Allowed

Pawan Verma v. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary Department of Home , Lucknow and Anr.

Allahabad HC28 Jul 2023/7/2022

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In a criminal appeal, the Allahabad High Court allowed the appellant's appeal and ordered his release on bail. The High Court reversed the lower court's order rejecting bail, noting the medical report showed no injuries and the alleged false promise of marriage under Article 21 made the detention unsustainable without compelling seriousness.

What did the court decide?

The appeal is allowed. The impugned order of 06.12.2021 is set aside. The appellant is released on bail with conditions including furnishing a bond with sureties, adhering to Cr.P.C. Section 437 condi

Pawan Verma Vs State of U.P. through Principal Secretary… — Bail and Remand | Allahabad HC (2023)

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Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:49893

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Court No. - 15

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Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 7 of 2022

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Appellant :- Pawan Verma Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Principal Secretary Department Of Home , Lucknow And Anr. Counsel for Appellant :- Sarvesh Kumar Verma,Mohit Kumar,Pramod Kumar,Rajesh Kumar Kashyap Counsel for Respondent :- G.A.

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Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed,J.

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Heard Sri Pramod Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Satendra Kumar Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the entire record.

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This Criminal Appeal under Section 14-A (2) of Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act has been preferred against the impugned order dated 06.12.2021 passed by learned Special/IInd Additional Sessions Judge, S.C./S.T. Act, Lakhimpur Kheri in Bail Application No.306/2021, Computerized No.3716/2021, Case Crime No.258 of 2021, under Sections 376, 417 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)5 of S.C./S.T. Act and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Mitauli, District Kheri, whereby the bail application of the appellant has been rejected.

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This Court has already issued notice to opposite party no.2 vide order dated 05.01.2022. Vide office report dated 27.01.2022, it has been stated that Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur Kheri has sent a letter dated 24.01.2022 wherein it has been stated that the opposite party no.2 has refused to accept the notice. Even till date no counter affidavit is filed on her behalf nor any counsel is present to represent her. As such, it appears that opposite party no.2 is not interested to contest this case.

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Since the matter pertains to bail and learned counsel for the appellant presses urgency in the matter, therefore, this Court has no other option but to proceed further in the matter.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case due to enmity and village rivalry. No such incident as alleged by the prosecution took place.

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As per the case set up by the prosecution, the appellant was in love affairs with the prosecutrix and he made false promise to marry the prosecutrix. However, the family members of the prosecutrix were not ready to marry her with the appellant, thus, she was married somewhere else. Even then also she was continuously loving the appellant and wanted to marry him. On behalf of the false promise of marriage, the appellant continuously made physical relations

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with her and for marrying her, the appellant demanded motor cycle as a dowry. When the family members of the prosecutrix were not able to fulfill the demand of motor cycle, the appellant refused to marry the prosecutrix.

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Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that in her statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., the prosecutrix has repeated the same version of F.I.R. whereas the allegations of rape were not supported by the medical evidences. The doctor in his opinion has opined that there was no visible internal or external injury found on the person of the prosecutrix even no sign of forceful sexual force was seen, as such, final opinion could not be given. The F.S.L. or pathological report is still awaited and till date the same is not available on record.

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Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that no such promise was ever made and even though if any promise is made with the prosecutrix, she was aged about 22 years, as such, she was major and was knowing the consequences very well. The parties are consenting parties. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 and placed reliance upon paras 17 and 21, which are reproduced hereunder:-

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"17. In Uday v State of Karnataka the complainant was a college going student when the accused promised to marry her. In the complainants statement, she admitted that she was aware that there would be significant opposition from both the complainants and accuseds families to the proposed marriage. She engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused but nonetheless kept the relationship secret from her family. The court observed that in these circumstances the accuseds promise to marry the complainant was not of immediate relevance to the complainants decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused, which was motivated by other factors: [(2003) 4 SCC 46].

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25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the

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marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 o'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married (Emphasis supplied).

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21. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellants failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellants promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainants statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 of the IPC has occurred."

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Thus, learned counsel for the appellant submits that in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the promise of marriage made by the appellant to the prosecutrix is in good faith as per the case set up by the complainant, it does not amount to rape as there is a consent of the prosecutrix. The allegation of rape levelled against the appellant are false and, therefore, the appellant is entitled for bail.

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Several other submissions in order to demonstrate the falsity of the allegations made against the appellant have also been placed forth before the Court. The circumstances which, according to the counsel, led to the false implication of the

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accused have also been touched upon at length. It has been assured on behalf of the appellant that he is ready to cooperate with the process of law and shall faithfully make himself available before the court whenever required and is also ready to accept all the conditions which the Court may deem fit to impose upon him. It has also been pointed out that the accused is not having any criminal history and he is in jail since 04.08.2021 and that in the wake of heavy pendency of cases in the Court, there is no likelihood of any early conclusion of trial.

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Learned A.G.A. opposed the prayer for bail, however, he is unable to dispute the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant.

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After perusing the record in the light of the submissions made at the bar and after taking an overall view of all the facts and circumstances of this case, the nature of evidence, the period of detention already undergone, the unlikelihood of early conclusion of trial and also in the absence of any convincing material to indicate the possibility of tampering with the evidence and considering the fact that the statements of the victim recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. are same as stated in the F.I.R., the allegation of rape got demolished after perusal of the medical report, as the doctor in his opinion has opined that no internal or external injury was found on the person of the prosecutrix and her age was found to be 22 years, the F.S.L. or pathological report is still awaited and further considering the larger mandate of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dataram Singh vs. State of UP and another , reported in (2018) 3 SCC 22 and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (Supra), this Court is of the view that the learned court below has failed to appreciate the material available on record. The order passed by the court below is liable to be set aside.

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Accordingly, the appeal is allowed . Consequently, the impugned judgment and order dated 06.12.2021 passed by learned Special/IInd Additional Sessions Judge, S.C./S.T. Act, Lakhimpur Kheri in Bail Application No.306/2021, Computerized No.3716/2021, Case Crime No.258 of 2021, under Sections 376, 417 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)5 of S.C./S.T. Act and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Mitauli, District Kheri is hereby set aside and reversed.

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Let the appellant, Pawan Verma be released on bail in the Case Crime No.258 of 2021, under Sections 376, 417 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)5 of S.C./S.T. Act and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Mitauli, District Kheri with the following conditions:-

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(i) The appellant shall furnish a personal bond with two sureties each of like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned.

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(ii) The appellant shall appear and strictly comply following terms of bond executed under section 437 sub section 3 of Chapter- 33 of Cr.P.C.:-

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(a) The appellant shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter.

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(b) The appellant shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected, and

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(c) The appellant shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence.

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(iii) The appellant shall cooperate with investigation /trial.

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(iv) The appellant shall file an undertaking to the effect that he shall not seek any adjournment on the dates fixed for evidence when the witnesses are present in court. In case of default of this condition, it shall be open for the trial court to treat it as abuse of liberty of bail and pass orders in accordance with law.

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(v) The appellant shall remain present before the trial court on each date fixed, either personally or through his counsel. In case of his absence, the trial court may proceed against him under Section 229-A of the Indian Penal Code.

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(vi) In case, the appellant misuses the liberty of bail during trial, in order to secure his presence, proclamation under section 82 Cr.P.C. is issued and the appellant fails to appear before the court on the date fixed in such proclamation, then, the trial court shall initiate proceedings against him, in accordance with law, under Section 174-A of the Indian Penal Code.

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(vii) The appellant shall remain present, before the trial court on the dates fixed for (i) opening of the case, (ii) framing of charge and (iii) recording of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. If in the opinion of the trial court absence of the appellant is deliberate or without sufficient cause, then it shall be open for the trial court to treat such default as abuse of liberty of bail and proceed against him in accordance with law.

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(viii) The trial court is also directed to expedite the trial of the aforesaid case by following the provisions of Section 309 Cr.P.C., strictly without granting any unnecessary adjournments to the parties, in case there is no other legal impediment.

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Order Date :- 28.7.2023 Saurabh

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Digitally signed by :- SAURABH VERMA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Pawan Verma v. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary Department of Home , Lucknow and Anr.

Case brief

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Pawan Verma v. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary Department of Home , Lucknow and Anr.

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