Allowed

Angad Tiwari and Another v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.Throu. Its Branch Manager and Anr.

Allahabad HC31 May 2022FAFO/747/2013

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appeal against Motor Accident Claims Tribunal award. Supreme Court allowed appeal, enhancing compensation to Rs. 5,96,000/- by revising multiplier, adding future prospects per state rules, and adjusting conventional heads.

What did the court decide?

Impugned award modified and compensation enhanced to Rs. 5,96,000/- payable by respondent Insurance Company with 7% interest.

Angad Tiwari and Another Vs National Insurance Co. Ltd.Throu… — Insurance | Allahabad HC (2022)

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RESERVED A.F.R.

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Court No. - 24

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Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 747 of 2013

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Appellant :- Angad Tiwari and another Respondent :- National Insurance Co. Ltd. through its Branch Manager and another. Counsel for Appellant :- Mukesh Singh Counsel for Respondent :- Deepak Mehrotra,Vikas Pandey

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Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.

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1. This is a claimants’ appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) seeking enhancement of the award made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (for short, ‘the Tribunal’).

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2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are these:

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On 28.03.2012 at about 02:30 p.m., one Rahul Tiwari was on board a Vikram tempo bearing Registration No. UP-42AT-2014 owned by his father, Angad Tiwari. He was proceeding on board the said vehicle along with some of his friends in a funeral procession from Gonda to Ayodhya. The tempo was moving on the left side of the road towards Ayodhya. As the vehicle reached near village Balapur on the Nawabganj-Katra Road within the local limts of P.S. Nawabganj, District Gonda, Rahul Tiwari met some relatives of his. The tempo was parked on the left hand side of the road and Rahul Tiwari was engaged in a conversation with the relatives. Suddenly, a tanker bearing Registration No. HR38K/0913 came on from the Nawabganj side driven recklessly at a high speed. The tanker hit the tempo and those standing around it, leading to Rahul Tiwari’s death besides that of some others on the spot. Still others from amongst occupants of the Tempo were left injured. The deceased was employed on a vehicle bearing Registration No. UP43T/1057 as a Khalasi, a job that yielded him an income in the sum of Rs. 7000/- per mensem . He further

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earned a sum of Rs. 3000/- per month from his agricultural pursuits. The deceased Rahul Tiwari, therefore, had a monthly income of Rs. 10,000/-.

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3. A First Information Report about the accident was lodged, giving rise to Crime No. 115 of 2012, under Sections 275, 337, 338, 304A and 427 IPC, P.S. Nawabganj, District Gonda. It is on the basis of these facts that the two claimants here, who are the father and the mother of the deceased Rahul Tiwari, instituted a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Faizabad. They claimed in compensation for the untimely death of their son, a sum of Rs. 21,60,000/- together with interest. The National Insurance Company Limited, Civil Lines, Faizabad through its Manager were impleaded as opposite party no. 1 to the claim petition, who are respondent no. 1 to this appeal. Smt. Urmila Rungta, who was the owner of the offending vehicle-tanker, was impleaded as opposite party no. 2 to the claim petition and respondent no. 2 to this appeal. Both the Insurance Company and the owner filed their separate written statements. The Insurance Company and the owner both denied the involvement of the offending vehicle. The owner further pleaded that the driver of the offending vehicle, Prahlad had a valid and effective driving licence on the date of accident and the vehicle was insured with respondentInsurance Company from 14.01.2012 to 13.01.2013. The liability, if any, would, therefore, fall on the shoulders of the Insurance Company.

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4. Upon pleadings of parties, the following issues were framed (translated into English from Hindi):

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(1) Whether on 28.03.2012 at about 02:30 in the day at village Balapur Nawabganj-Katra Road falling under the Police Station Nawabganj, District Gonda when the deceased Rahul Tiwari was proceeding on a Vikram tempo with his friends towards Ayodhya, and had parked the tempo on the left hand side of the road to talk to some relatives, tanker bearing Registration No. HR38K/0913 driven by its driver negligently and at a high speed hit the tempo and its occupants who were standing resulting in the

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death of Rahul Tiwari and some others?

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(2) Whether the driver of the tanker bearing Registration No. HR38K/0913 had a valid driving licence at the time of the accident?

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(3) Whether at the time of accident, the tanker bearing Registration No. HR38K/0913 was insured with opposite party no. 1?

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(4) Whether the claim petition is bad for nonjoinder of the owner and the driver of the tempo? (5) Whether the claimants are entitled to compensation? If yes, from whom and how much?

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5. In support of the claim petition, claimant-appellant no. 1 Angad Tiwari has testified as CPW-1 and Harishyam Tiwari as CPW-2. Documentary evidence was also filed, which includes the Ration Card, a copy of the First Information Report, the Registration Certificate of the offending vehicle, the driving licence of the vehicle’s driver, the offending vehicle’s insurance papers, its permit, the offending vehicle’s fitness certificate, its pollution clearance certificate, the accident inspection report, the charge sheet filed in the criminal case and a copy of the family register. No evidence was led on behalf of the insurance company, either oral or documentary.

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6. On behalf of the owner of the offending vehicle, the registration certificate of the said vehicle, its permit, fitness certificate and the driving licence of its Driver, Prahlad were filed.

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7. Issue no. 1 was answered in favour of the claimant-appellants, holding the offending vehicle to be responsible for the accident on account of being driven negligently and at a high speed. It was held that the offending vehicle hit the tempo and the persons standing around it, resulting in the death of Rahul Tiwari and others. Issue nos. 2 and 3 were both answered in favour of the claimant-appellants, holding that the driver of the offending vehicle held a valid and effective driving licence on the date and time of the accident and the offending vehicle was insured with respondent-Insurance Company. In answering Issue No. 4, the non-joinder of the owner and the driver of the tempo was held to be not fatal to the claim.

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8. In working out the compensation payable to the claimants, the Tribunal held the deceased to be aged between 15-20 years, though it was asserted that he was 21 years old. The Tribunal held that there was no proof about the income of the deceased, and, therefore, the deceased’s income had to be worked out on a notional basis, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Laxmi Devi and others vs. Mohammad Tabbar and another, (2008) 12 SCC 165. The annual income was held to be Rs. 36,000/-. This notional income was worked out on the basis of an unskilled daily wager’s prevalent wages, which were, in the opinion of the Tribunal, not more than Rs. 100/- per day. Since the deceased was unmarried, 50% was directed to be deducted towards his personal expenses. The annual dependency of the claimants was, therefore, held to be Rs. 18000/-. The Tribunal applied a multiplier of ‘13’ by taking into consideration the age of the dependents, both of whom were held to be, on an average, aged 47 years. The age of the deceased was not made the basis to determine the applicable multiplier. Thus, to the annual income of Rs. 18,000/-, a multiplier of 13 was applied to arrive at a total dependency of Rs. 2,34,000/-. To the aforesaid figure were added, under the conventional heads, funeral expenses, compensation for the loss of estate and love and affection, a sum of Rs. 5000/-, Rs. 5000/- and Rs. 10,000/- in that order. Adding up the figure of Rs. 20,000/- under the conventional heads to the substantive total dependency of Rs. 2,34,000/-, the Tribunal passed an award directing the Insurance Company to pay the claimants a sum of Rs. 2,54,000/- with 6% simple interest per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition until realization. Both the claimants were held entitled to an equal share of the compensation. It was further directed that a sum of Rs. 50,000/- in favour of each of the claimants shall be invested with a Nationalized Bank, in an interest bearing account, for a period of five years. It is the aforesaid order that the claimant-appellants have assailed in this

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appeal, seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded.

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9. Heard Mr. Mukesh Singh, learned Counsel for the claimantappellants and Mr. Deepak Mehrotra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Insurance Company.

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10. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the claimants that the award made is grossly inadequate and deserves to be enhanced. He submits that the Tribunal has erred in inferring the income of the deceased on a notional basis and pegging it down to a figure of Rs.100/- per day. It is also argued that the multiplier of 13, applied on the basis of the age of the dependents, is manifestly illegal, inasmuch as what is relevant is the age of the deceased. It is also submitted that nothing has been added to the deceased's income towards future prospects, which he is entitled to in view of the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company vs. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680 . It is argued that going by the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi ( supra ), the Tribunal has also erred in granting a miserably low compensation under the conventional heads.

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11. Mr. Deepak Mehrotra, learned Counsel for the Insurance Company has supported the impugned award and says that it is a just award, which ought not to be disturbed by this Court.

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12. This Court has considered the submissions advanced on behalf of both parties and carefully perused the record. There is not much to be said in criticism of the Tribunal's opinion about the income of the deceased. The reason is that there is hardly any evidence offered on behalf of the claimants to establish the deceased's income from his employment as a Khalasi on a commercial vehicle or the other component earned out of agricultural exploits. The Tribunal may not be perfectly right in determining the deceased's income on a notional

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basis, considering the fact that the deceased was a young man, held to be aged between 15-20 years; asserted by the claimants to be 21 years old. The deceased, no doubt, was in the prime of his youth and has to be credited with actual income from his exertions. The Tribunal, however, is not wrong in estimating the deceased's income on the basis of that earned at the relevant time by an unskilled labourer, because there is no evidence about any skilled profession that the deceased pursued, or about his income from employment in agriculture. Therefore, this Court is of opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding the deceased's income to be Rs.100/- per day on the basis of contemporary daily-wages earned by an unskilled labourer. In consequence, the monthly income of the deceased would be Rs.3000/-, which the Tribunal has rightly determined. The Tribunal has erred in not adding anything towards future prospects. The deceased, at his youthful age, had the entire future open to him and would, in course of time, earn much higher wages. The question about the entitlment to compensation on account of future prospects is no longer res integra in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi , where it is held:

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“ 56. The seminal issue is the fixation of future prospects in cases of deceased who are self-employed or on a fixed salary. Sarla Verma [ Sarla Verma v. DTC , (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] has carved out an exception permitting the claimants to bring materials on record to get the benefit of addition of future prospects. It has not, per se, allowed any future prospects in respect of the said category.

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57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardisation, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand would be unjust. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the legal representatives of

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a deceased who was on a fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect a self-employed person; and that apart there is always an incessant effort to enhance one's income for sustenance. The purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for some other change in service conditions, there is always a competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who is selfemployed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. Though it may seem appropriate that there cannot be certainty in addition of future prospects to the existing income unlike in the case of a person having a permanent job, yet the said perception does not really deserve acceptance. We are inclined to think that there can be some degree of difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or applied to in respect of the legal representatives who claim on behalf of the deceased who had a permanent job than a person who is self-employed or on a fixed salary. But not to apply the principle of standardisation on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degreetest is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. Taking into consideration the cumulative factors, namely, passage of time, the changing society, escalation of price, the change in price index, the human attitude to follow a particular pattern of life, etc., an addition of 40% of the established income of the deceased towards future prospects and where the deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years would be reasonable.

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58. The controversy does not end here. The question still remains whether there should be no addition where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Sarla Verma [ Sarla Verma v. DTC , (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] thinks it appropriate not to add any amount and the same has been approved in Reshma Kumari [ Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan , (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826] . Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that salary does not remain the same. When a person is in a permanent job, there is always an enhancement due to one reason or the other. To lay down as a thumb rule that there will be no addition after 50 years will be an unacceptable concept. We are disposed to think, there

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should be an addition of 15% if the deceased is between the age of 50 to 60 years and there should be no addition thereafter. Similarly, in case of self-employed or person on fixed salary, the addition should be 10% between the age of 50 to 60 years. The aforesaid yardstick has been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by the tribunals and the courts.”

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13. The question, however, to be considered is whether the future prospects are to be awarded in accordance with the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi or under Rule 220-A(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1998’) framed under the Act. This issue engaged the attention of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822. The aforesaid decision was rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the context of a motor accident claim that arose from the State of Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, squarely applies to the determination of future prospects in the State of U.P. The said decision holds that future prospects are to be determined in accordance with the Rules of 1998, which provide a precise statutory guide and scale for assessment of such prospects. In Urmila Shukla ( supra ), the question that arose before their Lordships is set forth in Paragraph No.4 of the report. It reads:

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“ 4. The basic ground of challenge by the appellant is that sub-rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A is contrary to the conclusions arrived at by the Constitution Bench of this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd v. Pranay Sethi reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680.”

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14. In answer to the question, it was held in Urmila Shukla thus:

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“ 9. It is to be noted that the validity of the Rules was not, in any way, questioned in the instant matter and thus the only question that we are called upon to consider is whether in its application, sub-Rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must be given restricted scope or it must be allowed to operate fully.

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10. The discussion on the point inPranay Sethiwas from the standpoint of arriving at “just compensation” in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

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11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision inPranay Sethicannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in

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cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 5060 years as stated inPranay Sethicannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid.

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12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs.”

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15. There is little doubt that future prospects in the State of Uttar Pradesh have to be determined in accordance with the Rules of 1998 and not by the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi . Rule 220-A(3) confers greater benefit upon the claimant and going by the principle in Urmila Shukla , it embodies the preferred principle to apply in order to determine future prospects. The deceased was aged below 40 years and, therefore, the claimants are entitled to add 50% to his monthly emoluments by way of future prospects.

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16. So far as the deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased goes, the decision of the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 that has been approved in the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi and followed in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur alias Satwinder Kaur and others, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 410 , lays down the clear principle that “for bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses”, to borrow the precise expression of their Lordships. In Sarla Verma ( supra ), it has been held:

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“ 30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra [(1996) 4 SCC 362], the general practice is to apply standardised deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased,

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should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependent family members exceeds six.

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31. Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the father.

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32. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where the family of the bachelor is large and dependent on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as two-third.”

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17. It must be remarked that the scale regarding deduction towards personal and living expenses of a deceased bachelor is also 50% under Rule 220-A(2)(i) of the Rules of 1998, unless the family of the bachelor is large and dependent on the income of the deceased, in which case the deduction shall be one-third. The case here is not one where the deceased, who was decidedly a bachelor, left behind a large family, dependent on his income. He has left behind two dependents who are his parents. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, deduction of 50% would apply, whether the rule in Sarla Verma is applied or the provisions of Rule 220-A(2)(i) are followed.

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18. The multiplier adopted by the Tribunal, in the opinion of this Court, is grossly inadequate. The Tribunal seems to have applied the multiplier, going by the age of the dependents. The multiplier is to be determined in accordance with the age of the deceased; not his

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dependents. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Amrit Bhanu Shali and Ors. vs National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., (2012) 11 SCC 738 . In Amrit Bhanu Shali ( supra ), it was held:

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“ 15. The selection of multiplier is based on the age of the deceased and not on the basis of the age of the dependent. There may be a number of dependents of the deceased whose age may be different and, therefore, the age of the dependents has no nexus with the computation of compensation.

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16. In Sarla Verma [(2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] this Court held that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the table of the said judgment which starts with an operative multiplier of 18. As the age of the deceased at the time of the death was 26 years, the multiplier of 17 ought to have been applied. The Tribunal taking into consideration the age of the deceased rightly applied the multiplier of 17 but the High Court committed a serious error by not giving the benefit of multiplier of 17 and bringing it down to the multiplier of 13.”

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19. The deceased here was placed in the age bracket of 15-20 years and going by his age, the multiplier, as mentioned in Paragraph No.42 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma , would be 18; and not 13, that the Tribunal has applied.

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20. So far as the compensation awarded under the conventional heads is concerned, the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi are of decisive importance, where it is observed:

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“ 48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [ UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra , (1996) 4 SCC 362] . Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy [ Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy , (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574] it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54)

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“ 54 . … we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.”

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49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned,

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the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows:

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“ 3. General damages (in case of death):

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The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above:

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(i)	Funeral expenses		Rs	2000
(ii)	Loss of consortium beneficiary is the spou	, if se	Rs	5000
(iii)	Loss of estate		Rs	2500
(iv)	Medical expenses — expenses incurred	actual before	Rs 15	,000”
	death supported	by
	bills/vouchers but exceeding	not

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50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [ UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra , (1996) 4 SCC 362] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [ Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh , (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] . The justification for grant of consortium, as we find from Rajesh [ Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh , (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] , is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore.

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51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads.

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52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh [ Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh , (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] . It has granted Rs 25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [ Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh , (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [ Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. , (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167] , it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this

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aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantumcentric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.”

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(Emphasis by Court)

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21. The award of compensation under the conventional heads, particularly, the one for loss of consortium, came up for consideration of the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 . In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. ( supra ), it has been held:

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“ 21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [ National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi , (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium”. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [ Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh , (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]

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21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of “company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation”. [ Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn., 1979).]

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21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training”.

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21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child

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causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit.

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22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognised that the value of a child's consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child.

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23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In case where a parent has lost their minor child, or unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of filial consortium. Parental consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Act. A few High Courts have awarded compensation on this count [ Rajasthan High Court in Jagmala Ram v. Sohi Ram , 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3848 : (2017) 4 RLW 3368; Uttarakhand High Court in Rita Rana v. Pradeep Kumar , 2013 SCC OnLine Utt 2435 : (2014) 3 UC 1687; Karnataka High Court in Lakshman v. Susheela Chand Choudhary , 1996 SCC OnLine Kar 74 : (1996) 3 Kant LJ 570] . However, there was no clarity with respect to the principles on which compensation could be awarded on loss of filial consortium.

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24. The amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under “loss of consortium” as laid down in Pranay Sethi [ National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi , (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] . In the present case, we deem it appropriate to award the father and the sister of the deceased, an amount of Rs 40,000 each for loss of filial consortium.”

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(Emphasis by Court)

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22. Again, Rule 220-A(4) of the Rules of 1998 provides for compensation under the non-pecuniary heads, but the scale of compensation or damages provided under Rule 220-A(4) do not confer better and greater benefit upon the claimants compared to the liquidated figures under each head stipulated in Pranay Sethi . The principle in Pranay Sethi envisages 10% upward revision to be done for the compensation payable under the conventional heads, bearing in

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mind the price index, falling bank interest, escalation of rates in different cases. The Rules of 1998, that have been amended to introduce Rule 220-A more than ten years ago, in the year 2011, do not serve as a realistic index to award compensation under the conventional heads. The determination of compensation in Pranay Sethi would, therefore, be applicable. Now, by the decision in Pranay Sethi , for the loss of estate and funeral expenses, a sum of Rs.15,000/each would be payable.

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23. So far as compensation for the loss of filial consortium is concerned, the claimants, who are the mother and the father of the deceased, would be entitled to Rs.40,000/- each.

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24. In the circumstances, the compensation payable stands to be revised as follows:

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(i) Monthly Income (of the deceased) 3000/- (ii) Monthly Income + Future Prospects =

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(monthly income x 50%) = 3000+1500 4500/-

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(iii) Annual Income (of the deceased) = 4500 =

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x 12 54,000/-

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(iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income – 50% deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased = 54,000 – =

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27,000 27,000/-

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(iv) Total Dependency = Annual Dependency =

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x Applied Multiplier = 27,000 x 18 4,86,000/-

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(v) Claimants’ entitlement towards conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + dependents’ =

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Consortium = 15,000 + 15,000 + 1,10,000/- 40,000+40,000

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The total compensation would therefore, work out to a figure of Rs.4,86,000 + Rs.1,10,000

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= 5,96,000/-

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33. The aforesaid sum of money would carry simple interest @ 7% per annum in accordance with Rule 220-A of the Rules of 1998 from

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the date of institution of claim petition until realization. However, the sum of money already deposited (paid or invested in terms of the impugned award or interim order of this Court) shall be adjusted.

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34. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs throughout. The impugned award is modified and the compensation enhanced to a sum of Rs.5,96,000/- (Rupees Five Lac Ninety Six Thousand only). The said sum of money shall be payable by the Insurance Company. The claimants shall be entitled to simple interest @ 7% on the sum of compensation awarded from the date of institution of the claim petition until realization. The inter se apportionment of compensation and the other directions made by the Tribunal shall remain intact.

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Order Date :- 31.05.2022 Deepak/Anoop

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(J.J. Munir, J.)

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Digitally signed by ANOOP KUMAR SINGH Date: 2022.06.18 19:44:38 IST Reason: Location: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Angad Tiwari and Another v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.Throu. Its Branch Manager and Anr.

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Angad Tiwari and Another v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.Throu. Its Branch Manager and Anr.

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