Dismissed

Ram Dayal and Another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and 2 Others

Allahabad HC12 Feb 2021WRIB/309/2021

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This court examined a plea challenging the condonation of a 30-year delay by a revisional authority in a land consolidation matter. Upholding the finding that the delay was caused by fraud and collusion, the court dismissed the writ petition for lack of infirmity in the impugned order, noting that Section 11-C mandates protection of State interests. The court did not adjudicate the merits of the l

What did the court decide?

The writ petition was dismissed on the ground that there was no infirmity in the impugned order condoning delay.

Ram Dayal and Another Vs Deputy Director of Consolidation… — Land Acquisition | Allahabad HC (2021)

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Court No. - 6

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Case :- WRIT - B No. - 309 of 2021

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Petitioner :- Ram Dayal And Another Respondent :- Deputy Director Of Consolidation And 2 Others

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Counsel for Petitioner :- Umesh Chandra Prajapati Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Deepak Gaur

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Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot,J.

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By the impugned order dated 18.01.2021, the respondent No.1-Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jhansi has condoned the delay in filing the revision by the State.

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The impugned order dated 18.01.2021, records that the order dated 12.04.1989 was brought in revision along with the delay condonation application. The initial order was passed by the Consolidation Officer on 12.03.1983 allotting various plots including Plot No.1160, etc. to the objectors (the petitioners). The notification under Section 52 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 was thereafter published signifying the end of consolidation operations. The father of the petitioners carried the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 12.06.1983 in appeal in 1989. The appeal was delayed by 6 years. The service of summons was shown upon the Land Management Committee through its President. The then Pradhan tendered an application without taking permission of the competent State Authorities. The Settlement Officer Consolidation decided the matter without hearing the necessary parties. The learned appellate authority altered the valuation of various plots in an arbitrary manner. The exercise was clearly beyond jurisdiction, inasmuch as, it was undertaken long years after the publication of notification under Section

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52 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. Various necessary parties including the person, who was allotted Chak No.20 were not impleaded in the appeal. The Settlement Officer Consolidation completely neglected to consider the best interests of the Gaon Sabha and the State Government as contemplated in Section 11-C of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The interests of the State were undermined.

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The impugned order dated 18.01.2021 thereafter records specific findings that the order dated 12.04.1989 was vitiated by collusion and fraud. A number of members of the petitioner's family were Pradhans (including the petitioner No.1-Ram Dayal) at relevant times. The petitioners and their family members exercise considerable influence in the area. They prevented the aforesaid processes and orders from being made public and kept them under the wrap. The order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation was not in the knowledge of the competent State authority. The knowledge of the aforesaid order came to the authorities when the respondents tried to take forcible possession over the land of the Gaon Sabha. The cause of delay was found to be sufficient by the revising court, and the delay was condoned by the impugned order dated 18.01.2021.

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Sri Umesh Chandra Prajapati, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the delay was illegally condoned by the revisional authority. The delay of almost 30 years was not liable to be condoned.

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Learned Standing Counsel for the State – respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on the other hand submits that the exercise of condonation of delay has to be seen in the context of the

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facts of the case. Where the proceedings are vitiated by collusion and fraud, the extent of the delay cannot come to the aid of the petitioners.

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Sri Deepak Gaur, learned counsel for the respondent No.3-Gaon Sabha adopts the submission of the learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents No.1 and 2.

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Heard learned counsel for the respective parties.

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The order on the delay condonation application was passed by the learned revisional court after hearing the petitioners. The arguments made before this Court inconsistent with the stand taken by the petitioners in their pleadings before the court below. The learned revisional court while deciding the delay condonation application has found that the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation was vitiated by fraud and collusion. The petitioners and their family members exert considerable political influence in the area. They managed to obtain a favourable order in collusive proceedings, and thereafter successfully managed to keep the aforesaid proceedings completely hidden from the public eye. There were deviations from procedures to obtain permission from the State authorities. These concessions were made to the detriment of the State to the benefit of the petitioners. The order was never brought to the knowledge of the competent authority. The procedure adopted by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, clearly compromised the interests of the State. The cause for delay was found to be sufficient by the learned courts below.

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Pleadings in the writ petition are weak and vague and not sufficient to disturb the aforesaid findings of fact. This Court sitting in the writ jurisdiction is always reluctant to interfere

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in findings of fact unless perversity is writ large on the face of the record. No perversity has been shown in the facts of this case. Moreover, most importantly the petitioners have not produced the order passed by the Consolidation Officer in the year 1983.

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It is now apposite to reinforce the narrative of good authority in point. The purpose of laws of limitation is to ensure that the parties remain vigilant to their cause and institute their claim in good time. The mandate of laws of limitation is not to shut the doors of justice to the parties or decline adjudication on merits. On the contrary it is the constant endeavour the courts and authorities to adjudicate issues on merits, and dispense justice on a substantive basis.

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There is good authority to hold that the courts and authorities should adopt a liberal, pragmatic and a justice oriented approach matters of condonation of delay. Equally pedantic view should be avoided and servitude to procedure in such matters should be eschewed.

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition V. Mst. Kati Ji and others , reported at 1987 (13) ALR 306 (SC) took a liberal view of the phrase “sufficient cause” and held as follows:

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"The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy."

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And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:

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1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this; when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would he decided on merit after hearing the parties.

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3. "Every" day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner.

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4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side can not claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

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5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by restoring to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.

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It must be grapped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."

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This view was fortified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

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N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy reported at 1998 (7) SCC 123 . The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted here under:-

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"The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts.

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So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy."

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Conduct and vigilance shown by a party are relevant criteria for consideration in an application seeking condonation of delay. In Shakuntala Devi Jain V. Kuntal Kumari reported at AIR 1969 SC 575, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court liberally construed the expression “sufficient cause” in New India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Smt. Shanti Misra reported at AIR 1976 SC 237 , by holding that discretion given by section 5 should not be defined so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned the courts to be mindful of the consequences of refusal to condone the delay leading to miscarriage of justice in O.P. Kathpalia V. Lakhmir Singh reported at AIR 1984 SC 1744 .

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The law set its face against an injustice-oriented approach while considering the applications for condonation of delay in Smt. Prabha V. Ram Prakash Kalra reported at 1987 (Suppl.) SCC 338.

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The authorities cited above are applicable to the facts of the case, and reinforce the impugned order dated 18.01.2021. The impugned order is correct in facts and consistent with law discussed in the preceding narrative. The delay was rightly condoned by the impugned order.

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There is another aspect of the matter. This Court notices the fact that public lands in the State of Uttar Pradesh are particularly vulnerable to encroachment and collusive litigations which undermine the interests of the State. Often the Gram Pradhan, who is President of the Land Management Committees gives in to political expediency, instead of looking at the higher interests of the State and public at large. State authorities also fail to display due diligence and on many occasions show callous disregard to encroachments over public lands.

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The legislature was conscious of the aforesaid infirmities in the system, and hence, introduced Section 11-C in the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The provision mandates the Consolidation Authorities to protect the interest of the State Government and the Gaon Sabha even in absence of any application, objection, appeal or revision being filed by the Government, Gaon Sabha and competent authority in that regard.

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It would be apposite to reproduce the provision of Section 11-C of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 hereunder:

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“ 11-C. In the course of hearing of an objection under Section 9-A or an appeal under Section 11, or in proceedings under Section 48, the Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) or the Director of Consolidation, as the case may be, may direct that any land which vests in the State Government or the Gaon Sabha or any other local body or authority may be recorded in its name, even though no objection, appeal or revision has been filed by such Government, Gaon Sabha , body or authority.”

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The legislative wisdom and aforesaid intent is borne out by the facts of this case. Clearly the Settlement Officer Consolidation while passing the order prima facie

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overlooked the mandate of Section 11-C of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 by permitting the petitioners to benefit from the fruits of collusive litigation. The order is liable tested on its merits by the revising court. 23. It is clarified that this Court has not entered into the merits of the dispute. The observations made in this judgement shall not influence the merits of the case which shall be determined by the competent court upon independent application of mind and in accordance with law. 24. In the wake of preceding discussion, no case is made out to exercise discretionary jurisdiction vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioners as there is no infirmity in the impugned order.

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The writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed.

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Order Date :- 12.2.2021 Ashish Tripathi

Ram Dayal and Another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and 2 Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Ram Dayal and Another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and 2 Others

Case brief

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