"In the case of Aligarh Muslim University vs. Mansoor Ali Khan A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 2783, this Court considered the question whether on the facts of the case the employee can invoke the principle of natural justice and whether it is a case where, even if notice has been given, result would not have been different and whether it could be said that no prejudice was caused to him, if on the admitted or proved facts grant of an opportunity would not have made any difference. The Court referred to the decisions rendered in M.C. Mehta vs. UOI (supra), the exceptions laid down in S.L. Kapoor's case (supra) and K.L. Tripathi vs. State Bank of India A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 273 , where it has been laid down that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) has to be proved. The Court has also placed reliance in the matter of S.K. Sharma vs. State Bank of Patiala 1996 (3) S.C.C. 364 and Rajendra Singh vs. State of M.P. 1996 (5) S.C.C. 450 where the principle has been laid down that there must have been some real prejudice to the complainant. There is no such thing as merely technical infringement of natural justice. The Court has approved this principle and examined the case of the employee in that light. In Viveka Nand Sethi vs. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 337 , this Court has held that the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is no unruly horse. When facts are admitted, an enquiry would be an empty formality. Even the principle of estoppel will apply. In another recent judgment in the case of State of U.P. vs. Neeraj Awasthi & Others, JT 2006 (1) SC 19 , while considering the argument that the principle of natural justice had been ignored before terminating the service of the employees and, therefore, the order terminating the service of the employees was bad in law, this Court has considered the principles of natural justice and the extent and the circumstances in which they are attracted. This Court has found in Neeraj Awasthi's case (supra) that if the services of the workmen are governed by the U.P. Industrial Disputes, they are protected under that law. Rules 42 and 43 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules lay down that before effecting any retrenchment the employees concerned would be entitled to notice of one month or in lieu thereof pay for one month and 15 days wages for each completed year of service by way of compensation. If retrenchment is to be effected under the Industrial Disputes Act, the question of complying with the principles of natural justice would not arise. The principles of natural justice would be attracted only when the services of some persons are terminated by way of a punitive measure or thereby a stigma is attached. Applying this principle, it could very well be seen that discontinuation of the service of the appellants in the present case was not as a punitive measure but they were discontinued for the reason that they were not qualified and did not possess the requisite qualifications for appointment."
