Partly allowed

Smt. Anita Pandey and Another v. the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and 5 Others

Allahabad HC10 Jul 2023WRIC/42913/2016

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In a writ petition challenging DRAT and DRT orders dismissing appeals against bank proceeds, the Court quashed the auction sale due to procedural violations regarding reserve price fixation and defective notice. The Court granted the borrowers two months to clear dues, after which property would revert.

What did the court decide?

Auction sale set aside; two months granted to petitioners to discharge dues; property to revert upon payment; auction purchaser to be refunded with interest.

Smt. Anita Pandey and Another Vs the Debts… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Allahabad HC (2023)

¶1

Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:137165 Judgement Reserved on :07.04.2023 Judgement Delivered on : 10.07.2023

¶2

In Chamber

¶3

Case :- WRIT - C No. - 42913 of 2016 Petitioner :- Smt. Anita Pandey And Another

¶4

Respondent :- The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal And 5 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- In Person,Shailendra Kumar Pandey Counsel for Respondent :- Krishna Mohan Asthana,Anadi Krishna Narayana,Chhaya Gupta,Manish Mehrotra,S.C.,Sanjeev Nigam,Sujeet Kumar

¶5

Hon’ble Ashutosh Srivastava, J.

¶6

Heard Shri Shailendra Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Sanjeev Nigam, the auction purchaser, who has appeared in person and Shri Manish Mehrotra, learned counsel for the respondent Bank.

¶7

The present writ petition has been filed assailing the judgment and order dated 12.04.2016, passed by the Chairperson, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, dismissing the Appeal filed by the petitioners and upholding the judgment and order dated 02.11.2015 passed by the Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad, dismissing the Securitization Application filed by the petitioners. By way of amendment a prayer has been sought for quashing the order dated 02.09.2016 passed by Chairperson, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, dismissing the Recall Application filed by the petitioners for recalling the order dated 12.04.2016, dismissing the Appeal. Further prayer has been made to issue directions upon the respondents to provide details of any dues payable by petitioners after adjusting the deposits made by the petitioners in discharge of the debt.

¶8

Brief facts leading up to filing of the instant writ petition are that the petitioners took a housing loan to the tune of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Ten

¶9

1 of 13

¶10

Lacs), from the respondent bank on 10.04.2008. The Bank disbursed only Rs.9.60 Lacs. The petitioners were not able to pay the instalments regularly, consequently, the respondent Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act and issued notice under Section 13 (2) demanding a sum of Rs. 11,96,260/- including interest upto 31.03.2011. On failure, to repay the amount, the respondent Bank issued possession notice under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act on 25.08.2011. The said proceedings were put to challenge by the petitioners before the Debt Recovery Tribunal by filing Securitisation Application No. 63 of 2013. The Debt Recovery Tribunal, vide order dated 25.10.2013 dismissed the Securitisation Application treating it to have become infructuous as the Bank had withdrawn its process and intended to initiate process from the stage of notice under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act on the basis of the demand notice dated 20.05.2011.

¶11

Thereafter, the respondent Bank issued a second possession notice dated 30.10.2013 for a sum of Rs. 6,74,026/- plus interest. Meanwhile the petitioners filed writ C No. 68377 of 2013, before this Court, challenging the demand notice and the recovery proceedings. This Court vide its order dated 13.12.2013 directed the petitioners to pay the dues in eight equal quarterly instalments. The petitioners deposited one instalment of 85,000/on 08.01.2014, however, due to some dispute with the bank regarding the balance amount and interest claimed by the Bank to be Rs. 5,89,026/towards principal up to 19.07.2014 and interest to the tune of Rs. 1,33,000/-, up-applied interest to the tune of Rs. 3,36,727/- totalling Rs. 10,58,753/- the petitioners did not deposit the balance amount so directed by this Court. In absence of deposit of loan by the petitioners, the respondent Bank proceeded under the SARFAESI Act and issued auction sale notice dated 26.09.2014, which was again put to challenge by means of Securitisation Application No. 276 of 2014. The Debt Recovery Tribunal vide order dated 19.08.2014 set aside the sale notice finding it

¶12

2 of 13

¶13

inherently defective with liberty to the respondent Bank to issue fresh sale notice in accordance with law in its own discretion.

¶14

The respondent Bank again issued sale notice on 09.10.2014, scheduling the auction of the property in question on 20.11.2014. The Securitisation Application being Securitisation Application No. 409 of 2014 was filed by the petitioners challenging the sale conducted by the respondent Bank. The Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad, vide judgement and order dated 02.11.2015 dismissed the Securitisation Application. However, noticing the fact that the sale was not confirmed till 16.10.2015, provided an opportunity of redemption to the petitioners, by permitting them to deposit the entire dues of the respondent Bank within 15 days along with an amount of Rs. 1.00 Lac as compensation to the auction purchaser.

¶15

The petitioners being aggrieved by the order dated 02.11.2015 passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad, filed an Appeal before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal. The petitioners deposited a sum of Rs. 3.50 Lacs as statutory deposit to maintain the Appeal and a further sum of Rs. 7 Lacs during the course of the proceedings of the Appeal. The Appellate Tribunal, vide its order dated 12.04.2016, dismissed the appeal and also held the petitioners to have forfeited the right of redemption. The petitioners filed a recall application before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, for recalling its order dated 12.04.2016. The recall of the order of the Appellate Tribunal was sought on the ground that there was no compliance of Rule 8(5) and 8(6) of the 2002 Rules, inasmuch as the valuation of the secured asset had not been done properly and the reserved price was not fixed in consultation with the secured creditor. The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal vide its order dated 02.09.2016 has dismissed the recall application. The judgement and order dated 02.11.2015 passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, judgement and order

¶16

3 of 13

¶17

dated 12.04.2016 and order dated 12.09.2016 passed by Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, are under challenge in the present proceedings.

¶18

7. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are that:

¶19

(I) There is violation of the statutory provisions contained in Section 13 (2) read with Section 2 (o) and Section 2 (2) of the SARFAESI Act and rule 8 (1), 8 (2), 8 (5), 8 (6), 9 (2) and 9 (6) of Rules 2002 and Section 54 and Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act.

¶20

(II) Possession notice dated 30.10.2013, is defective as only possession of land was taken as in the possession memo only land is mentioned and the structure standing thereon has not been mentioned.

¶21

(III) No proper valuation of the property was obtained and fixing of reserve price is vitiated as it lacks consultation qua the secured creditor.

¶22

(IV) There is violation of Rule 9 (2) and 9 (6) of the SARFAESI Act.

¶23

(V) The right of redemption of the property was violated by the Bank vitiating the SARFAESI proceedings.

¶24

(VI) That the property is a valuable property and the Bank has sold the property at a meagre price to a single bidder who participated in the earlier sale also and thus the auction proceedings are attended with malafides.

¶25

Submissions of the respondent Bank are as follows:

¶26

(I) The Securitisation Application itself was barred by limitation as possession was taken by the Bank on 30.10.2013 and no delay condonation application had been filed and as such the relief qua possession notice could not be granted.

¶27

(II) The Bank has duly complied with the provisions of the Rule 8 (5), 8 (6), 8 (7) and 9 (1) of the Security Interest Enforcement Rules, 2022.

¶28

(III) The Bank obtained the valuation report on 25.08.2014 from an approved valuer and thereafter reserve price was fixed.

¶29

(IV) Rule 8 (6) Notice dated 09.10.2014 was duly issued to the borrower as well as to the guarantor, thereafter, the sale notice was duly published in two newspaper out of which one was in vernacular language on 10.10.2014.

¶30

(V) Bank has complied with Rule 8 (7) of Rules 2002.

¶31

(VI) The sale certificate was prepared on 08.10.2015 and received by the auction purchaser on 17.10.2015.

¶32

The Auction purchaser who has appeared in person submits that he had deposited the entire dues as provided under law but he was not issued the sale certificates due to the pendency of the Securitisation Application.

¶33

4 of 13

¶34

Heard learned counsel for the parties, the auction purchaser in person and perused the record.

¶35

The records reveal that the Debt Recovery Tribunal while rejecting the Securitisation Application vide order dated 02.11.2015 has recorded the following findings:

¶36

(i) The Bank sold the property on the basis of demand notice issued on 20.05.2011. After issuance of the said demand notice the petitioners preferred two Securitization applications and one writ petition. The Bank sold the property on the basis of the possession notice given on 25.10.2011. Thereafter the petitioners preferred one Securitization application and one writ petition before the High Court and expressed their readiness and willingness to pay the dues of the Bank in eight equal quarterly instalments. The petitioners have no right to raise any grouse regarding wrong categorization of amount of NPA, non compliance of Rule 8 (1) and 8 (2) of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules 2002 and issues/ objections regarding non release of loan amount. The petitioners are estopped from raising such issues being barred by principle of res judicata, estoppel and waiver.

¶37

(ii) The Bank complied with the provisions of Rule 8 (5), 8 (6) and 9 (1) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules 2022.

¶38

(iii) The Bank mentioned superstructure embedded on land and no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioners on that count.

¶39

(iv) The sale was not confirmed till 16.10.2015 and held that the petitioners have right to protect their property. The Debt Recovery Tribunal granted right of redemption and provided one opportunity to the petitioner to pay off the dues of the Bank within 15 days along with amount Rs. 1,000,00/- compensation to the auction purchaser.

¶40

The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, affirmed the findings of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, and forfeited the right of redemption of the petitioners on the ground that the petitioners have been defaulters in the repayment of loan in spite of the order of this Court dated 13.12.2013 to pay the due amount in instalments. The auction notice was served and published in two leading news papers scheduling the date of sale on 20.11.2014. The petitioners/borrowers did not even choose to pay the dues or raise any objection.

¶41

The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal further observed that merely because the fixation of the reserve price of the property is stated to be less, in absence of challenge at the relevant time would not be sufficient to

¶42

5 of 13

¶43

set aside the auction sale. The petitioners have not pleaded any ground of fraud and submitted any evidence in this regard. Thus it cannot be held that there was non-compliance of the ‘rules’ to set aside the auction sale of the property.

¶44

In the opinion of the Court, the issue of fixation of the less reserve price was raised at the first instance in the Securitisation Application giving rise to the present proceedings. Thus, it cannot be said that the fixation of the reserve price was not challenged at the relevant time. Further, the correspondence regarding the fixation of the reserve price by the Authorised Officer in consultation with the secured creditor being in the custody of the Respondent Bank, in such circumstances, the Bank was obligated to discharge its burden to establish that the reserve price had been fixed in consultation with the secured creditor by the Authorised Officer. The Court finds that the Respondent Bank has failed to discharge the said burden. The Debt Recovery Tribunal has held that the valuation of the property itself has been obtained by Secured Creditor and the Authorised Officer has fixed the Reserve Price and it tantamounts to consultation inter-se. In the opinion of the Court, there was no consultation with the Authorised Officer and the secured creditor before fixing the reserve price as contemplated by Rule 8(6) of the 2002 Rules.

¶45

The petitioners/borrowers had not exercised any right of redemption under Section 13 (8) of the SARFAESI Act, firstly, as directed by this Court vide order dated 13.12.2013. Secondly at the time of service of sale notice dated 09.10.2014, which was duly published in two leading newspapers on 10.10.2014, the petitioners failed to comply the order dated 02.11.2015 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal and pay the dues within 15 days.

¶46

The learned Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal relying upon the judgement rendered in case of Smt. Sadhana Shukla vs. DRAT & Ors. Reported in 2015 (1) DRTC 489 (A4) held that the sale of the secured

¶47

6 of 13

¶48

asset in public auction as per the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, which has come to a logical end after issuance of the sale certificate, is a complete and absolute sale for the purpose of the SARFAESI Act.

¶49

The Apex Court in the case of Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar, AIR 2015 (SC) 50 has summarised the law observing in Paragraph 27 of the said judgment as follows:

¶50

“27. Therefore, by virtue of the stipulations contained under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, in particular, Section 13(8), any sale or transfer of a SECURED ASSET, cannot take place without duly informing the borrower of the time and date of such sale or transfer in order to enable the borrower to tender the dues of the SECURED CREDITOR with all costs, charges and expenses and any such sale or transfer effected without complying with the said statutory requirement would be a constitutional violation and nullify the ultimate sale.”

¶51

The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the notice under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act was defective and premature as the account of the petitioners were not classified as NPA. The counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of the Court to para 5 and 6 of the Securitisation Application No. 409 of 2016 and its reply filed by Bank. Para 5 and 6 of the Securitisation Application No. 409 of 2014 the petitioners has averred that the account of the petitioners was not classified as sub-standard, doubtful or loss asset as per norms of the Bank. The Bank in its objection in para 9 has stated “ That the contents of paragraph no. 5 and 6 of the Securitisation Application are incorrect, misconceived and without any evidence on record, hence denied”. The learned Debt Recovery Tribunal brushed aside this argument by observing that the petitioners had filed successive Securitisation applications and one writ petition assailing the Securitisation proceedings, hence the same is barred by res judicata , estoppel and waiver. Further the challenge to possession notice is barred by limitation. This finding of the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal could not have been sustained and was liable to be interfaced with by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal. However, the learned Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal failed to consider this

¶52

7 of 13

¶53

argument even though such ground was taken in the Appeal. The first Securitisation application was rendered infructuous on the statement of the respondent Bank that the Bank intended to initiate process afresh from the stage of notice under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act on the basis of the demand notice dated 20.05.2011. The second Securitisation application was allowed and the sale was set aside on the ground that there was defect regarding description of the property in the sale notice. The High Court disposed of the writ petition filed by the petitioners on the willingness of the petitioners that they are ready and willing to deposit the dues of the Bank in instalments. Thus this Court finds that the objection regarding the account having not classified as substandard, doubtful or loss asset were never considered as Securitisation application and writ petition were decided on short points in favour of the petitioners. This Court finds that no case of resjudicata, estoppel or waiver as submitted by counsel for the respondent Bank is made out.

¶54

In State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & Ors. Reported in 2011 (14) SCC 770 ; the Court explained the doctrine of waiver on the basis of earlier pronouncements which are taken note of discussed in the following manner:

¶55

“37. In Manak Lal this Court held that alleged bias of a Judge/ official/ Tribunal does not render the proceedings invalid if it is shown that the objection in that regard and particularly against the presence of the said official in question, had not been taken by the party even though the party knew about the circumstances giving rise to the allegations about the alleged bias and was aware of its right to challenge the presence of such official. The Court further observed that:

¶56

“8. waiver cannot always and in every case be inferred merely from the failure of the party to take the objection. Waiver can be inferred only if and after it is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and was aware of his right to take the objection in question.”

¶57

38. Thus, in a given case if a party knows the material facts and is conscious of his legal rights in that matter, but fails to take the plea of bias at the earlier stage of the proceedings, it creates an effective bar of waiver against him. In such facts and circumstances, it would be clear that the party wanted to take a chance to secure a favourable order from the official/court and when he found that he was confronted with an

¶58

8 of 13

¶59

unfavourable order, he adopted the device of raising the issue of bias. The issue of bias must be raised by the party at the earliest.

¶60

39. In Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines (P) Ltd. r eported in (1994) 2 SCC 448 this Court held as under:

¶61

“26. Acquiescence is sitting by, when another is invading the rights…. It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim…. It implies positive acts; not merely silence or inaction such as involved in laches. … The acquiescence must be such as to lead to the inference of a licence sufficient to create a new right in the defendant….”

¶62

40. Inaction in every case does not lead to an inference of implied consent or acquiescence as has been held by this Court in P John Chandy & Co. (P) Ltd. v. John P. Thomas reported in (2002) 5 SCC 90 . Thus, the Court has to examine the facts and circumstances in an individual case.

¶63

41. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right. It involves conscious abandonment of an existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim [pic]or privilege, which except for such a waiver, a party could have enjoyed. In fact, it is an agreement not to assert a right. There can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived, is fully informed as to his rights and with full knowledge about the same, he intentionally abandons them.

¶64

42. The Apex Court in Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenatns’ Assn. considered the issue of waiver/acquiescence by the non-parties to the proceedings and held: (SCC p. 65, paras 14-15)

¶65

“14. In order to constitute waiver, there must be voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a right. The essence of a waiver is an estoppel and where there is no estoppel, there is no waiver. Estoppel and waiver are questions of conduct and must necessarily be determined on the facts of each case. …

¶66

15. There is no question of estoppel, waiver or abandonment. There is no specific plea of waiver, acquiescence or estoppel, much less a plea of abandonment of right. That apart, the question of waiver really does not arise in the case. Admittedly, the tenants were not parties to the earlier proceedings. There is, therefore, no question of waiver of rights by Respondents 4-7 nor would this disentitle the tenants from maintaining the writ petition.”

¶67

The most important question in respect of challenge of sale proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal before this Court would amount to waiving the mandatory requirement of declaring the account as ‘sub standard’ doubtful’ or ‘loss asset’ before issuing notice under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act. This Court is of the opinion that the Bank

¶68

9 of 13

¶69

has to follow the guidelines of the RBI before declaring any asset as NPA and before issuing notice under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act.

¶70

This Court finds that on a bare perusal of the notice dated 20.05.2011 under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act it has been mentioned that the account of the petitioners was declared NPA on 06.04.2011 but when put to challenge in the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the Bank did not substantiate how the guidelines of RBI were followed while declaring the account of the petitioners as NPA. The reasoning of the Debt Recovery Tribunal that the issue is barred by res judicata is not sustainable as the principle of res judicata is that the said issue should be in issue and decided by the Court. A perusal of the Notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 reveals that the account of the petitioners was classified as NPA on 06.04.2011 while in the letter dated 26.11.2014 issued by the Bank along with the statement of account of the petitioners revealed the date of NPA as 30.06.2011 which establishes the case of the petitioners that their loan account was not classified as NPA on the date of issuance of Notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. This Court finds that auction sale notice dated 09.10.2014 is captioned as ‘Notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 read with Rule 6 (2) and/or Rule 8 (6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002.

¶71

Bare perusal of the alleged notice for sale dated 09.10.2014 reveals that it is ambiguous as the heading starts with “Notice under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act” and body contains the recital that the notice under Section 13 (4) of the Act has already been given on 30.10.2014 in view of the order dated 25.10.2013 passed by the Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad in Securitisation Application No. No. 63 of 2013. In the opinion of the Court, the notice of sale dated 09.10.2014 is not proper rather it is defective. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

¶72

10 of 13

¶73

Mathew Varghese (supra) has held that the procedure in all fairness should be adopted by the auctioneer.

¶74

From the perusal of the record it is borne out that the Debt Recovery Tribunal held that the sale had not been confirmed upto the date of argument i.e. 16.10.2015, while the learned Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal has assumed that the sale had been confirmed on 20.11.2014 i.e. the same date of the auction of the secured asset and proceeded to reject the Appeal. It is not in dispute that 20.11.2014 was the date fixed for the auction. The bid was finalized on 20.11.2014 and the auction purchaser was required to deposit 25% of the bid in terms of Rule 9(3). The balance 75% was required to be deposited within 15 days of the confirmation of the sale as contemplated by Rule 9(4). In the opinion of the Court, the sale could be confirmed only after deposit of the entire bid amount. The balance bid amount was admittedly got deposited on a date subsequent to 20.11.2014. Thus, the sale could not have been confirmed on 20.11.2014 as has been presumed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal.

¶75

This Court finds that the Debt Recovery Tribunal, while dismissing the Securitisation Application observed that the secured creditor and authorized officer have not confirmed the sale upto the date of arguments i.e. 16.10.2015 and in this light granted right of redemption to the petitioners to pay entire dues within 15 days. No appeal has been filed assailing this finding either by the respondent Bank or the auctionpurchaser. However, the learned Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal observed that the petitioners have forfeited their right of redemption of the mortgaged property as they did not comply with the time frame fixed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal and have not deposited the dues of the Bank within 15 days. The petitioners have deposited a sum of Rs. 3.5 Lacs as statutory deposit to maintain the Appeal and a further sum of Rs. 7 Lacs during the proceedings of the appeal. Thus a sum of Rs. 10.50 Lacs stood deposited by the petitioners before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal

¶76

11 of 13

¶77

which has not been accounted for by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal. This Court is of the considered opinion that appeal is the continuation of the suit and in absence of any challenge to the said finding of the Debt Recovery Tribunal either by the Bank or the auction purchaser, the said right of redemption of the mortgaged property could not be forfeited by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal.

¶78

In the opinion of the Court, the respondent Bank did not follow the procedure as provided in the SARFAESI Act in the proper manner and hence the entire proceedings are liable to be set aside. The moment this Court finds that the mandatory requirement of the Rules have not been followed, as held in Mathew Varghese case (supra) to the effect that when there is breach of the mandatory requirement of the provision of the SARFESI Act, the sale is to be treated as null and void. However, considering the fact that the loan was advanced to the petitioners as far back as in the year 2008 and despite ample opportunities having been availed by petitioners to discharge the dues of the Bank the petitioners have failed to liquidate the dues and since the Bank has also admittedly not complied with the provisions of the SARFESI Act the Court deems it appropriate to grant one last indulgence to the petitioners to discharge the dues of the Bank. Consequently the sale of the property in question is kept in abeyance for a period of two months.

¶79

As the sale has been kept in abeyance, this Court grants two months time to the petitioners to discharge the entire liability of the Bank. If the petitioners pay the entire dues, the property shall revert back to the petitioners. If the aforesaid amounts are not paid within the aforesaid two months, the Bank shall be at liberty to proceed to give effect to the sale of the property. In the event the entire dues of the Bank are paid the auction purchaser shall be refunded the amount spent by him along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.

¶80

12 of 13

¶81

It is made clear that this Court has granted 2 months time to the petitioners to liquidate the entire dues of the Bank. No further time shall be granted and no application shall be entertained in this regard.

¶82

With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is partly allowed.

¶83

Date: 10.07.2023 Deepak

¶84

(Ashutosh Srivastava,J.)

¶85

13 of 13

¶86

Digitally signed by :- DEEPAK KUMAR KUSHWAHA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Smt. Anita Pandey and Another v. the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and 5 Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Smt. Anita Pandey and Another v. the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and 5 Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Sunil Sahgal vs Sanjay Gupta and Another

Sher Singh Vs State of U.P. and 3 Others

Lata Vs State of U.P. and 3 Others

Iqbal Khan vs Smt. Manju Bansal and Another

Sabita Yadav Vs the State of U.P. and 4 Others

Rammehar Singh Vs State of U.P. and 6 Others