1. Where a person claims settlement of land under Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act, it must be ascertained that the land was appurtenant to the claimant's house before the abolition of zamindari. 'Appurtenant' implies a dependence of the building on the land for its beneficial use, not mere proximity. However, land may be appurtenant even if separated from the house by a public path, provided there was user for a sufficient period (e.g., 12 years) for the enjoyment of the house.
2. The definition of appurtenant includes incidental rights subsidiary to the principal property. The land must actually be used for the beneficial enjoyment of the building. If the building was used with a whole stretch of vacant space for a distinct purpose like a fair, the land is not appurtenant in the sense of the Act.
3. An easementary right may be acquired by the owner or occupier of land for the beneficial enjoyment of that land over other land. It does not require possession of the dominant heritage but requires proof of nature, acquisition, and disturbance of the right.
4. Easementary right and adverse possession are mutually exclusive claims. Adverse possession requires actual, open, hostile, and continuous possession for the statutory period (12 years), denying the owner's title. Easementary right is claimed by an owner of land who is not in possession of the servient land. A party cannot successfully plead both; choosing adverse possession necessitates renouncing the claim of ownership relied upon for easementary rights.
5. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial and first appellate courts are binding in a second appeal unless they are perverse. The courts below can consider the rival title set up by the defendant to appreciate the plaintiff's case, but the failure of the defendant to prove their title does not by itself sustain a decree against them.
6. In the present case, the appellant failed to prove possession of the suit land, while the respondent established possession since the time of his ancestors and beneficial use for agricultural and household purposes prior to vesting, satisfying Section 9. The appeal is dismissed.
