2025 (Ballu @ Chandrashekhar Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & others).

¶39

NA528 No. 1141 of 2025

¶40

3

¶41

The Additional District & Sessions Judge, Lalganj (in short 'Revisional Court') affirmed the order of Magistrate dated 12.06.2025 vide impugned order dated 20.08.2025.

¶42

To support his contention, which is to the effect that application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. ought to have been allowed, learned counsel has placed before the Court the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Manju Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2019) 6 SCC Page 203 and judgment of this Court passed in Application u/s 482 No.12409 of 2022 (Madhusudan Shukla Vs. State of U.P. and Another) .

¶43

Learned AGA opposed the present application. He stated that the application under Section 348 BNSS, akin to Section 311 CrPC was moved with sole intention to delay the trial, which is impermissible and in the circumstances of the case, the application has rightly been rejected by the trial court. Prayer is to affirm the impugned order and dismiss the instant application.

¶44

Considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

¶45

Considered the aforesaid and the observations made by the trial court in the order dated 28.11.2024 and the principles related to recall of witness under Section 348 BNSS, akin to Section 311 Cr.P.C. settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case(s) of Mohd. Khalid Versus State of West Bengal, (2002) 7 SCC 334; Hanuman Prasad (Supra), Natasha Singh vs. CBI, (2013) 5 SCC 741:(2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 828:2013 SCC OnLine SC 444; Rajaram Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar and another, AIR 2013 SC 3081; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Kumar Yadav, (2016) 2 SCC 402; State of Haryana vs. Ram Mehar and others, (2016) 8 SCC 762; Swapan Kumar Chatterjee vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2019) 14 SCC 328; Varsha Garg vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 986 and also by this Court in Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 274 of 2022 (Ram Nayak Singh vs. State of U.P. & Another) as also the judgments on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the applicant.

¶46

It is well settled by catena of decisions by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the power under Section 348 BNSS, akin to Section 311 CrPC must be exercised with the care, caution and circumspection and only for strong and valid reasons. The recall of a witness already examined should not be a matter of course and discretion given to the court in this regard has to be exercised judicially to prevent failure of justice. The object of the provision as a whole is to do justice not only from the point of view of the accused and the prosecution but also from the point of view of an orderly society.

¶47

The Court is fully conscious of the position that after all the trial is basically for the prisoners/accused and the Court should afford an opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible. At the same time, the Court should bear in mind that fair trial entails the interest of the accused, the victim and the society and, therefore, the grant of fair and proper opportunities to the persons concerned, must be ensured being a constitutional goal, as well as a human right. Recalling of witnesses has to be applied on the basis of judicially established and accepted principles.

¶48

The jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code is extraordinary and it can be used only in such cases where there is gross injustice or clear abuse of process of law. It can not be used to help such person who is not cooperating in fair trial. Similarly, power conferred to Trial Court in Section 311 of the Code to summon any person as witness for examination, cross-examination or for further examination can be exercised only in such cases where his examination is necessary for the just decision of the case. Such power cannot be invoked to harass the witness who has already been

¶49

NA528 No. 1141 of 2025

¶50

4

¶51

examined or for causing delay in trial.

¶52

In the facts of the case, it would be apt to refer the observations made in the judgment(s) passed in the case of Mohd. Khalid (Supra); Ram Mehar (Supra); State (NCT of Delhi) (Supra) and Swapan Kumar Chatterjee (Supra) .

¶53

In the case of Mohd. Khalid (Supra) , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-

¶54

"Before parting with the case, we may point out that the Designated Court deferred the cross-examination of the witnesses for a long time. That is a feature which is being noticed in many cases. Unnecessary adjournments give a scope for a grievance that the accused persons get a time to get over the witnesses. Whatever be the truth in this allegation, the fact remains that such adjournments lack the spirit of Section 309 of the Code. When a witness is available and his examination-in- chief is over, unless compelling reasons arc there, the Trial Court should not adjourn the matter on the mere asking. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in State of U.P. v. Shambhu Nath Singh and others (2001) 4 SCC 667 and N.G. Dastane v. Shrikant Shivde (2001) 6 SCC 135. In the case of State of U.P. v. Shambhu Nath Singh and others (2001) 4 SCC 667, this Court deprecated the practice of Courts adjourning cases without examination of witnesses when they are in attendance with the following observations:-

¶55

"9. We make it abundantly clear that if a witness is present in Court he must be examined on that day. The Court must know that most of the witnesses could attend the Court only at heavy cost to them, after keeping aside their own avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of income. The meagre amount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness may be paid by the Court is generally a poor solace for the financial loss incurred by him. It is a said plight in the Trial Courts that witnesses who are called through summons or other processes stand at a doorstep from morning till evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case is adjourned to another day. This primitive practice must be reformed by every one provided the presiding officer concerned has a commitment towards duty. No sadistic pleasure, in seeing how other persons summoned by him as witnesses are standard on account of the dimension of his judicial powers, can be a persuading factor for granting such adjournments lavishly, that too in a casual manner."

¶56

17. In the case of Ram Mehar (Supra) , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-

¶57

"23. In Bablu Kumar and others v. State of Bihar and another, (2015) 8 SCC 787 the Court referred to the authorities in Sidhartha Vashisht alias Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC, Rattiram and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 516, J. Jayalalithaa and others v. State of Karnataka and others (2014) 2 SCC 401, State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy (1999) 8 SCC 715 and other decisions and came to hold that keeping in view the concept of fair trial, the obligation of the prosecution, the interest of the community and the duty of the court, it can irrefragably be stated that the court cannot be a silent spectator or a mute observer when it presides over a trial. It is the duty of the court to see that neither the prosecution nor the accused play truancy with the criminal trial or corrode the sanctity of the proceeding. They cannot expropriate or hijack the community interest by conducting themselves in such a manner as a consequence of which the trial becomes a farcical one. It has been further stated that the law does not countenance a "mock trial". It is a serious concern of society. Every member of the collective has an inherent interest in such a trial. No one can be allowed to create a dent in the same. The court is duty-bound to see that neither the prosecution nor the defence takes unnecessary adjournments and take the trial under their control. We may note with profit though the context was different, yet the message is writ large. The message is - all kinds of individual notions of fair trial have no room"."

¶58

"38. At this juncture, we think it apt to state that the exercise of power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. can be sought to be invoked either by the prosecution or by

¶59

NA528 No. 1141 of 2025

¶60

5

¶61

the accused persons or by the Court itself. The High Court has been moved by the ground that the accused persons are in the custody and the concept of speedy trial is not nullified and no prejudice is caused, and, therefore, the principle of magnanimity should apply. Suffice it to say, a criminal trial does not singularly centres around the accused. In it there is involvement of the prosecution, the victim and the victim represents the collective. The cry of the collective may not be uttered in decibels which is physically audible in the court premises, but the Court has to remain sensitive to such silent cries and the agonies, for the society seeks justice. Therefore, a balance has to be struck. We have already explained the use of the words "magnanimous approach" and how it should be understood. Regard being had to the concept of balance, and weighing the factual score on the scale of balance, we are of the convinced opinion that the High Court has fallen into absolute error in axing the order passed by the learned trial Judge. If we allow ourselves to say, when the concept of fair trial is limitlessly stretched, having no boundaries, the orders like the present one may fall in the arena of sanctuary of errors. Hence, we reiterate the necessity of doctrine of balance".

¶62

18. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment passed in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) (Supra) are extracted hereunder:-

¶63

"10. It can hardly be gainsaid that fair trial is a part of guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Its content has primarily to be determined from the statutory provisions for conduct of trial, though in some matters where statutory provisions may be silent, the court may evolve a principle of law to meet a situation which has not been provided for. It is also true that principle of fair trial has to be kept in mind for interpreting the statutory provisions.

¶64

11. It is further well settled that fairness of trial has to be seen not only from the point of view of the accused, but also from the point of view of the victim and the society. In the name of fair trial, the system cannot be held to ransom. The accused is entitled to be represented by a counsel of his choice, to be provided all relevant documents, to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and to lead evidence in his defence. The object of provision for recall is to reserve the power with the court to prevent any injustice in the conduct of the trial at any stage. The power available with the court to prevent injustice has to be exercised only if the court, for valid reasons, feels that injustice is caused to a party. Such a finding, with reasons, must be specifically recorded by the court before the power is exercised. It is not possible to lay down precise situations when such power can be exercised. The legislature in its wisdom has left the power undefined. Thus, the scope of the power has to be considered from case to case. The guidance for the purpose is available in several decisions relied upon by the parties. It will be sufficient to refer to only some of the decisions for the principles laid down which are relevant for this case.

¶65

14. In Hoffman Andreas case [Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector of Customs, (2000) 10 SCC 430 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1488] , the counsel who was conducting the case was ill and died during the progress of the trial. The new counsel sought recall on the ground that the witnesses could not be cross-examined on account of the illness of the counsel. This prayer was allowed in peculiar circumstances with the observation that normally a closed trial could not be reopened but illness and death of the counsel was in the facts and circumstances considered to be a valid ground for recall of witnesses. It was observed : (SCC p. 432, para 6)

¶66

" 6. Normally, at this late stage, we would be disinclined to open up a closed trial once again. But we are persuaded to consider it in this case on account of the unfortunate development that took place during trial i.e. the passing away of the defence counsel midway of the trial. The counsel who was engaged for defending the appellant had cross-examined the witnesses but he could not complete the trial because of his death. When the new counsel took up the matter he would certainly be under the disadvantage that he could not ascertain from the erstwhile counsel as to the scheme of the defence strategy which the predeceased advocate had in mind or as to why he had not put further questions on certain aspects. In such circumstances, if the new counsel thought to have the material witnesses further

¶67

NA528 No. 1141 of 2025

¶68

6

¶69

examined the Court could adopt latitude and a liberal view in the interest of justice, particularly when the Court has unbridled powers in the matter as enshrined in Section 311 of the Code. After all the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts should afford the opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible."

¶70

15. The above observations cannot be read as laying down any inflexible rule to routinely permit a recall on the ground that cross-examination was not proper for reasons attributable to a counsel. While advancement of justice remains the prime object of law, it cannot be understood that recall can be allowed for the asking or reasons related to mere convenience. It has normally to be presumed that the counsel conducting a case is competent particularly when a counsel is appointed by choice of a litigant. Taken to its logical end, the principle that a retrial must follow on every change of a counsel, can have serious consequences on conduct of trials and the criminal justice system. The witnesses cannot be expected to face the hardship of appearing in court repeatedly, particularly in sensitive cases such as the present one. It can result in undue hardship for the victims, especially so, of heinous crimes, if they are required to repeatedly appear in court to face crossexamination.

¶71

16. The interest of justice may suffer if the counsel conducting the trial is physically or mentally unfit on account of any disability. The interest of the society is paramount and instead of trials being conducted again on account of unfitness of the counsel, reform may appear to be necessary so that such a situation does not arise. Perhaps time has come to review the Advocates Act and the relevant rules to examine the continued fitness of an advocate to conduct a criminal trial on account of advanced age or other mental or physical infirmity, to avoid grievance that an Advocate who conducted trial was unfit or incompetent. This is an aspect which needs to be looked into by the authorities concerned including the Law Commission and the Bar Council of India.

¶72

27. It is difficult to approve the view taken by the High Court. Undoubtedly, fair trial is the objective and it is the duty of the court to ensure such fairness. Width of power under Section 311 CrPC is beyond any doubt. Not a single specific reason has been assigned by the High Court as to how in the present case recall of as many as 13 witnesses was necessary as directed in the impugned order. No fault has been found with the reasoning of the order of the trial court. The High Court rejected on merits the only two reasons pressed before it that the trial was hurried and the counsel was not competent. In the face of rejecting these grounds, without considering the hardship to the witnesses, undue delay in the trial, and without any other cogent reason, allowing recall merely on the observation that it is only the accused who will suffer by the delay as he was in custody could, in the circumstances, be hardly accepted as valid or serving the ends of justice. It is not only matter of delay but also of harassment for the witnesses to be recalled which could not be justified on the ground that the accused was in custody and that he would only suffer by prolonging of the proceedings. Certainly recall could be permitted if essential for the just decision but not on such consideration as has been adopted in the present case. Mere observation that recall was necessary "for ensuring fair trial" is not enough unless there are tangible reasons to show how the fair trial suffered without recall. Recall is not a matter of course and the discretion given to the court has to be exercised judiciously to prevent failure of justice and not arbitrarily. While the party is even permitted to correct its bona fide error and may be entitled to further opportunity even when such opportunity may be sought without any fault on the part of the opposite party, plea for recall for advancing justice has to be bona fide and has to be balanced carefully with the other relevant considerations including uncalled for hardship to the witnesses and uncalled for delay in the trial. Having regard to these considerations, we do not find any ground to justify the recall of witnesses already examined.

¶73

28. It will also be pertinent to mention that power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly when there is patent error or gross injustice in the view taken by a subordinate court [Jasbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 8 SCC 294 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 470, paras 10 to 14] . A finding to this effect has to be

¶74

NA528 No. 1141 of 2025

¶75

7

¶76

supported by reasons. In the present case, the High Court has allowed the prayer of the accused, even while finding no error in the view taken by the trial court, merely by saying that exercise of power was required for granting fair and proper opportunity to the accused. No reasons have been recorded in support of this observation. On the contrary, the view taken by the trial court rejecting the stand of the accused has been affirmed. Thus, the conclusion appears to be inconsistent with the reasons in the impugned order.

¶77

29. We may now sum up our reasons for disapproving the view of the High Court in the present case:

¶78

(i) The trial court and the High Court held that the accused had appointed counsel of his choice. He was facing trial in other cases also. The earlier counsel were given due opportunity and had duly conducted cross-examination. They were under no handicap;

¶79

(ii) No finding could be recorded that the counsel appointed by the accused were incompetent particularly at the back of such counsel;

¶80

(iii) Expeditious trial in a heinous offence as is alleged in the present case is in the interests of justice;

¶81

(iv) The trial court as well as the High Court rejected the reasons for recall of the witnesses;

¶82

(v) The Court has to keep in mind not only the need for giving fair opportunity to the accused but also the need for ensuring that the victim of the crime is not unduly harassed;

¶83

(vi) Mere fact that the accused was in custody and that he will suffer by the delay could be no consideration for allowing recall of witnesses, particularly at the fag end of the trial;

¶84

(vii) Mere change of counsel cannot be ground to recall the witnesses;

¶85

(viii) There is no basis for holding that any prejudice will be caused to the accused unless the witnesses are recalled;

¶86

(ix) The High Court has not rejected the reasons given by the trial court nor given any justification for permitting recall of the witnesses except for making general observations that recall was necessary for ensuring fair trial. This observation is contrary to the reasoning of the High Court in dealing with the grounds for recall i.e. denial of fair opportunity on account of incompetence of earlier counsel or on account of expeditious proceedings;

¶87

(x) There is neither any patent error in the approach adopted by the trial court rejecting the prayer for recall nor any clear injustice if such prayer is not granted. "

¶88

In the case of Swapan Kumar Chatterjee (Supra) , a note of caution was sounded and the same can be deduced from paragraphs 11 and 12 of the report, which are as under:-

¶89

"11. It is well settled that the power conferred under Section 311 should be invoked by the court only to meet the ends of justice. The power is to be exercised only for strong and valid reasons and it should be exercised with great caution and circumspection. The court has vide power under this section to even recall witnesses for re-examination or further examination, necessary in the interest of justice, but the same has to be exercised after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. The power under this provision shall not be exercised if the court is of the view that the application has been filed as an abuse of the process of law.

¶90

12. Where the prosecution evidence has been closed long back and the reasons for non-examination of the witness earlier are not satisfactory, the summoning of the witness at belated stage would cause great prejudice to the accused and should not be allowed. Similarly, the court should not encourage the filing of successive

¶91

NA528 No. 1141 of 2025

¶92

8

¶93

applications for recall of a witness under this provision."

¶94

Upon due consideration of aforesaid facts as also the law settled on the issue, this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned order dated 04.06.2025. It is for the following reason(s):-

¶95

(i) It is evident from the material available on record including observations made in the impugned orders that the application under Section 348 BNSS, akin to Section 311 Cr.P.C., for summoning the formal witness- Dr. M.S. Beg was preferred after huge delay of about 9 years from the date of order dated 14.04.2016 whereby the same request/prayer, i.e. the prayer to summon formal witness- Dr. M.S. Beg was allowed and the revisionist did not take steps for summoning this witness and other formal witnesses in relation to whom the prayer sought was also allowed on 14.04.2016 and this aspect of the case has not been refuted/impeached.

¶96

(ii) The private opposite parties were summoned by the trial court vide order dated 12.08.2011 and the applicant, as appears from the record, is not cooperating in the matter for early conclusion of trial.

¶97

(iii) From the aforesaid it appears that only for the purposes of harassing the private opposite parties, the applicant is keeping the case pending and for this purpose the application in issue was moved.

¶98

For the aforesaid, this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned orders. The instant application is hereby dismissed. Costs made easy.

¶99

September 3, 2025

¶100

Anand/-

¶101

(Saurabh Lavania,J.)

¶102

Digitally signed by :- ANAND KUMAR SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Bablu @ Chandra Shekhar Yadav v. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. of Home Lko. and 3 Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Bablu @ Chandra Shekhar Yadav v. State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. of Home Lko. and 3 Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

All orders in this case

Similar cases

Juvenile of Case Crime No. 517/2024 Thru. His Natural Guardian Mother Vs State of U.P Thru. Prin . Secy. Home Lko. and Another

Shrimati Jagpati and 6 Others Vs State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. and Another

Shiv Mangal and 2 Others Vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Deptt. Lko and Another

Virendra Pratap Sen (Titu in Complaint ) and 2 Others vs State of U.P. Thru. Its Addl. Chief Secy. Home Deptt. Lko. and Another

Harsh Singh and 8 Others vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. of Home Lko. and Another

Bablu @ Chandra Shekhar Yadav vs State of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. of Home Lko. and 3 Others