Dismissed

Omprakash and 4 Others v. State of U.P. and 3 Others

Allahabad HC19 Apr 2022CRLP/4096/2022

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Single Judge held that the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act 1984 applies to encroachment on public land as mischief. The court rejected reliance on the Statement of Objects and Reasons to narrow the Act's scope and quashed the petition.

What did the court decide?

Petition to quash FIR dismissed; authorities directed to proceed with investigation.

Omprakash and 4 Others Vs State of U.P. and… — Public Procurement and Tenders | Allahabad HC (2022)

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Court No. - 44

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Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 4096 of 2022

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Petitioner :- Omprakash And 4 Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Rahul Kumar Tyagi Counsel for Respondent :- G.A.

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Hon'ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra,J. Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar,J.

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This petition has been filed with prayer to quash the First Information Report registered as Case Crime No.0096 of 2022, under Sections- 447 I.P.C. and Section 3 of Public Property (Prevention of Damage) Act 1984, Police Station- Babugarh, District- Hapur on the ground that allegations made in the F.I.R. at best can enable the authorities to initiate action under Section 67 of the U.P. Revenue Code 2006, but lodgement of F.I.R. in respect of such allegation would be impermissible and would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

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Petition is opposed by learned A.G.A.

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We have perused the First Information Report which records that Khasra No.940 area 0.063 hectare is recorded in the revenue records as Jauhad (Public Utility Land). As per allegations the petitioners are trying to encroach upon such land and raise construction upon it. Previously such attempt was stalled by the revenue authorities but the petitioners have again changed the nature of the public property and consequently the F.I.R. has been lodged.

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The aforesaid First Information Report has been lodged under Section 447 I.P.C. read with Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. Section 3 of the Act of 1984 provides that whoever commits mischief by doing any act in respect of any public property shall be punished with

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imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years with fine. Mischief specified in Section 3 carries the same meaning as is assigned to it in Section 425 of the I.P.C. Section 425 I.P.C. provides that whoever with intent to cause, or knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to the public property or to any person, causes the destruction of any property, or any such change in any property or in the situation thereof or destroys or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it injuriously, commits "mischief". Prima facie allegations made in the F.I.R. clearly make out a case of offence in terms of Section 3 of the Act of 1984. Whether these allegations are correct or not would be an aspect to be examined during course of investigation. Petitioners otherwise have not brought on record any material to indicate that this land was ever recorded in their names or have perfected any right over it. A civil suit appears to have been filed by the petitioners for injunction but no proceedings have been instituted for grant of declaration in favour of the petitioners in respect of such land. The statement made in the F.I.R. that the plot in question is recorded as public utility land is otherwise not disputed or shown to be factually incorrect.

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Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in petition Under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No.9964 of 2020; Munshi Lal and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Another, in which the charge sheet came to be quashed by the learned Single Judge relying upon the statement of objects and reasons contained in the act of 1984 so as to restrict its application only to acts of vandalism including destruction and damage caused to public property during riots and public commotion. Reasoning assigned in that regard is contained in para 11 of the judgment in Munshi Lal

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(supra), which is reproduced hereinafter:-

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“11. As far as the P.D.P.P. Act, 1984 is concerned, the same has been enacted with the specific purpose. The statement of objects and reasons of the said Act shows that it was enacted with a view to curb acts of vandalism and damage to public property including destruction and damage caused during riots and public commotion. A need was felt to strengthen the law to enable the authorities to deal with cases of damage to public property. The "public property" as defined under Section 2(b) of the P.D.P.P. Act, 1984 means any property, whether immovable or movable (including any machinery) which is owned by or in possession of or under the control of the Central or State Government or any local authority or any Corporation or any institution established by the Central, Provincial or State Act or its undertaking. Section 3 of the P.D.P.P. Act, 1984 provides that anyone who commits mischief by doing any act in respect of any 'public property' including the nature referred in subsection (2) in the said section shall be punished with imprisonment and a fine depending upon the nature of the property as per subsection (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the P.D.P.P. Act, 1984. Section 4 provides punishment for an act of 'Mischief' causing damage to pubic property by fire or explosive substance. The P.D.P.P. Act, 1984 is, thus, a Special Act enacted to punish for the offence committed under Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act by doing any act of vandalism including the destruction or damage during any riots or public demonstration in the name of agitations, bandhs, hartals and the like. The "Mischief" has been defined under Section 2(a) of the P.D.P.P. Act, 1984 having the same meaning as in Section 425 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). Section 6 is the saving clause which says that the Act' 1984 covers the offence committed under it and the provisions of it are in addition to any other law which provides for any proceeding (whether by way of investigation or otherwise) which may be instituted or taken against the offender, apart from this Act. Special provisions with regard to disposal of a prayer for bail made by a person accused of commission of offence under the Act' 1984 has been provided under Section 5 of the P.D.P.P. Act, 1984.

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The provisions oblige a person found guilty of commission of offence to pay the damage or loss caused to the public property. This Act, thus, covers the specific area of damage or loss or destruction of public property and recovery of such damages from the person(s) who is/are found guilty of such damage during the course of any public demonstration in the name of agitations, bandhs, hartals and the like.”

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Law is settled that statement of objects and reasons can not be relied upon so as to interpret the specific provisions contained in the act itself and it (statement of objects and reasons) can be seen only where the provision is not clear or

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any confusion prevails. In Aswini Kumar Ghose and another Vs. Arabinda Bose and another, AIR 1952 SC 369, Hon’ble Patanjali Sastri, the then CJI, speaking for the majority emphasized the rationale to rule out statement of objects and reasons as an aid to the construction of statute in following words:-

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“As regards the propriety of the reference to the statement of objects and reasons, it must be remembered that it seeks only to explain what reasons induced the mover to introduce the Bill in the House and what objects he sought to achieve. But those objects and reasons may or may not correspond to the objective which the majority of members had in view when they passed it into law. The Bill may have undergone radical changes during its passage through the House of Houses, and there is no guarantee that the reasons which led to its introduction and the objects thereby sought to be achieved have remained the same throughout till the Bill emerges from the House as an Act of the Legislature, for they do not form part of the Bill and are not voted upon by the members. We, therefore, consider that the statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill should be ruled out as an aid to the construction of a statute.”

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In Central Bank of India Vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12, the Supreme Court again held that statement of objects and reasons is in the nature of external aids to interpretation of statutes and can be looked into, only if it is necessary to do so, to ascertain legislative intent in case of confusion. In Gurudevdatta Vksss Maryadit & Others Vs. State Of Maharashtra & Others, (2001) 4 SCC 534, the Supreme Court while following the earlier judgments on the issue made following observations in para 19:-

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“19.Further, after introduction of the Bill and during the debates thereon before the Parliament, if a particular provision is inserted by reason of such a debate, question of indication of any object in the objects and reasons of the Bill does not and cannot arise. The statements of objects and reasons need to looked into though not by itself a necessary aid as an aid to construction only if necessary. To assess the intent of the Legislature in the event of there being any confusion, statement of objects and reasons may be looked into and no exception can be taken therefor this is not an indispensable requirement but when faced with an imperative need to appreciate the proper intent of the Legislature, statement may be looked into but not otherwise. The submission of Mr. Bobde thus can only be given credence only in the event of there being any necessity of

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such a requirement in the facts of the matter under consideration, to wit: some confusion somewhere for assessment of the intent of the Legislature.”

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In cases where provision in statute is clear the need to refer to statement and objects is clearly disapproved. In Anandji Haridas & Co. Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh and Another; AIR 1975 SC 946, the Supreme Court also observed as under in para 8 and 9:-

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“8. We are afraid what the Finance Minister said in his speech cannot be imported into this case and used for the construction of Clause (e) of Section 7. The language of that provision is manifestly clear and unequivocal. It has to be construed as it stands, according to its plain grammatical sense without addition or deletion of any words.

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As a general principle of interpretation, where the words of a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no external evidence such as Parliamentary Debates, Reports of the Committees of the Legislature or even the statement made by the Minister on the introduction of a measure or by the framers of the Act is admissible to construe those words. It is only where a statute is not exhaustive or where its language is ambiguous, uncertain, clouded or susceptible of more than one meaning or shades of meaning, that external evidence as to the evils, if any, which the statute was intended to remedy, or of the circumstances which led to the passing of the statute may be looked into for the purpose of ascertain- ing the object which the Legislature had in view in using the words in question.”

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In Arul Nadar Vs. Authorized OfÏcer, Land Reforms; (1998) 7 SCC 157, the Supreme Court made following observations in para 5 :-

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“5. We may notice at this stage the contentions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that the object of the Act being to further reduce the ceiling area. Section 21-A, if is made applicable to the pending proceeding then said object would be frustrated. We are afraid that this contention cannot be sustained in as much as when the language of a statute is unambiguous, in interpreting the provisions thereof it is not necessary to look into the legislative intent or the object of the Act. As has been stated by this Court in the case of State of Uttart Pradesh Vs. Vijay Anand Maharaj1963 (1) Supreme Court Reports p.1,

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"When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.”

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In Bhaiji Vs. Sub-Divisional OfÏcer, Thandla and Others;

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(2003) 1 SCC 692, the Supreme Court made following observations in paras 11 and 12:-

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“11. Reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons is permissible for understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute sought to remedy. The weight of judicial authority leans in favour of the view that Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be utilized for the purpose of restricting and controlling the plain meaning of the language employed by the Legislature in drafting statute and excluding from its operation such transactions which it plainly covers. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, Eighth Edition 2001, pp.206- 209).

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The learned senior counsel for the appellant placed strong reliance on M/s Girdhari Lal and Sons Vs. Balbir Nath Mathur and Ors. (1986) 2 SCC 237 wherein it has been held that the courts can by ascertaining legislative intent place such construction on statute as would advance its purpose and object. Where the words of statute are plain and unambiguous, effect must be given to them. The Legislature may be safely presumed to have intended what the words plainly say. The plain words can be departed from when reading them as they are leads to patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity or invalidation of a law. The Court permitted the Statement of Objects and Reasons, Parliamentary Debates, Reports of Committees and Commissions preceding the Legislation and the legislative history being referred to for the purpose of gathering the legislative intent in such cases. The law so stated does not advance the contention of Shri Gambhir. The wide scope of transactions covered by the plain language of Section 170-B as enacted in 1980 cannot be scuttled or narrowed down by reading the Statement of Objects and Reasons.”

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Similar view is expressed by the Supreme Court in M/s Govind Saran Ganga Saran Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax and Others; AIR 1985 SC 1041, in Raymond Ltd. & Another Vs. State of Chahattisgarh and Others; AIR 2007 SC 2854, and in Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa, etc. etc Vs. M/s N.C. Budharaja and Company and Another, etc. etc; 1993 AIR SCW 3317 and it can safely be deduced that law on the subject is consistent throughout.

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We, therefore, are not inclined to subscribe to the view taken by learned Single Judge in Munshi Lal (Supra), particularly as the provision contained in the Act of 1984 are clear & admits

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of no ambiguity.

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So far as the petitioners argument with regard to initiation of proceeding under Section 67 of the U.P. Revenue Code is concerned, we notice the argument of the petitioners but are not persuaded to accept it in view of the specific provision contained in Section 6 of the Act of 1984, which reads as under:-

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"The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, and nothing contained in this Act shall exempt any person from any proceeding (whether by way of investigation or otherwise) which might apart from this Act, be instituted or taken against him."

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Section 6, aforesaid clearly provides that provisions of the Act of the 1984 would be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force and nothing contained in this Act shall exempt any person from any proceeding which might, apart from this Act, be instituted or taken against him. Merely because proceedings under Section 67 can also be initiated against the petitioners in such circumstances would not prohibit the initiation of proceeding under the Act of 1984 particularly in view of Section 6.

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The purpose of imposing penalty under Section 67 of the U.P. Revenue Code is to recover the damage for the wrongful use of property whereas the penalty / punishment stipulated under the Act 1984 is a separate and distinct offence specified in the Act of 1984. Sub-section 3 of Section 67 is extracted herein below:-

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"(3) If the person to whom a notice has been issued under subsection (2) fails to show cause within the time specified in the notice or within such extended time as the Assistant Collector may allow in this behalf, or if the cause shown is found to be insufficient, the Assistant Collector may direct that such person

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shall be evicted from the land, and may, for that purpose, use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary, and may direct that the amount of compensation for damage or 34 misappropriation of the property or for wrongful occupation, as the case may be, be recovered from such person as arrears of land revenue."

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In the event necessary ingredients to attract an offence under the Act of 1984 are made out, the consequences flowing from the statute can not be curtailed merely because a distinct course is otherwise stipulated to recover the damages under the Code of 2006.

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Argument of learned counsel for the petitioners based upon Rule 67 (7) that only where action is taken under Section 67 that the proceedings under Section 447 I.P.C. can commence is based wholly on the misreading of the provision itself which reads as under:-

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"67.(7) Nothing in sub-rule (5) shall debar the Land Management Committee or the local authority as the case may be from prosecuting the person who encroaches upon the same land second time in spite of having been evicted under the Code or the rules, under section 447 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860."

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In our opinion the proceedings under the I.P.C. read with act of 1984 are independent proceedings which are not affected or circumscribed in any manner by the provisions and the proceedings under the Act of 2006 or the Rules framed pursuant thereto of the year 2016. In the facts of the case, it is otherwise noticed that the F.I.R. contains specific allegations that initially encroachment by the petitioners was got stopped but since the petitioners have again encroached upon the land therefore proceedings have been initiated under the Act of 1984 and the I.P.C.

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