The National Insurance Company Limited vs Smt. Ghazala Praveen and 6 Others

The instant appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been preferred by the insurer of the offending Car No. UP-22-AA4847 against the judgment and award dated 16.04.2025 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Rampur, in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 175 of 2020 (Smt. Gajala Parveen and Others vs. Naved Ahmad and Others), whereby, for the untimely death of Shoaib Ahmad in a motor accident that occurred on 14.07.2020, the claimants, being the legal representatives of the deceased, have been awarded compensation of Rs. 82,37,226/- along with interest at the rate of 7% per annum, which has been directed to be indemnified by the insurer of the offending car.

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Factual matrix is that the deceased Shoaib Ahmad was travelling on Motorcycle No.UP22AA-9122 towards Rampur, then at 3:30 P.M., when he reached Bilaspur-Rampur road near Village Shankara-Peela Khad river bridge, then the above motorcycle was hit head on by Swift Dzire Car No.UP22AA4847, which was being driven in a rash and negligent manner by its driver, resulting in serious injuries to Shoaib Ahmad, who died instantaneously on the spot. The FIR regarding the accident was registered on the same day being Case Crime No.69 of 2020, under Sections 279, 304-A, 427 IPC at Police Station Bhot, District Rampur.

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At the time of the accident, the deceased was aged about 49 years, was teacher in the Basic Education Department, drawing salary of Rs.60,925/per month, besides allowances. The Tribunal assessed the income of the deceased on the basis of his salary certificate, after deducting Rs.2,000/income tax paid by him, as Rs.58,925/- per month and has granted 30% future prospects, applied multiplier of 13 and after deduction of 1/4th towards personal expenses, has awarded compensation of Rs.82,37,226/alongwith interest at the rate of 7% per annum to the claimants, to be indemnified by the insurer of the offending car. The Tribunal has also recorded a finding that there was 10% contributory negligence in the accident on the part of the deceased motorcycle driver.

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Learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company submitted that the finding of the Insurance Company regarding contributory negligence

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on the part of the motorcycle driver is perverse because there were two bridges on the spot and the deceased was travelling on the wrong side of the bridge and, as such, the accident occurred solely due to the negligence of the motorcycle driver, but the Tribunal has not appreciated this fact and has only concluded that there was 10% contributory negligence on the part of the motorcycle driver, which is erroneous.

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Learned counsel further submitted that from the site-plan also it was proved that the entire negligence was of the deceased motorcycle driver. Learned counsel further submitted that at the time of the accident, as per the newspaper reports, the offending car was being driven by a person, who was not having a valid and effective driving licence and, as such, the Insurance Company was not liable to indemnify the claimants.

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Per contra, learned counsel for the claimants-respondents no. 1 to 4 submitted that there is no perversity in the finding recorded by the Tribunal regarding contributory negligence. Learned counsel submitted that it is apparent that the deceased was driving his motorcycle on the extreme left of the road and the car came from the wrong side and hit the motorcycle of the deceased head-on, which proves that the accident occurred due to the sole negligence of the driver of the offending car, but still the Tribunal has concluded that there was 10% contributory negligence on the part of the deceased motorcycle driver.

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Learned counsel further submitted that as per the site-plan also it was apparent that the car came to the wrong side of the road and caused the accident, as such, the finding recorded by the Tribunal insofar as the issue of contributory negligence was concerned, requires no interference from this court.

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Learned counsel further submitted that it was the duty of the owner of the car to disclose who was driving the car at the relevant time and as per Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if the owner discloses the name of the person, who was driving the alleged vehicle at the time of the accident, then it cannot be challenged on the basis of some newspaper report. Learned counsel submitted that no contra evidence has been adduced by the Insurance Company on this issue.

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Learned counsel submitted that after investigation, a chargesheet has been submitted against the driver of the offending car, as such, the finding of accident and negligence requires no interference from this court.

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I have heard the learned counsel of both the sides, perused the impugned judgment and the documents annexed with the appeal.

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The Apex Court in the case of ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited vs. Rajani Sahoo and Others (2025) 2 SCC 599 , has held as under:-

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"8. As regards the reliability of charge-sheet and other documents

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collected by the police during the investigation in motor accident cases, this Court in Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2018) 5 SCC 656 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 819 : 2018 INSC 311] , held in para 27, thus : (SCC p. 672)

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“ 27. Another reason which weighed with the High Court to interfere in the first appeal filed by Respondents 2 and 3, was absence of finding by the Tribunal about the factum of negligence of the driver of the subject jeep. Factually, this view is untenable. Our understanding of the analysis done by the Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No. RST 4701 was driven rashly and negligently by Respondent 2 when it collided with the motorcycle of the appellant leading to the accident. This can be discerned from the evidence of witnesses and the contents of the charge-sheet filed by the police, naming Respondent 2. This Court in a recent decision in Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] , noted that the key of negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly not by standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to observe that the exposition in the judgments already adverted to by us, filing of chargesheet against Respondent 2 prima facie points towards his complicity in driving the vehicle negligently and rashly. Further, even when the accused were to be acquitted in the criminal case, this Court opined that the same may be of no effect on the assessment of the liability required in respect of motor accident cases by the tribunal.”

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9. It is true that the Tribunal had looked into the oral and documentary evidence including the FIR, final report and such other documents prepared by the police in connection with the accident in question. The Tribunal had also taken note of the fact that based on the final report, the driver of the offending truck was tried and found guilty for rash and negligent driving. The High Court took note of such aspects and found no illegality in the procedure adopted by the Tribunal and consequently dismissed the appeal.

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10. In the contextual situation it is relevant to refer to a decision of this Court in Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi [(2023) 13 SCC 510 : 2023 INSC 621] , this Court held thus : (SCC p. 514, para 12)

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“ 12. … A holistic view of the evidence has to be taken into consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof of an accident caused by a particular

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vehicle in a particular manner need not be established by the claimants. The claimants have to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering the petition seeking compensation on account of death or injury in a road traffic accident. To the same effect is the observation made by this Court in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz [(2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] which has referred to the aforesaid judgment in Bimla Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] .”

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11. Thus, there can be no dispute with respect to the position that the question regarding negligence which is essential for passing an award in a motor vehicle accident claim should be considered based on the evidence available before the Tribunal. If the police records are available before the Tribunal, taking note of the purpose of the Act it cannot be said that looking into such documents for the aforesaid purpose is impermissible or inadmissible.

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12. It is also a fact that the appellant had attributed that the respondent claimants connived with police and fraudulently prepared the chargesheet. The contention is that the vehicle insured with the appellant was not involved in the accident and the accident had occurred solely due to the rash and negligence on the part of the deceased. But the evidence on record would reveal that pursuant to the filing of the final report, cognizance was taken for rash and negligent driving which resulted in the death of Udayanath Sahoo."

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(emphasis supplied)

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The Apex Court in the case of Ranjeet and another vs. Abdul Kayam Neb and another 2025 SCC OnLine Sc 497, has held as under:-

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"4. It is settled in law that once a charge sheet has been filed and the driver has been held negligent, no further evidence is required to prove that the bus was being negligently driven by the bus driver. Even if the eyewitnesses are not examined, that will not be fatal to prove the death of the deceased due to negligence of the bus driver. "

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(emphasis supplied)

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The Apex Court in the case of Jiju Kuruvila & Ors. vs. Kunjujamma Mohan & Ors. (2013) 9 SCC 166, held as under:-

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“ 20.5. The mere position of the vehicles after accident, as shown in a scene mahazar, cannot give a substantial proof as to the rash and negligent driving on the part of one or the other. When two vehicles coming from opposite directions collide, the position of the vehicles and its direction, etc. depends on a number of factors like the speed of vehicles, intensity of collision, reason for collision, place at which one vehicle hit the other, etc. From the scene of the accident, one may suggest or presume the manner in which the accident was caused, but in the absence of any direct or corroborative evidence, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether there was negligence on the part of the driver. In absence of such direct or corroborative evidence, the Court cannot give any specific finding about negligence on the part of any individual.

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20.6. The post-mortem report, Ext. A-5 shows the condition of the deceased at the time of death. The said report reflects that the deceased had already taken meal as his stomach was half-full and contained rice, vegetables and meat pieces in a fluid with strong smell of spirit. The aforesaid evidence, Ext. A-5 clearly suggests that the deceased had taken liquor but on the basis of the same, no definite finding can be given that the deceased was driving the car rashly and negligently at the time of accident. The mere suspicion based on Ext. B-2 “scene mahazar” and Ext. A-5 post-mortem report cannot take the place of evidence, particularly, when the direct evidence like PW 3 (independent eyewitness), Ext. A-1 (FIR), Ext. A-4 (charge-sheet) and Ext. B-1 (FI statement) are on record.”

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The Apex Court in the case of Prabhavati & Ors. vs. Managing Director, Bangalore Metropolitan, Transport Corporation 2025 SCC OnLine SC 455 , held as under:-

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“ 10. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court on the 25% contributory negligence of the deceased and 75% upon the driver of the bus. We find ourselves to agree with the view taken by the Tribunal on this issue. The Tribunal rightly, after considering the evidence on record and on perusal of the Ex. P3 Spot Mahazar, came to the conclusion that there wasn't any sufficient evidence on record, indicating that the accident occurred due to negligent driving on the part of the deceased, and after considering the oral evidence of P.W.1, held the cause of the accident to be rash and negligent on the part only of the offending

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vehicle.

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11. Thus, in our considered view, the contributory negligence taken by the High Court at 25% of the deceased is erroneous. We advert to the principles laid down in Jiju Kuruvila v. Kunjujamma(supra) where it was held that in the absence of any direct or corroborative evidence on record, it cannot be assumed that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of both the vehicles. This exposition came to be followed in Kumari Kiran v. Sajjan Singh (2015) 1 SCC 539. In the present case, therefore, on an allegation simpliciter, it cannot be presumed that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of both vehicles, for having driven at high speed.”

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It is the claimants' case that on the date of the accident the deceased, Shoaib Ahmad was driving Motorcycle No.UP22AA-9122, then the offending Swift Dzire Car No.UP22AA4847 came from the wrong side and hit the above motorcycle head on resulting in serious injuries to Shoaib Ahmad, who died instantaneously on the spot. The claimants have examined Naseem Ahmad as PW2, who has proved the accident. This witness has deposed that he knew Shoaib Ahmad prior to the accident, and at the time of the accident, he was going on his motorcycle behind the motorcycle of Shoaib Ahmad, then suddenly the offending car, which was being driven in a rash and negligent manner came in front on the wrong side and hit the motorcycle of Shoaib Ahmad. He further deposed that he saw the accident and apprehended the driver of the car on the spot and also saw the registration number of the car.

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It is apparent that the first information report regarding the accident has been registered on the same day against the unknown driver of the above offending car and after investigation, a chargesheet has been submitted against the driver Mukhteyar Ahmad. It is further apparent that in the technical inspection of the offending car, its transmission, suspension, brake, clutch, both the front tyres, both mirrors, electrical system, front lights, fuel system, bonnet, bumper, radiator, dashboard etc. have been found severely damaged, which itself proves that the accident occurred head on.

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From the site-plan also it is evident that at the time of the accident, the deceased was driving the motorcycle on the bridge on the extreme left, then the car came from its left to right side of the road and hit the motorcycle head-on, which was corroborated from the evidence of eye witness Naseem Ahmad, PW-2. The tribunal has appreciated the above evidence on record and has concluded that the deceased was somewhat negligent in the accident and has accordingly, attributed 10% contributory negligence to the deceased, which cannot be said to be perverse, in the facts and circumstances of the case, warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

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Accordingly, the conclusion of the Tribunal, insofar, as the quantum of the contributory negligence on the part of the deceased is concerned, warrants no interference from this Court.

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It is further apparent that in the first information report, the name of the driver of the offending car has not been disclosed and it was disclosed in the written statement submitted by the owner that Mukhteyar Ahmad was driving the offending car at the time of the accident. The owner and driver of the car have admitted the accident, but have submitted that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the motorcycle driver. No contra evidence has been led by the Insurance Company to the effect that some other person was driving the car on the date of the accident.

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Learned counsel for the appellant during the course of arguments has attracted the attention of this Court towards the newspaper report describing the accident, but it is well settled that the news printed in a newspaper, is not an evidence and it is only a hear-say evidence, on which no reliance can be placed. On the basis of newspaper report, it cannot be inferred that Mukhteyar Ahmad was not driving the offending car on the date of the alleged accident. No other point was pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant.

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