Summoning of a non-charge-sheeted accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was upheld on eyewitness testimony satisfying the required evidentiary threshold. The Court rejected objections to witnesses examined under unchallenged court orders and dismissed the criminal revision.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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Court No. - 83
Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 2434 of 2021 Revisionist :- Rammohan @ Guddu Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Revisionist :- P.K. Singh,Abhai Kumar Tiwari Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Rajeev Misra,J.
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18.7.2014, it is alleged that on 17.7.2004 at 6:00 pm, Dharmveer @ Pappu (nephew of first informant) was returning from market to the village along with Gajendra Sigh @ Attu. As they reached near Junior High School, Bhadehi accused Babu Singh, Raju, Gopal along with some other persons met Dharmveer and started abusing his nephew (Dharmveer) which was protested by him. There upon named accused and others assaulted Dharmveer and others by Khurpi, Lathi and Danda, as a result of which, he sustained serious injuries and his teeth were broken. Aforesaid incident was witnessed by Visharam Singh and Sanju, who were coming from market and were behind injured.
(i) L.W. 4.5 cm x 3.5 cm on bone deep on temporal present.
(ii) L.W. 3.5 cm x 3 cm on bone deep present.
(iii) Abraded contusion 2.5 cm x 1.5 cm on right side upper shoulder present.
(iv) Abraded contusion 2.5 cm x 4 cm on dorsum aspect posteriorily ankle present.
(v) L.W. 14.0 cm x 0.5 cm on back of it. Side of head x bone deep 6 cm from left in 7.0 cm pennies given bleed present KUO Adv X-ray.
(vi) L.W. 1.0 Cm x 0.3 cm to deep on back of blisters on outer side of present.
(I) L.W. 2.0 cm x 1.0 cm x bone deep on Rt. Side back head to opinion
Rt. Eye 12.0 cm from mid of neck KUO Adv X-ray bleeding present.
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(ii) Abraded contusion on 15.0 cm x 2.0 cm on left side of face and forehead 1.0 cm on front of right blister present.
(iii) Abraded contusion of size 7 cm x 5 cm on Rt. Side of face to bleeding present.
(iv) Abraded contusion 5.0 cm x 3.5 cm on Right shoulder bleeding present on clear cut.
(v) Abraded contusion 6.0cm 3.0 cm on front of left leg 3.0 cm below KUO bleeding present.
(vi) Abraded contusion 4 cm x 2 cm and (4.0 cm x 2.5 cm bone deep) presetn and 4.0 cm abriaded Rt. Side present.
(vii) Abraded contusion 6.0 cm x 5.0 cm on left side of free clot blood present.
(viii) Multiple abrasion in area of 5.0 cm x 20.0 cm on back side of chest abdomen and both glistenial 8.0 cm present level bluish present.
(ix) Contusion abrasion 5.0 cm x 3.0 cm ( 5.0 cm x 3.0 cm) back of neck 2.0 cm above side neck. Bleeding point present.
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9.6.2006, whereby, seven persons namely, Babu Sing, Gopal Singh, Raju, i.e. named accused and Satyapal, Netrapal, Lala and Gunda @ Akhilesh were nominated as accused. In the aforesaid charge sheet, as many as 28 witnesses namely, Chhote Singh, Shri Gajendra Singh, Vishram Singh, Sanju, Rajveer Singh, Veer Bhan Singh, Vinod Shrishak Mangal Singh, Ram Kripal, Dharmendra Singh Magan Lal Ahirwar, Rajendra Singh, Than Singh, S.K. Seth, Dr. M.L. Gupta, R.K. Garg, Man Pratap Sigh, Kripal Singh, Gajraj Singh, Satendra Singh, Mahesh, Harpal Singh, Ajay Pal Singh, Abhay Singh, Surendra Nath, N.S. Rana, M.C. Chaturvedi were nominated.
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had conducted autopsy of the body of deceased was examined. Thereafter deposition of P.W.6 Mahesh Chaturvedi (Investigating Officer), P.W.7 Doctor R.K. Garg (who had examined the injured), P.W.8 S.I. Abhay Singh, P.W. 9 Balwan Singh (brother-in-law of deceased) were recorded. Subsequently, deposition of P.W10 Sanju @ Jaydan Yadav was recorded who was declared hostile. Lastly P.W. 11 Doctor S.K. Seth who had examined deceased while he was alive and P.W. 12 S.H.O. Surendra Nath Singh (Investigating Officer) deposed before Court below.
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Smt. Sarla Devi and P.W.9 Balram Singh, who are wife and brother-in-law of deceased, have not been nominated as witness in the charge sheet submitted by Investigating Officer. Aforesaid witnesses were not even examined by Investigating Officer, as such, they have been engineered to fill up the lacuna in prosecution case. No application was filed before Investigating Officer or any other Police Officer regarding dissatisfaction with the investigation of concerned case crime number by opposite party2. Sarla Devi. Injured Rajendra and Dharmveer who have been examined have not implicated revisionist in the crime in question. Statement of first informant was recorded by Investigating Officer after a period of more than one month from the date of occurrence. It is lastly submitted that P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W3, who have been adduced on behalf of prosecution, have not supported the prosecution story. It is, thus, contended that revisionist is not named as an accused in the F.I.R. However, Investigating Officer on the basis of statements of witnesses examined under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as other material collected during course of investigation came to the conclusion that complicity of revisionist in the crime in question is not established. Revisionist has been falsely implicated. Accordingly, Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet, whereby named accused and others were charge-sheeted, whereas revisionist was exculpated. It is also contended that no protest petition was filed by first informant/opposite party-2 against charge-sheet submitted by Investigating Officer. In the application under Sections 319 Cr.P.C. filed by first informant/opposite party-2, no explanation regarding same has been offered. As such, application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. filed by opposite party-2 Sarla Devi is with an ulterior and oblique motive. As such, same is wholly malicious. Learned counsel for revisionist further contends that as per the testimonies of P.W.-4 and P.W.9, no cast iron case for summoning of present revisionist is made out. Revisionist cannot be convicted as per testimony of P.W.4 and P.W.9. Court below has not recorded any finding in the light of law laid down by
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Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh and others Vs. State of Panjab and others 2014, 3 SCC 92. It is, thus, urged that court below has failed to exercise it's jurisdiction diligently. Accordingly, court below has summoned revisionist in a “casual and cavalier manner” even when no “strong and cogent evidence” exists against revisionist on the record of above mentioned Sessions Trial. On the aforesaid premise, it is, thus, urged by learned counsel for revisionist that order impugned dated 04.09.2019, passed by court below cannot be sustained in law and fact. Consequently, same is liable to be quashed and revision be allowed.
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the realm of legal evidence. Consequently, no illegality has been committed by Court below in placing reliance upon same for deciding application under section 319 Cr.P.C. Furthermore, P.W.9 Balwan Singh, has also supported P.W.4 whose statement in chief/examination-in-chief have been recorded and they clearly implicate the revisionist in the crime in question. No illegality has been committed by Court below in placing reliance upon the same as per Constitution Bench judgement in Hardeep Singh (Supra). Police report submitted by Investigating Officer is not conclusive proof of innocence of revisionist. No irregularity or illegality has been committed by court below, in passing impugned order dated 2.3.2021. Even though revisionist has been exculpated by Investigating Officer, same cannot be taken as a ground to urge that revisionist cannot be subsequently summoned to face trial. Revisionist will have adequate opportunity to prove his innocence before court below by adducing evidence as well as Investigating Officer as a defence witness. There is nothing on record to show that P.W.4 Sarla Devi and P.W.9 Balwan Singh were examined by Investigating Officer in terms of section 161 Cr.P.C. Court below has recorded a categorical finding that in spite of the fact evidence emerged against Dr. Balram Singh and Rammohan alias Guddu yet Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet against them. In view of above ratio laid down in Brijendra Singh and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan (2017) SCC 706, shall not be applicable in present case. No parallel can be drawn with the statements of opposite party-2 Sarla Devi and P.W.9 Balwan Singh recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. and their deposition before Court below to find out whether something new was stated by them than what was stated in their statements under section 161 Cr.P.C. Impugned order passed by court below is in conformity with the principles laid down by Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh (supra), wherein court has defined the manner in which jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised as well as the nature of evidence required to summon a prospective accused. As per testimonies of
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P.W.4 Sarla Devi and P.W.9 Balwan Singh, complicity of revisionist in the crime in question stands established. On the aforesaid premise, it is thus urged by learned A.G.A. that no indulgence be granted by this Court in favour of revisionist.
( i ) Dharam Pal and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2014) 3 SCC 306 (Constitution Bench)
( ii ) Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2014) 3 SCC 92 (Constitution Bench)
( iii ) Babubhai Bhimabhai Bokhiria and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2014) 5 SCC 568
( iv ) Jogendra yadav and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Another, (2015) 9 SCc 244
( v ) Brijendra Singh and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2017) SCC 706
( vi ) S Mohammed Ispahani Vs. Yogendra Chandak and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 226
(vii) Deepu @ Deepak Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 2 SCC 393
( viii ) Dev Wati and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another (2019) 4 SCC 329
( ix ) Periyasamai and Others Vs. S.Nallasamy, (2019) 4 SCC 342
( x ) Sunil Kumar Gupta and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2019) 4 SCC 556
( xi ) Rajesh and Others Vs. State of Haryana, (2019) 6 SCC 368
( xii ) Sukhpal Singh Khaira Vs. State of Punjab, (2019) 6 SCC
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638
(xiii) Shiv Prakash Mishra Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2019) 7 SCC 806
( xiv ) Mani Pushpak Joshi Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Another, (2019) 9 SCC 805
( xv ) Sugreev Kumar Vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2019) SCC Online Sc 390
( xvi ) Labhuji Amratji Thakor Vs. State of Gujarat, (2019) 12 SCC 644
(xvii) Sartaj Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2021) 5 SCC 337
(xviii) Manjeet Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Others, 2021 SCC Online SC 632
(xix). Criminal Appeal No. 990 of 2021 (Umesh Chandra Srivastava Vs. The State of U.P. and another)
"4. Reference made in Dharam Pal (Supra) came to be answered in relation to the power of a Court of Sessions to invoke Section 319 Cr.P.C. at the stage of committal of the case to a Court of Sessions. The said reference was answered by the Constitution Bench in the case of Dharam Pal & Ors.
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v. State of Haryana & Anr., AIR 2013 SC 3018 [hereinafter called 'Dharam Pal (CB)'], wherein it was held that a Court of Sessions can with the aid of Section 193 Cr.P.C. proceed to array any other person and summon him for being tried even if the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. could not be pressed in service at the stage of committal.
6.3 (iii) Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?
6.5 (v) Does the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charged or who have been discharged?
"319 Cr.P.C. -Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence:-
(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an
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offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.
(2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.
(3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.
(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced."
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Section 319 Cr.P.C. is to do complete justice and to ensure that persons who ought to have been tried as well are also tried. Therefore, there does not appear to be any difficulty in invoking powers of Section 319 Cr.P.C. at the stage of trial in a complaint case when the evidence of the complainant as well as his witnesses is being recorded.
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evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence' is clear from the words "for which such person could be tried together with the accused." The words used are not 'for which such person could be convicted'. There is, therefore, no scope for the Court acting under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused.
Questions (i) and (iii)
AND
Answer
117.1. In Dharam Pal case, the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under Section 193 Cr.P.C. and the Sessions Judge need not wait till 'evidence' under Section 319 Cr.P.C. becomes available for summoning an additional accused.
117.2. Section 319 Cr.P.C., significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) Inquiry (2) Trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 Cr.P.C.; and under Section 398 Cr.P.C. are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Cr.P.C. Materials coming before the Court in course of such enquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet.
117.3. In view of the above position the word 'evidence' in
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Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.
Question (ii)- Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. could only mean evidence tested by crossexamination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned?
Answer
117.4. Considering the fact that under Section 319 Cr.P.C. a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) Cr.P.C. the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination.
Question (iv)- What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319 (1) Cr.P.C. can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted?
Answer.
117.5. Though under Section 319(4)(b) Cr.P.C. the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the Court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 Cr.P.C. would be the same as for ?framing a charge. The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial - therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different.
Question (v)- Does the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted or who have been discharged?
Answer
117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial. However, in so far as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of ?Sections 300 and 398 Cr.P.C. has to be complied with before he can be
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summoned afresh."
"7. Before we proceed to deal with the evidence against the appellant and address whether in light of the evidence available, power under Section 319 of the Code was validly exercised, it would be expedient to understand the position of law in this regard. The issue regarding the scope and extent of powers of the court to arraign any person as an accused during the course of inquiry or trial in exercise of power under Section 319 of the Code has been set at rest by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab[(2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86 : (2014) 1 Scale 241] . On a review of the authorities, this Court summarised the legal position in the following words: (SCC p. 138, paras 105-06)
"105. Power under Section 319 CrPC is a discretionary and an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner.
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the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC."
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summoning the appellant, as affirmed by the High Court, cannot be allowed to stand."
"13. We are not unmindful of the fact that the interpretation placed by us on the scheme of Sections 319 and 227 makes Section 227 unavailable to an accused who has been added under Section 319 CrPC. We are of the view, for the reasons given above, that this must necessarily be so since a view to the contrary would render the exercise undertaken by a court under Section 319 CrPC, for summoning an accused, on the basis of a higher standard of proof totally infructuous and futile if the same court were to subsequently discharge the same accused by exercise of the power under Section 227 CrPC, on the basis of a mere prima facie view. The exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC, must be placed on a higher pedestal. Needless to say the accused summoned under Section 319 CrPC, are entitled to invoke remedy under law against an illegal or improper exercise of the power under Section 319, but cannot have the effect of the order undone by seeking a discharge under Section 227 CrPC. If allowed to, such an action of discharge would not be in accordance with the purpose of Criminal Procedure Code in enacting Section 319 which empowers the Court to summon a person for being tried along with the other accused where it appears from the evidence that he has committed an offence."
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149, 323, 448, 302/149 I.P.C. and Section- 3 and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Court went a step further. A parallel was drawn with the deposition of prosecution witnesses before court and their statements recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. to find out whether something new has come out in their depositions or not. Having done so, Court summed up as follows in paragraphs 13, 14, 15:-
"13. In order to answer the question, some of the principles enunciated in Hardeep Singh's case may be recapitulated: power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the trial court at any stage during the trial, i.e., before the conclusion of trial, to summon any person as an accused and face the trial in the ongoing case, once the trial court finds that there is some 'evidence' against such a person on the basis of which evidence it can be gathered that he appears to be guilty of offence. The 'evidence' herein means the material that is brought before the Court during trial. Insofar as the material/evidence collected by the I.O. at the stage of inquiry is concerned, it can be utilised for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the Court to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. No doubt, such evidence that has surfaced in examination-in-chief, without cross- examination of witnesses, can also be taken into consideration. However, since it is a discretionary power given to the Court under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and is also an extraordinary one, same has to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrants. The degree of satisfaction is more than the degree which is warranted at the time of framing of the charges against others in respect of whom chargesheet was filed. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the Court that such power should be exercised. It is not to be exercised in a casual or a cavalier manner. The prima facie opinion which is to be formed requires stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity.
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FIR regarding alleged presence of the appellants at the place of incident had also made statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to the same effect. Notwithstanding the same, the police investigation revealed that the statements of these persons regarding the presence of the appellants at the place of occurrence was doubtful and did not inspire confidence, in view of the documentary and other evidence collected during the investigation, which depicted another story and clinchingly showed that appellants plea of alibi was correct.
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paragraphs 10 to 13 of Brijendra Singh's Case and by making departure from the settled meaning of evidence for the purpose of exercise of jurisdiction under section 319 Cr.P.C. opined that prospective accused can be summoned only when “strong and cogent evidence” occur against him during course of trial and not in a “casual and cavalier manner”. Ultimately, Court opined as follows in paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37:
"31. The order of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate reveals that while dismissing the application of the complainant under Section 319 CrPC, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was swayed by two considerations:
(a) The complainant (PW 1) in his examination-in-chief had not spoken anything with regard to the alleged conspiracy entered into between the appellants i.e. the landlords and the bailiff. Also other witnesses i.e. PWs 2, 3 and 4, who were working in the company of the de facto complainant had not spoken anything with regard to the appellants. There was no documentary evidence produced by the complainant. Therefore, the available "evidence" was not sufficient to implead the appellants/proposed accused as accused in the case.
(b) The police, after thorough investigation, had filed the charge-sheet in which the appellants were not implicated. However, the complainant never filed any protest petition at that stage.
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order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and exercised its discretion in summoning the appellants as accused persons. No doubt, at one place the Constitution Bench observed in Hardeep Singh case [Hardeep Singh v.State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] that the word "evidence" has to be understood in its wider sense, both at the stage of trial and even at the stage of inquiry. In para 105 of the judgment, however, it is observed that "only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner". This sentence gives an impression that only that evidence which has been led before the Court is to be seen and not the evidence which was collected at the stage of inquiry. However there is no contradiction between the two observations as the Court also clarified that the "evidence", on the basis of which an accused is to be summoned to face the trial in an ongoing case, has to be the material that is brought before the Court during trial. The material/evidence collected by the investigating officer at the stage of inquiry can only be utilised for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the Court to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC.
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that "Subsequently I came to know the said people is not police officials the people was sent by landlords of the building…". That statement may not be enough for roping in the appellants/landlords to face the charge under those provisions of IPC with which others are charged. The standard of evidence mentioned in Hardeep Singh case [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] , namely, "strong and cogent evidence", is lacking."
“ 7. In the matter on hand, the Sessions Court, as aforementioned, has found that the earlier order of discharge was without reference to the supplementary charge-sheet, though the supplementary charge-sheet was in existence then. Only after applying its mind judiciously to the facts of the case and on verifying the details of the supplementary charge-sheet as well as other material on record, mentioned supra, the trial court concluded that it is a fit case to proceed against the appellant-accused under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said order is confirmed by the High Court. The procedure as contemplated under Section 319 CrPC as well as the procedure as laid down by this Court in Hardeep Singh [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] is fully satisfied by the trial court.”
"8. Section 319(1) CrPC empowers the court to
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proceed against other persons who "appear" to be guilty of an offence, though not accused before the court. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] has ruled that the word "appear" means "clear to the comprehension", or a phrase near to, if not synonymous with "proved", and imparts a lesser degree of probability than proof. Though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the Court, it requires much stronger evidence than a mere probability of the complicity of the persons against whom the deponent has deposed. The test that has to be applied is of a degree of satisfaction which is more than that of a prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, may lead to conviction of the proposed accused. In the absence of such satisfaction, the Court should refrain from exercising the power under Section 319 CrPC. In our considered opinion, the impugned judgment has been passed by the High Court keeping the aforementioned principle in mind, though the said judgment has not been cited before the High Court.
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Vs. State of Gujarat, (2019) 12 SCC 644, which provides the nature of evidence, required to summon a non charge sheeted accused. Upon evaluation of statements of prosecution witnesses, who had deposed before Court, in the light of above Court expressed itself as follows in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16:
"13. In the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code during the course of investigation, the complainant and his witnesses have not disclosed any other name except the 11 persons named in the FIR. Thus, the complainant has sought to cast net wide so as to include numerous other persons while moving an application under Section 319 of the Code without there being primary evidence about their role in house trespass or of threatening the complainant. Large number of people will not come to the house of the complainant and would return without causing any injury as they were said to be armed with weapons like crowbar, knife and ripper, etc.
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the application under Section 319 of the Code is dismissed. The appeal is allowed."
"13. Applying the above principles to the case in hand, in our considered view, no prima facie case is made out for summoning the appellants and to proceed against the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. As pointed out earlier, in the dying declaration, deceased Shilpa has only mentioned the name of Chanchal alias Babita; but she has not mentioned the names of others. In his complaint lodged before the police on the next day i.e. 20-8-2012, Sudhir Kumar Gupta PW 1 has stated that his daughter Shilpa told him that Chanchal alias Babita and all other people set her on fire after pouring kerosene. PW 1 has neither stated the names of the appellants nor attributed any overt act. Likewise, in their evidence before the court, PWs 1 and 3 have only stated that Shilpa told them that Chanchal alias Babita and all others have set fire on deceased Shilpa. Neither the complaint nor the evidence of witnesses indicates as to the role played by the appellants in the commission of the offence and which accused has committed what offence. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the prosecution has shown prima facie material for summoning the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
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satisfied with the dowry and that they used to demand dowry each and every time. Insofar as the demand of dowry and the dowry harassment, there are no particulars given as to the time of demand and what was the nature of demand. The averments in the complaint and the evidence is vague and no specific demand is attributed to any of the appellants. In such circumstances, there is no justification for summoning the appellants even under Section 498-A IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It is also pertinent to point out that upon completion of investigation, the investigating officer felt that no offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is made out. Charge-sheet was filed for the offence punishable only under Section 302 IPC against Chanchal alias Babita. As held in the Constitution Bench judgment in Hardeep Singh [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] , for summoning an accused under Section 319 CrPC it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity which is lacking in the present case. The trial court and the High Court, in our considered view, has not examined the matter in the light of the wellsettled principles and the impugned order is liable to be set aside."
"6.8. Considering the law laid down by this Court in Hardeep Singh [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] and the observations and findings referred to and reproduced hereinabove, it emerges that (i) the Court can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned and the Court need not wait till the cross-examination of such a witness and the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination; and (ii) a person not named in the
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FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 CrPC, provided from the evidence (may be on the basis of the evidence collected in the form of statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned), it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial.
6.9. In S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak [S. Mohammed Ispahani v.Yogendra Chandak, (2017) 16 SCC 226 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 138] , SCC para 35, this Court has observed and held as under : (SCC p. 243)
"35. It needs to be highlighted that when a person is named in the FIR by the complainant, but police, after investigation, finds no role of that particular person and files the charge-sheet without implicating him, the Court is not powerless, and at the stage of summoning, if the trial court finds that a particular person should be summoned as accused, even though not named in the charge-sheet, it can do so. At that stage, chance is given to the complainant also to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to summon other persons as well who were named in the FIR but not implicated in the charge-sheet. Once that stage has gone, the Court is still not powerless by virtue of Section 319 CrPC. However, this section gets triggered when during the trial some evidence surfaces against the proposed accused."
6.10. Thus, even in a case where the stage of giving opportunity to the complainant to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to summon other persons as well who were named in the FIR but not implicated in the charge-sheet has gone, in that case also, the Court is still not powerless by virtue of Section 319 CrPC and even those persons named in the FIR but not implicated in the chargesheet can be summoned to face the trial provided during the trial some evidence surfaces against the proposed accused.
29
in Hardeep Singh [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] , the persons against whom no charge-sheet is filed can be summoned to face the trial. Therefore, we are of the opinion that no error has been committed by the courts below to summon the appellants herein to face the trial in exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC.
30
319 Cr.P.C. need to be re laid down. Following was observed by the Court in paragraphs 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27:
"22. It was contended that the question of law herein is unique to the present case, and the earlier judgment of Hardeep Singh [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] did not have an opportunity to cast any light about the validity of summoning orders pronounced after the passing of the judgment. They further argued that, Hardeep Singh case [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] , treats Section 319 in an isolated manner without taking into consideration the spirit and the mandate of the Code.
26.1.(i) Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial with respect to other co-accused has ended and the judgment of conviction rendered on the same date before
31
pronouncing the summoning order?
26.2.(ii) Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial in respect of certain other absconding accused (whose presence is subsequently secured) is ongoing/pending, having been bifurcated from the main trial?
26.3.(iii) What are the guidelines that the competent court must follow while exercising power under Section 319 CrPC?
"13. In the light of the above principles, considering the present case, having regard to the contradictory statements of the witnesses and other circumstances, in our view, the trial court and the High Court rightly held that Respondent 2 cannot be summoned as an accused. The FIR in Case Crime No. 328-A/2013 was registered on 6-9-2013 at 1815 hours. The name of the second respondent is no doubt mentioned in the FIR and overt act is attributed to him. It is clear from the record that during the course of investigation, the investigating officer recorded the statements of witnesses, namely, Rajesh Kumar, Nizamuddin, Nand Kishore, Tribhuwan Singh, Bintu Rai and Nageshwar Kumar and other seven witnesses who have stated that Respondent 2 was not present at the place of occurrence at the time of the incident. The investigating officer has also recorded the
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statement of one Shiv Kumar Gupta and Sandeep Gupta who are working in the same office in which Respondent 2 was employed who had stated that Respondent 2 was in the office at the time of incident. Based on the statements recorded from the witnesses, the investigating officer found that the second respondent was posted on the post of Junior Engineer in the Bridge Construction Unit of Bridge Corporation, Lucknow and he usually resided there and on 6-9-2013, he was present at his workplace and discharging his official duties. Based on the materials collected during the investigation, the investigating officer recorded the finding that on the date and time of incident, Subhash Chandra Shukla was not present at the place of occurrence. Accordingly, the name of Subhash Chandra Shukla was dropped when the first charge-sheet was filed on 19-9-2014. The supplementary charge-sheet was filed against Rahul Shukla on 15-10-2014. Though the name of the second respondent was mentioned in the FIR, during investigation, it was thus found that the second respondent was not present in the place of incident and on the basis of the findings of the investigating officer, he was not charge-sheeted. Be it noted that the appellant complainant has not filed any protest petition then and there. During investigation, when it was found that the accused was not present at the place of incident, the courts below were right in refusing to summon Respondent 2 as an accused.
"… Subhash Chandra Shukla does not live in the house. He does service/job. At the same time in Jigna Police Station, District Mirjapur he was making bridge and due to this reason, he was on duty there.…"
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the trial court and the High Court expressed doubts about the evidence of PW 2 as to the presence of the second respondent. The evidence brought on record during trial does not prima facie show the complicity of Respondent 2 in the occurrence and the High Court was justified in refusing to summon Respondent 2 as an accused.
"12. In Labhuji Amratji Thakor v. State of Gujarat [Labhuji Amratji Thakor v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 12 SCC 644 : AIR 2019 SC 734] , this Court held that the Court has to consider substance of the evidence, which has come before it and has to apply the test i.e. "more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. It was held as under: (SCC p. 649, paras 1314)
"13. The High Court [Meruji Jesuji Thakore v. State of Gujarat, 2018 SCC OnLine Guj 4765] does not even record any satisfaction that the evidence on record as revealed by the statement of victim and her mother even makes out a prima facie case of offence against the appellants. The mere fact that the Court has power under Section 319 CrPC to proceed against any person who is not named in the FIR or in the charge-sheet does not mean that whenever in a statement recorded before the Court, name of any person is taken, the Court has to mechanically issue process under Section 319 CrPC. The Court has to consider substance of the evidence, which has come before it and as laid down
34
by the Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh[Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] has to apply the test i.e. 'more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction'.
35
order of summoning the appellant under Section 319 CrPC is not legal. The fact, that the prosecution after investigations has found no material to charge the present appellant also cannot be ignored. The heinous crime committed should not be led into prosecuting a person only because he was part of the management of the school. We have extracted the evidence led by the prosecution only to find out if there is any prima facie case against the appellant. We are satisfied that there is no prima facie case against the appellant, which warrants his trial for the offences pending before the Court."
"18. Thus, the provisions contained in Section 319 CrPC sanction the summoning of any person on the basis of any relevant evidence as available on record. However, it being a discretionary power and an extraordinary one, is to be exercised sparingly and only when cogent evidence is available. The prima facie opinion which is to be formed for exercise of this power requires stronger evidence than mere probability of complicity of a person. The test to be applied is the one which is more than a prima facie case as examined at the time of framing charge but not of satisfaction to the extent that the evidence, if goes uncontroverted, would lead to the conviction of the accused.
20 The appellant (PW 1) has made the statement assigning specific roles to the proposed accused persons. At the stage of consideration of the application under Section
36
319 CrPC, of course, the trial court was to look at something more than a prima facie case but could not have gone to the extent of enquiring as to whether the matter would ultimately result in conviction of the proposed accused persons.
"10. In the present case, there are not even suggestions of any act done by the appellants amounting to an offence referred to in Sections 3 and 4 of thePocso Act. Thus, there was no occasion to proceed against the appellants under the Pocso Act.
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Court in allowing the criminal revision and setting aside the order of the Pocso Judge. The judgment of the High Court runs into four paragraphs and the only reason given by the High Court for allowing the revision is contained in para 3, which is to the following effect:
"3. On going through the depositions of the victim as well as her mother, some overtact and participation on the part of Respondents 3 to 5 are clearly revealing. But, this Court is not inclined to opine either way as the said fact was not stated before the police at the time of recording of their statements. But, taking into consideration the provision of Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this Court deems it appropriate to summon them and put them to trial…."
38
the offence. The observations of the trial court while rejecting the application holding that the application appears to be filed with mala fide intention, has not even been adverted to by the High Court."
“ 14. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the case of the accused on hand, we are of the opinion that the learned trial court was justified in summoning the private respondents herein to face the trial as accused on the basis of the deposition of the appellant—injured eyewitness. As held by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, the accused can be summoned on the basis of even examination-in-chief of the witness and the court need not wait till his cross-examination. If on the basis of the examination-in-chief of the witness the court is satisfied that there is a prima facie case against the proposed accused, the court may in exercise of powers under Section 319 CrPC array such a person as accused and summon him to face the trial.
39
respondents herein are disclosed. It might be that whatever is stated in the examination-in-chief is the same which was stated in the FIR. The same is bound to be there and ultimately the appellant herein-injured eyewitness is the first informant and he is bound to again state what was stated in the FIR, otherwise he would be accused of contradictions in the FIR and the statement before the court. Therefore, as such, the learned trial court was justified in directing to issue summons against the private respondents herein to face the trial.
“ 29. No evidence except the statement of Sartaj Singh, which has already been investigated into by the DSPs concerned was relied upon by the trial court to summon, which was not sufficient for exercising power under Section 319 CrPC.
40
“ 34. The ratio of the aforesaid decisions on the scope and ambit of the powers of the Court under Section 319 CrPC can be summarized as under:
(i) That while exercising the powers under Section 319 CrPC and to summon the persons not charge-sheeted, the entire effort is not to allow the real perpetrator of an offence to get away unpunished;
(ii) for the empowerment of the courts to ensure that the criminal administration of justice works properly;
(iii) the law has been properly codified and modified by the legislature under the CrPC indicating as to how the courts should proceed to ultimately find out the truth so that the innocent does not get punished but at the same time, the guilty are brought to book under the law;
(iv) to discharge duty of the court to find out the real truth and to ensure that the guilty does not go unpunished;
(v) where the investigating agency for any reason does not array one of the real culprits as an accused, the court is not powerless in calling the said accused to face trial;
(vi) Section 319 CrPC allows the court to proceed against any person who is not an accused in a case before it;
(vii) the court is the sole repository of justice and a duty is
41
cast upon it to uphold the rule of law and, therefore, it will be inappropriate to deny the existence of such powers with the courts in our criminal justice system where it is not uncommon that the real accused, at times, get away by manipulating the investigating and/or the prosecuting agency;
(viii) Section 319 CrPC is an enabling provision empowering the court to take appropriate steps for proceeding against any person not being an accused for also having committed the offence under trial;
(ix) the power under Section 319(1) CrPC can be exercised at any stage after the charge-sheet is filed and before the pronouncement of judgment, except during the stage of Sections 207/208 CrPC, committal, etc. which is only a pretrial stage intended to put the process into motion;
(x) the court can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC only after the trial proceeds and commences with the recording of the evidence;
(xi) the word “evidence” in Section 319 CrPC means only such evidence as is made before the court, in relation to statements, and as produced before the court, in relation to documents;
(xii) it is only such evidence that can be taken into account by the Magistrate or the court to decide whether the power under Section 319 CrPC is to be exercised and not on the basis of material collected during the investigation;
(xiii) if the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, it can exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC and can proceed against such other person(s);
(xiv) that the Magistrate/court is convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in examination-in-chief, powers under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised;
(xv) that power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised even at the stage of completion of examination-in-chief and the court need not has to wait till the said evidence is tested on cross-examination;
(xvi) even in a case where the stage of giving opportunity to the complainant to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to summon other persons as well who were named in FIR but not implicated in the charge-sheet has gone, in that case also, the Court is still not powerless by virtue of Section 319 CrPC and even those persons named in FIR but not implicated in the charge-sheet can be summoned to face the trial, provided during the trial some evidence surfaces against the proposed accused (may be in the form of examination-in-chief of the prosecution witnesses);
(xvii) while exercising the powers under Section 319 CrPC the Court is not required and/or justified in appreciating the deposition/evidence of the prosecution witnesses on merits
42
which is required to be done during the trial.
43
specific role attributed to them, the Learned trial Court as well as the High Court ought to have summoned the private respondents herein to face the trial. At this stage it is required to be noted that so far as the appellant herein is concerned he is an injured eye-witness. As observed by this Court in the cases of State of MP v. Mansingh(2003) 10 SCC 414 (para 9); Abdul Sayeed v. State of MP (2010) 10 SCC 259; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Naresh (2011) 4 SCC 324, the evidence of an injured eye witness has greater evidential value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. As observed hereinabove while exercising the powers under Section 319 CrPC the Court has not to wait till the cross-examination and on the basis of the examination-in-chief of a witness if a case is made out, a person can be summoned to face the trial under Section 319 CrPC.
44
Court refused to interfere with order passed by trial Court. Court considered the Constitution Bench Judgement in Hardeep Singh (Supra) as well as the Labhuji Amratji Thakor (Supra ) and on basis thereof allowed the appeal and remanded the matter before Sessions Judge for decision afresh.
38.With the aid of above, Court now proceeds to examine the correctness of impugned order dated 04.09.2019 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.5, Rampur, in Sessions Trial No. 268 of 2018 (State Vs. Khurshid and others), under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 326, 504, 506 I.P.C., Police Station-Bhot, District-Rampur, whereby revisionist and Dr. Balram Singh have been summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to face trial in above-mentioned sessions trial.
45
only requirement is that such statement discloses more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence if goes unrebutted would lead to conviction. The second test laid down therein is that such person could be tried with other accused. In paragraph- 36 of the judgement in S. Mohammed Ispahani (supra), Court held that a non charge sheeted accused can be summoned only on the basis of “strong and cogent evidence”.
46
can be challenged on the grounds raised in the grounds of revision. Learned counsel for revisionist instead of replying the query of Court continued with his submissions which in no way deal with the merits of the order.
(I) Because, order dated 2.3.2021 passed by the Court below illegal arbitrary and against the evidence on record.
(ii) Because, the trial court has not recorded satisfaction to the effect that evidence so produced by prosecution is sufficient to record conviction of the revisionist.
(iii) Because the revisionist is not named in first information report at belated stage complicity of revisionist was shown by the witness during statement under section 161 Cr.P.c. and the aforesaid witnesses of the fact were declared hostile.
(iv) Because the wife of deceased was not present at the time of incident and is also not witness of the charge sheet. She is the witness who has been cooked up by the prosecution.
(v) Because the statement of P.W.9 who is brother in law of deceased was also not present at the time of incident and has been dragged as witness just to fill up the lacuna.
(vi) Because, there is no strong and cogent evidence against the revisionist even then revisionist has been summoned in casual and cavilier manner.
(vii) Because, law is well settled in the constitution bench of the judgement that the power under section 319 Cr.P.C. is an extra ordinary one and same should be exercised sparingly.
(viiii) Because the case in hand is lacking material evidence, even then
47
trial court has summoned.
48
revisionist and Doctor Balram Singh stands clearly established in the crime in question. This witness was also cross examined by defence. However, defence has failed to dislodge the credibility and reliability of this witness, up to this stage. This Court does not find any such ground to discard the testimony of this witness. In case, testimony of this witness goes unrebutted, it may lead to conviction of revisionist.
53 . The main thrust of arguments raised by learned counsel for
49
revisionist is primarily to the effect that since P.W.4 Sarla Devi and P.W.9 are not prosecution witnesses nominated in the charge sheet, therefore, they could not have been examined as prosecution witnesses. It is true that from perusal of charge sheet copy of which is on record as annexure-7 to the affidavit, it is evident that 28 prosecution witnesses have been nominated but the names of P.W.4 and P.W.9 are conspicuous by their absence. However, the fact remains that above two witnesses have been examined under orders of Court which orders have not been challenged by present revisionist. It is well settled that if the order is not challenged the consequences cannot be challenged.
50
(Supra), Shiv Prakash Mishra (Supra) and Sartaj Singh (Supra) considered the veracity of orders passed on an application under section 319 Cr.P.C., whereby prospective accused were summoned in cases under sections 302, 307 IPC or both. In all the cases referred to above, Court meticulously examined the testimonies of prosecution witnesses in each of above mentioned cases in the light of tests laid down by Apex Court in Hardeep Singh (Supra) and S.Mohammed Ispahani(Supra) and after undertaking aforesaid exercise proceeded to decide whether on the testimony of prosecution witnesses, prospective accused could be summoned or not.
Order date: 8.10.2021
HSM
3 issues framed by the court
Did the eyewitness depositions satisfy the evidentiary threshold for summoning the revisionist under Section 319 Cr.P.C.?
Could examination of witnesses omitted from the charge-sheet be challenged without challenging the orders permitting their examination?
Did the investigating officer's decision not to charge-sheet the revisionist preclude his summoning on the evidence presented?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Dharam Pal and Others Vs. State of Haryana and AnotherExplained¶74
Dharam Pal and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2014) 3 SCC 306 · Who else cites this
Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and OthersApplied¶328
Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2014) 3 SCC 92 · Who else cites this
Babubhai Bhimabhai Bokhiria and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and OthersExplained¶131
Babubhai Bhimabhai Bokhiria and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (2014) 5 SCC 568 · Who else cites this
Jogendra yadav and Others Vs. State of Bihar and AnotherExplained¶145
Jogendra yadav and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Another, (2015) 9 SCc 244 · Who else cites this
Brijendra Singh and Others Vs. State of RajasthanDistinguished¶334
Brijendra Singh and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2017) SCC 706 · Who else cites this
S Mohammed Ispahani Vs. Yogendra Chandak and OthersApplied¶328
S Mohammed Ispahani Vs. Yogendra Chandak and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 226 · Who else cites this
Deepu @ Deepak Vs. State of Madhya PradeshExplained¶170
Deepu @ Deepak Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 2 SCC 393 · Who else cites this
Dev Wati and Others Vs. State of Haryana and AnotherExplained¶172
Dev Wati and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another (2019) 4 SCC 329 · Who else cites this
Periyasamai and Others Vs. S.NallasamyExplained¶177
Periyasamai and Others Vs. S.Nallasamy, (2019) 4 SCC 342 · Who else cites this
Sunil Kumar Gupta and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and OthersExplained¶186
Sunil Kumar Gupta and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2019) 4 SCC 556 · Who else cites this
Rajesh and Others Vs. State of HaryanaRelied on¶337
Rajesh and Others Vs. State of Haryana, (2019) 6 SCC 368 · Who else cites this
Sukhpal Singh Khaira Vs. State of PunjabExplained¶202
Sukhpal Singh Khaira Vs. State of Punjab
Shiv Prakash Mishra Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and AnotherRelied on¶337
Shiv Prakash Mishra Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2019) 7 SCC 806 · Who else cites this
Mani Pushpak Joshi Vs. State of Uttarakhand and AnotherExplained¶227
Mani Pushpak Joshi Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Another, (2019) 9 SCC 805 · Who else cites this
Sugreev Kumar Vs. State of Punjab and OthersRelied on¶337
Sugreev Kumar Vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2019) SCC Online Sc 390 · Who else cites this
Labhuji Amratji Thakor Vs. State of GujaratExplained¶248
Labhuji Amratji Thakor Vs. State of Gujarat, (2019) 12 SCC 644 · Who else cites this
Sartaj Singh Vs. State of Haryana and AnotherRelied on¶337
Sartaj Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2021) 5 SCC 337 · Who else cites this
Manjeet Singh Vs. State of Haryana and OthersRelied on¶301
Manjeet Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Others, 2021 SCC Online SC 632 · Who else cites this
Umesh Chandra Srivastava Vs. The State of U.P. and anotherExplained¶296
Criminal Appeal No. 990 of 2021 (Umesh Chandra Srivastava Vs. The State of U.P. and another)
1 provisions across 1 enactments
Rammohan @ Guddu
State of U.P.
Sarla Devi
Rajeev Misra
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
