Dismissed

Indian School Society v. State Of Uttarakhand and Others

Uttarakhand HC1 Apr 2019WPMS/905/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Court dismissed a writ petition challenging an order directing the petitioner society to remove the word 'Indian' from its registered name. The Court held that the term suggests government patronage under Entry 7 of the Schedule to the 1950 Act.

What did the court decide?

Petitioner directed to remove word 'Indian' from society name per Clause 1 and 2 of order dated 10.07.2017.

Indian School Society Vs State Of… — Constitutional and Fundamental Rights | Uttarakhand HC (2019)

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HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

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Writ Petition No. 905 of 2018 (M/S)

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India School Society (Registered) ..…Petitioner. Versus State of Uttarakhand and others .…Respondents

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Present : Mr. Tapan Singh, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Anurag Bisaria, Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand.

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Dated: 1st April, 2019

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JUDGMENT

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Hon’ble Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.

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In the present Writ Petition, a very interesting question, which has emerged for consideration before this Court is pertaining to the use and the nomenclature of the petitioner Society, with which, it was registered as back as in 1982-83, showing it as to be a Society registered in the name of “Indian School Society, Jogiwala, Deharadun”. It also reflects with the said name, it was continued to be reviewed from time to time by the Registrar of the Societies. The necessity arose for the petitioner to file the instant Writ Petition, when he was faced with the order dated 10^th July, 2017, as passed by respondent No. 3, whereby, while making reference to the extent made in Clause 1 and 2, directed the petitioner Society to remove the word ‘Indian’ from its name. Having reference to the Clauses 1 and 2 of the letter dated 10^th July, 2017, it reads as under :-

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“vkids mijksDr lkslkbVh ds uohuhdj.k gsrq izLrqr izi=ksa esa fuEu dfe;ka ik;h x;h gS&

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1- vkidh lkslkbVh ds uke ds lkFk bafM;u 'kCn tkSMk x;k gSA “kklukns”k la0 01/XXBOO(6)-pkj&ch 135&2011] foRr vuqHkkx&6] fnukad 11&01&2017 ds dze esa fuca/kd] QElZ lkslkbVht ,ao fpVl] mRrjk[kaM] nsgjknwu ds i=kad 4628] fnuakd 25 tuojh 2017 ds vuqikyu esa vki lkslkbVh ds uke ls bafM;u “kCn dks gVkdj] uke ifjorZu dh lk/kkj.k lHkk ds 2@3 cgqer ls ikfjr izLrko dh Vafdr dk;Zokgh dh nks izfr;ksa dks izLrqr djsaA

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2- lkslkbVh ds u;s uke ls la”kksf/kr Le`fr i= rFkk fu;ekoyh dh nks&nks Vafdr izfr;ksa dks lfpo rFkk 3 vU; inkf/kdkfj;ksa ds ewy gLrk{kjksa ls lR;kfir djk djds izLrqr djsaA”

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For the reason, which has been assigned in the said two clauses, which are questioned in the present writ petition, is that in terms of the Government Order No. 01/XXVII (6)-4-B 135-2011 dated 11^th January, 2017, as issued by the Additional Secretary, it has imposed restriction from the use of the word ‘Indian’ in the name of the Society of the petitioner. The Government Order as referred above dated 11^th January, 2017, which has been passed by the Additional Secretary, though, it was in reference to the name of the Society called as “Indian Confederation of Medical Laboratory Sciences, Haridwar”, whereby, while interpreting the implications of Section 2 (a) and Section 3 along with the Schedule of the Act, called as Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950, has held that the use of word “Indian” happens to be in contravention to the provisions of the Act of 1950. Consequently, it was as per the said Government Order, which was made applicable, in relation to the Indian Confederation of Medical Laboratory Science, that it prohibited the use of word “Indian”. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the said Government Order dated 11^th January, 2017, which is the basis of passing of the impugned order in relation to the petitioner dated 10^th July, 2017, could not have been borrowed because it was not a Government Order which was issued by way of general directions.

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For the purposes of establishing his case, the learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the only bar which has been created by the Act is for the use of word “India” and not “Indian” and, hence, the implication of the Government Order dated 11^th January, 2017, which was in relation to another Society, could not have been borrowed for imposing the restriction by Clause 1 and 2 of the impugned order dated 10^th July, 2017, issued against the petitioner.

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An interesting issue, which crops up for consideration before this Court is that the Act was incorporated in 1950, it was having an intend to prohibit the use of emblems and names as enumerated therein for the purposes of use of it by the organization engaged in professional or commercial activities. The term emblem has been defined under Section 2 (a) of the Act of 1950, which reads as under :-

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“ 2. Definition. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -

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(a) “emblem” means any emblem, seal, flag, insignia, coat-of-arms or pictorial representation specified in the Schedule: ”

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The prohibition, which has been imposed by the use of emblems as specified in Schedule of the Act is contemplated under Section 3 of the Act of 1950, which specifies that there would be a restriction on the use of any emblem specified in the Schedule or even any colourable intimidation thereof except without the previous approval by the Government of India.

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In response to the arguments as extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Anurag Bisaria, learned Standing Counsel supports his argument and stand taken by them in the counter affidavit in view of the Entry 7 of the Schedule of the Act, which was added by the S.R.O. 1230 dated 4^th June, 1955. Entry 7 of the Schedule, which has been framed under Section 2 (a) of the Act read with Section 3 of the Act, is quoted hereunder :-

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“[7. Any name which may suggest or be calculated to suggest(i) the patronage of the Government of India or the Government of a State; or (ii) connection with any local authority or any corporation or body constituted by the Government under any law for the time being in force.]”

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For the purposes of appropriate adjudication of the question raised by the petitioner pertaining to the restriction imposed by Clause 1 and 2 of the impugned order, the entry 7 has had to be given specific interpretation as to what was the intention behind it, that is why, the entry 7 uses the word :

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i. suggest.

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ii. calculated iii. patronage.

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If the inference is drawn from the use of this word, entry 7 of the Schedule, the restriction in the use of name of the word “Indian”, is from the view point that any name which has used by any organization which is engaged in the commercial and professional activities cannot use any name as restricted to be used by the Act which suggest; suggest means which conveys an impression to the public at large that it happens to be one of the wings of Government of India and is not an entity which is independently registered under the Societies Registration Act.

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Secondly, the Legislature has deliberately and with a clear intend has used the word ‘calculated’ from the view point that any camouflage used of name as reflected by the Act, if it is permitted to be utilized by any commercial or professional body which could be determined and interpreted by the people suggesting thereof to be having a patronage of the Government cannot be permitted to be utilized and that is why in its specific terms under Sub-section (i) of entry 7 of Schedule, the use of the word “Indian or “India” would be restricted because the word “Indian” would always suggest and convey an information to the public at large and would create an impression as if the body which stands registered in individual capacity under the Societies Registration Act rather enjoys the patronage of the Government of India. Patronage here would mean that it owes a support from the Government of India from the activities, in which, the petitioner is engaged.

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Consequently, the distinction which has been sought to be drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the use of the word “Indian and “India” is acceptable by this Court for the reason that may be that there is bar of use of word “India” according to the Act of 1950, but, as soon as the language in the title of the society is “Indian”, it will obviously convey a message to the public at large that it is enjoying the patronage of Government of India and that is why the restriction which has been imposed by Clause 1 and 2 of the impugned order do not suffer from any wrongful interpretation of Entry-7 of the Schedule appended to the Act of 1950.

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Consequently, the Writ Petition fails and is accordingly

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dismissed.

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There would be no order as to costs.

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(Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.) 01.04.2019

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Shiv

Indian School Society v. State Of Uttarakhand and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Indian School Society v. State Of Uttarakhand and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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