Dismissed

Mr. R.Chandra Shekhar v. Mr. S. Venkatehswar Rao

Telangana HC20 Dec 2024CRP/4041/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Civil revision petition challenging an interlocutory order appointing a Receiver to collect rents over suit properties, contending the trial Court acted beyond the relief claimed. Citing Bombay and Andhra Pradesh High Court decisions, the High Court held such appointment permissible even without a specific prayer, found no ground for Article 227 interference, and dismissed the petition.

What the court decided

AI extract

Mr. R.Chandra Shekhar Vs Mr. S. Venkatehswar Rao — Property and Title | Telangana HC (2024)

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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE SIATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD

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FRIDAY THE TWENTIETH DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL

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CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 404'l OF 2024

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Petition under Article 227 of lhe Constitution of lndia, aggrieved the order passed in 1.A.No.2602 of 2024 in O S.No.319 of 2024 dated 28th November 2024 on the file of the court of the ll Addl Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.

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Between:

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Mr. R.Chandra Shekhar, S/o R Jagdish Arya aged about 54 years occpn business R/o Flat No. 502, Sai Murali Apartments, Sharda Nagar, Ramanthapur, Hyderabad.

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.. Petitioner/Defendant

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AND

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Mr. S. Venkatehswar Rao, S/o late S. Ganga Ram aged about 58 years ocpcn business R/o H. No. 3.4- 1 01 3/1 3, Rajendra Colony, Kachiguda, Hyderabad.

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... RespondenUDefendant

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lA NO: 1 OF 2024

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Petition under Section 15'l CPC praying that rn the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition. the High Court may be pleased to suspend the orders passed in lA No 2602 ot 2024 in O S No. 319 ot 2024 dated 28th November 2024 passed by the ({ooosabh- ll Addl Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad pending disposal of the present Revision *od. pgsa

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Counsel for the Petitioner:Sri. Aadesh Varma

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Counsel for the RespoMent. Sri. Manlari S Ganu

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The Court made the following. ORDER

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THE HONOURABLE^{SRI WSTICESUJOY PAUL} CTVIL REVISI^{ON PETITION No.4O41 of 2o24}

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ORDER:

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This Civil Revision Petition^{filed under Article227 of the} Constitution takes^{exception to the order dated 28 'll '2024 rn} I.A.No.26O2 of 2024^{in O.S.No.319of 2024 on the file of II} Additional Chief^{Judge,City Civil Court,Hyderabad, whereby the} application filed^{underSection151 of CPC wasallowed'}

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The singular contention^{raised by Sri Aadesh Varma, learned} counsel for the^{petitioner is that the reliefclaimed inthe} impugned interlocutory^{application shows that the singular} direction prayed. for^{was to deposit half of the rent amount in} respect of petition^{scheduleA to H'propertiesthereinin the bank} account of respondent^{herein or to the credit of the suit until {inal} adjudication of the^{rights of the parlies. The trial Court passed} order beyond the^{relief claimed byappointing receiver and} therefore, the^{said order is bad in law. In this regard, reliance is} placed on the^judgment of^{Supreme Court in the case of Ganapati}

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Madhav Sawant v. Dattur^{Madhav Sawantr'}

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(1008) I scc l8-l

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Sounding at contra note, Ms. Manj ari S.^Ganu,learned counsel for tl-re respondent placed reliance on the^judgmentof Bombay High Court in the case of Vishnu Damodar^{Solankar v.} S. Purandara Lakshmi Janardana Joisaz and^{judgment of the} High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, in the^{case of Rawi} Lakshmaiah v. Nagamothu Lakshmi S.^{Ramadosssand urged} that in view of these^judgments even if relief^{is not specifically} claimed in the present case, the trial Court^{is justified in} appointment of Receiver.

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The learned counsel for the parties have confined^their arguments to the exLent indicated above.

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Before deating with rival contentions, it^{is apposite to look}

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into the relevant part of the impugned^{order whichreadsthus:}

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'1O. As seen from the^{pleadingsof both the parties, petitioner} is claiming that he invested the amount^{along with the} respondent for the purchase of^{petitionschedule 'A to H'} properties and developed same. On the other^hand, respondent disputed the same stating^{that petitioner has no} financial capacity and only his name^{is incorporatedin the} sale deeds. In fact, respondent^{himself paid the entiresale} consideration, however, he handed^{over the amounts to show} that cheques are issued on the name^{of the plaintiff in someof} the transactions. In the^{presentcase,both thc parties not} filed the original documents and^{onlv hled copies of the said} sale deeds. Even as per the admission^{of the respondent,} * -- name of the petitioner is shown in the^{sale deeds and}

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'2009^{scc onlineBom lE30} r tglo scc online AP 4e

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development agreements as a co-purchaser.^Though respondent contended that^{petitioner has no Iinancial} capacity and^{petitioner has not paid any amountand in fact,} he has paid amount in cash to^{petitioner and see that cheques} are issued on the name of the^{petitioner. Sincethe name of} the petitioner is found in all the^{saledeeds under which} schedule 'A to H' properties are^{purchasedas co-purchaser} and in view of Sections 3 to 4 of^{Benami Transactions} (Prohibition) Act, 1988, respondent is not^{permitted to claim} exclusive ownership over the suit^{scheduleproperty.} Therefore, this Court can safely^{conclude that both the} petitioner and respondent are the^joint owners^{of the petition} schedule^'A lo H' properties.

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1 1. In the case on hand, further both^{the parties admitted} that all the petition schedule^{'A to H' properties are let out to} various tenants and entire^{properties are in the occupation of} the said tenants. As riehtlY contended^{by the counsel for the} respondent, petitioner simply^claimed that^{each propertyis} fetching rent, but no^proof like^s t or the receipts issued to the tenants or anv other^{material in sup} rt of the ouantum of rent^paid bv^{eachtenant in respect of petition} schedule^'A to H'properties is^{filed. Therefore,in the absence} of such material, this Court is^{unableto conclude whzrt is} total amount^getting as rent from^pe tition^{schedule 'A to H'} properties. When the learned counsel for the respondent objcctcd with regard to the^{quanturnmentionedin the petition} and claimecl by the petitioner as rents^{and his half share, the} Icarned counsel for petitioner^{would came} up^{with another} zrrgument stating that if there is a dispute^{with regardto the} (lu:lntum ol rent, which has to be decided after full fledged trizrl, as pelitioner is entitled for half^{share in the petition} sr:hedule properties, an Advocate^{Commissionerorany} Rcceiver can be appointed for collection^{of tl.e rents and same} c:rn be deposited to the credit of^{the presentsuit and both the} parties can share the same after adjusting the^maintenance and other ancillary charges and further^{he has relied upon the} _jrrdgments^{reported inVishnu DarnodarSalonkarVs.} S.Purandara Lakshmi Janardana Joisa,^{2(XX)SCC Online} Bom 183O, Ravi Lakshmaiah Vs. Nagamothu^Lakshmi S.Ramadoss, 1970 SCC Online AP 44 and in^Durlabhji Dhanjibhai Patel and Others^{Vs. Competent} Authority^and Deputy Collector, Surat and others,^{1996 SCC Online Guj} 48. This Court also perused^{ttre said judgments, wherein,the} tlon ble Cor.irts held that "There^{is no bar to appoint any} Receiver or Advocate Commissioner to maintain^the

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properties with an iutention to prevent the same from misuse. "

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In the present case, respondent having knowledge that petitioner alleged that he alone is collecting rents and utilizing the same and stopped pa5rment of rents from May 2024 onwards, respondent did not choose to deny the same and he has not pleaded anything stating that he is not collecting the rents. As it is established that petitioner and respondent are joint owners of the petition schedule 'A to H' properties and both of them are entitled to share benefits arising out of the petition schedule 'A to H' properties. As it is established that res DOndent alone is collec tin s rents and as there is dispute with regard to the quantum of the rents fetching out of the petition schedule 'A to H' properties, this Court is of the opinion that a Receiver can be appointed to collect the rents from tenants. Further the pleadings shows that both of them have no cordial relationship, therefore, it may not be proper to rmit both the partie s to manage themselves and it mav^grve further scope to further litieation Viewed from any angle, this Court is of the opinion that it is better to appoint an Receiver to collect the rents and to maintain the propertie s. Further more, since all the properties are in possession of tenants, if Receiver is appointed no prejudice would be caused to anyone.

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Point is answered accordingly.

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In the result, the petition is allowed and Sri B. Rajeshwar Rao, Advocate at Sl.No. 192 is appointed as Receiver and Receiver is directed to collect rents from the tenants over the petition schedule 'A to H' properties and to deposit the said rents to the credit of the suit account on or before lSfi of every month from December, 2024. His fees is fixed at Rs. l5,OOO/- per month, which has to be deducted from the rents collected from the tenants by him over the petition schedule 'A to H' properties. The Receiver is directed to file statement of account along with receipts showing expenditure incurred for payments of taxes and ancillary charges etc., if any, for every month into the Court, until further orders."

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(Emphasis Supplied)

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A plain reading of the order shows that the Court has given reasons why Receiver needs to be appointed. The main question

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raised is whether in^{absenceof any prayerthe appointment of} Receiver is permissible.^{Learned counselfor the petitioner has} relied upon the^{judgmentof SupremeCourt in GanapatiMadhav} Sawant (supra), which^{dealswith a differentaspect and relates to} grant of mesne profits and^{the same is not relating to the} appointment of^Receiver.

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lrarned counsel for the^{respondent placed reliance on the} judgment of Division Bench of Bombay High Court in^{the case of} Vishnu Damodar Salonkar^{(supra), in which the judgmentof} Madras High Court in the^{case of Sri Nar5rana DossjuVaru, the} Mahant of Sri Hathiramjee^{Mutt, Tirupati v. The Madras} Hindu Religious Endowments^{Board, by ttspresident at}

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I{ungambakka m4^was considered^{and opined as under:}

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"17.^'lhc next^{question which arisesfor considerationis as} to whethcr the learned^{Single Judgeis justified in appointing} the Court Receiver, especially^{when plaintiffhad not amended} the noticc of motion^{bYaskinqfor such relief, as ttre original} relief asked for in the no tice of^{motion is that the defendant} mav be restrained from^{disturbing the possessionof the} plaintiff. In this behalf, Mr.^{Soni, learned Counsel for the} appellant, has^placed a^{strong reliance in tJre case of (Sri} Naragana Dossju^{Van4the Malwnt of Si HathiramjeeMutt,} Tirupati v - The Madros Hindu^{ReligiousEndoum.entsBoard, bg} its President at Nungambakkamlt,^{A.I'R.(38) 1951Madras} 706, whcrein a view has^{been taken by the Madras High Court} that if no specific prayer^{for aPPointmentof Receiver is made} the Court cannot ap int Receiver.

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'^{aln (;t)l95 t Madras706}

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At this stage, reference is required to be^{madeto the} decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court^{(R.M. Lodha,} J. as His tordship then was), in the case of^{(Mulji Umershi} Stah and etc. v. Parodkia Builders Put.^Ltd.l2 , 1997⁽⁴¹ Bom.C.R. 97 : AIR 1998 Bom. 87. In the said case, it^{is held} that in view of the provisions of Order 40 Rule^{1, in a} given case the Court on its own can appoint Court Receiver if the facts and circumstances of the case^so demand. The relevant observations in this regard, reads^as under:

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" 19. In my view, in suitable cases, the^{Court is not} powerless to pass appropriate order for appointment of receiver without any application by any of the^parties while rejecting the application for temporary injunction. Such power of course has to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases, where dismissal^of an application for grant of temporary injunction^may lead the parties to take law in their own hands^anduse their own devices either for protection of unlawful possession of recent origin or for gaining possession of such like circumstances. There is no impediment^put by the Code of Civil Procedure, in^passing such^order to prevent the ends of^justice being defeated. Such order may be imminently required to^{be passedalso so} that possession may be made over to that^partywho is pima facie entitled to possession but is deprived^by unlawful conduct or illegal act of the^{other party. An} appointment of Receiver can be made on^the application of either parties to the litigation as^well as suo motu and therefore, absence of application^shall not preclude the Court from passing such order it it^is just and convenient. The cases may be varied and many. A party may not have any right to the^property and still comes in possession of the^property unlawfully and illegally which may be of^{recent origin} and on that basis, may seek to^{protect his possession} by hling suit for injunction and by making^an application for temporar5r injuncLion. The^Courtmay find that such person has no title, right^{or interest in} the property and is not in lawful^{possessionand} therefore, is not entitled to grant of any^temporary inj unction. To avoid grave situation where^{thc partie s} may take law in their own hands even while temporary

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lnJunction has^{been refused, in the absenceof any} appIication,^the Court may make an order of 1S a lntment of Receiver.^{Suchexceptional order} perTnlssl ble under^{law to preventlarger mischief if it1S} just and convenient in the facts^{and circumstances of} the case. There is^nothin if bv takine such recourse the olaintiff^{who hasun} come 1n ssession recentl is dis ossessed durin suit. In suitable^{and appropriatecase, tf the trial} Court appoints the^{receivet whlle rejecting the} application for^{temporaryinjunction, itcannotbe} oid th"t such^{power is withoutjurisdictlon' I frnd} myself in respectful^{disagreement with the abstract} proposition of Madras High^{Court in Sri Narayan} b"""g" Vari^{(A.t.R. 1951 Mad 7O6) (supra) that in a} suit for injunction^{it is not opento the Courtto appoint} a receivei. The^{viewof Allahabad, Travartcore, Cochin} and Andhra Pradesh^{HighCourts in the casesreferred} here-in-above, appear^{to be more sound and to which} 1 fully agree.^"

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(Emphasis SuPPlied)

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A similar view is^{taken by the High Courtof AndhraPradesh} at Hyderabad in the^{case of Ravi LakshEaiah(supra), the} relevant^{portionreads thus:}

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"4. Further under^{O. 40, R. 1 C.P.C. the court has the power} to appoint a receiver^{rvhereit appearsto the Court to be just} and'convenicnt.^{The said order doesnot requlre that there} should be an aPPlication^{for the appointmentof receiver.} Even without^{suchanaoplication. ifthefacts and} circumstances are^bro t to the notice of the^court lustifvine the^{appointmentof a recerver it mav do so suo} Botu even without^{an aPPlication by any of the parties for} that purpose. In this^{case, the court, while hearing the} application for an injunction^{came to the conclusion tJlat it} *r" ir"t and convcnient to^{appoint a receiver. We do not find} anytiring either in Or. 39 or^{Order 40 C'P-C'whichwould} priclude thc Court from passing^{such an order' On the other} hand, on a reading together^{of O. 39 and Order 40 C'P'C' we} are of the view that^{the court is entitled to pass an order} appointing a receiver^{even in an applicationfor an injunction}

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under O. 39 C.P.C. The decision of the Madras High Court in Naragana Dossji v. Madras H.R.E. Board {A.I.R. 1951 Madras P. 706.1 (Supra) was distinguished by the same High Court in D.K. Rajav. P.S- Kumaraswami Raja [A.I.R. 1955 Madras P. 360.]."

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(Emphasis Supplied)

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In view of these^judgments, in the considered opinion of this Court, the view taken by the trial Court is a plausible view and it cannot be said to be a view which is wholly impermissible. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited. If the impugned order is passed by a Court having no jurisdiction, order suffers from any patent illegality or palpable procedural impropriety, interference can be made. Another view is possible, is not a ground for interference. This Court cannot act as bull in the china shop to interfere on mere asking (see Shalini

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Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patils). In the instant case, there is no ingredient on which interference can be made.

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