Disposed

Onkar Nath Gaur and Another v. District Magistrate/President Appellate Tribunal Lko. and 2 Others

Allahabad HC13 Dec 2024A227/612/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Senior citizens challenged an appellate order that modified their Tribunal-ordered eviction of son and daughter-in-law, relying on a decision holding the Tribunal cannot order eviction simplicitor. Noting conflicting Division Bench rulings on the Tribunal's and District Magistrate's powers to evict, the judge found Krishna Kumar per incuriam and referred the matter for a Larger Bench.

What did the court decide?

Notice ordered to private respondents; matter referred to the Chief Justice for placement before a Larger Bench.

Onkar Nath Gaur and Another vs District… — Property and Title | Allahabad HC (2024)

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Court No. - 8

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Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 612 of 2024

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Petitioner :- Onkar Nath Gaur And Another Respondent :- District Magistrate/President Appellate Tribunal Lko. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Arvind Kumar Srivastava,Anurag Narain Srivastava Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.

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Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh,J.

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Heard Shri Anurag Narain, learned counsel for the State petitioners and Shri Upendra Singh, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent no.1.

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Under challenge is the order dated 10.01.2024 passed by the respondent no.1 in exercise of powers under Section 16 of the Uttar Pradesh Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act of 2007 (hereinafter referred to the Act of 2007) by which the order dated 21.02.2023 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate Sadar/ U.P. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Tribunal, Lucknow, as a consequence, an order of eviction which was passed against the private respondents by the tribunal has been modifired by allowing the appeal partly.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the respondent no.2 is the only son of the petitioners while the respondent no.3 is the wife of the private respondent no.2. The petitioners have been living in their house, however, after the marriage of their son with the respondent no.3, their attitude has changed towards the

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petitioners and the respondents no.2 and 3, the respondents no.2 and 3 started ill treating the petitioners and they also had a ill intention of grabbing the house. In the aforesaid backdrop, the petitioners filed a complaint under Section 22 of the Act of 2007 before the Tribunal as constituted under Section 7 of the Act of 2007.

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The complaint of the petitioners came to be allowed and an eviction order was passed by the Tribunal. This order of eviction was assailed by the private respondent no.2 by filing an appeal before the District Magistrate in terms of Section 16 of the Act and the Appellate Authority modified the order passed by the Tribunal by relying upon a decision of this Court in Krishna Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and others 2023; AHC-LKO; 54220 wherein it was held by the learned Single Judge that the Tribunal cannot direct the eviction simplicitor from the property at the instance of senior citizen. It is thus submitted that the order dated 10.01.2024 modifying the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate is not appropriate as it infringes the rights of the petitioners as well as it frustrates the intent of the Act of 2007.

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Learned counsel for the State had raised an objection that the instant petition is not maintainable; inasmuch as the issue in question has been dealt with by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Krishna Kumar (supra) and the aforesaid position has been settled, hence there can be no error found in the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 10.01.2024.

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This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and it

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has also been brought to the notice of the Court that apart from the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Krishna Kumar (supra), there are certain other decisions of this Court where the aforesaid issue has been considered and they are being noticed hereinafter.

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At the outset, a Division Bench of this Court in Ms. Swaraj Varun and another Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2020 (11) ADJ 646 while considering the Act of 2007 and the rules framed thereunder opined that considering the object and purpose of the Act, the prayer for eviction or dispossession could not granted by the District Magistrate in exercise of powers conferred on him under Rule 21 of the Rules 2014. It also held that the issue of eviction can only be examined by the Civil Court in proper proceedings and to that extent the bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court contained in Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 shall not be attracted. The relevant portion of the said report reads as under:-

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"....29. In light of the above discussion, considering the object and purpose of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that the prayer for eviction or dispossession of the respondent no. 5 and her two sons from the house-in-question could not have been granted by the District Magistrate in exercise of the powers conferred on him under Rule 21 of the Rules, 2014. The issue of eviction or dispossession of respondent no. 5 from the house-in-question which is stated to be her matrimonial house can only be examined by a Civil Court in a proper proceeding. The bar under Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 will not be attracted in the instant case. Even otherwise, any such objection, if taken, has to be examined by the competent court in the suit proceeding. "

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8. In Khushboo Shukla Vs. District Magistrate, Lucknow

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and others, 2021 SCC Online All. 794 learned Single Judge of this Court considered the provisions of the Act as well as the

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Rules and it held that neither the Tribunal constituted under Section 7 of the Act of 2007 nor the District Magistrate in exercise of powers as an Appellate Authority had the power to pass an order of eviction. The relevant portion reads as under:-

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"14. In the present case, the impugned order is passed by the SubDivisional Magistrate, Sadar, Lucknow ignoring the law settled by the apex Court in case of S. Vanitha (supra). Paragraph-38 and 39 of the said judgment reads:—

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“38. The above extract indicates that a significant object of the legislation is to provide for and recognize the rights of women to secure housing and to recognize the right of a woman to reside in a matrimonial home or a shared household, whether or not she has any title or right in the shared household. Allowing the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to have an overriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of competing entitlements of a woman to a right in a shared household within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005, would defeat the object and purpose which the Parliament sought to achieve in enacting the latter legislation. The law protecting the interest of senior citizens is intended to ensure that they are not left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. Equally, the purpose of the PWDV Act 2005 cannot be ignored by a sleight of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations have to be harmoniously construed. Hence the right of a woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared household cannot be defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting the summary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act 2007.

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39. This Court is cognizant that the Senior Citizens Act 2007 was promulgated with a view to provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy to senior citizens. Accordingly, Tribunals were constituted under Section 7. These Tribunals have the power to conduct summary procedures for inquiry, with all powers of the Civil Courts, under Section 8. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has been explicitly barred under Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007. However, the over-riding effect for remedies sought by the applicants under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 under Section 3, cannot be interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and protections that are sought to be conferred by the PWDV Act 2005. The PWDV Act 2005 is also in the nature of a special legislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting gender discrimination that pans out in the form of social and economic inequities in a largely patriarchal society. In deference to the dominant purpose of both the legislations, it would be appropriate for a Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance, as envisaged under S.2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that do not result in obviating competing remedies under other special statutes, such as the PWDV Act 2005. Section 26 of the PWDV Act empowers certain reliefs, including relief for a residence order, to be obtained from any civil court in any legal proceedings. Therefore, in the event that a composite dispute is alleged, such as in the present case where the suit premises are a site of contestation between two groups protected by the law, it would be

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appropriate for the Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to appropriately mould reliefs, after noticing the competing claims of the parties claiming under the PWDV Act 2005 and Senior Citizens Act 2007. Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be deployed to over-ride and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of a woman's right to a ‘shared household’ under Section 17 of the PWDV Act 2005. In the event that the? aggrieved woman? obtains a relief from a Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007, she shall duty-bound to inform the Magistrate under the PWDV Act 2005, as per Sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the PWDV Act 2005. This course of action would ensure that the common intent of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 and the PWDV Act 2005 of ensuring speedy relief to its protected groups who are both vulnerable members of the society, is effectively realized. Rights in law can translate to rights in life, only if there is an equitable ease in obtaining their realization.”

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15. From the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, it stands settled that both the Acts i.e. Senior Citizens, Act, 2007 and PWDV Act, 2005 are to be read simultaneously and a wife cannot be ousted from her matrimonial home on the basis of the summary proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. In the present case, the SubDivisional Magistrate, Sadar, Lucknow has passed the order in violation of the law settled by the Supreme Court by directing eviction of the petitioner under the provisions of Senior Citizens Act, 2007."

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Once again, this issue was considered by another Division

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Bench of this Court in Bipraji Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others 2021 SCC Online All. 964 wherein after considering the scheme of the Act of 2007 held that the District Magistrate in exercise of Rule 21 did not have the powers to decide the dispute in respect of title and ownership and would also not have the power to order eviction. The relevant portion reads as under:- para 23 to 31

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"23. It is to be seen that under Rule 21 Sub-Rule (2)(i) of the Rules of 2014, the District Magistrate has been conferred with the duty to ensure the life and property of senior citizens of the district are protected and they are able to live with security & dignity and further under Rule 22 a comprehensive action plan has been envisaged for the welfare of senior citizens. The power conferred on the District Magistrate by Rule 21 of the Rules of 2014 are for the purpose of providing protection to the life and property of the senior citizens.

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24. The scheme of the Act would go to show that in respect of maintenance of the senior citizens under Chapter II of the Act of 2007, adjudicatory mechanism has been placed under the Act of 2007. For the purpose of maintenance of senior citizens, a Maintenance Tribunal has been constituted under Section 7 to

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adjudicate upon the issue with regard to maintenance of senior citizens and parents and the aforesaid Tribunal has been conferred with the power of civil court under Section 8 of the Act for the purpose of determination of the issues before the Maintenance Tribunal. It is further to be seen that adjudicatory mechanism has been provided under Chapter II of the Act of 2007, for which the Tribunal is the authority to adjudicate the dispute.

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25. In so far as the power conferred under Rule 21 to the District Magistrate is concerned, the said power is limited to the protection of the life and property of the senior citizens. No such power has been conferred on the District Magistrate to be part of adjudicatory mechanism under the act and the power of the District Magistrate are executive in nature and he is only required to protect the property of the senior citizens, where from the records or otherwise, it can be found that the title of the property or rights to the property is vested in the senior citizen. The proceedings before the District Magistrate are summary in nature and only limited inquiry can be made by the District Magistrate for the purpose of carrying out the object of Rule 21, to find out whether the property belongs to senior citizens or not or the senior citizen has any right in the property in question. Rule does not in any manner permit the District Magistrate to consider the disputed claim of the parties in respect of title or rights to the property. The “protection” of property must therefore be understood to mean where a senior citizen retains a property in his name or possession for his welfare and well being.

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26. The adjudicatory mechanism under the present constitutional frame work is provided to the ordinary courts of law and executive is not conferred with powers to determine the rights of the parties in respect of property. Where ever the power has been conferred on the executive to adjudicate the rights of the parties under any law, the power has been well defined and the jurisdiction of executive authority under the relevant law is also prescribed. In the Act of 2007, no power have been prescribed of any adjudicatory mechanism being conferred on the District Magistrate for deciding the disputed question of title, right and interest in the property.

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27. It is also to be seen that the dispute in respect title or right to property would require leading of evidence and recording of finding on the basis of evidence led with regard to the right and ownership of the property. The said powers under the constitutional framework is to be exercised by the ordinary courts of law and such a mechanism without there being any provisions in the Act of 2007, cannot be permitted to be conferred on the District Magistrate in the garb of Rule 21 which is limited to protection of property of the senior citizens.

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28. Under section 23, the transfer of property in certain circumstances have been declared to be void and the senior citizen is permitted to approach the tribunal for declaration of the transfer is void or for maintenance as the case may be. In respect of the protection of the property and rights of the senior citizen arising out of the property under section 23, the adjudicatory mechanism has been conferred on the maintenance Tribunal constituted under

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chapter 2 of the Act of 2007.

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29. Under the scheme of the above-mentioned act, wherever the adjudication of the right of a senior citizen is required, the power has been conferred under the aforesaid act on the tribunal. The tribunal has also been conferred with the powers of the civil court under Section 8 of the Act of 2007. The orders passed by the tribunal under the act is subjected to an appeal under Section 16 of the Act of 2007. It is to be seen that the adjudicatory mechanism in place under the aforesaid act for the purpose of maintenance of senior citizen and for protection of the rights conferred under Section 23 of the Act of 2007, indicate that the power of the District Magistrate under the aforesaid act for protection of the property & life of the senior citizen is san of any adjudication at the behest of the District Magistrate in respect of any disputed claim to the property or the rights of the senior citizen.

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30. The District Magistrate under Rule 21 of Rules of 2014 is not an adjudicatory forum in respect of serious dispute of title between the senior citizen and the third party. The provisions contained in the Act of 2007 and the rules framed thereunder merely provide for protection of the rights of the senior citizen over the property with the object of maintenance of such property. The act does not intend to create any new forum for adjudication or determination of the property dispute or rights in the property between individuals. The powers of the District Magistrate under the Rules of 2014 would require the District Magistrate to ascertain that the applicant before the aforesaid authority is a senior citizen and further the property in respect of which the protection is being sought is in the ownership of the senior citizen or the senior citizen has any right, interest or title in the property in dispute. The right or title or interest in the property as claimed by the senior citizen should be an existing right which is without any cloud on the title, interest or right of the senior citizen in the aforesaid property. Where there are serious dispute with regard to the title, interest or right of the senior citizen to the property in question and the aforesaid dispute can only be resolved by leading evidence and further by recording a finding in respect of title of the property, the district magistrate in such circumstances would not have the authority to consider upon the rival claims of the parties specifically in the case where the dispute with regard to the property is with the third party who is neither the relative nor the children of the senior citizen.

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31. It is further to be seen that under the Act of 2007, no adjudicatory powers have been conferred on the District Magistrate and under section 22 of the Act of 2007 a direction was issued to the state government to prescribe a comprehensive action plan for providing protection to life and property of the senior citizen. The State government while exercising the powers under section 32 of the Act of 2007 has framed the Rules of 2014 where under the District Magistrate has been conferred with the powers to protect the property & life of the senior citizen. It is for the legislature to confer adjudicatory powers on any authority and we have already observed that such power of adjudication, in respect of disputed claim to property is neither intended to be conferred upon the District Magistrate nor has actually been conferred upon the District

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Magistrate. We are therefore inclined to read down Rule 21 in light of the statutory scheme and clarify that the power vested in the District Magistrate vide Rule 21 does not extend to potential claims in respect of property where title, interest or possession needs determination/adjudication. For the aforesaid purpose the District Magistrate can make a summary enquiry as regard to the title, interest of the senior citizen in the property in question however the intrinsic question of title or right which requires evidence and adjudication could not be gone into by the District Magistrate under the aforesaid Rule of 2014."

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Yet again, another Single Judge of this Court in Abhishek Tiwari and another Vs. State of U.P. and others which was tagged alongwith another petition Rahul Vs. State of U.P. and others had the occasion to consider the provisions of the Act of 2007 as well as the Rules of 2014 and by means of its judgment dated 31.05.2022, held that the Tribunal in terms of Section 7 cannot direct eviction but in befitting cases, the District Magistrate, in exercise of powers under Rule 21 of the Rules of 2014 can order eviction, if conditions are fulfilled. While deciding the issue in Abhishek Tiwari (supra) learned Single Judge also considered the decision of the Apex Court in S. Vanitha Vs. Deputy Commissioner Bengaluru Urban District and others (2020) SCC Online SC 1023 and it also noticed the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Abhishek Tiwari (supra). The relevant portion thereof read as under:-

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"31. Considering the judgments of various High Courts and the difference in the rules framed in the State of Delhi and in the State of U.P., I have no hesitation in holding that the SDM did not have any powers to direct eviction and the SDM can only direct the children or relatives to provide for residential needs of parents if such an application is moved and the Tribunal finds it appropriate to order so. However, the District Magistrate who could have exercised such powers under Rule 21 that too if the conditions were satisfied to come to a conclusion that the senior citizens are being prohibited from enjoying the property and are being deprived of the same at the hands of the children or relatives which, I fear, is not existing in the present case.

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32. Conclusions :

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On interpretation and analysis of the Act, my conclusion is that under Chapter II, no power is vested in the Tribunal to direct eviction simplicitor from the property at the instance of senior citizens. However, the Tribunal is fully empowered to direct the children/relatives (as the case may be) to provide for a residence on an application being filed under Chapter II by a senior citizen.

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The District Magistrate is empowered under Chapter V to pass orders and take such steps as may arise for ensuring that the senior citizen may enjoy the property, such steps may include right to order eviction only as a last recourse and in relation to a specific part of the property which are in joint possession of senior citizens as well as children/relatives.

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33. Coming to the relief that can be moulded/granted in the present case, the allegation of the senior citizens was that the daughter in law, the petitioner no.2 had slapped the respondent no. 6 and on several occasions had issued threats and thus, there was apprehension and fear lurking in the minds of the respondent no.6 and her husband, the appropriate relief that can be granted to the respondents in the present case, in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is to direct the District Magistrate to ensure the safety and well being of the respondent no.6 and her husband and if required to use such measures as may be deemed appropriate by the District Magistrate on a request being made by the respondent no.6.

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I also deem it appropriate to injunct the petitioners herein not to go to the ground floor portion of the house and not to do any acts to cause any inconvenience to the respondent no.6 and her husband. Any violation of this directions shall be dealt with by the concerned police station, on respondent no.6 or her husband approaching them.

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34. I have not gone into the second question raised by the counsel for the petitioners that the order passed is in violation of the principles of natural justice as I have already held that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to direct the eviction under the Scheme of the Act."

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At this stage, it will be relevant to notice that in the case of Khushboo Shukla (supra) the Division Bench decision of Ms. Swaraj Varun (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Court though the ratio of the said judgment was in line with findings recorded by the Division Bench in Ms. Swaraj Varun (supra). The subsequent Division Bench decision of Bipraji Singh (supra) also considered the issue but the decision of the earlier Division Bench in Ms. Swaraj Varun (supra) was not brought to its notice.

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Significantly, the aforesaid two Division Bench decisions

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namely Ms. Swaraj Varun (supra) and Bipraji Singh (supra) were also not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge dealing with the case of Abhishek Tiwari (supra).

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Once again, the issue relating to the powers conferred on the Tribunal in terms of Section 7 of the Act of 2007 and the powers of the District Magistrate in exercise of Rule 21 of the Rules of 2014 came to be considered by another Division Bench of this Court in

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Shivani Verma Vs. State of U.P. and others 2023(6) ADJ 496 wherein the Division Bench overruled the decision of Abhishek Tiwari (supra) and Khushboo Shukla (supra). The said Division Bench laid down the following propositions which reads as under:-

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"67. Conclusion:

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(i) Chapter II and Chapter V of the Act 2007, read with, Rules 2014, operate in different areas and for different purpose, inter alia, pertaining to the property of the senior citizen.

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(ii) Chapter II is confined to order of maintenance to be passed by the Tribunal, which includes, provision for residence either for the senior citizen or parent against children/relatives, but not against minor children or third party.

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(iii) The Tribunal under Chapter II of the Act 2007, read with, Rules 2014, has sole jurisdiction to order maintenance, inter alia, in regard to provision of residence against children/relative. The premises/property sought for maintenance (residence) by the senior citizen, Tribunal alone would have jurisdiction. Tribunal while allowing the application of maintenance in respect of residence can order eviction from the said residential property against children/relatives of the senior citizen.

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(iv) Chapter V is confined to protection of life and property of the senior citizen alone. Protection of property would also include eviction of the occupant from the tangible property. The power is conferred on the District Magistrate. The occupant could be children/ relatives or third party.

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(v) District Magistrate under Chapter V, however, would lack jurisdiction in respect of property, i.e., maintenance for provision for residence, to order eviction of children/relatives from such property. Though, District Magistrate would have power in respect of any other kind of property of the senior citizen, including, order of eviction therefrom.

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(vi) Daughter-in-law, being relative of the senior citizen, can be evicted from the residence sought by the senior citizen for

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maintenance to satisfy his needs for leading a normal life. But such an order of eviction by the Tribunal is subject to the order passed by the competent Magistrate/civil court in respect of shared household under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 20057. The interest of the senior citizen and the daughter-in-law would have to be adjusted by the Tribunal having regard to their competing needs. Daughter-in-law cannot be evicted from the ‘shared household’ in possession or owned by the senior citizen8, though, suitable adjustment can be made by the Tribunal.

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68. In view of law that has been held hereinabove, Abhishek Tiwari (supra) and Khusbool Shukla (supra), is overruled. The decision rendered in any other matter which is in contradiction to the law enunciated hereinabove shall also stand overruled."

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The decision of the Division Bench in Shivani Verma (supra) held that an order of eviction can be passed and it further overruled the decision of Abhishek Tiwari (supra) and Khushboo Shukla (supra) and also held that all other decisions which are contrary to the dictum of Shivani Verma (supra) shall also stand overruled.

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Significantly, the two earlier Division Bench cases of Ms. Swaraj Varun (supra) and Bipraji Singh (supra) were not brought to the notice of the later Division Bench deciding with the case of Shivani Verma (supra).

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Even after the decision of the Division Bench in Shivani Verma (supra), another learned Single Judge of this Court in Krishna Kumar (supra) held that the order of eviction simplicitor cannot be passed and the decision of the Division Bench in Shivani Verma (supra) was not brought to its notice.

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However the order impugned in the instant petition is based upon the decision of Krishna Kumar (supra) which is against the Division Bench dictum in Shivani Verma (supra). Moreover, in light

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of the Division Bench decision in Shivani Verma the decision in Krishna Kumar (supra) is rendered per incuriam.

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Significantly on perusal of the above judgments it would indicate that in Shivani Verma (supra) the decisions of the earlier Division Bench in Ms. Swaraj Verma (supra) and Pipraji Singh (supra) were not brought to its notice. Even the decisions of the learned Single Judge as mentioned hereinabove do not consider the Division Bench cases nor it appears to have been brought to the notice of the Court and all the cases were decided on its own facts.

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This Court finds that there are conflicting decisions of not only of Single Judges of this Court but there is an apparent conflict in the decision of the two Division Benches i.e. Ms. Swaraj Varun (supra), Bipraji Singh (supra) on one hand and Shivan Verma (supra) on the other

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The Core question whether the Tribunal under Section 7 has the power to grant an eviction order or such order of eviction can be granted by the District Magistrate in exercise of powers under Rule 21 of the Rules 2014 or neither, the Tribunal nor the District Magistrate has the power to grant an order of eviction, is to be adjudicated.

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This Court further notices that there are other decisions of learned Single Judges and the Division Benches of other High Courts namely (i) Om Prakash Saini and another Vs. Smt. Manbhar Devi and another of Rajasthan High Court (Division Bench); (ii) Yogesh Kumar & another Vs. Additional Deputy Commissioner, Panchkula

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& another of Panjab & Haryana High Court; (iii) Justice Shanti Sarup Dewan, Chief Justice (Retired) and another Vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others of Punjab & Haryana High Court (Division Bench) wherein similar issues have been considered but again there is a conflict in the said decisions in this regard.

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Since the matter requires consideration, accordingly let notice be issued to the private respondents. Steps be taken within one week, returnable at an early date.

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Since the predominant issue relating to the powers and objects of the Tribunal and the District Magistrate while dealing with matter under the Act of 2007 and as to whether an order of eviction can be passed by such Tribunal or Authority are cropping up frequently before the Court sitting single as well as in Division Bench and there is an apparent inconsistency between two Division Benches, hence the judicial discipline requires and prods this Court to refer this matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court with a request to refer the matter to a Larger Bench in terms of Chapter V Rule 3 of the Allahabad High Court Rules 1952 to settle the controversy by an authoritative pronouncement on the issues mentioned hereinafter.

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This Court frames the following issues for consideration by a Larger Bench:-

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(i) What is the true scope and powers of the maintenance Tribunal constituted under Section 7 of the Act of 2007 which is contained in Chapter-II of the Act of 2007 and whether the Tribunal in

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exercise of its power in context with Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Act of 2007would be empowered to pass an order of eviction while deciding an application preferred before it in terms of Section 5 of the Act of 2017?

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(ii) What would be the true scope and power of the District Magistrate who exercises power as an Appellate Tribunal in terms of Sections 15 and 16 of the Act of 2016 and whether in exercise of such powers the Appellate Tribunal can pass an order of eviction?

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(iii) What is the true scope of Section 21 of the Act of 2007which deals with protection of life and property of senior citizen which is contained in Chapter-V of the Act of 2007 and to what extent the Authority can pass an order for adjudging certain transfers as void in terms of Section 23 of the Act of 2007 vis-a-vis the duties and powers of the District Magistrate conferred under Rules 21 and 22 of Rules of 2014 and in this context whether the orders for eviction can be passed?

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(iv) Whether the Division Bench in Ms. Swarj Verma (supra) and Bipraji Singh (Supra) lays down correct law or whether the law laid down by the Division Bench in Shivani Verma (supra) lays down the correct law?

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Let this matter be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Order Date :- February 15, 2024 ank/-

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Digitally signed by :- ALI NEWAZ KHAN High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Onkar Nath Gaur and Another v. District Magistrate/President Appellate Tribunal Lko. and 2 Others

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Onkar Nath Gaur and Another v. District Magistrate/President Appellate Tribunal Lko. and 2 Others

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